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China's Aid and Oil-for-Infrastructure in Nigeria: Resource-Driven or Development Motive?

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Abstract

China's ascent influences the Western aid dynamic significantly and changes the landscape in aid-donor and aid-recipient relationship for resource-endowed countries in Africa. Similarly, within China-Africa relations, Nigeria established diplomatic relations with China in 2006 for a concessional oil-for-infrastructure plan to fill the development aperture. However, Nigeria opted out as political uncertainty and elite interest in rent-seeking supersedes development and well-being motive. We conclude that two interrelated causal factors – accountability and transparency – overwhelmingly obstruct Nigeria from optimising China interest in infrastructure development. The study recommends the review of National Planning Commission (NPC) 2007 ODA policy document on technical assistance, grants, and concessional loans to identify new problems and challenges associated with formulation and implementation of donor-assisted programmes.

Keywords: *foreign aid, oil-for-infrastructure, development motive, resource-driven*

1. Introduction

Official Development Assistance (ODA) is the transfer of finance and resources[1], which includes loans, grants, and technical assistance, at a concessional rate. Such donors, include the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the United Nations Development Cooperation Forum, Paris Club, the Commonwealth, the Group of 8 (G-8), the OECD, and the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), whose objectives are to support economic development and improvements in welfare (Bräutigam, 2010; Younas, 2008). Also, the OECD's Development Assistance Committee's (DAC) members define "Other Official Flows" (OOF) as preferential export credits, that is, official government bilateral transactions of loans and grants of less than 25 percent that do not meet the ODA standards (Bräutigam, 2010). The need for development assistance arises due to recipients' countries' shortage of domestic resources to improve infrastructure and reduce the vulnerability to foreign exchange fluctuations owing to the balance of payment crunch (Younas, 2008).

However, despite its importance, the mainstream literature on aid effectiveness argues that economic, political and strategic interests of the donor supersede development and well-being motives. Others are opinionated that colonial ties, United Nations (UN) vote to support recipient country institutions and donor exports as the determinants of aid flow (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Neumayer, 2003). This argument brought to the fore "moral standard" issue about the economic and institutional conditions tied to aid by traditional donors, particularly in the 1980s and 1990s during the period of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) put in place by the World Bank due to the chronic debt crisis in Africa. Subsequently, by late 1990s, the world began to witness the emergence of Asian economies shaping the new global economic order and exerting huge influence through South-South development cooperation[2]. Among the Asian economies, China's economic interactions and influence are more pronounced in aid-giving, infrastructure (Bräutigam, 2009), exports of low-cost manufactured goods at the detriment of African countries' industries (Lubieniecka, 2014; Muhammad, Mukhtar and Lola, 2017; Schott, 2008), while its quest for agricultural and natural resources are viewed to have caused commodity booms and economic growth as the resource-endowed countries become global investment targets[3] (Kaplinsky, 2009). The above scenario about Chinese dealings in Africa is inconsonant with the economics of aid objective of securing trade benefits through goodwill.

Akin to its increased dominance in trade and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), Chinese aid and other official economic assistance to Africa is rapidly overshadowing several traditional donors, due to its loan policy of no conditionality. The unconditionality policy to critics encourages debt defaults and hinders good governance and reforms (Alden, 2005; Broich and Szirmai, 2014; Kragelund, 2008; Tull, 2006; Zafar, 2007). Furthermore, Chinese assistance and other engagements with Africa is termed "ambiguous" (Hanusch, 2012; Kobayashi, 2013: 5; Mawdsley, 2008), because of its divergence from the traditional bilateral and multilateral agencies' and donors' standardised pattern, channels, disbursement modalities, institutions, rules, and norms (Bräutigam, 2009, 2011). Thus, China's approach is classified as changing forever the landscape in aid-donor relationship involving resource-endowed and aid-recipient countries in Africa (Nissanke, 2013; Nissanke and Shimomura, 2013; Shimomura and Ohashi, 2013; Zafar, 2007).

However, speculations abound mostly from Western commentators who perceive China as a competitor in the acquisition of Africa's natural resources (Alden, 2005; Bing and Ceccoli, 2013; Hanson, 2008). The Chinese government has rebuked some of these contentions by pointing out that its development assistance is meant to improve the welfare of the poor, transfer technology, create employment, improve overall bilateral balance, and categorising its engagement with Africa as a win-win, mutual-benefit relationship. In sync with this view, African leaders welcome the upsurge in China's economic cooperation with traditional donors losing grips owing to not satisfactory arrangements. Also, China's assistance in Africa is conspicuous in infrastructure projects in exchange for natural resources as witnessed in Angola and Nigeria[4] (Bing and Ceccoli, 2013). While the China-Angola relations (termed "Angolan mode"[5]) is successful, in the case of Nigeria, "oil for infrastructure concession" is unsuccessful.

Although Kobayashi (2013) and Renard (2011) argue that assessing China's economic impact on Africa is premature, our study differs because China's aid effectiveness is not only best evaluated with individual recipient countries, but also to be carried out against dealings with traditional donors. Against this backdrop, the paper explicitly analyses Chinese aid-funded infrastructure projects in Nigeria from the year 2001 to 2012. It is crucial because infrastructure deficiency is a significant development challenge in Nigeria (Alabi, Adetunji Babatunde and Olawale Ogunkola, 2011; *China Daily*, 2015; Egbula and Zheng, 2011). Complementarily, China has one of the world's largest and most competitive construction industries, and at the same time enjoys the capacity to provide the required financial assistance (Ogunkola, Bankole and Adewuyi, 2008; Oyeranti, Babatunde, Ogunkola and Bankole, 2010). To explore this dimension, Section 2 details China's development assistance in Africa. Section 3 appraises China's economic cooperation manifestation in Africa, and Section 4 is on development cooperation experience between China and Nigeria. Section 5 discusses Sino-Nigeria aid, resources and infrastructure and Section 6 concludes.

2. China's Development Assistance in Africa

An "emerging donor", as the People's Republic of China (PRC) is called (Bräutigam, 2010: 3), began its international development assistance as early as 1949. The first phase began following the Bandung conference on April 18-24, 1955 (Ofodile, 2009) of Non-Aligned Nations, that is termed solidarity for the Third World, driven by China's ideological rivalry with the former Soviet Union (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2009). During this era, China borrowed and gave political, moral, limited military assistance and other forms of aid to decolonising Africa (*ibid.*). Its first development assistance programme in Africa was to Egypt in 1956, Guinea in 1960 and Socialist leaders in Ghana and Mali. The scope later extended to all African countries enjoying diplomatic relations with Beijing in lieu of Taipei (Republic of China on Taiwan).

Furthermore, China as a member of the United Nations Security Council (Yin and Vaschetto, 2011) became a valuable ally to Africa allowing many African countries to have a voice with which to make their concerns heard. By mid-1970, other major infrastructure projects include the Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA) funded using Chinese capital (Bräutigam, 2009; Strange *et al.*, 2013; Xinhua, 2011). China's aid to African continent dwindled in the 1970s and 1980s, following the economic reforms that took place in 1978 (Bräutigam, 2010). Nonetheless, in December 1982, the Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang supported the South-South cooperation and added diversity in form as a new principle of its foreign aid relations during his visit to Africa. This significant reform marked the switch of aid from one-way loans to cooperation targeted at benefiting both partners. In 1984, China's development assistance to Africa surpassed several OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) member countries such as Sweden, Japan, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States of America (Bräutigam, 2010; Kobayashi, 2013).

Indeed, the Chinese foreign policy bedrock was formulated in the *eight principles of Economic Aid and Technical Assistance*, laid down in 1964 by Prime Minister Zhou Enlai, namely, (1) a relationship built on equity and mutual benefit; (2) reverence for sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-interference in other countries' domestic affairs; (3) provision of interest-free loans or low-interest loan with flexible repayment; (4) increase in recipient's income and capital accumulation through completing projects with less investment and faster results; (5) economic development and self-reliance of recipient countries; (6) provision of guaranteed high-quality equipment and other affordable manufactured Chinese products to developing nations; (7) provision of technical assistance; (8) equal treatment for dispatched Chinese construction experts and the recipient's experts. More than 50 years later, the eight principles remain attributes of China's engagement with a view towards influencing the way Chinese officials position themselves vis-à-vis the West (Strange *et al.*, 2013).

The second phase was from the mid-1990s when African countries started witnessing Chinese presence in economic and political spheres in the continent (Carmody and Owusu, 2007; Ofodile, 2009), mainly through trade and investment carried out by Chinese State-Owned

Enterprises (SOEs) (Jauch, 2011). To ease its activities, Department of Foreign Aid of the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) established the Export-Import (Exim) Bank in 1994 along with China Development Bank and China Agricultural Development Bank. The Exim bank is currently the world's third largest credit agency to provide concessional loans (fixed-rate, low-interest), semi-commercial grants, zero interest loans and finances to developing countries. Grants are not cash, but donations in kind intended for social developments (such as housing, hospitals and schools), technical assistance, training and disaster relief. Interest-free loans are given to construct infrastructure like dams, roads, electricity and rails. The concessional loans are provided for 20 years, complemented with semi-commercial operations through government subsidy and commercial operations, such as trade and FDI (Kobayashi, 2013). Thus, China's foreign aid revolves around grants, interest-free loans (from China's state finances), and concessional loans (from Exim-Bank) (Xinhua, 2011).

In the wake of the new millennium that coincided with China's emergence as an economic superpower, China under the leadership of Jiang Zemin introduced the *going out* policy in 1999. The plan is China's new economic development strategy with external assistance embedded as one of the instruments to achieve it. Consequently, China's strategic diplomatic cooperation with Africa was more intensified during this phase under the auspices of Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) that was inaugurated and held in Beijing in October 2000 (FOCAC, 2015). With about 80 Ministers from 44 African countries and other African representatives who have diplomatic relations with China and the Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan and Shi Guangsheng of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation in attendance (*China: Facts and Figures*, 2002), this Forum marked the official platform for China-Africa solidarity, economic and other cooperation, with two core documents indicating the legal and policy framework of their dialogues. Ever since, FOCAC has been held consecutively every three years (ter Brugge, 2012) to establish a fair and just international political order in the 21st century, and through successive follow-up of Chinese leaders and ministers to Africa annually (Zafar, 2007), to showcase China as a political friend and an attractive economic partner (Jauch, 2011).

The Sino-Africa relations solidified further in the Beijing FOCAC summit of 2006 when China declared to be the "world biggest developing country" while Africa "encompasses the biggest numbers of developing countries" (Bing and Ceccoli, 2013: 120). Defining the extents of its ideologies in Africa with a policy statement "*China's African Policy*" (Broich and Szirmai, 2014) and re-emphasising its adherence to the ideology of non-interference in political affairs, mutual benefit, and international development agenda for the African countries (Fijałkowski, 2011; Xinhua, 2014; Yin and Vaschetto, 2011) – these principles made some African leaders replace "Washington Consensus" with China's "Beijing Consensus"[6] (Jauch, 2011). For instance, the Sierra Leonean ambassador to Beijing, Sahr Johnny, in 2005 said:

> "… We like China …, we have one meeting, we discuss what they want to do, and they just do it …, there is no benchmark or preconditions".
>
> (Zafar, 2007: 103)

This is unlike the traditional donor's debt financing bundled with cohesive conditionality and strict financing methods (Mawdsley, 2008; Renard, 2011) which in reality produce less tangible results in development and welfare indicators. As well, performance-selectivity-based policy approach remains the cornerstone governing the Western aid allocation to reforming recipient governments. They penalised especially low-income countries that are more exposed to exogenous shocks, climate and trade-related conditions rather than government performances (Dollar and Levin, 2004; Nissanke and Shimomura, 2013). However, China's political ideology of no interference with internal policies of African states as against the Western doctrine of hegemony has generated some concerns (Alden, 2005; Alden, 2012; Hilsum, 2008; Tull, 2006), amid claims that China has difficulty manoeuvring in countries more democratic than itself – thus, its engagement and supports to elite regimes and autocratic and venal African leaders posing a threat to quality governance, and other externalities in their funding to low-income African states who are either in debt or have poor institutions (Condon, 2012; Ofodile, 2009).

Nonetheless, the fast-growing economic cooperation between Africa and China has culminated in the proliferation of Chinese companies and multinational enclaves in the continent (Mohan, 2013). Importantly, China's Exim-Bank remained an essential vehicle for delivering FOCAC's pledges and coordinating the administration of foreign assistance (Ofodile, 2009). Moreover, since the inception of FOCAC, Africa remains the largest recipient of China's external aid (Kobayashi, 2013; ter Brugge, 2012). The financial resources to Africa increased from 45.7 percent in 2009 to 51.8 percent in 2010-2012 of the total overseas foreign aid of China (Figure 1).

3. China's Economic Cooperation Manifestation in Africa

Although Chinese development assistance and humanitarian assistance[7] to Africa is relatively small (Alden, 2005), its development programs centred on large-scale construction, technical support and training (Bräutigam, 2011). Rather than the OECD-implemented programs and

Figure 1 (a) China's Foreign Aid Distribution (2009)



Figure 1 (b) China's Foreign Aid Distribution (2010-2012)



Source: Xinhua (2011).

social projects aimed at promoting donors' objectives, China's aid has gone directly to develop infrastructure in Africa (Condon, 2012). Unlike the highly publicised Western aid, China's aid figures were kept as a state secret and not officially published until recently (Bräutigam, 2011; Strange *et al.*, 2013). The secrecy is majorly due to the possible criticism from "a substantial part of the Chinese population who might have strong objections to Beijing's decision to give aid to other developing nations" (Broich and Szirmai, 2014: 18), especially from the western and the mountainous parts of China where poverty and income inequality is still evident. Another reason is that China viewed its aid data publicity as 'improper or even immoral' (Bräutigam, 2009: 166) to take pride in delivering assistance to other countries.

However, China's not publicising its aid data changed with its *going out* policy and FOCAC. Consequently, China has been more open with aid data and in declaring its intended aid to Africa. For instance, China announced the cancellation of US$1.27 billion debt, aid disbursement and military cooperation with 31 African countries during the second FOCAC held in Addis-Ababa in 2003 (Alden, 2005). At the 2006 FOCAC Beijing Summit, the eight-point plan pledge made for Africa were: (1) To double assistance provided to Africa by 2009; (2) To provide $3 billion preferential loans and $2 billion export buyer's credit by 2009; (3) To establish $5 billion Sino-Africa development fund and assist Chinese investors in Africa; (4) To construct African Union Convention Centre; (5) To cancel all African Highly-Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) and Least Developed Countries (LDCs) interest-free government loans that have failed repayment in due time; (6) Open Chinese market to African LDCs through granting more zero-tariff treatment to their commodities and increase the coverage from 190 to over 440 tariff lines; (7) To set up three to five overseas trade and economic cooperation zones (SEZs) (proposed to be established in

Zambia, Mauritius, Egypt, Nigeria and Tanzania); (8) Support more human resource development, education, social development, agriculture and medical care, through training of 15,000 professionals, 100 senior agro-technology experts and the dispatch of 300 youth volunteers to Africa. Additionally, China would set up ten extraordinary agro-technology demonstration centres, 100 rural schools and increase the current annual 2,000 African students' scholarship to 4,000, and to build, staff and equip 30 hospitals and 30 centres for malaria prevention and treatment, with over 30 million Chinese Yuan grant of anti-malaria drugs. Furthermore, at the 2008 UN High-Level Meeting on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), China pledged to train 1,500 African countries teachers and principals, as well as train 1,000 managers and doctors (Xinhua, 2011).

In 2009 fourth FOCAC ministerial conference held in Sharm El-Sheikh, new eight-point plan for Sino-Africa cooperation was: (1) To tackle climate change, urban environmental protection, development and use new energy, and prevent and control desertification issues through the provision of 100 solar energy, biogas, and small hydropower stations projects; (2) To inaugurate China-Africa partnership in science and technology with 100 joint research demonstration projects to be carried out by 100 post-doctoral students invited to China with the aim of giving them subsidy on their return to home countries; (3) To provide \$10 billion concessional loan, \$1 billion small and medium enterprises (SMEs) loan, and cancel 168 African countries debt of interest-free government loans matured in 2009 for HIPCs and LDCs; (4) To offer an initial 60 percent zero-tariff to exported commodities from LDCs in 2010, with a gradual increase to 95 percent to allies countries; (5) To add 10 to the existing ten agro-technology demonstration centres and deploy 50 teams to teach the 2,000 agro-technicians; (6) To deliver malaria-fighting materials, medical equipment worth 500 million Yuan and train

3,000 medical personnel; (7) To strengthen human development resources through building 50 schools, and increase African students' scholarship to 5,500 by 2012; (8) To enlarge Sino-Africa joint research and exchange plan for better policymaking. Interestingly, all the FOCAC pledges and promises were met even at the peak of global financial crises in 2008 (Renard, 2011; Xinhua, 2011).

At the end of 2010, China's Exim-Bank loaned Africa $67.2 billion for development projects (Bing and Ceccoli, 2013). The scheme financed 325 infrastructural projects, of which 142 were completed (Kobayashi, 2013) in LDCs and other countries (see Figure 2). Similarly, the Department of Aid, China Ministry of Commerce, financed over 900 projects in Africa during this period (Bräutigam, 2010). The bulk of the projects sited in Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Nigeria and Sudan which are resource-endowed countries (Foster, 2009). In the Beijing 2012 FOCAC summit, Africa received $20 billion loan, to give specific preference to agriculture, medical and infrastructure projects (Kobayashi, 2013). Within this period, over 86 infrastructural and economic projects were completed, including the landmark Tanzania-Zambia Railway (Xinhua, 2014). More importantly, at the 2012 FOCAC summit, Africa Union members were officially allowed to participate in the ministerial meeting to institutionalise and consolidate their relationship with China (Alden, 2012).

Explicitly, China's foreign assistance between 2010-2012 covered eight areas, which were: development of human resource and cooperation; technical cooperation; volunteer programmes in foreign countries; goods and materials; complete projects; emergency humanitarian aid; medical assistance; and debt relief of 1.42 billion Yuan to nine African HIPCs and LDCs. The nine assisted countries are Benin, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Mali, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, and Zambia (Xinhua, 2014). Also, humanitarian aid and

Figure 2 (a) China's Aid Classification (2009)



Figure 2 (b) China's Aid Classification (2010-2012)



Source: Xinhua (2014).

$120 million were provided from April 2014 to February 2015 in the quest to combat the Ebola epidemic in some West African countries (*China Daily*, 2015).

Figure 3 Africans' Major Donor Bilateral ODA Disbursements (2001-2011)



Source: Broich and Szirmai (2014).

As shown in Figure 3, China's aid to Africa overshadows some of the traditional donors, although critics contest the aid volume and flow (Zafar, 2007). Besides, Chinese assistance to Africa estimated by some researchers is over-bloated (Bräutigam, 2010, 2011). For instance, in 2008 and 2009, China's ODA disbursement was $1.2 billion and $1.4 billion respectively, as against the USA's $7.2 billion, World Bank's $4.1 billion and France's $3.2 billion of ODA to Africa. Likewise, illustrative case studies on Ghana's Bui Dam and DRC mining and reconstruction reveal that China's "concessional loan" and "tied aid" cannot be regarded as "development aid" (Bräutigam, 2011: 215). Firstly, "concessional loan" on the two projects is almost at par with commercial lending rates. Secondly, its "tied aid" is "economic conditionality", because Chinese construction and engineering firms executed 70 percent of the projects, while China procures 50 percent of the used materials and equipment from China. Thirdly, the majority of the workforce were imported from China and rarely was cash grants given out. These cast doubts on the actual benefits of the economic assistance to the common people in the recipients' countries (Bing and Ceccoli, 2013). Typically, to protect China's SOEs from financial risks, the bulk of the fund remains in China's Exim-Bank from where it is transferred to SOEs to execute projects in the recipient country (Bräutigam, 2010; Kaplinsky and Morris, 2009; Nissanke, 2013). Correspondingly, Bräutigam (2010, 2011) points out that since China's Exim-Bank has been able to loan-out to a traditional financial provider like the World Bank, with time, it will fall in-line with basic global lending standards. Conversely, Kragelund (2008), Fijałkowski (2011), Renard (2011), Condon (2012) and Kobayashi (2013) note that Chinese engagement with Africa has mixed consequences especially in the aggressive pursuit of its economic policies. Nonetheless, China is a game changer that provides Africa with a better opportunity in bargaining for aid from their traditional partners and serves as a new competitor for USA and EU in Africa.

4. Development Cooperation between China and Nigeria

At the bilateral level, China joined the leagues of individual country donors to Nigeria by establishing a formal economic and technical cooperation agreement as early as 1972. Apart from a few exchanges in a limited area, the diplomatic relations between China and Nigeria was low-keyed for about three decades. During this period, Nigeria, due to series of military regimes, witnessed unstable polity[8], corruption, embezzlement of oil wealth and conflict, with low infrastructural development (Egbula and Zheng, 2011; Idemudia, 2012). Available records indicate that the second agreement signed between China and Nigeria was on May 12, 1997, during the military regime of Sani Abacha. Although abolished, he succeeded in re-initiating contact with China to create Nigerian-Chinese Chamber of Commerce in 1994 (Ogunkola *et al.*, 2008). As against the concerns about China's exclusively pursuing its engagement in Pariah states (Pegg, 2012), the early 2000s was a watershed in China-Nigeria relations, owing to the return of democracy and stable polity in 1999 (Egbula and Zheng, 2011). By August 27, 2000, the civilian administration of Olusegun Obasanjo signed the third Sino-Nigeria Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and other agreements to strengthen ties, with periodic political visits by leaders from both countries to cement the agreements (Alden and Davies, 2006; Egbula and Zheng, 2011).

In signifying the importance of Nigeria, the first official Chinese newspaper in West Africa issued in August 2005 was in Nigeria. In January 2006 China signed the first Strategic Partnership MOU in Africa with Nigeria for the formation of China Investment Development and Trade Promotion Centre in Nigeria and established a Nigeria Trade Office in China after the intergovernmental Nigeria-China Investment Forum. In December 2006, China's Southern Airlines Company (CSAC) scheduled its first Beijing-Lagos flight en route Dubai (Alabi *et al.*, 2011; Taylor, 2007, 2014). In the same year, Nigeria-China "oil-for-infrastructure" development plan blossomed, with oil blocks awarded to China in exchange for infrastructure that is grossly inadequate(Alabi *et al.*, 2011; Bing and Ceccoli, 2013; Taylor, 2006). However, President Umaru Yar'Adua (2007-2010) achieved little progress in Sino-Nigeria relations till his death in May 2010 (Egbula and Zheng, 2011). President Jonathan Goodluck rekindled China-Nigeria relations on his assumption of office as president in 2010. The revived relationship prompted China at the tail end of 2010 to declare renewed strategic partnership on political, economic and social-cultural cooperation, which made China a close ally of Nigeria particularly in the pursuit of Nigeria's Vision 2020 (Egbula and Zheng, 2011; Ogunkola *et al.*, 2008; Oyeranti *et al.*, 2010). The Sino-Nigeria relationship developed to the extent that Beijing produced Nigeria's 2011 general election materials (Kafilah and Devadason, 2015). The detailed overview, description and conditions of the economic and social infrastructural projects supported by Chinese loans and grants including the preferential "oil-for-infrastructure" mode in Nigeria from 2001 to 2012 are shown in Table 1.

President Jonathan involved China in infrastructural improvements, industrialisation program implementation, and in all-around economic development till the end of his tenure on 29 May 2015. In consonance with the practice of paying a courtesy visit to a new leader, the Chinese ambassador, Gu Xiaojie visited the president-elect Muhammadu Buhari in Abuja. Likewise, Chinese Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC) presented a prototype of high-speed rail project intended for Nigeria during the visit (*The Nation*, 2015). In return, President Buhari paid a diplomatic visit to China in April 2016, to consolidate on Sino-Nigeria relations, with the readiness to uphold *One China Principle* of no any official dealing with Taiwan and identification of the intended projects as the two most important conditions (*The Nation*, 2016). During the visit, China granted Nigeria loans of $6 billion for infrastructure development, $2 billion for two cement plants in Beijing and a $15 million agricultural assistance to establish 50 demonstration farms across Nigeria.

Table 1 China's Economic Assistance and other Official Finance to Nigeria

Year	Description	Condition
2001	The Chinese Ambassador Liang Yinzhu gifted computers, televisions, and malaria drugs to the Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in reciprocation of their assistance to the Chinese embassy.	**Status:** Completed **Flow class:** (OOF) In-kind Grant (Goods or Services) **Intent:** Representational
2002	The modernisation of "small-scale" farming through construction of 3,000 small dams, training of 500 agricultural experts and technicians, and 10,000 Nigerians on how to build and control small dams.	**Status:** Implementation **Flow class:** (ODA) Free-standing technical assistance **Implementing Agency:** United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) **Intent:** Development
2003	Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Qiao Zonghuai signed a N325 million Naira debt cancellation agreement from China to Nigeria.	**Status:** Pipeline Commitment **Flow class:** (ODA); Debt forgiveness **Intent:** Development
2004	Nigeria negotiated $100 million loans from the Chinese government for the third phase of a National Rural Telephony project that covered over 150 local government areas.	**Status:** Implementation **Flow class:** Vague (OOF); Loan (excluding debt rescheduling) **Funding agency:** ZTE and Alcatel-Lucent Shanghai Bell Co., Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. **Intent:** Development
2004	The Fujian Association for Promotion of Asia-Pacific Economic and Cultural Exchanges sponsored 13 Nigerian carpet professionals and government officials to a two-month study project at the	**Status:** Implementation **Flow class:** (ODA); Donor country scholarships/training

	International Training Program on Carpet Technology in Fuzhou, Fujian.	**Funding agency:** Ministry of Commerce; Fujian Association for Promotion of Asia-Pacific Economic and Cultural Exchanges **Intent:** Development
2006	Concessional agreement to exchange four oil drilling blocks licenses for a commitment of $4.5 billion in "oil-for-infrastructure" plan under President Olusegun Obasanjo with China National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC). The three projects attached to this initial agreement are: Lagos-Kano railway ($2.5 billion), Kaduna oil refinery rehabilitation ($2 billion), and Mambilla power station. However, all the three projects were on hold due to change in government in 2007. After the unsuccessful concession in 2007, China bid for both controlling interest and to reconstruct the 110,000 barrel per day Kaduna oil refinery facilities but failed to win the auction (Bräutigam, 2010).	**Status:** Implementation **Flow class:** Vague-TBD **Funding agency:** Exim-bank **Implementing agency:** Chiyoda Corporation, China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC) and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) **Intent:** Mixed (Some Development)
2006	Guangdong Xinguang International and CCECC invest in light rail transit from Nnamdi Azikiwe International Airport to the Abuja city centre and Murtala Muhammed International Airport in Lagos. The Nigerian government made $2 billion available to commence the projects. The Exim-Bank funded $1 billion for this project and another rail project from Lagos to Kano. The project is 25% completed at the time of new term agreements in September 2012.	**Status:** Implementation **Flow class:** (ODA) Concessional Loan (excluding debt rescheduling) **Funding agency:** Exim- Bank **Implementing agency:** Guangdong Xinguang International Group and CCECC **Intent:** Commercial
2006	CCECC and Nigeria Transportation Ministry signed a contract worth $8.3 billion (reduced to $8 billion in 2009) for the implementation of the Lagos-Kano railway modernisation project connected with 2002 proposed "oil for infrastructure". China's Exim-Bank offers to finance the project with a $2.5 billion loan,	**Status:** Implementation **Flow class:** Vague-Credit for Trade or investment **Funding agency:** Exim-Bank

	and the project implementation was planned in phases to ease funding. The first is 186.5 km Abuja to Kaduna section of the 1,313-km railway from Lagos to Kano. The projected cost is $849,750,903 and duration is over 36 months. The second is the Lagos-Ibadan double track of 156.8 km line railway sections, worth about $1.487 billion with a construction period of 36 months. The Abuja-Kaduna line commenced operation in August 2016. However, Bräutigam (2010) states that China offered a line of credit for $2 billion at a competitive commercial rate, as well as a preferential export credit of $500 million, as against the proclaimed ODA offer by some commentators. While China renewed the $500 million preferential-credit to resuscitate the Chinese construction company Lagos-Kano suspended railway infrastructure project.	**Intent:** Development
2006	To reciprocate Nigeria and China's formalisation of preferential access to oil blocs. Both countries signed an agreement for a CNY5 million grant for anti-malaria drugs, training on malaria, bird flu control, and co-operation in technology.	**Status:** Commitment **Flow class:** (ODA); Monetary Grant (excluding debt forgiveness) **Intent:** Development
2007	Hydroelectric project award of $1.46 billion civil work and steel hydraulic structure for Mambilla dam in Taraba State for 60 months. The project is expected to add another 2,600 MW to the national grid. According to Feng Jun, the Vice-Director of the Beijing liaison office, the $5 billion plant was majorly financed by the Nigerian government and accented by a $300 million loan from the Exim-Bank. However, the project capacity increased to 3,050 MW and design completed in 2012 with 75% project cost Exim-Bank financed and counterpart funding of $309 million from the Nigerian government.	**Status:** Implementation **Flow class:** Vague (OOF); Loan (excluding debt rescheduling) **Funding agency:** Exim- Bank **Implementing agency:** China Gezhouba Group Company Ltd. (CGGC); China Geo-Engineering Corporation (CGC); Overseas Construction Co., Ltd. (CGCOC); China National Electric Equipment Corporation (CNEEC); SinoHydro **Intent:** Development

2007	China's Secretary of the Jiangsu Provincial Committee, Li Yuanchao and Bola Ahmed Tinubu, former governor of Lagos State, signed a $50 million MOU on the development of Lekki Free Trade Zone. Initiated by Lagos State, Jiangsu Province, Nanjing Jiangning Development Zone, and China Railway Construction Corporation (Oyeranti et al., 2010) to encourage trade and cooperation in agriculture, industry, infrastructure, information technology, human resources and healthcare.	**Status:** Implementation **Flow class:** Vague (OOF); Free-standing technical assistance **Funding agency:** China-Africa Development Fund, Public-Private Partnership **Implementing agency:** China Railway Construction Corporation (CRCC) **Intent:** Mixed (Some Development)
2007	China donated equipment for controlling and fighting the avian flu to Nigeria's agriculture and water resource departments. It includes biological sitting cabinets, temperature freezers, an incinerator, disinfectant equipment and 529,000 doses of anti-malaria drugs worth N70 million.	**Status:** Completed **Flow class:** (ODA); In-kind Grant (Goods or Services) **Intent:** Development
2007	The Chinese Ambassador Xu Jianguo, donated N2.08m ($1.6m) of equipment – multi-media projector, projector screen, portable camcorder, two tape recorders, magnetic board; a laptop, two tabletop computers, printer, V-sat and accessories to improve the teaching of Mandarin in Nnamdi Azikiwe University.	**Status:** Completed **Flow class:** (OOF); In-kind Grant (Goods or Services) **Implementing agency:** Nnamdi Azikiwe University **Intent:** Representational
2009	Both governments signed N107.4 million agreements to construct four rural primary schools in Katsina, Kaduna, Ogun, and Federal Capital Territory (FCT). As part of the FOCAC 2006 pledge to improve education and compliment government initiative to accomplish MDGs and education for all goals by 2015. The schools with a total capacity of 1,200 pupils cost N500 million and China spent N308 million.	**Status:** Completed **Flow class:** Vague (OOF); In-kind Grant (Goods or Services) **Intent:** Development

2009	The National Staff Hospital Abuja contract was signed in line with the FOCAC 2006 pledge. Nigerian government donated 4.85 hectares of land for the building and other required infrastructure. The construction commenced in 2010 and completed in 2012. China provided 150-bed facility worth N12.5 million.	**Status:** Completed **Flow class:** Vague (OOF); In-kind Grant (Goods or Services) **Implementing agency:** Nigerian Federal Staff Hospital **Intent:** Development
2009	China's CGC signed $1 million MOU with Federal Capital Territory Administration (FCTA) for houses construction and water distribution in FCT, Abuja. The projects are to be financed through two $500 million commercial loans obtained by CGC and backed by FCT land collateral. About 1,212 hectares of land near Gwarinpa Estate is provided for the mass housing, while the FCT water project will cover Lugbe and Kuje regions. Discussions between FCTA and CGC commenced in 2010 over the water supply project but were not yet concluded until 2012. In 2012, CGC offered to execute the project at the cost of $575 million with Exim-Bank loan facility and counterpart funding from the Nigerian government. When completed, more than 60% of FCTA 8,000 square km will get potable water. Also, the FCTA announced that it would embark on the Greater Abuja Water Project through a Public-Private Partnership with a Chinese company and the World Bank.	**Status:** Pledge **Flow class:** Vague (OOF); Loan (excluding debt rescheduling) **Funding agency:** Exim-Bank **Implementing agency:** China Geo-Engineering Corporation (CGC) **Intent:** Development
2012	China is giving concessionary $30.6 million loan with over eight years' repayment period beginning with two and a half years' period to Kaduna State for the digitisation of the State Media Corporation (KSMC). Also, to be constructed are two substations in Kafanchan and Zaria; three booster stations in Birnin-Gwari, Sanga, and Lere local government areas from the loan. The project's end goal is to strengthen the working capacity of the state television station and entirely shift from analog to digital broadcasting before June 2015.	**Status:** Commitment **Flow Class:** (OOF); Concessional Loan (excluding debt rescheduling) **Funding agency:** Exim- Bank **Intent:** Development

2012	Sinohydro and China National Electrical Equipment Corporation (CNEEC) invested $927million in constructing a 700 MW hydropower station on the Northern Zungeru River. China provided 75% of the total fund and the Nigerian government bore 25% balance fund.	**Status:** Implementation **Flow Class:** Vague (OOF); Loan **Funding agency:** Exim- Bank **Implementing agency:** Sinohydro, CNEEC **Intent:** Development
2012	A $100 million Exim-Bank loan was given at a concessional rate to develop a galaxy backbone ICT network to be completed by 2015. The ICT project goal is to improve government security efforts, connectivity, and providing resources to youths in rural areas.	**Status:** Implementation **Flow Class:** (ODA); Concessional Loan (excluding debt rescheduling) **Funding agency:** Exim-Bank **Intent:** Development
2012	A loan agreement of $500 million being the total cost for airport terminal construction between China and Nigeria. The project consists of four new airport terminals in Abuja, Kano, Port Harcourt, and Enugu. The construction project had a projected completion date of 2015.	**Status:** Implementation **Flow class:** (ODA); Concessional Loan (excluding debt rescheduling) **Funding agency:** Exim-Bank **Implementing agency:** CCECC. **Intent:** Development

Source: Authors' compilation from AidData (2016); Hanson (2008); Taylor (2006); Taylor (2007); Bräutigam (2009); Kafilah and Devadason (2015).

5. China-Nigeria Aid: Resources and Infrastructure

In Nigeria, the oil sector represents the primary engine of all its economic activities (Frynas and Paulo, 2007). Hitherto, the Western MNCs from Europe and America are Nigeria's traditional partners in trade, investment and aid, until the emergence of China (Ogunkola *et al.*, 2008). However, just as the case of the China's engagement in Nigeria, the relationship between the West and Nigeria is also tagged as exploitative, based on the structure and patterns of trade and investment in natural resources (Alabi *et al.*, 2011).

More specifically, China came into the Nigeria oil sector through powerful diplomacy and deal of launching the Nigerian satellite in 2006 (Taylor, 2007, 2014). By bilateral relations, Nigeria granted three major China's SOEs oil fields permits. The first Chinese oil company to enter Nigeria was China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (SINOPEC) in late 2004. China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) arrived in 2006 (Pegg, 2012). The other Chinese SOEs seeks investment opportunities in construction and services. It is worth mentioning that although China's imports from Nigeria in this sector constitute only 2 percent of their total imports from Africa (Egbula and Zheng, 2011), they represent the primary determinant of FDI, aid, (Feng and Mu 2010) and nearly the total exports to China (Anyu and Ifedi, 2008; Taylor, 2014).

Subsequently, the concession on resources blossoms as Nigerian government allocates oil blocks to China in 2006. In exchange, China will assist to relieve infrastructure bottlenecks hindering development, forgive debts, and give loans and grants. This plan according to China will produce "win-win" result (Alabi *et al.*, 2011; Downs, 2007; Egbula and Zheng, 2011; Mthembu-Salter, 2009; Quigley, 2014). However, the plan was short-lived due to change of government in 2007 when late President Ya'radua revoked almost all the deals citing lack of transparency as the basis (Egbula and Zheng, 2011). The main reasons for the dissolution of the oil-for-infrastructure deal are that the rentier state (Nigeria) prefers cash for oil blocks, and the elites will delay development projects for their benefits (Mthembu-Salter, 2009). Downs (2007) cited an instance of jeopardised China's CNPC planned investment in the Kaduna refinery when the Nigerian government traded 51 percent shares of Kaduna refinery to Bluestar Oil Company owned by former President Obasanjo ally against China's interest. To cover up the Nigerian government's cancellation decision, Irene Chigbue, Director-General of Nigeria Bureau of Public Enterprises, claimed that China was not meeting up to expectations and had run into hitches as CNOOC have not been forthcoming with the takeover plans of the Kaduna refinery. By and large, the Sino-Nigeria oil-for-infrastructure failed majorly because some political elite prefers cash benefit to the idea. Secondly, the non-transparency nature of the deal on Nigerian government's part, especially deliberate inflation of the expected project costs and that the implicit arrangement on the oil-for-infrastructure plan is unknown (Taylor, 2007, 2014). Thirdly, the gross inconsistency in Nigerian government policies, particularly as it relates to reviewing, renegotiating, reversing and nullifying an already signed contract agreement due to change in government. Indeed, this is disastrous as foreign investors lost confidence in the viability of investing in Nigeria seeing these signals and much more on the part of the Nigerian government.

Consequently, the oil-for-infrastructure agreements' suspension affected China's exposure to the Nigerian oil sector and signalled China to be wary of the "oil for concession" agreement for infrastructure development to gain access to Nigerian crude oil – instead, to purchase oil reserves, invest in buying equity shares in oil blocks, and rely on their major international oil companies (IOCs) partners to carry out production and relieve them from the technological demands that come with offshore drilling (Anyu and Ifedi, 2008; Mthembu-Salter, 2009; Quigley, 2014). Thus, to analyse the arguments developed on Chinese oil-for-infrastructure in Nigeria, such relevance would, however, be minimal. Similarly, the impact of China's aid to Nigeria is conflicting as it is often re-negotiated without competitive bidding, coupled with not too transparent nature of China foreign aid dealings. Usually, China's ODA is vastly exaggerated particularly in the case of Nigeria where from 2000 to 2009 (Bräutigam, 2010), the total amount is $589 million given in five separate loans, against $5 billion total financial commitments as at 2008 (Ogunkola *et al.*, 2008). Nonetheless, we consider the fact that Nigeria a recipient of China's aid is aware of the flows and stocks of assistance received. Hence, foreign assistance is transparent to the individual recipient country. So, it is the responsibility of the government to be accountable and to provide information about the given economic cooperation from China to her citizens as this will help to evaluate the impacts.

Figure 4 China's Loan to Top Ten African Countries (2000-2014)



Source: Authors' compilation from Chinese loans to African Governments, version 1.2 October 2016 (Bräutigam and Hwang, 2016).

As shown in Figure 4, Nigeria is among the ten resource-rich countries that account for 70 percent of China infrastructure financing which indicates the importance of Nigeria's future to China (Nissanke, 2013). Although the amount over the years remained low when compared to the economic size, in this framework, we argue that the extent of the overall foreign aid is enveloped by budget constraints laid out annually by the Chinese government. With the required resources to provide infrastructure, technically, China's infrastructure contribution with the aperture to be filled will only be visible if the government offers counterpart funding on time. On the other hand, so long as economic development projects are private sector-financed due to the host country's liberalisation and privatisation policies, then the assertion of a public goods characteristic of infrastructure is eroded. Therefore, increasing aid through concessional loans rather than grants allows the augmentation of overall aid resources envelope that requires a lesser genuine cost for donors to manage their resources, alleviate constraints and critical development bottlenecks (Nissanke, 2013). The lessons are clear: there is the need for a careful study of the reforms and other measures that have supported the development of the modern-day China for it to serve as useful inputs into Nigeria's development process.

6. Concluding Remarks

Our study discovered that the number of infrastructure and other financial assistance put in place in the years under review indicates that China's non-conventional aid architecture has helped in promoting positive socio-economic development in Nigeria. Nigeria has failed severally to maximise the benefit from the development experiences of China, having opted out of the oil-for-infrastructure plan. This arrangement invariably would have eased Nigeria's infrastructure bottlenecks through its massive crude oil and minerals for exchange or as collateral in accessing preferential loans. China has shown the "complementarities" in China-Nigeria engagements (Alabi *et al.*, 2011;

China Daily, 2015): Nigeria needs capital to finance its development agenda, while China holds approximately $3 trillion in foreign reserves (Renard, 2011). There is no doubt that China's policy plan for Nigeria is driven by domestic economic imperatives, to secure a stable supply of natural resources through long-term imports contracts and exports of its manufacture. Nigeria lacks cogent policy plan for China and fails to capitalise on their differences to benefit more infrastructures.

Therefore, China avails Nigeria the opportunities to copy from China's development strategy, for instance, China development is based on negotiation for appropriate configuration of aid for many economic infrastructures financed through long-term loans yielding growth dividends (Ogunkola *et al.*, 2008). Importantly, China's non-conditionality policy and less cumbersome financial assistance would have given Nigeria the opportunity and leverage to negotiate and explore new development agenda against the established relationship with the traditional donors. It could potentially assist economic development in sectors such as the manufacturing and agriculture in order to be able to move closer to the actualisation of the desired diversification of its oil-dependent economy and share in the benefits of economic liberalisation on a sustainable basis.

For this to become a reality, the Nigerian government should encourage competitive biddings in all dealings and allow market surveys to be carried out to determine the actual cost of projects and other procurements. Lastly, all relevant government agencies, civil societies and private sectors are to be involved in the implementation, monitoring and evaluation of cooperation agreements in their respective areas of strengths to ensure ownership and sustainability. The National Planning Commission (NPC) 2007 ODA policy document on technical assistance, grants, and concessional loans has identified new problems and challenges associated with formulation and implementation of donor-assisted programmes. Importantly, if a modern Nigeria's ODA policy framework is drafted, followed and actualised to the latter, only then will Nigerians maximise the benefit of foreign aid. By and large, it is worth mentioning that globally no country achieves economic development through foreign aid. Instead, it is through emulating development experiences, mutual respect, trust, while keeping in mind individual historical and cultural backgrounds (Bräutigam, 2010; Nissanke, 2013).

Notes

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1. Military motives finances and assistance are excluded.
2. To promote South-South trade and collaboration within its agencies, the United Nations in 1978 established South-South cooperation, but its influence on development began in the late 1990s.
3. There is a consensus that natural resources, lucrative market, labour cost, fiscal and other non-tax incentives, exchange rate, interest rate and liberalization policies determines China's influx to Nigeria (Nissanke, 2013; Ofodile, 2009).
4. Nigeria has the 11th largest oil reserves globally and other minerals in exportable quantities (NIPC, 2015).
5. See for a review, Aguilar and Goldstein (2009), Bing and Ceccoli (2013) and Nissanke (2013).
6. "The Beijing Consensus" is China's economic development model for developing countries, coined by Ramo (2004), as alternative to the Western

pattern of economic cooperation known as "the Washington Consensus" (Lubieniecka, 2014; Turin, 2010).

7. "Humanitarian assistance" is another initiative implemented that falls outside PRC's aid policy provision for Africa. It is an expedient measure given to prevent excessive suffering and disaster, and it is differently administered by the Ministry of Social Welfare and funded through its various Ministries (Alabi *et al.*, 2011).
8. See Agbiboa and Maiangwa (2012), Fagbadebo (2007) and Taylor (2014) for further elaboration on corruption and political instability in Nigeria and their effects on Chinese investment.

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