Human rights in Hong Kong: 
One Country Looms as Two Systems Fade

Chris Yeung*
CitizenNews / Voice of Hong Kong / Hong Kong Shue Yan University

Abstract

Twenty-one years after Hong Kong reverted to Chinese sovereignty, the jury of China’s experiment of “one country, two systems” is still out. But fears are growing. True, the city remains one of the freest economies. On the political and human rights front, chilly wind is blowing. The city’s liberalism, respect for human rights, prospect for democracy and important systems and institutions including rule of law and independent judiciary are shrouded under a thickening air of uncertainty.

Keywords: universal suffrage, national security, Umbrella Revolution, national education, press freedom, judicial independence, autonomy

1. Introduction

On the face of it, Hong Kong is still a free city, the freest in China, 21 years after its reversion to Chinese sovereignty. Protests and petitions are not uncommon. Citizens dare to argue against police officers when being questioned, be it about a traffic rule or a street search, verbally without
fears of facing reprisals. On every June 4 since 1989, tens of thousands of people attend the annual candle vigil in commemoration of the Tiananmen Square crackdown victims at the Victoria Park, Hong Kong’s central park. On July 1, an often sizeable procession stages a march in Hong Kong Island to voice out their aspirations for democracy, freedoms and a raft of policy changes. Falun Gong (法輪功), a spiritual-cum-physical exercise campaign that was banned in the mainland, is allowed to operate in the city. Beneath the surface changes are bubbling, however.

A closer look at the city’s social and political scene reveals a far more complex and increasingly bleak picture of Hong Kong’s rights and freedoms, now blanketed by an air of jitters and worries. In April 2018, a coalition of 45 civil society groups jointly submitted more than 100 suggestions to the United Nations relating to Hong Kong’s “deteriorating rule of law and human rights environment”. It was made to the UN Human Rights Council for the third Universal Periodic Review (UPR) on China, which will take place in November and will be attended by Hong Kong government officials.¹ The last UPR was held in 2013. Since the 1997 handover, the University of Hong Kong Public Opinion Programme has conducted tracking survey on a range of issues relating to the changeover. One finding shows that a combined total of 36 per cent of respondents on average in the first half of 2018 are either “very positive” or “quite positive” when asked about the government’s performance in the protection of rights and freedoms. A combined total of 49 per cent of respondents on average are either “very negative” or “quite negative” about the government’s performance. Eleven per cent say “half-and-half”. The net value of the satisfaction rating was 12.5 per cent. The corresponding figure in the second half of 1997 was 0.2 per cent.²
In a letter to Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam Cheng Yuet-ngor (林鄭月娥) days before July 1, 2018, the New York-based Human Rights Watch warns that Hong Kong’s protection of civil and political rights is deteriorating at a quickening pace. Sophie Richardson, China director at Human Rights Watch, said: “From publicly intimidating an academic for his peaceful speech to barring pro-democracy figures from public office, what emerges is a chilling offensive against basic rights in Hong Kong.” Human Rights Watch wrote to Lam in 2017, calling on her to protect freedoms in Hong Kong. The New York group said Lam had replied at that time, saying the “contents are noted.”\(^3\)

2. China Tightens Grip

The year 2017 marks a milestone in the city’s political journey; it marks the 20th anniversary of its reversion to Chinese sovereignty and implementation of the “one country, two systems” policy since then. To mark the occasion, Xi Jinping (習近平) paid his first visit to the city in his capacity as State President. Dubbed by some Western media as “Emperor Xi”, it was an emperor’s inspection trip in many aspects. The words he uttered during his three-day visit have become an order on Hong Kong policy from Zhongnanhai (中南海). Xi’s power was further consolidated at the national plenum of the Chinese National People’s Congress (NPC) in March 2018. At the plenary session, he was re-elected as President with a vote of 2,969 to one. An amendment to the Chinese Constitution was approved, lifting the two-term cap on the length of the tenure of President. It restored the life tenure system that late Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平) had scrapped, paving the way for Xi’s continued leadership after his second term ends. The perpetuation of Xi’s leadership means the hard-line policy of Beijing towards Hong Kong in recent years will remain unchanged. That does
not augur well for the city’s civil rights and liberty.

In his speech delivered at the inauguration ceremony of the Carrie Lam administration, Xi has reitered that the central authorities would adhere to the policy of “one country, two systems” unswervingly. Second, he said they would stick to the correct direction of fully and accurately implementing the policy in Hong Kong to ensure it has not “deformed”. Xi’s speech has set out the “bottom-line” and “red-line” of the “one country, two systems” framework.4

Xi maintained that matters relating to central-SAR relations must be correctly handled firmly under the principle of “one country”. The thinking of “one country” should be firmly established, he said. Any activities that pose a danger to national security, challenge to the power of the central authorities and the authority of the Basic Law and use Hong Kong to infiltrate the mainland are deemed as a challenge to Beijing’s “bottom-line”. “(They) must not be allowed,” he said. The persistence on the principle of “one country” and the respect for the differences between the “two systems”, he said, should be “organically integrated” with the upholding of the power of the central authorities, the safeguarding of Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy and the enhancement of the city’s competitiveness through the backing of the motherland. At no time, he said, the endeavour should be abandoned.

3. Democracy Delayed Indefinitely

Beijing’s move to redefine the “one country, two systems” policy could be dated back to 2014 when the State Council published the White Paper on the Implementation of One Country, Two Systems. Later that year, the Chinese NPC announced a decision on universal suffrage in Hong Kong on August 31. It was dubbed as “8.31 decision” since then. Critics branded the NPC decision as “fake universal suffrage” because it was
too restrictive. Under a screening mechanism in the NPC decision, any candidate who does not have the blessing of the central authorities, from whom the majority of the Election Committee members take the cue in the nomination process, will not possibly get enough nominations to become a formal candidate. The intransigence of Beijing over their proposed restrictions on universal suffrage had sparked the Umbrella Movement in 2014. Pro-democracy activities had succeeded in galvanising the public in staging a 79-day protest at the heart of the Hong Kong Island and Kowloon, bringing traffic to a standstill and causing inconvenience to daily life. But both the central and Hong Kong governments had not caved in. The movement was ended in a failure. Beijing stood firm on the “8.31 decision”, leaving no room for changes to the government electoral blueprint. As expected, the government’s electoral proposal, which mirrored the NPC decision, was vetoed at the Legislative Council when the pan-democrat lawmakers exercised their power of veto by the minority as provided in a Basic Law provision. Under the provision, any changes of the electoral arrangements for the chief executive and the legislature must be approved by a two-thirds majority of members at the legislature. The pan-democrats held more than one-third of Legco seats, enough to block the passage.

Following the electoral reform fiasco, both the then Leung Chun-ying (梁振英) administration and the central government had given no indication of an early restart of the reform drive. Beijing refused to rethink the “8.31 decision”, saying it would be the only electoral package on the table even when political reform is resumed. Carrie Lam, who succeeded Leung as the Chief Executive in July 2017, said she had no plan for political reform in her five-year term. With no timeframe given, the ultimate goal of universal suffrage for the chief executive, not to mention the full legislature, as stated in Basic Law Article 45, has become increasingly elusive.
4. Moving Backward

Promulgated in 1990, the Basic Law has laid down a 10-year-long timetable of incremental democracy after 1997. It does not specify the electoral arrangements for post-2007 Hong Kong, leaving room for a switch to full democracy with the chief executive and all members of the Legco being elected by “one person, one vote” voting system. Although full democracy had never happened in 2007, the NPC Standing Committee made a surprise decision then by giving a promise of universal suffrage by 2017 at the earliest possible time. When the promise was given in 2007, doubters had already warned against premature celebration. They were proved to be correct.

The five-year reign of Leung Chun-ying as the Chief Executive from 2012 saw a marked change of mind in Beijing towards the city’s gradual democratisation. One watershed event was the students-led protest against the introduction of national education curriculum in secondary schools beginning from 2012. A protracted demonstration outside the Government Headquarters and boycott of classes had prompted Leung to back down by shelving the curriculum change plan indefinitely.

The introduction of national education in the curriculum of secondary schools came five years after the then Premier Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) paid a visit to the city in 2007. He said during his visit to the city national education for young people should be stepped up. Ten years after the sovereignty changeover, Beijing felt unease that the “hearts” of Hong Kong people had not yet returned to the motherland.

Against that background, it is not surprising that the shelving of the curriculum change has stoked Beijing’s fears about what they deemed as the growing feeling of alienation from the mainland prevalent in some quarters of the society. The emergence of localism, the notion of self-determination and Hong Kong independent sentiments has deepened
the anxieties of Beijing. Already obsessed with fears about pro-
independence sentiments, the highly provocative acts and words of two
Youngspiration (青年新政) legislators-elect when they took their oaths
had infuriated the mainland authorities and the pro-Beijing camp. Their
antics had given a Godsent case for Beijing to seek judicial review to
disqualify the pair. They are Sixtus Leung Chun-hang (梁頌恆) and
Yau Wai-ching (游蕙禎). The pair’s antics, featured anti-China slogans
and banners in the Legco chamber on October 12, 2016, prompted
Beijing to issue an interpretation of the Basic Law, and make such
offences punishable by disqualification. In August 2017, the Court of
Final Appeal rejected their bid for an appeal.

The case centred on parts of the Oaths and Declarations Ordinance
and the Basic Law dealing with requirements for solemnity and sincerity
in oath-taking, and whether the court should interfere with the
legislature.

Riding on the success of the bid to kick out Leung and Yau, the
Government sought judicial review of four other pan-democratic
legislators in 2017. They succeeded. The four are Leung Kwok-
hung (梁國雄), who is better known as “Long Hair” (長毛), Lau Siu-
laï (劉小麗), Edward Yiu Chung-yim (姚松炎) and Nathan Law
Kwun-chung (羅冠聰). They were ruled to have failed to meet the
requirements for solemnity and sincerity in declaring their commitment
to uphold the Basic Law and “one country, two systems” in their oaths.

The move to disqualify legislators-elect before and even after they
took office had prompted the central authorities and the Hong Kong
Government to adopt the same tactic in the nomination process of
elections. One notable case saw the disqualification of Agnes Chow Ting
(周庭), a leader of a students’ group, Demosistō (香港眾志), from
running for a Legco by-election following the ousting of Demosistō’s
Nathan Law. Chow had been seen as the natural candidate to bid for the
seat left vacant after Law lost his seat. Chow’s bid was thwarted. A
government officer in charge of electoral matters had argued that
Demosistō, which has close ties with students and young leaders, had
stated self-determination on their platform. The options for people to
decide on their own include independence. Chow has insisted she did not
support Hong Kong independence. Chow has lodged an appeal against
the returning officer’s ruling. No date has been fixed at the time when
this article went to press.

“DQ”, the shortened term for disqualification, became the city’s
political buzzword, fuelling fears that political aspirants whom Beijing
has ruled to have crossed the political “red-line” would be barred from
standing for elections. Their right of being elected, an important part of
political right, would in effect be denied. That could put enormous
pressure for them to censor their own political views to avoid being
blocked in their pursuit of elected seats. As a result of that, the room of
freedom of expression could shrink.

Their fears are not unfounded. In March 2018, Tam Yiu-chung
(譚耀宗), the only Hong Kong delegate who sits on the NPC Standing
Committee, caused a stir when he said people who have chanted the
slogan, “end one-party dictatorship”, should not be allowed to run for
Legco election. He said that could happen following an amendment of
the Chinese Constitution at a NPC plenum ended that month. Under the
amendment, the ruling Chinese Communist Party has become an integral
part of the socialist system in the Constitution. To call for an end of the
Communist Party rule could therefore be deemed as a violation of the
Constitution, thus making anyone who said so not eligible for being a
lawmaker in the Hong Kong SAR.

Tam’s remarks are indicative of a trend of growing intolerance of
Beijing towards criticism against the ruling party. The trend represents a
marked deviation from the tone and substance of words uttered by late
patriarch Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s when the city began its journey of return to the motherland. Deng had said the Communist Party was not afraid of being criticised, adding that Hong Kong people could continue to blast the Party. “The Chinese Communist Party will not collapse because of criticism,” he said.

5. Right to Stage Rallies under Cloud

The first of July 1997 marks the city’s reversion to Chinese sovereignty. But beginning from 1998, July 1 has become a special day in Hong Kong. Every July 1 since then, people from different walks of life have held a protest to vent out their grievances, at times anger, towards the government at that time. In 2003, the July 1 march made history. More than half a million people took part. It was described as a perfect storm with pent-up anger towards the Tung Chee-hwa (董建華) administration, ignited by an unpopular national security bill, exploded. The rest is history.

Seen as a political barometer of the city, the July 1 rally has also been rightly seen as a sign of Hong Kong being a free society with freedom of expression and rallies. Though unwelcome, the annual protest, like the annual June 4 candlelight vigil, has been cited as evidence that shows people are still free to demonstrate.

But signs are aplenty that the government has tried to adopt administrative tactics to restrict the right to freedom of expression. Take the case of the open area outside the main entrance of the Government Headquarters in Tamar at the Wan Chai (灣仔) waterfront in Hong Kong Island. Dubbed as the “civic square”, the open area was the site of sit-in by a group of protesters led by student leader Joshua Wong Chi-fung (黃之鋒) at the end of a demonstration against the national education curriculum in 2014. The sit-in was followed by the outbreak
of the Umbrella Movement in the area. The “civic square” was since then cordoned off for the public. It was reopen to the public after Mrs Lam took office. But protests are not allowed on weekdays.

A more obvious case of the exercise of administrative power to put restrictions on demonstration and rally is about the venue for assembly of the July 1 rally. Traditionally, the rally started with an assembly at the football fields of the Victoria Park before the procession marched from there to the Government Headquarters in Admiralty. For two consecutive years since 2017, the Government had rented all the six football fields to a pro-Beijing group for them to hold celebrations to mark the reversion of sovereignty. The Government explained charity organisations are given priority to the use of their venues and facilities. Critics have questioned whether the pro-Beijing group should be classified as charity body and why all the fields should be given to one organisation. The government’s move gave rise to speculation that it is a politically motivated move aimed to cause inconvenience to the July 1 protesters.

Calls for a ban on the July 1 surfaced on the eve of the July 1 rally in 2018. On June 21, the pro-Beijing Ta Kung Pao (大公报) said in its editorial that the July 1 rally was “clearly in violation of the law and the Constitution”, aimed to resist against China and cause chaos in Hong Kong.”5 The editorial questioned why it had not been banned. In a clear departure from the Government’s previous stance, Mrs Lam issued a statement at the end of the rally, echoing the basic position of the Ta Kung Pao editorial. In her statement, she warned against any slogans that do not respect “one country”, ignore the constitutional order, are exaggerating and factually wrong and misleading, adding that they do not conform with the overall interest of Hong Kong and not conducive to its development. Mrs Lam was referring to one of the two theme slogans of the 2018 July 1 march, which says, “end one-party dictatorship”. In previous years, the Government had stressed in their post-rally
statements that the Government respected people’s freedom of expression and demonstration.

6. Article 23 Looks Set To Be Back

The rise of pro-independence sentiments during the five-year reign of Leung Chun-ying has re-ignited calls for the Government to resume the enactment of a law aimed to safeguard national security as prescribed in Article 23 of the Basic Law. Legislative work of a national security bill was shelved indefinitely in July 2003, days after the 500,000-strong rally. The then Tung Chee-hwa administration and the government led by his two successors, Donald Tsang Yam-kuen (曾蔭權) and Leung, had made no attempt to resume the legislative work. Nor Lam has given a timetable of a renewed exercise. Changes of the mood of Beijing and the pro-Beijing camp in Hong Kong, however, have become apparent in recent years. Though stopped short of giving a deadline, they said the Government should enact the legislation as soon as possible.

In her election manifesto, Mrs Lam has stressed that the SAR government is obligated to enact a law in accordance with Article 23. She said that should be done in a prudent manner after careful consideration. If elected, Mrs Lam said she would try to create an environment conducive to legislative work. She did not give a timetable. Speaking at a radio programme in December 2017, she said she would double her effort to improve the economy and livelihood. Mrs Lam said she would try to remove the negative stigma of Article 23. She said: “Do not demonise Article 23,” asking, “isn’t it a good thing to protect national security?”

While Mrs Lam is vowing to “de-demonise” Article 23 and playing the “good guy” by stressing that there is no timetable of Article 23, central government officials and pro-Beijing figures are eagerly keen to
play the “bad guy”, drumming up public support for an enactment of national security law. Li Fei (李飛) paid a visit to Hong Kong in November in his capacity as chairman of the Basic Law Committee before he stepped down from the post in 2018. During the visit, he made an explicit statement that the failure of an enactment of national security law has clearly brought about “negative impacts”. He did not specify. A row over the remarks made by University of Hong Kong law professor Benny Tai Yiu-ting (戴耀廷) in Taiwan in March has ignited another round of calls for an early resumption of legislative work on Article 23. Envisioning the arrival of democracy in China, Tai said all nationalities including Hong Kong people should be given the right to decide their own future. He said options included a confederation, federation and independence. Although he emphasized that he did not support independence and that the options are aimed for academic debate, the central and Hong Kong government took it seriously. They issued separately statements to condemn Tai for making pro-independence remarks, fuelling speculation that the return of Article 23 legislation to the legislative agenda during Lam’s first term should not be ruled out.

7. Act Tough on the Opposition

Even without a national security law, the Government has played hardball with the opposition pan-democrats during the Leung administration. While heeding Beijing’s calls for handling the Umbrella Movement and Mong Kok (旺角) riot cases strictly in accordance with the law, Leung had invoked draconian laws to take the activists to court. The three initiators of the Umbrella Movement, namely Benny Tai, Chan Kin-man (陳健民) and Reverend Chu Yiu-ming (朱耀明), are facing three counts including conspiracy to commit public nuisance, inciting others to commit public nuisance, and inciting others to incite others to
commit public nuisance. In the Mong Kok case, Edward Leung Tin-kei (梁天琦) was sentenced to six years in jail on June 11, 2018 for rioting. The sentencing has been widely criticized by the pan-democrats as too harsh. Last governor Lord Patten criticized the Government for using the Public Order Ordinance against the political opposition. He said in a statement that he did not criticise the sentence, but the “existence and use in this case of a Public Order Ordinance, which is a direct contravention of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which the Hong Kong government is allegedly committed under the Basic Law.”

Inside the Legislative Council, the power of the pro-democratic opposition has been further weakened after the legislature approved changes to their Rules and Procedures that govern the operation of the legislative body. The amendment was made possible after six pan-democrat legislators were disqualified because a court had declared their oath as invalid. With six seats lost, the pan-democrats lost their power to veto the amendments moved by the pro-establishment camp in late 2017. One of the usual tactics adopted by the pan-democrats to counter the government and their friendly lawmakers was to adopt filibustering within the parameters of the rules to put pressure on the Government over bills and other public finance matters. That power has been significantly weakened.

8. Judicial Independence Faces Challenge

Justice Kemal Bokhary, a non-permanent judge of the Court of Final Appeal, has warned when he retired as a permanent judge of the final appellate court in 2012 that the rule of law in Hong Kong faced “a storm of unprecedented ferocity”. He said voices disrespecting the city’s autonomy were getting louder and louder. Speaking at a lunch talk in
April 2016, he said his fears expressed in 2012 have been realized. He said a judicial system is standing tall among the storm, the Chinese-language *Hong Kong Economic Journal*’s website reported.7

In 2018, dark clouds were gathering over the city’s independent judiciary. In May, the judiciary received photos of four members of a nine-member jury taken at a hearing of a case relating to the Mong Kok riot in 2016. The jury was discussing the verdict of five people charged with rioting, including a localist group spokesman Edward Leung Tinkai. In an email, the sender/s said they have had more photos of the jury. Police was still investigating the case when this article went to press. It has been rightly seen as a challenge to the authority of the judiciary.

In April, a legislator from the pro-Beijing Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong (民主建港協進聯盟) has demanded a public hearing on the appointment of two foreign non-permanent judges to the Court of Final Appeal. Holden Chow Hoding (周浩鼎) has argued that the two female judges from Canada have publicly supported equal rights for sexual minorities. He said the two judges should refrain from handling sexual discrimination cases in future. His move is seen as an attempt to interfere with independent judiciary.

Foreign judges have also faced with criticism against their alleged bias towards radical activists. In an article published in the Chinese-language *Ming Pao* (明報) on March 3, 2017, Tian Feilong (田飛龍), a law professor and a member of a semi-official think tank in Beijing, accused foreign judges of being lenient towards the radicals. He accused foreign judges of condoning the proliferation of radical politics, separatism and pro-independence thinking. “This is not conducive to the maintenance of stability and prosperity.” Tian called for the gradual reduction of foreign judges. In January, a magistrate, who is Hong Kong-born Indian, suffered from racial discrimination after she sentenced a
senior police officer convicted of assault on a man during the Mong Kok riot in 2016 to three months in jail.\textsuperscript{8}

\textbf{9. Press Freedom and Publication Jitters Grow}

Figures speak. In its first Press Freedom Index Survey published in 2002, the Paris-based Reporters Without Border put Hong Kong in the 54th place. Hong Kong slipped to 70th in the 2018 survey. China ranked 176th. Hong Kong Journalists Association published its annual “Press Freedom Index” in April 2018. Of total points 100, the general public gave an average 47.1 points in the last 12 months, down by 0.9 points from the previous year. It is the lowest score since the survey was launched in 2013. Journalists’ rating was 40.3 points, up by 0.9 points compared with the previous year. Still, it falls below the 50-point Pass Level. In the same survey, 73 per cent of journalists who responded said press freedom has gone backwards. The survey shows most journalists and members of the public said pressure from the central government is the major factor that undermines press freedom. Other factors are self-censorship and pressure from media proprietors.\textsuperscript{9}

Journalists and the public fear self-censorship getting worse because of political pressure applied directly or indirectly behind the scene to media proprietors or chief editors. The fact that many media owners have had close political and business ties with the mainland has deepened the concerns about self-censorship. Their fears are not difficult to understand. There have been occasional cases of alleged self-censorship by the media over such stories as June 4 archives and alleged business interests of people in Hong Kong associated with Chinese Communist Party leaders. Although most cannot be fully confirmed, media professionals say they have rung some truth.
In Western countries, media plays the role of watchdog, or Fourth Power. They bark and bite against bad government and corrupted businesses; they exercise checks and balances over the exercise of powers. A free press is an integral part of the British colonial legacy and the city’s systems. In China, a free press remains a pipe dream. Media is strictly under the control of the ruling party as part of its tool of political and ideological control. The gulf between the mainland and Hong Kong over the concept and function of the press remains wide. Beijing’s tolerance of a free and independent press in Hong Kong seems to have worn thin as they feel adamant that the city has been given too much freedom. To be fair, there has been no new law being enacted to gap the media after 1997. Jitters about the shrinking room for a free press are growing. In addition to the increasing likelihood that legislative work on Article 23 will resume in the next couple of years, the government’s delay in enacting laws on archives and information access has not helped boost confidence in their commitment to openness and accountability.

The China factor featured with mystery and scare in the so-called “missing booksellers case”, which has sent shockwaves through the publication sector and society at large. It raised concerns about freedom of publication and distribution of books that Communist Party leaders do not like. In 2015, five publishers who ran a bookstore in Causeway Bay went missing separately. Some were last seen in Hong Kong. One disappeared in Thailand. Their bookstore was famous for selling books about political struggle in the Chinese Communist Party. Their books also included the alleged private life of Xi Jinping. They eventually turned up in the mainland under the custody of public security officers.
10. The Jury Is Out; the Picture Gloomier

Before 1997, political watchers and pundits had given different predictions about the post-handover Hong Kong. One widely held view was encapsulated in the famous cover story of the Fortune magazine in an edition in 1995, whose headline read “The Death of Hong Kong”. Its prediction was simple and daunting: “It’s over.” Optimists predicted Hong Kong could become an agent of positive change in the 1.4 billion-populated nation after the reintegration, likening the city to a “colossal Trojan horse”. Both scenarios did not happen. The death of China’s leading dissident Liu Xiaobo in 2017 while serving an 11-year-long jail sentence after being convicted of subversion says volume about the country’s dismal record of human rights. It has sent a grim reminder to Hong Kong people about the wide gap between the city and the mainland over human right issues.

Twenty-one years on, the jury is still out; the picture is getting more complex and bleak. Hong Kong remains the freest economy. But on the political and human rights front, chilly wind is blowing. The city’s liberalism, respect for human rights, prospect for democracy and important systems and institutions including rule of law and independent judiciary are shrouded under a thickening air of uncertainty.

Notes

* Chris Yeung (楊健興), a veteran journalist, is a co-founder and chief writer of CitizenNews (眾新聞), a Chinese digital-only media platform, and founder of the Voice of Hong Kong, an English opinion website and part-time journalism lecturer at Hong Kong Shue Yan University (香港樹仁大學). He had previously worked with the South China Morning Post and the Chinese-language Hong Kong Economic Journal (信報財經新聞). He writes regularly on Hong Kong politics and
Greater China issues and is one of the contributors to books on the Tung Chee-hwa administration and Donald Tsang Yam-kuen government. <Email: chriskh yeung@gmail.com>


4. Xi Jinping’s full speech given in Hong Kong on July 1, 2017, can be found at “Full text of President Xi Jinping’s speech on ‘one country, two systems’ and how China rules Hong Kong”, *South China Morning Post*, July 1, 2017 <https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/2100856/full-text-president-xi-jinpings-speech-one-country-two>.


7. See a related article “My fears about rule of law have been realized, senior judge says”, *EJ Insight of Hong Kong Economic Journal (信報財經新聞)* at: <http://www.ejinsight.com/20160419-my-fears-about-rule-law-have-been-realized-senior-judge-says/> published on April 19, 2016.
