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Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal

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Special Issue
Crossing the Chinese Frontier
Nation, Community, Identity and Mobility

Special Issue Editors
Samuel C.Y. Ku   Emile K.K. Yeoh   Titus C. Chen
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INTRODUCTION

Crossing the Chinese Frontier,
Interpreting the Chinese Nation:
The Shifting Nexus of Community, Identity and Population Mobility

The present volume, Crossing the Chinese frontier: Nation, community, identity and mobility, represents a special issue of Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal (CCPS) that focuses on the interconnecting issues of population mobility, community formation and shifting ethnic identity as related to the transmuting notion of the Chinese nation amidst the context of increasingly intricate cross-border business and economic nexus and growing transnationalism. As Professor Samuel C.Y. Ku, director of the Institute of China and Asia-Pacific Studies (ICAPS) at Taiwan’s National Sun Yat-sen University (NSYSU) and convener of the 2014 International Conference on Asia-Pacific Studies, “Migration and transformation in the Asia-Pacific”¹, remarks in the preamble to the conference, given “the fact of increasing migration and the transformation it brings in countries across the Asia-Pacific, a number of issues and problems have emerged [which] span several different arenas, from domestic policies and regional relations, to political identities and economic interactions, to
social adaptation and cultural shifts, and more.” The ten articles featured in this special issue of *CCPS* which represent new versions of selected papers among the many that were originally presented at the said conference, duly revised by incorporating critical peer feedback received at the conference and from other reviewers, are categorized under three sections. The first section *Migration and national identity transformation* consists of four papers, beginning with Olga Yurievna Adams’ article, “Migration patterns between the Russian Far East and China’s Northeast: Lessons from experience and plans for the future”, that examines the changes in migration patterns between the Russian Far East and China’s Northeast over the two decades since the collapse of Soviet Union in 1991, analysing the trends and factors that have shaped and continued to influence these patterns, and followed by two papers focussing on the ethnic mosaic in a region of proximity – the post-Soviet Central Asia – and another one on a case of Southeast Asian Chinese diaspora.

While also looking at the *xinyimin* (新移民, “new migrants”) from China as in Adams’s paper, the article “From Dungans to *xinyimin*: China, Chinese migration and the changing sociopolitical fabric of Central Asian republics” by Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh has as its central theme the ethnic identity formation and transformation of today’s Dungans – descendants of early Chinese migrants, mostly political refugees escaping the Imperial Ch’ing (the Manchu dynasty) court’s near-genocidal suppression of the Northwest Muslim Uprising in the late 1800s – and its change and preservation in the context of the fragile social fabric of the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan (as well as Tajikistan, where the Dungans are today just a small rural community) that were born from the shadow of the non-defunct Soviet Union, and the arduous processes of nation-building plagued by often violent, competing emergent nationalisms as well as
political and economic turbulence. The emergence of the *xinyimin* from China flowing en masse into these countries since the early 1990s that has triggered xenophobic response in many of these Central Asian societies (linked to a growing domestic politically charged perception of “China threat” to their nation’s sovereignty which has potentially explosive implications for their bilateral relations with their powerful East Asian neighbour) is adding a new dimension to the existing set of new challenges faced by the Dungans today brought about both by the onslaught of nationalisms of the newly politically dominant ethnic groups especially in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan and the economic turmoil faced by these new republics following the collapse of the Soviet command economy, which in a violent form, resulted in the severe interethnic clashes between the Chinese-speaking and Turkic-speaking youths in Iskra, near the Kyrgyz capital Bishkek, in February 2006 which sent a tremor through Kyrgyzstan’s delicate ethnic social fabric that was still licking its wounds after the Kyrgyz-Uzbek clash in 1991 that claimed more than 300 lives.

Also focusing on the same region is the third paper under this section, “‘Kazakhstani’ identity, Eurasian regionalism and Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Biopolitics of forced migration, modernity and multilateralism” by Aliya Sartbayeva Peleo. Beginning with the traumatic history of biopolitical “forced migration” of different ethnic groups to Kazakhstan (then Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic) during the totalitarian Stalinist era that drastically altered the original “Kazakh” ethnic identity of the area into today’s ethnic mosaic that makes up the “Kazakhstani” national identity, the author proceeds to explore the present impact and future potential of the unique multilateralism of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (上海合作組織 / Шанхайская организация сотрудничества) which places its emphasis squarely on “non-traditional security, infrastructure, energy and economic
development rather than on the democratization and improvement of human rights records” (vis-à-vis the European Union model, for instance) on the forging of identity among the diverse ethnic population of the Eurasian land mass, including the Uighur and Dungan diaspora originated from western China which both in the main represented traumatic cases of biopolitical “forced migration”, though in the case of the Dungans the exodus of their forefathers from China as political refugees occurred more than a century ago, as has been explored in the preceding article in this journal issue. In the 9th meeting of the secretaries of the security councils of the SCO member states held in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, on 17th April 2014, China called upon SCO’s member countries to strengthen control over the Internet and the management of non-governmental organizations in order to ward off “colour revolutions” (street protests that Russian military officers view as a “new US and European approach to warfare that focuses on creating destabilizing revolutions in other states as a means of serving their security interests at low cost and with minimal casualties”2 which had overthrew autocratic leaders of Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan over the past decade.3). Such call has raised fear that these SCO member countries led by China are going to join hands in strengthening control over domestic dissidents and stepping up suppression of voices of dissent. Together with the disciplinary mandate of Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) which for China is targeting the Uighur diaspora’s support for anti-Beijing movement in Xinjiang, it is becoming increasingly pertinent to explore the implication of such strengthening of authoritarian rule through the SCO on the Uighur diaspora and its relations with the Han Chinese political centre in China. Also, the impact from the forging of the new “Kazakhstani” identity as discussed in Peleo’s article in turn on interpreting nation, community and identity in the context of demographic mobility as in the theme of this special issue
is apparent, by taking into consideration the transnationalism of ethnic minorities on both sides of the border – China’s Central Asians especially the Kazakhs in Xinjiang (and the “returned Kazakhs” or “Oralman” resettling in Kazakhstan under the “Oralman” repatriation programme that aims at modifying Kazakhstan’s demographic equilibrium to the disadvantage of the Slavic populations⁴) and the Uighur diaspora in Kazakhstan and other Central Asian republics whose identity and well-being are deeply affected by the volatile political situation across the border in Xinjiang and their host countries’ relations with China.

The fourth article under this first section, “Ethnic Chinese remigration from Southeast Asian countries since 1960s: A case study of Malaysian Chinese outflows” by Kang Xiaoli, shifts our focus to Southeast Asia to examine the phenomenon of ethnic Chinese remigration from Malaysia to other countries – mostly advanced developed countries. There is also inflow of ethnic Chinese from Malaysia to Taiwan, Hong Kong and Mainland China but they are mostly short-term entrants, distinct from the “Return Ethnic Chinese” from other Southeast Asian countries – mainly from the Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia who fled to Mainland China as refugees in the early years after the Communist conquest of Indochina that led to political persecution, economic hardship and genocide in the region when the new Communist rulers imposed radical, brutal collectivisation and elimination of the “bourgeois” class.

Thus, traversing regions from Central Asia to the Russian Far East, China’s Northeast to Southeast Asia, the four papers under the section Migration and national identity transformation scrutinise the intricate nexus involving cross-border population movement, national identity formation and ethnic identity preservation, as well as ethnogenesis and reethnicisation amidst the complex and often volatile milieux of political
change, economic transition, resurrection of quiescent central ethnonationalism and resurgence of latent or suppressed peripheral nationalism that often lead to violence against minorities or rising discriminatory ethnic preferential policies. From biopolitics of ethnic accommodation for survival and to avoid a dreadful state of *bellum omnium contra omnes* – Thomas Hobbes’s portentous “state of nature” as told in his 1651 treatise *Leviathan*: “a condition of war of everyone against everyone”5 – to geopolitics of tactical actions and responses, population mobility voluntary or forced is bringing tremendous transformation to polities, societies and economies through evolving transnationalism, transcending borders, and reinterpreting the notion of the Chinese nation and its counterparts in the regions concerned.

The next two sections in this special issue continue with this focus on population movement and its impact on the biopolitics of identity formation and maintenance and geopolitics of strategic relations, but with further extension into the related issues of local community development and empowerment, and the evolvement and advancement of the international status of the Chinese nation.

Setting the context of the section *Public policy, societal outlook and community development* is Tzu-Ting Huang’s article “Media representation of Taiwan’s new female immigrants in documentaries” that looks at Taiwan’s “fifth ethnic group”6, the new female immigrants, which she describes as an underprivileged “Others” having difficulties to integrate into the Taiwanese society – being fully accompanied by all the negative labels and stereotyping like “foreign bride”, “commoditized female” and “mercenary marriage”. Huang takes the approach of accessing the meaning of media representation in the form of documentaries and in the process she analyses how these documentaries reflect by means of shots and language the important aspects in the lives of these new female immigrants including their multiple roles such as
daughters-in-law and wives, their civil rights, and empowerment within the current sociopolitical praxis.

Continuing with the focus on State policy and community development in this section, next we have Chunlei Huang’s in-depth analysis of the problems and contradictions of an important mode of urbanization in Mainland China in her article “Mixed supply model of public service provision in ‘village to residence’ community: An empirical case study in Jinan” and Andi Kao’s investigation of the impact of Taiwan-Mainland China rapprochement resulting in growing trade and investment, as well as increasing long- and short-term migrant labour and visitors, on the indigenous Paiwan ethnic group, typically among Taiwan’s most vulnerable citizens. While Huang examines at once community restructuring at the micro level and rapid national process of urbanization in microcosm, Kao on the other hand in his paper “Indigenous communities and cross-Strait rapprochement: A case study of Chun-ri and Shih-wen” focuses upon the plight and vulnerability of the minority Paiwan nation amidst the complex web of biopolitical interdependence and geopolitical interplay of the dominant split Chinese nation across the waters of the Taiwan Strait.

Picking up on this background milieu of at once intra- and international relations, the last section of this special issue, National identity and evolvement of strategic relations, opens with Ching Chang’s article “Taiwan’s security calculus of cross-Strait migration” that focuses on the rather unique issue of migration across the Taiwan Strait, i.e. between Taiwan and Mainland China, which is as the author points out, while relatively insignificant in scale yet indisputably politically sensitive and a cause for security concern, possible political myths and unequal treatment of cross-Strait migrants, and then moves back into history with Xiaohua Ma’s paper “China, Japan, and the United States in World War II: The relinquishment of unequal treaties in 1943” to see
how the entwinment of national identity and strategic relations began to manifest itself in the global arena in a strategic action which not only marked a historical turning point in America’s China policy but also led to the transformation of East Asian geopolitics and international strategic relations during World War II and henceforth charted China’s road of strategic positioning among the world’s powers. Moving forward from this fascinating historical prelude, this section closes with an interesting exploration of what to many has come controversially to define the extent of China’s current composite power outreach by Hai-Tao Tsao, Cheng-Chang Lu and Ryh-Song Yeh in their article “China’s outward FDI in Africa: Enterprises with different ownership types”.

This volume ends with two book reviews by Ng Sor Tho and Zhang Yemo respectively on Li Peilin and Laurence Rouklleau-Berger’s *China’s internal and international migration* (2013) and Tom Miller’s *China’s urban billion: The story behind the biggest migration in human history* (2012).

Whereas in 1965, about 75 million people (2.5 per cent of the world population) migrated across country borders, in 2010 the number had already risen to around 214 million (3 per cent of the world population) and almost four times of this international migration figure are the more than 740 million people who migrated within their own countries from rural to urban areas and from city to city. As Professor Samuel Ku notes in the convening preamble to the 2014 International Conference on Asia-Pacific Studies, “Migration and transformation in the Asia-Pacific”, in which earlier versions of these ten selected papers were presented: “As short-term migration continues to take place, the long-term impact of these various groups as a transformative force is beginning to emerge in many countries.” Such transformative force is strikingly evident as, through the three distinctive sections in this special issue, the authors of these ten selected papers bring us on a journey cruising, as the title of

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this volume says, across the Chinese frontier, whether geographically or metaphorically, whether in terms of demographic mobility, ethnographic transition or global “Going Out” (zouchuqu, 走出去) cross-border expansion of political and economic clout, along which the very notion of the Chinese nation is being interpreted and reinterpreted against the backdrop of the shifting nexus of community, identity and that real winner among ideologies, nationalism. All these ten articles represent new versions of the earlier papers presented at the said conference, duly revised by incorporating critical peer feedback received at the conference and from other reviewers. We would like to thank these conference presenters who have taken great effort to revise their papers for inclusion in this special issue as well as the anonymous reviewers who have given invaluable assistance in providing critical comments on the earlier versions of these papers. We are also grateful to Mr Chang Le and Mr Zhang Yemo for their crucial assistance in proof-reading. The responsibility for any errors and inadequacies that remain is of course fully mine.

Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh*
Chief Editor
Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal

Notes
1. The 2014 International Conference on Asia-Pacific Studies: “Migration and Transformation in the Asia-Pacific” held at the National Sun Yat-sen University, Taiwan, on 13-15 November 2014, jointly organized by the Institute of China and Asia-Pacific Studies of the National Sun Yat-sen University and the Department of Political Science of the University of the
Philippines Diliman.


6. The other four ethnic groups are the Malayo-Polynesian Aborigines, Hakka (客家), Mainland Chinese who came to Taiwan in 1949 and their descendants (waishengren, 外省人, i.e. “people from outside provinces”) and the majority “native Taiwanese”, i.e. “local” Minnan/Hokkien (閩南 / 福建)-speaking Hoklo/Tâi-oân-lâng (福佬 / 臺灣人) who together with the local Hakka (both being descendants of Chinese who had already moved to Taiwan before the Republic of China took over the rule of Taiwan in 1945) are also known as the benshengren (本省人, i.e. “people of this province”).


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Migration and National Identity Transformation
Migration Patterns between the Russian Far East and China’s Northeast: Lessons from Experience and Plans for the Future

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Abstract

The Russian Far East (RFE) is a vast territory with land borders with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and North Korea and water borders with several other APEC countries. Presently it comprises 36% of the territory of the Russian Federation but only 5% of its population (around 6.5 million). From 1991 to the present the population has steadily declined, and attempts to reverse the trend have not been successful. Bordering the RFE are three northeastern provinces of the PRC with a total population of 106 million. During the Cold War years, the Russian-Chinese border was “sealed shut” to migration, and sporadic economic and political exchanges initiated in Moscow and Beijing did not have any lasting impact on the neighboring areas. After the fall of the Soviet Union, restrictions on trade were lifted and the borders were open for “tourism” – a word which carried much deeper connotations in the early 1990s. This period of visa-free travel was marked by skyrocketing numbers of travelers from the PRC’s neighboring provinces resettling,
often illegally, in the RFE. The issue became politically charged and new migration policies were haphazardly designed. An increasing number of Russian university students were going to China to study, and many stayed there, also often illegally, as there were few opportunities at home at the time. In the early 2000s the trend has once again intensified. The RFE remains an economically depressed region and the central government’s efforts at reviving its economy are now combined with stimulating intra-state migration. Deepening economic and social ties between RFE and its East Asian neighbors require comprehensive up-to-date migration policies which are still in their early stages of development.

**Keywords:** Russian Far East, PRC Northeast, migration policies, adaptation

**JEL classification:** F22, F52, F59, J61

1. **Introduction**

In the broadest sense, migration is defined as the “permanent or temporary resettlement of people in a new place”. Internal migration refers to moving within one’s country of origin, while international migration, to moving to other – “destination” – countries; the latter is a key concept in today’s global world. The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) estimates that in 2013 there were 232 million international migrants in the world, crossing borders and resettling in new places following jobs or family, pursuing educational opportunities, or escaping from war, ethnic strife or hunger. The United States of America (USA) hosted the largest number of international migrants at 45.8 million, or about 20% of total; the Russian
Federation became the destination country for 11 million people (which made it second largest). The OECD report notes that despite the crisis of 2008, global migration stock keeps rising, albeit somewhat more slowly. This means that people continue to seek new opportunities and are willing to tackle the challenges of adapting to new economic, cultural and linguistic realities to take advantage of them. For some, living in a foreign land is temporary – even though they may remain for decades until the children get their education, etc. – while others leave their native countries intending never to look back.

Migration is always a “result” of geographic and resource push and pull; the outcome of government policies (both intended and not); the call of opportunities; an informed personal decision; or just daydreaming. This human and often seemingly irrational dimension of migration should not be ignored even though it cannot always be neatly categorized. It presents additional difficulties in studying migration, while at the same time making it an illuminating research perspective to observe a host of subjects – from people undergoing another socialization as they adapt to new environments (with often quite unexpected results), to policy planning which reflects a widespread (if unacknowledged) sentiment concerning migration and migrants, and is often subject to the electorate’s pressure on issues like job security and market competition, the social safety net, migration quotas, etc. and wider questions such as inter-ethnic and inter-faith co-habitation (the European Union provides many examples).

The present article aims to trace the changes in migration patterns between the Russian Far East (RFE) and China’s Northeast over the last two decades (since the collapse of Soviet Union in 1991) and to map the trends and factors that initially shaped and continue to influence them. We shall start with a brief overview of border area history, and through analysis of the migration policies and practices which were developed
during the systemic upheaval in immediate post-Soviet Russia and government-directed modernization in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), we shall demonstrate changes in migration flows between contiguous countries. The RFE will be the article’s main focus: over the course of its non-linear development, the region has undergone many rapid transformations. Initially czarist Russia’s distant frontier, the RFE then became a heavily militarized defense line, then a largely neglected area in the aftermath of Soviet Union’s breakup, and finally, as a result of actively promoted “Asian Vector” in Russian politics, it has been proclaimed the “gateway to the Asia-Pacific region”. With few features that make it an attractive area for resettlement, sustaining stable demographics has been an issue: it is currently threatening to impede the region’s modernization; the negative population trends of the early 1990s have not yet been reversed. According to Alexander Galushka – the minister of Far Eastern development – for the first time since the fall of the Soviet Union, in 2014 the number of births in the region was by 9,334 higher than number of deaths. However, this widely publicized number is disputed by the regional statistical bureau (Primorskstattat) that quotes 24,693 births and 25953 deaths (higher by 1,260) in 2014. The statisticians agree that the demographic losses have slowed but have not been reversed: 75,467 people arrived at the Primorsky Region in 2014 and 79,415 left (a 3,948 net loss as compared to 7,139 in 2013)².

In regard to policy development, the author maintains that even 20 years of area-specific cross-border experience have not yet translated into a well-designed, long-term migration strategy that could function as an important measure to help minimize negative demographic trends and fully utilize the RFE’s potential as a hub of international cooperation. Among the contributing factors is a lag in the development of a national migration policy, local authorities’ habit of advancing the agenda they formed in the 1990s (when they were left without much assistance or
guidance from the federal government), which has often allowed them to pursue short-term gains to the detriment of strategic long-term goals and caused radical policy shifts with each change in administration. Due to the lack of reliable statistical data and systemic research into the issue of trans-border, or, in Russian-language sources, “cross-border” migration in the RFE (which encompasses migration from the former Soviet republics), it remains a sensitive subject to an often ill-informed public and is prone to political manipulation. Despite being a notable presence historically and through the post-Soviet years, and likely to grow in numbers and role, the Chinese migrant population in the Russian Far East continues to receive little attention from local authorities in terms of developing a legal framework accommodating changing patterns of migration, implementing policies of adaptation and educating native populations on migration issues in order to ease persistent xenophobic attitudes. Historically the cradle of China studies in Russia, the Far Eastern Sinological community should be actively involved in monitoring and studying cross-border interactions in search of answers to the most fundamental questions: What are the prevalent forms of migration from China to the RFE, and what are their associated challenges and benefits? What is urging people to leave their native environment to make a life in a distinctly different cultural setting? How are they contributing to local society, and are they even interested in making the Russian Federation their adopted country, or is it merely a waypoint en route to other dreams?

The primary sources for the article were official documents signed by the central governments of both countries (treaties, agreements, memoranda of understanding, etc.), statistical reports from migration agencies in Russia and China, regional agreements and policies, and reports from traditional and social media. Secondary sources include scholarly studies from Russian, Chinese and Western researchers which
provide often contrasting perspectives on the subject; publications from local print media allowing a glimpse of prevailing sentiment and fluctuating public opinion.

2. The Neighboring Areas: Mutual Compatibility and a Shared History

The Russian Far East (RFE) is a loose definition for vast territories in the watersheds of rivers to the Pacific Ocean, Sakhalin Island, and smaller archipelagos in the eastern part of the Russian Federation bordering China’s Northeast, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK/North Korea), Japan and the USA (they share a water border). Comprising approximately 36% of Russia’s territory, the RFE was home to only 7% of its total population during the Soviet period (up to 1991) and around 5% after its dissolution (6.3 million people in 2013). In 2000, the Far Eastern Federal District was created, comprising 9 federal subjects. Of those, the southernmost Amur and Primorye territories will be our main focus, since they both border the PRC’s Northeast (2,536 km out of total 4,209 km of the Russia-China border) and are home to the largest numbers of Chinese migrants.

Rich in natural and bioresources (both marine and land) with its key geographical position and features (deepwater non-freezing ports, navigable transborder rivers) that defined the goal to transform the region into Russia’s gateway to Asia in the first place, the RFE quickly became the focus of attention in the czarist government’s expansionist policies that prompted the arrival of the first Russian settlers in the XVII century, and in the dispatching of mapping expeditions in the early XIX century. Negotiations with Qing China were initiated on delineating borders in this vast and largely uninhabited area. After signing the Treaties of Aigun’ in 1858 and Peking (Beijing) in 1860, the territories in
the Primorsky region (Primorye) were ceded to Russia, with a small number of Chinese settlers permitted to settle there while remaining subjects of the Qing empire: this set a unique diplomatic precedent which may have played into the local population’s habit of freely moving around the area without regard to formal borders. The area’s settlement was supported by the Russian government’s patronage - it played the key role in attracting populations by providing the necessary incentives (that role remained fundamentally unchanged through the 1990s until market forces came into play), but maintaining a stable presence in the remote border area has always been difficult. Recognizing the demographic challenges faced by newly acquired territories and the necessity to tap into Asian human potential, General Konstantin Posyet, in his 1874 memorandum to the czarist government, wrote that “the Amur and Primorye regions suffer from a lack of grain, cattle and labor” – a situation he proposed to remedy by establishing close ties with Korea and inviting settlers from there⁶. His proposed solution was not met with enthusiasm by officials who feared divided loyalties among settlers that might lead to the creation of a “fifth column” close to areas of potential Russia-Asia conflict. Despite not being well-versed in Asian nations’ social structure and customs, official documents and diaries of that period correctly noticed the tendency of Koreans to set up permanent insular agricultural communities, as opposed to Chinese migrants’ intraregional mobility – which in modern studies is termed “pendulum migration” referring to the temporary character of settlement. The Chinese population was temporary in the area, not considerable in numbers, and only increased in the 1880s with the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway (東清鐵路) and other projects: in the years leading up to the Revolution of 1917, the RFE as Russia’s Asian outpost was actively building up extractive industries’ capacities, ports, and railroads – all of utmost importance due to the
ever-present challenge of transporting industrial output to the central parts of Russia. All these endeavors required a considerable supply of low-skilled labor, which internal migrants arriving in the area under the government resettlement policies could not meet. Asian migrant laborers – Chinese, Korean and Japanese – were therefore a constant feature in the Far East. Official policy toward them remained unstable and susceptible to narrow political interests, mistrust, and xenophobia among the local Russian population, including the officials themselves.

The well-documented unwillingness of successive Primorye governors to allow wide-scale Chinese settlement in the Far East, even with the area’s desperate need for human capital, was justified by their perceived prevailing loyalty to China, and the “impossibility to russify them” in the words of Vladimir Arseniev, a famous XIX-century Russian explorer, military-trained cartographer, and author of books on the ethnography of Far East. A knowledgeable historian of the region, he recognized the challenges Primorye faced if it wanted to become a fully integrated part of the empire, engaged in productive cooperation with neighboring China: its prolonged history as a no man’s land, neighboring empires’ relatively recent interest in the area and their competing claims of sovereignty, and the vying claimants’ resulting ambiguous status there. These issues continued to exert their influence until nearly all contact gradually ceased and the borders were closed during the Soviet era. Nonetheless, acculturation, defined as learning about and borrowing from another’s cultural traditions while retaining one’s own, was certainly taking place in the Far East – neighbors were residing in close proximity and interacting constantly. Over the years, Chinese nationals’ waxing and waning population as laborers, gatherers of taiga resources, traders, and, at the time of October 1917 Revolution, even as fighters for the new “people’s power”, established itself as a stable social presence in the Far East, albeit subject to ever-present political shifts, nationalistic
whims and changing market demands – “always ready to disappear again” in the words of I. Saveliyev – which did not facilitate integration into their host society. That their native countries were so close may also have been viewed as a bonus for Korean and Chinese settlers, since the same was not true for newly arriving Russians. This perceived advantage may have influenced local policy-makers who attempted to strictly regulate the numbers of Asian settlers.

Vladimir Arseniev’s observations from over hundred years ago captured the challenges of receiving migrants from a densely populated and culturally different country which was at odds with a country in which population was sparse and territory was vast. The challenges in establishing a distinct identity in the Russian empire’s frontier area were particularly acute in the Far East. Writing on the history of Harbin and the role the Chinese Eastern Railway construction and concession played in its transformation into the center of Russia-China relations, B.R. Chiasson points out that “like Vladivostok, Tiflis, Orenburg, and Baku, Harbin had been constructed as a center of Russian political and economic power. These cities acted as both oases and fortresses for Russian identity in non-Russian parts of the Russian Empire” (Chiasson, 2010: 156). All of the previous imperial outposts had distinct roles and formed specific industry anchors – vast agricultural lands in Kazakhstan (Orenburg), the oil industry (resource extracting) in Baku, the military fortress of Tiflis. Vladivostok was all those combined (save traditional crop cultivation) and was the farthest from the empire’s heartland, and this further influenced the trajectory of its development and the characteristics of the local Russian population. In Amur oblast’ in 1897, there were 103,523 Russians and 9,585 Chinese and Koreans; in 1911, Russians numbered 242,304 and Chinese and Koreans 38,006⁸.

All these factors contributed to the formation of a unique Russian Far East identity with its main feature being its ability to function in a
remote area at the intersection of divergent nations and to be responsive to foreign cultures while retaining its own. B.R Chiasson mentions the identity of Russian immigrants to Harbin in the late XIX-early XX centuries as distinct from that of Russians hailing from “Russia proper”. This observation holds true in regards to modern day Far Easterners, who refer to the rest of their country as “the West” and often have more knowledge about China, Japan and Korea (at the very least the closest tourist destinations) than they do about Western Russia. Moreover, today, just as a hundred years ago, the challenge of a “permanently transitory” population has not been resolved: forging a permanent community loyal to this often challenging area and making long-term life plans there has had a limited degree of success.

Due to mounting tensions in the 1920-40s that eventually led to Japan entering World War II against the USSR, the latter’s focus on development in the RFE shifted towards creating a heavily fortified Far-Eastern line of defense – buildups of the Navy and industry, border reinforcement and their subsequent sealing. The Russian “gateway to Asia” closed shut. Migration between China’s northeast provinces (東北三省) and the RFE virtually stopped then, and Chinese settlers also suffered greatly from the forced relocation of ethnic minorities as practiced in the 1930s all over the USSR². Border issues continued to remain unresolved and during the Cultural Revolution resulted in bloody clashes and numerous casualties in 1969 on Damansky Island (珍寶島). These border-related questions unavoidably loomed large, coloring mutual perceptions – while there were no “territorial disputes” according to a host of Russia-China border documents, “unresolved issues” were nevertheless present. After the Maoist-indoctrinated military provocation on Damansky, the border was sealed shut. It was not until the “Agreement on Easing of Population’s Movement between USSR and PRC” was signed in 1988 when sporadic and limited visits
began again.

On the other side, the northeastern region of the People’s Republic of China (also called “Northeast” or “Dongbei”) struggled to solve its own development issues. Historically a part of the Manchuria region (满洲), the Northeastern provinces (东北三省) of Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang (the latter two border the Russian Far East) and parts of Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, are similar to the RFE in terms of richness in resources and high costs of extracting them. In a series of policy decisions similar to the Soviet-era development in the RFE, after the founding of the PRC in 1949, the region was earmarked to become the Republic’s heavy industry base – its development, just like RFE’s, government-directed and -funded, dependent upon dispatches of highly-qualified personnel from the central regions of China to manage large steel-making, petrochemical and heavy-machinery enterprises, e.g. automobile manufacture and shipbuilding. This distinct pattern of socioeconomic development – a frontier area heavily reliant on state support (state patronage) for development and attracting people in order to fulfill its two main tasks – resource-extraction and border protection – is still recognizable in both areas, even though the PRC’s Northeastern policies have proven to be more consistent and successful in adjusting to changed conditions.

By the time reforms were initiated, the Northeast had been consistently demonstrating positive results from planned industrialization policies – in 1978, Heilongjiang and Liaoning occupied the 4th and 5th positions respectively among all provincial administrative units in per capita GDP growth (Fan and Sun, 2008: 10). Wide-scale heavy industry development attracted a large number of internal migrants: cumulative net migration in 1981-85 (the PRC’s 6th 5-year plan) was 365,300 people in Liaoning, 102,900 in Jilin and 202,100 in Heilongjiang (Yu, 2006).
In the early stages of reform, the region started to rapidly lose hard-
earned gains due to general contraction in Northeastern heavy industry,
its subsequent privatization (which raised serious concerns due to the
opaque process and often unfulfilled social obligations by the new
owners), and competition from new industrial centers in the coastal
provinces which were nimbly adapting to new challenges. As a result, by
the mid-1990s the region – by then dubbed “the rustbelt of China” – was
dealing with sharply falling production (Heilongjiang slipped to 12th in
the rating cited above) and soaring unemployment, which when
combined with large populations, became important factors leading to its
shift from the net migration “destination” area of the planned-economy
era to the net migration “origination” provinces during the reforms.
Internally, preferred destinations for migrants from the Dongbei fell into
two categories: origination areas of migration flows previously directed
into the Northeast – the provinces of Shandong, Hebei, the Autonomous
Region of Inner Mongolia – were now becoming destination areas with
the direction of migration reversed; and newly developed and promising
areas, to include the deltas of the Zhujiang and Changjiang Rivers and
the Beijing-Tianjin capital region (Yu, 2006: 32-33). There were most
likely two primary motivations to migrate at that time: family ties or
pursuing new opportunities and realizing one’s potential in a more
diversified setting. In both cases, migration was a personal choice and
not the result of government-directed resettlement of large numbers in
the planned-economy era. This is an important distinction, since it
dispels the image of the Russian Far East as “the only choice” for
migrants from the struggling Northeast, as it was often portrayed in the
RFE’s mass media in the 1990s when the subject of the “threat of
Chinese infiltration of the Far East” was first raised.

The Russian Far East and China’s Northeast share a complicated
history, long contested borders, and a rich experience of co-habitation,
despite long periods of mutual isolation. Representing unique and highly divergent cultures, the two nations were facing similar challenges in the remote Far East in the XVII-XVIII century – a short period in their respective presences there, adjusting to life after signing border-delineating treaties which restricted habitual free cross-border movement (especially from the Chinese side) and making the region “their own”. From that time to the late XX century, nearly all aspects of settling the area were under government patronage: strategic decisions and funding came from the center; this approach in the 1990s began to be supplemented and, on Russian side, almost completely replaced by turbulent market forces operating with limited government oversight. Subsequently, voluntary outward migration intensified and resulted in substantial demographic losses to the area. In light of acute problems in the RFE – depopulation, decreased life expectancy, and low birthrates – and limited appeal as a destination choice for migrants, there is an obvious need for new resettlement policies and incentives that would utilize years of inter-country cooperation in the border areas. Let us take a closer look at its non-linear history.

3. 1990s: Systemic Changes and First Encounters

After the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991, things looked bleak for the RFE. The integral part of the centrally planned economic system for 70 years, the region was completely dependent upon the central government’s policies and subsidies. Attracting internal migrants proved successful with solid state support and generous financing: by January 1st of 1991, the Primorye’s population was the largest it had ever been: 8,056,600 people.10 However, starting that same year, it had to map out its own path. Demographic challenges loomed larger than ever – outward migration from RFE began after 1991 and has not been reversed.
since: in the period 1990-2009, RFE’s population shrank by 1.594 million people – a net loss of about 20%.\textsuperscript{11}

Whole industries collapsed without government financing, with high transportation costs to ship products to the country’s center, and hitherto unseen competition from imports. Left with no support from the center and no new vectors of development that would include the region in a socioeconomic system already undergoing drastic change, the RFE’s regional authorities began looking outwards for new opportunities, at first primarily to import basic staple foods and consumer goods to satisfy a newly impoverished population. Rules and regulations reflecting “local conditions” were created quickly – principles of strategic partnership between Russia and China could truly be seen in practice in the Far Eastern border areas. While never contradicting central policies, they were dealing with the practical issues of creating working mechanisms of cross-border cooperation; many of these mechanisms, understandably, were not addressed in the official framework documents. The urgency of matters led to documents being promulgated in rapid succession and, with all their shortcomings, they lay the foundations of localized international cooperation.

Despite that the situation was far from being settled in the Russian border areas, understandable in the context of its systemic upheaval (a rough transition from state socialism to wild capitalism), migrants from the Chinese Northeast started to flow into RFE, taking advantage of visa-free entrance granted according to China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Russia’s embassy’s in PRC \textit{nota verbale} in 1991 (in 1993 the “Agreement on Visa-Free Tourist Groups’ Exchange” was signed) which allowed visitors from bordering countries to enter with just their passports as members of tour groups; border control points exchanged lists of names and affixed them with entry-exit stamps. In essence, “border tourism” at the time provided a relatively simple opportunity to
visit the contingent country (usually without venturing outside the border areas, as tour groups were obligated to cross into and out of the country together) for a variety of reasons – from conducting business to visiting relatives – and with a few adjustments remains a staple of current RFE-Northeast trans-border relations. Over the years, the reasons for travel have changed; today, conventional tourists constitute a larger percentage of people crossing land borders between Russia and China.

In the early 1990s, a trickle of visitors quickly turned into a steady stream: from 1988 to 1993, the number of arrivals from the PRC grew 13.5 times – from 55,500 to 751,200. In a short span of two years, arrivals just from Heilongjiang province saw a spike from 33,200 in 1991 to 73,000 in 1993 (Nechaeva, 2008). While this growth was often portrayed in the RFE media as a rush of Northeasterners to “colonize the Far East”, these figures reflected just the number of crossings through border control points mainly located in Heilongjiang province, with no breakdown by “reason for visit”. Furthermore, the number of Chinese and Russian tourists in the border areas was roughly equal – 3,689 groups from China (110,000 tourists) and 3,662 from Russia (102,000).

Visa-free travel rules allowed up to 90-day stay per visit with no limits on subsequent returns. As mentioned earlier, there was very little conventional (recreational) tourism, etc. involved in most of these border crossings: the primary aim of visiting the neighboring country was to conduct rudimentary business. The basis of the new trans-border (“regional” in Russian sources) trade in the early 1990s was barter – the RFE used raw materials (diesel, oil, bioresources, timber, coal etc.) and Soviet-era surplus (mostly military) goods to trade for PRC-manufactured consumer goods and staple foods. Barter exchanges were soon complemented by the so-called “shuttle” trade – a far cry from any sort of regular organized business activity: Chinese and Russian traders would literally carry suitcases full of goods for sale in the border towns.
Throngs of Russian “tourists” poured into Northeastern border towns to buy consumer goods for resale at chaotic markets that sprung up all over the RFE, with the highest concentration in Primorye in the vicinity of the border: towns of Grodekovo and Suifenhe on the Russian and Chinese sides respectively quickly became the bustling hubs of commercial activity with a “Wild West” atmosphere. Visa-free Chinese “tourists” shuttling across the border frequently overstayed their 90-day allotments (as did Russian visitors to the Northeast, albeit on a smaller scale). Rule enforcement was sporadic due to a lack of resources, legal loopholes, an absence of shared computer databases of registered offenders, language barriers, and little cross-border practical interaction by law-enforcement authorities – apart from a few official visits to sign new memoranda of understanding. Fragmented statistical data on the number of Chinese visitors to the RFE from that period come mostly from border control and law-enforcement agencies.

Russia-China cross-border interactions in the 1990s predominantly reflected the turbulent systemic changes on the Russian side. Victor Larin, director of the Institute of History, Archaeology and Ethnography of Indigenous Peoples of the Far East of the Russian Academy of Sciences and historian of Russian-Chinese border interaction, considers the period of 1990s a “lost” time for Russia’s Asian politics in general, and Russia-China border areas in particular due to the prevailing pro-Western attitudes among policy-makers, their singular focus on Europe and the United States as the main avenue for Russian foreign policy, and negligence of the Far Eastern territories, which in his view explains the lack of long-term policies for the area’s development which should have included plans for mutually beneficial cross-border cooperation (Larin, 2005: 22-23). The area, which had for a long time been completely shut off from any international exposure because of its military nature and hence with no previous experience or training in navigating the
subtleties of international politics and business, suddenly found itself in a precarious sink-or-swim situation. Against this challenging backdrop, ordinary Far-Easterners, for decades shielded from interaction with foreigners despite living in the border area, were suddenly exposed to the thrills, demands and challenges of “intercultural communication” (the term would become very popular later with entire university departments devoted to its studies). Feelings of insecurity and “abandonment” by Moscow were also unwelcome news for a population long-accustomed to their government taking care of long-term plans and daily concerns.

In the confusion of the moment, even available resources were underutilized: there was little involvement by the long-established Far-Eastern sinological community in due diligence of various agreements and education of both the general public and establishment in the subtleties of Chinese culture and traditions. The lack of reliable statistical information on the number of visitors from the Northeast, instances of overstays, etc. fueled the politicization of the international migration issue with sensationalism and unsubstantiated claims in the local media\(^{12}\), with a haphazardly designed and sporadically implemented local regulatory framework for Russian-Chinese cross-border relations at the time. Developing against the backdrop of a sharp decline in living standards in the RFE, widespread feelings of insecurity and the loss of a moral compass, cross-border exchanges quickly became rife with corruption among police, border control and customs employees. Official documents on cross-border interaction during the transitional period (from 1991 to 2000) demonstrate Russian regional actors’ ambivalence: on one hand, they were objectively interested in widening the scope of economic cooperation with their neighbors; on the other, they were wary of such cooperation, fearing the “Chinese threat” (中國威脅論). These factors translated into ambiguity and
inconsistency in policies, their slow implementation, and the formation of a negative image of Chinese migrants among the public.

The first attempts to address the issue of work migration – something which has been consistently regarded in the mass media as a potential threat to the ethnic and cultural composition of the RFE – included the “Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the PRC on Principles of Dispatching and Receiving Chinese Citizens to Work in Factories, Associations and Organizations in the Russian Federation”, signed on August 19th of 1992 in Moscow. A few notable points from this agreement include:

- Multiple “authorized actors” – the Ministry of Labor in Russia and the Ministry of Foreign Economic Affairs and Trade in China. Considering Russian governmental organs’ limited experience in dealing with migration issues at that time, it appears to be a more far-sighted move by the Chinese.
- The proposed actors were Russian “economic entities”\(^\text{13}\) (receiving) and Chinese foreign economic cooperation companies of ministries and administrations; provinces, autonomous regions and cities of PRC vetted by the Ministry of Foreign Economic Affairs and Trade and hereinafter referred to as “Chinese companies” (sending). Workers sent remained the responsibility of the state organs in China that sent them; receiving them in Russia was often delegated to newly created commercial entities. With their status being still in flux with legal frameworks still being developed, questions concerning a foreign workforce were often left unanswered in a comprehensive and timely manner by government organs. This, in turn, created confusion and opportunities for malpractice; in the RFE, the situation was worsened by the economic hardship of the transition period, as we see below.
• “The number and professional qualifications of Chinese citizens and the period of their stay in the Russian Federation are regulated by contracts between Russian economic entities and Chinese companies. However, the duration of stay cannot exceed 3 years.” Work conditions and work schedules, labor protection and the stipend paid to Chinese workers are covered under Russian law, taking into consideration special conditions set forth in the present Agreement (Article 3). Work contracts could be terminated “in the highest interests of the participating parties”, among other reasons.

• Article 4 stipulated that Chinese workers could not bring their family members to Russia. This article further stipulated that workers arriving must be between 18 and 45 years of age, and qualified specialists – up to 55 years of age. Articles 3 and 4 clearly demonstrate a lack of interest in foreign workers staying in Russia longer and becoming better integrated into the host society. Of course, many questions associated with long-term migration were not a high priority for government officials and budding entrepreneurs at the time.

While the document above provided a generalized legal foundation for labor migration – almost too late, as by the time the document was issued, large-scale “inter-state” contracts were becoming fewer and were largely absent in the border areas – area-specific concerns remained unaddressed.

The publication of the first post-Soviet “Federal Focused Program of Economic and Social Development of the Far East and Baikal Region for 1996-2005” coincided with then President Boris Yeltsin’s reelection campaign, and was widely perceived as an empty election promise among inhabitants of the Far East. “Easing of social tensions” was stated as one of its main goals, and the plan to achieve it was through
vaguely defined economic measures: “formation of transportation corridors” in order to strengthen Russia’s position in the worldwide transportation system; development of a resource base for the oil and gas industry and their pipelines; development of the marine bioresources of Far-Eastern seas; modernization of key economic sectors – energy, transportation and fishing – creating necessary conditions for the development of small- and medium-scale private business. Measures to stop “negative demographic tendencies” were mentioned in passing, and the only solution offered was “encouraging” internal migration from the northern parts of the RFE to the more developed south. The potential of international migration were not discussed at all. As M. Alexandrova from Moscow Institute of Far Eastern Studies’ Center for Research and Prognosis on Russia-China Relations pointed out in her analysis of the development programs for the RFE over the course of over 100 years, “unless it was designed specifically for the region with the central government in charge of implementation and, most importantly, funding, it was likely to become a failure” as was once again proved true in the case of the Federal Program for 1996-2005 (even though in 2002 it was extended to 2010). More official documents were to follow, with varying degrees of attention paid to migration issues.

On the other side of the border, the Northeast’s economy looked better despite its struggles and challenges. Following its tried-and-true strategy of experimental implementation of new policies, the PRC’s central authorities designated the province of Heilongjiang as the gateway to the Russian Far East. In 1992 a few townships – Suifenhe, Manzhouli, Hunchun and Heihe – received “designated areas of trans-border trade and cooperation” status. These measures served important purposes:
• new policies designed by central authorities in Beijing could be quickly tested in practice and adapted to accommodate unforeseen circumstances and regional challenges – varying greatly in a vast country, this approach exponentially increased their effectiveness;
• upon making them de facto points of China-Russia economic trade and exchange, small towns became a magnet for internal migrants, thus somewhat easing the problem of unemployment in the Northeast;
• in the same “wave” of liberalization, border towns in Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture (Hunchun, Yanji) in the PRC began to pull the Korean diaspora’s resources into the orbit of a burgeoning trans-border cooperation which, too, served the overarching goals of modernizing the Northeast and widening its participation in international cooperation.

Through the 1990s, RFE authorities tried to replicate the experiences of Northeastern “free border trade towns” with Special Economic Zones (SEZs) that would have been created in order to solve specific problems, with all projects playing an important role in international cooperation and the free flow of labor. Among the most trumpeted of these SEZs were “Tumangan”, which was supposed to become the hub for high-tech industries utilizing the geographical proximity of the RFE, Northeast, and North Korea, and the convenience of a transborder river, the Tumenjiang (Tumangan in Korean) which provides access to the Pacific Ocean; SEZ “Nakhodka” focused on modernizing the commercial port in the city of Nakhodka (in the south of Primorye) and turning it into a competitor to other ports in the region and with investments from the Republic of Korea (South Korea), China, Singapore and other Asian countries. “Big Vladivostok” was supposed to turn its namesake into a Far Eastern Hong Kong, providing financial services for this unique area, positioned at the crossroads of Asia and
Europe, attracting foreign investors and highly qualified foreign workers to its modernized natural resource, manufacturing and logistics industries. Unfortunately, none of these projects materialized, and shifts in RFE migration policies to attract highly skilled labor remain to be seen.

“The Plan for the Revitalization of the Old Northeast Industrial Base” (振興東北老工業基地) of 2007 provided a necessary general impetus and framework for Northeast development. Upgrades to aging production facilities, the development of new industries with a focus on modern technologies, and diversification of the region’s economy were named key goals of the state-funded program. Thus newly established and rapidly developing centers of cross-border cooperation were contributing to a much larger effort to reform the PRC’s economy, which gave the area an additional advantage over its counterpart in the RFE. The country-wide “one thousand people” policy (千人計劃), adopted in 2008, aimed to attract and “fully utilize” top foreign talent in key areas of research and innovation, logically fed into the “Revitalization Program” which was also attractive to internal migrants due to its opportunities, to include those in the trans-border exchanges. In their analysis of the experience of years of active economic cooperation between the RFE and Northeast, Russian researchers also point out the far more developed legal foundation for commercial activity conducted in the border area, with streamlined registration, banking and tax procedures and labor regulations with the specifics of the border areas in mind. All those, once again, provided a competitive advantage to the Northeast while raising the effectiveness of dialogue between China’s provincial governments and business interests, allowing them to adapt to changing conditions quickly. Strict regulations on export-import business – requiring the participation of Chinese middlemen, limits on the registration of foreign companies in the border areas, etc. put RFE’s
companies at a further disadvantage, compounded by the “unpreparedness of Russian government structures in charge of foreign trade”, which resulted in further lagging with updates to legal documents\textsuperscript{16}.

Summarizing the cross-border co-operation experience of the transition period, we can see many similarities between the paths to development of the two nations, similarities which allowed Russia and China to engage in productive – if chaotic – economic exchanges in the 1990s to early 2000s. In the transitional period after Soviet Union’s collapse, early forms of business cooperation (barter exchanges and shuttle trade) eased the problems that scarcity in food and consumer goods posed to the RFE, and helped to alleviate the problem of unemployment in the Northeast, thus proving objectively beneficial to both sides. At that time, policies governing international cooperation in both countries were being developed at clear, if somewhat divergent, “central” and “local” levels, with centers setting overarching goals and engaging in generally positive and optimistic dialogue, while regional authorities tried to apply these general themes to solve practical problems in regional development, which oftentimes brought unexpected results. A legal framework on migration was in its embryonic state on both sides, with the Chinese side closing the gap faster by enacting countrywide policies that included the Northeast as a priority. Local migration policies became a logical “extension” of the socioeconomic plan for development for the region. On the Russian side, the question of migration from China and finding ways of successfully utilizing its potential unfortunately received insufficient attention in academic and policy-making circles and became the purview for border and law enforcement authorities. That relegation led to growing alarmism among the public, which was mostly unfounded: a few smaller-scale sociological studies of Chinese migration in the RFE showed
insignificant numbers of migrants in the sociological sense of the word, although the number of visa overstays and visa-free policy violations was relatively high.

4. Continuity of Change and New Policies

The turn of the 21st century brought changes both to global migration flows and to how the issue of migration was understood. Economic considerations remain the primary impetus for migration (temporary and permanent), with high numbers of illegal migrants from poor countries in North Africa, Pakistan, Afghanistan and others continuing to attempt to resettle in developed European countries, Australia and North America. Migration between higher-developed countries (including Russia and China) is becoming much more nuanced. For example, outbound labor migration from the PRC is now following two clear routes that, for purposes of our analysis, can be termed “private-” and “state-sponsored”. The former is the traditional way of an individual’s resettling in the destination country following job prospects, family members, etc., and relying on the process on his/her own resources and making his/her own decisions about where to settle, the duration of stay, job changes, etc. State-sponsored labor migration occurs in an organized fashion in order to provide human resources for PRC-funded large-scale projects – latest examples of this would include oil exploration and extraction and infrastructure projects in Africa and Central Asia. Workers and specialists are relocated by their companies (often state-backed) and do not have flexibility in matters mentioned above. On the other hand, they are better protected against the vagaries of unfamiliar places and job market fluctuations.

Returning to the regions in question, new migration policies were put in place at the beginning of this century, and both governments were
actively involved in their implementation. The approach of choice for China is “crossing the river, feeling the stones” (摸石过河) when experimental policies are tried out – and adjusted accordingly – on a smaller scale first, in order to optimize them for wider implementation later. The successful strategy of “designated areas of international cooperation” has been realized in both policy-making and functioning free economic zones close to the border in the Northeast, which has been consistently paying particular attention to developing cooperation with the RFE.

The “Primorsky Krai Migration Program for 1999-2000” was the first document focusing on Far Eastern area-specific migration issues; by its contents, it was more of a “statement” than a “program”, but with all its drawbacks, it gives a clear account of the disastrous economic situation in the area in the transition period: a 92% loss of “financial investments from all sources” (meaning mostly central government funding) when compared to 1997; a 93.1% drop in industrial and 96.3% drop in agricultural output; a 96.4% drop in consumer goods production. In the context of the ongoing socioeconomic upheaval in the early 1990s, Primorsky Krai was also receiving the first wave of mostly ethnic Russian and Korean migrants arriving from the former Soviet republics, escaping from civil wars, ethnic conflicts and economic hardship. The Program mainly focused on that group of refugees, with “international labor migrants” receiving only a cursory note. “Economic revival” was named the key provision for a successful migration policy, and its aims were the “regulation of migration flows, taking into consideration the socioeconomic capabilities of the region’s cities and townships and the ethnic compatibility of the populations; creating conditions for receiving migrants and providing necessary conditions for the protection of their rights; the organization of an immigration control system; and the cooperation between executive and border control organs”17. The
Program’s 2-year life span was too short to achieve meaningful results, and the shift in attention to the more pressing concerns of hosting repatriates from the former USSR left foreign migrants behind.

The number of foreign workers was relatively insignificant – a total of 10,333 in 1998 (2,500 fewer than in 1995) working in construction (2,915), agriculture (4,208) and trade (1,938); manufacture workers numbered 834. The majority came from the PRC (7,179), DPRK (2,134), Vietnam (127) and the Republic of Korea (61). There were 670 workers from NIS – Newly Independent States (former Soviet republics) – Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan. Overall, in 1994-1998, the PRC was the main sending country for labor migrants – 69.5% of the total, while DPRK’s share was 20.6%, NIS’ 6.5%, and Vietnam’s 1.2%. These numbers dispel the persistent myth about “China’s seizure of the RFE”. Moreover, the “Migration Program” above lists a host of other problems foreign migrants encountered upon their arrival, most of them stemming from the challenging local economic conditions and the ineptitude of local authorities, e.g. “lack of contractually stipulated work” for those arriving to work in construction and, as a result, their “looking for other employment opportunities, often in small-scale trading in low-quality consumer goods, which creates unfair competition to local manufacturers” (the latter not truly a threat, since local consumer goods manufacturing had already all but ceased). Most puzzling was that “that the same companies which were unable to guarantee construction work continued to bring over foreign workers for consecutive contract periods”. Salary arrears were common in agriculture, once again forcing workers to look for other opportunities, often in places far from those stipulated in their contracts, which was technically another breach of contractual obligations.

These circumstances helped cast Chinese migrants in local public opinion in an excessively negative light at the same time likely pushing
them in the direction of strengthening diasporisation in their interpersonal ties. Defined as a process of collective adaptation of a group of people – however loose – of common origin and cultural socialization to another cultural and linguistic setting as a way of dealing with the challenges of long-term living in a foreign setting often perceived as inhospitable or hostile, diasporization attaches particular importance to maintaining ties with the country of origin (both for practical and cultural-pull reasons), and it may eventually lead to the formation of diaspora proper (examples of Chinese diasporas around the world abound).

A. Kireev argues that this process does not come to completion if migrants perceive their foreign stay as strictly temporary, in which case there is little need for it; or they choose to assimilate into the receiving society. However, even if migration is of the semi-temporary variety (seasonal, pendulum), the possibility of migrants’ diasporization rises, especially under challenging or unstable conditions described above. Even with this sociological explanation in mind, the possibility of the formation of Chinese diasporas, with their opaque and insular nature and perceived links to ethnic cross-border organized crime, have long been a favorite image in alarmist mass media pieces in the RFE (and Russia in general). There is no doubt, in the absence of reliable institutionalized support networks (such as professional associations), interpersonal relations and ethnicity- and common culture-based connections are viewed by Chinese as vitally important in a foreign environment, but to make the leap towards a full-fledged diaspora in its classical interpretation requires at least one generation raised and socialized in a foreign society, which is clearly not the case with the Chinese presence in the RFE. There are a few professional organizations, such as the “Association of Chinese Citizens in the city of Vladivostok”, which was established in 2007; moreover, Chinese-owned businesses are generally
viewed both by migrants and locals as protecting the interests of Chinese citizens in Russia, but all these arrangements are a far cry from the long-established, full-fledged Chinese diasporas in Western countries. I. Saveliev considers the Chinese presence in Russia unique because “it never has had a naturalized Chinese community as a core, strong enough to fight for legal equality with Russians. It has always been a highly mobile, floating community with vague boundaries.”

Further legal developments included the “Protocol to Establish a Working Group on Migration Issues” which was signed in May of 2006. The stated goals were for a new, smaller and more agile structure and included “cooperation in regulation of migration flows, including in the legal basis of cooperation; regulating of external migration flows, guaranteeing migrants’ rights and interests, joint measures against illegal migration; and strengthening of cooperation between government organs in the area of migration”21. The most important aim of a working group was to establish regular channels for information exchange that were to assist in the stemming illegal migration and fight against trans-border criminal operations. In September of 2009, a joint Russia-China “Program on the Revitalization and Development of Border Territories” was signed by Presidents Vladimir Putin and Hu Jintao and aimed at the convergence of development plans for the Northeast and Russian Far East. Calling for “deepening cooperation in trans-border labor movement”, the document did not mention the potential of inter-state migration and its associated challenges, however. The document drew fire among Russian economists and academics, who saw it as yet another example of turning the RFE into a “resource area” and exploiting its natural riches for China’s benefit without putting adequate effort into developing production capabilities which would help maintain population levels22. The debate on the degree of compatibility of development goals is still open, but regardless of the direction it takes,
the demographic issue remains of utmost importance. The long-held intention of Russia’s policy-makers to find an internal solution to the problem of declining populations should be cast aside in order to fully utilize the potential of migration – including international migration. So far, it has been a difficult journey.

In Russia’s policy to attract migration flows, “The Strategy for the Development of Primorye and Zabaikalye Regions up to the year 2025”, the sense that authorities are reluctantly acquiescing is noticeable: “in any case, even with the most positive developments, attraction of migration flows is unavoidable ... It is imperative to design and implement measures to introduce migrants from foreign countries to Russian cultural values and traditions ... [This should be accomplished] via a network of language-training centers, qualification services and naturalization centers”24. The measures planned are one step in the direction of migrants’ adaptation to their new country – even though it is likely that the majority of them would not plan a permanent move.

Higher education historically provided avenues for international migration. Current worldwide trends provide even more opportunities, both for quality education and for possible permanent or long-term often job-related migratory opportunities for new graduates. The Russian Federation has been expanding its efforts to attract prospective students who are approaching education both as an academic pursuit and an avenue to successful integration into Russia’s society. According to the Federal Migration Service of the Russian Federation, as of end of 2012, the highest number of university students came from Kazakhstan (30,700), Byelorussia (White Russia) (27,100) and China (16,900); followed by Ukraine (11,200), Uzbekistan (10,900) and Azerbaijan (8,300)25. Mongolia sent 5,600 students, and Vietnam 3,900. There are currently approximately 1,000 students from the PRC studying in the RFE.
The new campus of the Far-Eastern Federal University (FEFU) on Russky Island off the coast in Vladivostok is likely to attract some new arrivals due to its location and an established tradition of academic cooperation and exchange with the PRC and other Asian countries. As of January 2015 there were 2,000 students from 35 countries studying in the FEFU, and 70% of the foreign students were from China\(^26\). FEFU is joining the intense competition in higher education market – students are increasingly choosing North America and Europe as their top destinations for higher education, especially for advanced degrees. Nevertheless, Russian institutions of higher learning continue to improve their cooperation with the PRC: Moscow State University recently announced plans to establish a joint China-Russia university in Shenzhen with instruction in three languages – Chinese, Russian and English. FEFU among other things is increasing the number of Russian language learning programs as an introduction to higher education in the RFE in the hope of persuading prospective students to earn their degrees in Vladivostok.

Meanwhile, studies on regional migration that were carried out in the late 1990s to mid-2000s (Gelbras, 2002) addressed the issue of statistical distortions in calculating the number of border crossings separately from the number of visas, work permits and residence permits that were issued. They also demonstrated that the number of migrants from the Northeastern provinces was relatively low and that the patterns of trans-border migration were mostly of the non-permanent variety, with so-called “seasonal”, “visiting” (“vacation”) and “pendulum” migration flows dominating and the majority of migrants polled planning “to work in Russia and save money to open businesses back in China”. According to V. Gelbras’s estimates around 86 400 people permanently resettled in Russia during 1998-2003.\(^27\)
In the first half of 2010, nearly 220,000 visitors from the PRC – 25% more compared to the same period of 2009 – arrived in the RFE; 22,300 work permits were issued to PRC nationals during the same period. The spike in numbers can be plausibly attributed to massive construction projects in preparation for the APEC Summit of 2012. A total of 36,900 Chinese migrants were “engaged in labor activities” in the RFE at the time, with the majority concentrated in Primorsky Krai – 16,700, or 43% of the total. A total of 7,000 visitors were charged with administrative offenses (visa regulations) – 4% fewer than the previous year.28 In 2012 - the year of the APEC summit – Primorye was leading in numbers of visitors – 82,000 – primarily due to the newly built infrastructure (suspension bridges in Vladivostok). In the first 9 months of 2013, 130,000 tourists from the PRC visited Russia. The summer of 2013 was marked by disastrous flooding in the Amur Oblast’, which did not seem to stem the flow of tourists – 35,500 in the first 10 months – or 99% of the previous year’s figures. The Khabarovsk area witnessed a rise of 15.6%, bringing the total to 3,500 as of October 1, 2013.29

With the expansion of visa-free tourism and intensifying competition in order to attract foreign visitors which prompt authorities to offer more incentives, in 2014 a total of 1,125,000 visa-free Chinese tourists visited Russia. Another 286,000 visitors acquired Russian visas for business and work purposes. The interest to visit Russian Federation is clearly on the rise. Moreover, thanks to a host of new tourism-related agreements between PRC and Russia, visa-free visits are now possible not only to the border areas of the RFE, but also Moscow, St. Petersburg, Sochi, Volgograd and Crimea.30 Moscow is the most popular destination – during January-March of 2015 it hosted over 9,500 tourists from PRC. Amur Oblast’ attracted 6,500 visitors during the same period, and Primorye 5,500. RFE remains the most attractive – and affordable - destination for visitors from the Northeast.31 Due to the weakened ruble,
the standard itineraries now reserve time for shopping – including groceries – which tourists perceive as superior in quality than those of Chinese origin.

The public’s attitudes are also demonstrating positive tendencies: in 2000, 82% of respondents believed that the PRC intended to appropriate Primorye as part of its geographic expansion, 46% considered “peaceful encroaching” by Chinese laborers and traders as a first step in expansionist policies. Over time, this alarmist mood has subsided somewhat: in 2005, 10% fewer respondents were wary of China’s expansionism and 7% fewer believed that Russia’s territories might be taken over. In a 2013 survey, 61%, or a full 20 percentage points fewer respondents were worried about China’s territorial claims, and for the first time, the majority of respondents thought that it was “highly unlikely” that China would claim RFE territories as part of its expansion. Researchers attributed these shifts in attitudes to political changes (a new governor was voted into office in 2005) and decreased feelings of abandonment by the federal government. Paradoxically, xenophobia is on the rise: close to 75% are against granting migrants (including foreign) residency permits, and 90% in 2013 (80% in 2005) were against “marriage of their close relatives to Chinese nationals”.32 The situation certainly presents a serious challenge to fostering tolerance and acceptance, and local government should deepen their efforts in this area, possibly moving their focus to primary-school level education for them to become an integral part of the socialization process.

Another paradox is the increasing outbound migration from the RFE to the Northeast along education and retirement lines. The tradition of studying in institutions of higher learning in China has long been established in the RFE, and nowadays a growing number of students choose to earn their degrees in the PRC, usually starting with a year-long language school which also serves as an adaptation time. Another
popular way is leaving to study in China after 1-2 years at university/institute in Russia, either acquiring basic Chinese language skills in specialized departments, or sparking the interest and proceeding on to China. Unfortunately for the RFE, educational migration often becomes a permanent outbound move: fragmented statistical data points at a majority of graduates not returning to their native country.

Relocation to China’s border towns is growing in popularity among Russian retirees from the RFE, who cite the lower cost of living, the ease and transparency of buying and maintaining real estate, the higher quality of medical services, a healthier lifestyle and “better treatment and respect for older generation” as leading reasons for their moves. Unverified data on Russian-language websites discussing the particulars of permanent relocation to the Northeast report that 30,000-40,000 Russians have already acquired real estate in China. New transplants do not feel disconnected from their native country and family members thanks to advances in communications technology and geographical proximity. While retirement relocation appears to be a positive experience for new migrants, the RFE, unfortunately, is losing its demographic battle once again.

5. Conclusion

Changing locations is quickly becoming second nature to millions of people. Their reasons and destinations vary greatly – forced migrants are fleeing war zones and lawlessness, voluntary re-settlers follow education and job prospects, and, in the case of an increasing number of middle-class families from China, better ecology and a more balanced lifestyle. The nature of migration is also changing – permanently resettling in a new country and severing all links to one’s ancestral home is becoming rare, with all kinds of fluid migration patterns taking its place. While
these new kinds of relocation can be beneficial for ambitious individuals pursuing their own life plans and goals, this way of semi-settling presents additional difficulties for receiving societies when newcomers are not willing to fully integrate and are relying upon diasporal (in the widest sense of term) mechanisms to achieve their goals. Highly-educated and highly-skilled migrants have more options in selecting their destination, with countries competing for human talent. A host of reasons are considered by potential migrant workers – ranging from the richness of educational opportunities to the comfort of the local climate. The Russian Federation is just coming to terms with this new reality, and considering its continuing negative demographic trends, should accelerate its efforts to turn itself into an attractive destination.

In 2012, a total of 90,139 foreigners – a 53% rise compared to 2011 – acquired Russian citizenship\(^{33}\). In comparison, the USA – retaining its position as a top-choice destination for international migrants – naturalized 757,434 legal permanent residents in 2012 according to the Department of Homeland Security, a 9% increase compared to 2011\(^{34}\). In June of 2012, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed into law “The Concept of State Migration Policy in the Russian Federation for the Period up to 2025”. Important conditions and imperatives were finally acknowledged: the demographic crisis in Russia and its continuing population drop; its relative unattractiveness as a destination country for migrants originating in countries other than the former Soviet republics; and the urgent need to improve its prospects as a destination for educated and highly skilled migrants and creating working mechanisms for their integration into the Russian society. Monumental tasks, such as “forming new and predictable way of life for all social groups”, are listed in the “Policy”. In 2013, a total of 135,000 people were granted Russian citizenship, in 2014 the figure was raised to 154,000 (half of them from Ukraine).\(^{35}\)
In an interesting twist, despite continuing concerns about the development goals for the PRC and Russian Federation and a general shift towards the perception of China as a political and economic heavyweight able to dictate conditions to other countries – and now overshadowing Russia – ordinary Russian citizens’ attitudes towards China seem to be generally positive. According to recent polls, 64% of respondents view it as “basically good”, with an additional 13% as “very good” and 15% “undecided”.36 However, this has yet to be factored into long-term strategic planning on migration-related issues in Russia in general and the RFE in particular.

Until recently, migration was an overlooked subject in Russian state policies. The surge of forced migrants in 1992-1994 from the former Soviet republics set a reactive precedent in regard to migrants – people were forced to deal with a myriad of issues in unfamiliar circumstances with no assistance from the authorities. There was no advanced mapping out of possible destinations or efforts at new arrivals’ successful integration into Russian society. The situation with a wave of forced migrants began to repeat itself in 2014 with the crisis in Ukraine unfolding. This time, however, the Russian government and dedicated agency (Federal Migration Service) are more prepared. The RFE is one of designated regions for resettling people arriving from Ukraine. The state relocation expenses’ reimbursement for those moving to the RFE is the highest among “designated areas of resettlement” – RR 240,000 for participants in the “State Program of Assistance to Compatriots” and RR 120,000 for dependents37. However, the RFE remains a tough sell – as of the end of 2014, only 5,700 arrived there (compared to over 61,000 in the Central Federal Region).38 The negative population trends continue with the total population of the RFE still just slightly over 6.2 million people in 2014.39
In the RFE, the traumatic transition period of the 1990s established a pattern of short-term thinking among local elites which resulted in a lack of strategic vision for the region’s future, frequent policy shifts and inconsistent migration policies, especially in relation to international migration which, in the context of the RFE, meant primarily inbound migration from China’s Northeast. In all fairness, at the time the pattern of making strategic decisions in Moscow was established often with no concession to local conditions, so it was left to local authorities to find a way to adopt and minimize possible negative consequences. The trend continues: for example, the federal government’s ban on foreigners’ employment in retail, passed in 2007, resulted in a massive outflow of Chinese traders who previously provided affordable necessities to the vast majority of region’s population.

The issue of Chinese migration to the RFE and the perceived “unbalanced character” of its relations with the PRC Northeast remain highly politicized in public opinion and mass media, even though the statistical data do not demonstrate any evidence of migrants’ substantial influence on the Far-Eastern job market or the underworld. The number of workers employed remains relatively low, and newcomers are in fact often targets of criminal exploits. Expanded government efforts in educating the local population on present-day demographic challenges and the benefits of international cooperation are a requirement, as are designing and implementing adaptation policies with particular attention paid to potential long-term highly educated migrants. Engaging adaptation and acculturation capabilities of higher education may prove beneficial in this long-term effort. Culturally pluralistic societies are a sign of the times and the real need to find practical ways to cooperate and cohabitate is inescapable. A lack of exposure to different cultures, ethnicities and languages partly account for the persistent xenophobic attitudes in the RFE. Change might take longer, but efforts in fostering
tolerance should be an integral part of the socialization and education processes, with government, NGOs and migrants’ associations actively involved. Citizens should have a say in the discussion of migration policies designed with local conditions in mind. The new reality of voluntary migration is on the rise, and countries around the world competing for the best and brightest, should prompt change. “New migrants – new strength” (新移民新力量) as they say in Taiwan.

Notes

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3. Federal district – unit of administrative division in Russia. Far Eastern district comprises Amur Region (oblast’), Jewish Autonomous Region, Kamchatky Territory (krai), Magadan Region, Primorsky Territory (krai), Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), Sakhalin Region, Khabarovsk Territory, Chukotka Autonomic Region.
4. In Russian “krai” – literally, “edge”, sometimes translated as “maritime province” or “territory”.
5. Treaty of Nerchinsk between Russia and China signed in 1689. It acknowledged the territories as belonging to China, but did not address the question of delineating borders.
9. A. Khisamutdinov, renowned historian of the RFE, writes about “the Chinese roundup” in the south of the RFE which was carried out at the end


12. According to Professor Larin’s calculations about 150 articles on “yellow peril” were published in the Russian media during 1992-1995 (op. cit.: 321).

13. In text “predpriyatiya” – a Soviet-era term referring to manufacturing entities. From the text it is clear that these are indeed manufacturing entities, possibly of different forms of ownership by 1992 already being established in Russia.


22. Alternative view points out economic inefficiency of building advanced technological facilities from the ground up in the remote and underpopulated area, suggesting instead close cooperation with the Northeastern China where proposed manufacturing facilities would be located. The issue remains highly contentious.

23. The imperative of attracting higher numbers of foreign migrants has been acknowledged and analyzed in the works of Russian sociologists – Z. Zaionchkovskaya, L. Rybakovsky and others.


30. Republic of Khakasiya and city of Ul’yanovsk are expected to join the list of visa-free tourist destinations in 2015.
hima-dlya-knr-stimuliruet-turistichsekiy-rost-v-primore/ (in Russian)
(accessed on July 13, 2015).
(accessed on September 20, 2014). The “NEORUSS” project is sponsored
by the University of Oslo and the Norwegian Institute of Foreign Affairs
and studies new Russian nationalism. The survey was designed by the
author M. Alexeev from the University of San Diego in cooperation with
the Institute of History, Archaeology and Ethnography of the Far Eastern
Peoples in Vladivostok. A total of 1,010 people took part in the 2000
survey, 650 in 2005 and 680 in 2013. Findings are reported in: M. Alexeev.
“Parting with Asian Balkans: Perceptions of Chinese migration in the
Russian Far East, 2000-13”. PONARS Eurasia.
July 10, 2015).
(in Russian) (accessed on August 13, 2014). The poll by “Levada Center”
was conducted on May 23-26, 2014 among 1,600 respondents, with
statistical error around 3.4%.
37. At the time of writing, about USD 4,900 and USD 3,500, accordingly. If
the migrants do not stay 2 years or longer, they must return the relocation
assistance.
2015).
July 07, 2015)
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From Dungans to *Xinyimin*: China, Chinese Migration and the Changing Sociopolitical Fabric of Central Asian Republics

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Abstract

This paper looks at the issue of ethnic identity of the Dungans – descendants of early Chinese migrants in Central Asia – and its change and preservation in the context of the fragile social fabric of the Central Asian states that were born from the shadow of the now-defunct Soviet Union, the arduous processes of nation-building plagued by often violent, competing emergent nationalisms as well as political and economic turbulence, and the impact brought by the emergence of the *xinyimin* (Chinese new migrants). These Chinese-speaking Dungans staying in compact communities mostly in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are descendants of political and war refugees from China’s provinces of Shaanxi and Gansu who moved across the border into the territory of Czarist Russia in the later part of the nineteenth century after the crushing of the Northwest Uprising by the Imperial Ch’ing (the Manchu dynasty) army which bordered on genocide and ethnic cleansing. This paper analyses how a new ethnic identity has since
emerged due partly to the geographical isolation imposed by the formidable natural barrier of the Tianshan ("Heavenly Mountains") However, their Chinese language in the form of a mixture of the Shaanxi and Gansu regionaleccts, remarkably written today not in Chinese characters but in the Cyrillic alphabet, and Chinese traditions of the Shaanxi and Gansu varieties have been fiercely preserved through the generations until today, including nineteenth-century vocabulary and traditions which are no longer found in modern China, due both to the cohesiveness of communal life and an aversion to marriage outside the community. After analysing the community’s dilemmas of identity preservation and identity creation, this paper then proceeds to look at the impact of the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 resulting in the birth of the post-Soviet independent Central Asian republics, and the influx of the xinyimin from China since the early 1990s that has triggered xenophobic response with varying intensity in many of these Central Asian societies, towards these descendants of early Chinese migrants who are now facing a whole new set of challenges brought about both by the onslaught of nationalisms of the new politically dominant ethnic groups in these Central Asian states and the economic turmoil faced by these new republics following the collapse of the Soviet command economy.

**Keywords**: migrants, Dungans, xinyimin, China, Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan

**JEL classification**: F22, F52, J15, O15
1. Introduction

In his iconoclastic 1985 study, Charles Tilly questioned the idea of a social contract in state making, where a society whose shared norms and expectations call forth a certain kind of government, and defined “those peculiar forms of governments we call national states” as “relatively centralized, differentiated organizations the officials of which more or less successfully claim control over the chief concentrated means of violence within a population inhabiting a large, contiguous territory” (Tilly, 1985: 170). Without going so far with Tilly in seeing nation-states as “quintessential protection rackets with the advantage of legitimacy”, it is still impossible not to question the long taken-for-granted notion of the inviolable sovereignty of the nation-state and even the very essence of the nation-state itself. Benedict Anderson (1991: 6-7), too, defined a nation as a community socially constructed and ultimately imagined by the people who perceive themselves as part of that group – essentially forming a nation unto itself – and “regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible […] for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings”. The sovereignty of a nation-state is imagined, according to Anderson, because the concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm, giving rise to the national dreams of freedom whose gage and emblem were the sovereign state. Similarly, other historicist (in contrast to the primordialists) like Ernest Gellner (1983) and Eric Hobsbawm (1990) also posited that nations and nationalism are products of modernity and have been created as means to political and economic ends, and the nation, assuming the nineteenth-century conceptual entity of a nation-state, is the product of nationalism – but not vice versa –
through the unification of various peoples into a common society or community. It is in such context of the nation, nation-state and nationalism that this paper sets out to examine and analyse the issue of the ethnic identity of the descendants of Dungan Chinese migrants and its change and preservation in the context of the fragile social fabric of the Central Asian states that were reborn from the shadow of the non-defunct Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR, Soviet Union), and the arduous processes of nation-building plagued by often violent, competing emergent nationalisms as well as political and economic turbulence. These Chinese-speaking Dungans mostly staying in compact communities in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are descendants of political and war refugees (in contrast to Chinese migrants in Southeast Asia, Europe and the Americas who were mainly economic migrants) from China’s provinces of Shaanxi (陕西) and Gansu (甘肅) who moved across the border into the territory of Czarist Russia in the later part of the nineteenth century after the crushing of the Northwest Uprising by the Imperial Ch’ing/Qing (清, the Manchu dynasty) army which bordered on genocide and ethnic cleansing. After arriving in Russian Central Asia, these early landless Chinese migrants were allowed by the Czarist government to reclaim wasteland for farming and engage in livestock husbandry. In early twentieth century, these Chinese migrants and their descendants also actively participated in the construction of the former Soviet Union and Stalin’s war against the Third Reich’s invasion in the 1940s.

This paper analyses how a new Dungan ethnic identity has since emerged due partly to the geographical isolation imposed by the formidable natural barrier of the Tianshan (T’ien Shan, 天山, “Heavenly Mountains”) and partly to the ambiguous sentiments towards the ancestral homeland of Zhongyuan given the collective memory of the tragic exodus (the earlier generations of these Chinese migrants in
Central Asia used to call themselves *tsun-ianziŋ*, i.e. “people of/from Chungyüan” – “Chungyüan” or “Chungt’u” (中原/中土), literally “Middle Land” or “Middle Earth”, being a common Chinese expression in the old days referring to China). However, the Chinese language in the form of a mixture of the Shaanxi and Gansu regionalects remarkably written today not in Chinese characters but in the Cyrillic alphabet, and Chinese traditions of the Shaanxi and Gansu varieties have been fiercely preserved through the generations until today, including nineteenth-century vocabulary and traditions which are no longer found in modern China, due both to the cohesiveness of communal life and an aversion to marriage outside the community.

Besides analysing the Dungan community’s dilemmas of identity preservation and identity creation, this paper also looks at the impact of the disintegration of the Soviet union in 1991 and the birth of the post-Soviet independent Central Asian republics on these descendants of Chinese migrants. The influx of the *xinyimin* (新移民, “new migrants”) from China since the early 1990s that has triggered xenophobic response in many Central Asian societies (linked to a growing domestic politically charged perception of “China threat” to their nation’s sovereignty which has potentially explosive implications for their bilateral relations with their powerful East Asian neighbour) is also adding a new dimension to the existing set of new challenges faced by the Dungans today brought about both by the onslaught of nationalisms of the new politically dominant ethnic groups especially in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan and the economic turmoil faced by these new republics following the collapse of the Soviet command economy, which in a violent form, resulted in the severe interethnic clashes between the Chinese-speaking and Turkic-speaking youths in Iskra, near the Kyrgyz capital Bishkek, in February 2006 which sent a tremor through Kyrgyzstan’s delicate ethnic social fabric that was still licking its
wounds after the Kyrgyz-Uzbek clash in 1991 that claimed more than 300 lives.

2. The Iskra Ethnic Riots

On 6th February 2006, severe ethnic clashes broke out between the Chinese-speaking Dungan (“Tungan”, or called “Dolgans” by the Russians) youths and Turbic-speaking Kyrgyz youths in the Dungan-majority village of Iskra, about 70 kilometers from Kyrgyz capital Bishkek (called Frunze in the Soviet period), sending a tremor through Kyrgyzstan’s delicate ethnic social fabric. The Chinese Dungans (Дунгане, Dungani), while comprising up to 90 per cent of Iskra’s 3,000 residents, are but one of the smallest minority groups in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The first sign of trouble came a week earlier on the night of 31st January when two Kyrgyz boys were allegedly beaten by six Dungan youths in a dispute over a seat in a local computer center. Tension rapidly escalated, culminating in large Kyrgyz demonstrations on 4th-5th February that demanded the forced removal of the six Dungan youths involved in the brawl, along with their families. Situation got worse when on 5th February four Dungan youths in a speeding car allegedly fired gunshots at the Kyrgyz protesters, triggering a rampage by the Kyrgyz demonstrators in which Dungans were beaten and houses were set on fire, forcing some Dungan families to seek refuge in a local mosque. When order was restored on 6th February, 20 people had been injured, 40 people had been arrested and about 30 homes had been destroyed. Hundreds of Dungan families were forced to seek political asylum in neighbouring Kazakhstan though eventually returned after the tensions had calmed down (Laruelle and Peyrouse, 2009: 104-105).
3. Host Environment, Contextual Factors, and Xinyimin from China: Deeper Roots of Conflict

Violent attacks on the Dungans like that in the Iskra riots are rare, so far unseen yet in Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan, but have deeper roots in the case of Kyrgyzstan – where interethnic tensions between Dungans and Kyrgyz are frequent especially in the Chui region (Laruelle and Peyrouse, 2009: 104) – which Nicholas J. Steiner in his thesis submitted to Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies attributes to, firstly, Chinese migrant entities’ “overt presence in Kyrgyzstani society that openly competes with local labor and business”, and, secondly, the inaction of the Kyrgyz government “to stem the flow, or at least compartmentalize, the Chinese presence in the country” (Steiner, 2013: 34-35) in a decentralized state with weak economic development. As the largest Chinese export market among the nations of Central Asia, observes Steiner, the presence of Chinese migrants, goods, and investments in Kyrgyzstan, as seen in the country’s numerous bazaars serving “as re-export bases for massive quantities of Chinese wares […] interacts with society on a much more noticeable level than they do in Kazakhstan”, which unfortunately:

Rather than creating greater prosperity for Kyrgyz society as a whole, however, the Sino-Kyrgyz partnership has actually fostered greater instability in Kyrgyzstan. In a decentralized state with weak economic development, uncertainty surrounding China’s growing influence continues to channel resentment against Chinese interests.

(Steiner, 2013: 28)

According to Amantur Zhaparov (2008: 83), in the major Kyrgyzstan markets in Bishkek and near Osh where the Chinese xinyimin have been trading since the late 1990s, local Dungans mostly work as assistants to
Chinese traders, whether Uyghurs or Hans. In terms of ethnic relations, Marlène Laruelle and Sébastien Peyrouse (2009) observe that

Historically, the relations between Uyghurs and the Hui from Xinjiang have been conflictual. The two peoples do not in the least foster Muslim solidarity; indeed the Hui/Dungans are keener on working with the Hans [...] yet, it is] very rare that the Central Asian Dungans are able to re-establish familial links in China and can use them as a driver of trade. In confirmation of this absence of family networks, the Dungans involved in trade work almost systematically with Xinjiang, in particular via the Urumqi industrial park and the free-trade zones at the borders, or in the Pearl River Delta, but they do not venture as far as Gansu [which is the ancestral homeland of most Dungans in Kyrgyzstan] and Shaanxi [which is the ancestral homeland of most Dungans in Kazakhstan].

Laruelle and Peyrouse (2009: 107)

Hence, in view of this close link between the local Dungans and the xinyimin from China in terms of economic activities, it would be difficult for the Dungans – are usually wealthier than other local ethnic groups in Kyrgyzstan due to their business credentials and community networks, as well as gaining from their service together with the Uyghur diaspora as as intermediaries of the Han shuttle traders (Steiner, 2013: 31, 34) – to extricate themselves from the local Kyrgyz resentment and aggression channeled against the Chinese interests represented by the Chinese xinyimin who to many in the post-Soviet countries represent “an integral part of China's strategy of global economic expansion, aiming at encouraging Chinese business abroad [...] designed to create conditions for the ‘transnational management’ doctrine, whereby the Chinese diaspora in destination countries forms communities and small
businesses for the purposes of economic and geopolitical expansion of China” (Sadovskaya, 2007: 157).

Besides local Kyrgyz people’s backlash against perceived economic threat posed by the Chinese xinyimin’s economic exploitation including invading local industrial jobs and dominating small and medium-sized enterprises, such resentment against Chinese interests in general also stems from increasing perception among the Kyrgyz people that their government is unwilling to defend the country from perceived Chinese threats to their nation’s sovereignty – whether in the form of the then Askar Akayev government’s concession in 2002 of nearly 100,000 hectares of land to China to resolve a longstanding territorial dispute, or the Kyrgyzstan government’s allowing China to extradite more people, often on loosely-formed terrorism accusations, from Kyrgyzstan than it did from all of the other members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) combined, or even China’s submission in 2010 to the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) an application to protect the Kyrgyz epic poem “Manas” as a Chinese contribution to world cultural heritage, a move that many Kyrgyz people viewed as part of China’s effort to take ownership over their nation’s cultural icons (Steiner, 2013: 32-33). In addition, élite Kyrgyz social entrepreneurs with political incentives independent of the State also tend to mobilize popular opposition against Chinese entities, contributing further to the occasional violent disputes between the Kyrgyz people and the Chinese xinyimin (ibid.: 28-29, 33-35):

- Assassination of the First Secretary of the Chinese Embassy in Bishkek in the summer of 2002 and a fatal attack on a Chinese bus in March 2003 that left 17 dead – the blame of both of these incidents were placed by the Chinese government on the alleged Uyghur terrorist organization, East Turkestan Liberation Front (ETLF).
• Violent attacks against Uyghur and Dungan neighborhoods, including the abovementioned almost anti-Dungan program in Iskra in February 2006, and the attack (including gun attack) on Dungans and Uyghurs in Tokmok during the political protests of April 2010.
• Numerous attacks against Chinese nationals and commercial centers in Bishkek during Kyrgyzstan’s political turmoil in the summer of 2010, particularly in the core Chinese areas surrounding Guoying and Tataan plazas. The targets are mostly Han Chinese, but at least one Uyghur restaurant was also attached, and one Uyghur resident was killed in the disturbance.
• The killing of five Kyrgyz border guards by a colleague in August 2012 led to initial media suspicions of a direct Chinese attack.
• Hostage-taking in Osh Province of locals by drunken Chinese labourers in January 2013.

In the worst among the above incidents, while the Iskra village administration has been blamed by the Dungans for allegedly taking side with the ethnic Kyrgyz and participating in the violence against the Dungans in February 2006, the Kyrgyz government attributed the clashes to three major factors – economic malaise, social problems and interethnic misunderstanding. These severe clashes are particularly alarming given the fact that the two ethnic communities have been living peacefully with each other all along. However, tensions have been accumulating in recent years. Apparently, the Dungans have not been spared in the general rising interethnic tensions that afflicted the Central Asian republics amidst the political and socioeconomic upheavals following the their independence from Soviet Union that collapsed in 1990.
4. Flight from Zhongyuan¹: Historical Geography of Ethnicity of a Forgotten People

Referred to by historians as the largest Overseas² Chinese migrant community and the largest overseas Shaanxi(-Gansu) migrant community³, the 100,000-120,000 Dungans also represent the largest Chinese Muslim community outside China, with 50,000 found in Kazakhstan (36,000 persons in the 1999 census, in particular in the Dzhambul region, and in smaller numbers in Almaty, Akmolinsk, Karaganda, Aktiubinsk and West-Kazakhstan)⁴, 60,000 in Kyrgyzstan (60,000 persons according to 2008 statistics, 51,000 persons at the 1999 census, where they constitute the country’s fourth largest nationality)⁵ and a much smaller number in Uzbekistan⁶. In Kyrgyzstan, there are 12000 to 13000 Dungans in Sokuluk (Saohulu, 驚葫蘆; about 30 km west of Bishkek) including the adjacent Aleksandrovka (Александровка), 5000-10000 in Milianfan (米糧坊, or Miliangchuan) (about 60 km west of Tokmok and 60 km northeast of Bishkek), about 3300 in Bishkek, 2800 in Yrdyk (Erdaogou, 二道溝), 1500 in Ivanovka and 800-2500 in Osh (Aoshe, 救什). In Kazakhstan, there are 7000-12000 Dungans in Masanchi/Masanchin (Масанчи/Масанчин, 馬三清; 8 km north of Kyrgyzstan’s Tokmok) which before 1965 was called Karakunuz (Каракунуз, Караконыз, meaning the breeding place of black beetles), 9000-12000 in Sortobe (Сортоб/Шортоб, Xinqu, 新渠; a few km downstream from Tokmok and south of Masanchi/Karakunuz) and 3000-5000 in Zhalpak-tobe (Джалпак).

It would not be inappropriate to refer to the Dungan Chinese as a “forgotten people”, for despite the fact that, as mentioned above, they constitute the largest Chinese community outside People’s Republic of China and Taiwan, there was, for instance, no record of their existence in the authoritative Encyclopedia of Chinese Overseas published in Singapore in 1998.
Other than the traditionally Dungan villages, many Dungsans also live in the nearby cities, such as Bishkek, Tokmok (Токмок, Russian “Tokmak” (Токмақ)), Karakol. Masanchin, known to Dungsans traditionally as Ingpan (Yingpan, 營盤 – Dungan “Йинпан” or Russian “Инъпан”), however, has a particular significance, being the heartland of the Tungan people and their earliest settlement in Central Asia. Karakunuz was renamed in 1965 Masanchi or Masanchin, after Magazi Masanchi or Masanchin (马三青), a prominent Dungan during the Communist Revolution and a Soviet Kazakhstan statesman. Magazi Masanchi had great contribution to the building of the Soviet regime in Central Asia and founded the School of Dungan Culture in Almaty in the 1930s. He was killed in 1936 in the Stalin’s purge. The Masanchin village’s traditional Dungan name Ынпач (Ingpan) is a Chinese military term meaning “a camp” or “an encampment”. The military flavour of the name indeed captures well the background of historical geography of the Dungan ethnicity in Central Asia.

The etymology of the name “Dungan” (or “Tungan”) remains uncertain. The Dungsans actually continue to refer to themselves, as in China, as the Hui people (huizu, 回族 – Dungan “хүэйзү” [xueidzi]), while their Turkic- and Tajik-speaking neighbours in Xinjiang (新疆) and the Central Asian states and the Russians refer to them as the Dungsans – Russian plural дүнгәне (dungane), singular дүнгәнин (dunganin), probably derived from Turkic döňän (“one who turns”), similar in meaning to the Chinese 回 (hui). Some scholar thought that it could have meant Eastern Gansu province from which many of the Dungsans’ forefathers came, despite the fact that the character “gan” in the Dungsans’ Chinese ethnic name Donggan (東干) is different from that in the name of Gansu (甘肅) province. Others attributed the name to Turkic Turup Qalghan, meaning “people who have settled down”, or Chinese dong’an (東岸, “east bank”, referring to the east bank of the
Yellow River where these people originally came from), or “Tongguan” (潼關, the place and nearby area in today’s Shaanxi province where some of these people came from), or even “Dunhuang” (敦煌, which is situated on the these people’s route of migration into Czarist Russia). In the past the Dungans used to call themselves ṭsun-ianziŋ (zhongyuanren, 中原人, literally “people of/from zhongyuan” – “zhongyuan”, literally “Middle Land”, is a common Chinese expression in the old days referring to China) (Rimsky-Korsakov Dyer, 1981: 46-47).

According to Liu (2004)’s statistics, the pattern of distribution of the Dungans in Central Asia is similar to that of the Hui Muslims in China – the overall scattering of small concentrations. They are in general scattered among the rural and urban areas of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, in particular their respective capital cities of Almaty, Bishkek and Toshkent (Tashkent). However, whether in the urban or rural areas, the Dungans tend to live closely together in compact communities. The 120000 Dungans in the three Central Asian states are living on/in about 30 farms or urban compact communities. The distances between Dungan communities range from just 2 km (e.g. from Kazakhstan’s Sortobe to Kyrgyzstan’s Tokmok) to thousands of kilometres (e.g. from Kazakhstan’s Almaty to Uzbekistan’s Toshkent (Liu, 2004: 14). The largest number of Dungan farming communities are in Kyrgyzstan; Kazakhstan has a smaller number but with large areas and number of people. Eighty per cent of the Dungans mainly live on the plains on the banks of the Chui River (or “Chuy”, “Chu” or “Shu”, Kazakh “Шы”, Kyrgyz “Чуий”, Russian “Чу”) that forms a natural border between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, with the majority on the 200 km long, 80 km wide fertile plain of the Chui River around the capital Bishkek of the otherwise mountainous Kyrgyzstan. From Masanchin/Ingpan, the first Dungan farming community, in the centre of the Alatau mountain ranges (Kazakh “Алатау”, Kyrgyz “Ала-Тоо”,
Russian “Алатай”) of the Tianshan, crossing the Chui River about 9 km away is the city of Tokmok, and from around Tokmok the Kyrgyz capital Bishkek and to Sokuluk in the south, Dungans are distributed among the 20 or so farms, towns and cities on the plain all within an area of 100 km from east to west, 50 km from north to south (ibid.).

There are four phases in the history of the Dungan Chinese migration to Central Asia, reflecting closely the sociopolitical development of China.

The first phase of the Dungan Chinese migration was related to China’s northwestern Muslim rebellion against the imperial Ch’ing court during the period 1862-1877. Following the defeat of the Yakub-Beg state in 1877, thousands of people were forced to escape to Tsarist Central Asia. From late November 1877, defeated rebels retreated in three batches into Russian territory. The first batch consisted of a few thousand people from Gansu Province’s Didaozhou (狄道州), led by Ahong (阿訇, Imam) Ma Yusu or Ma Yuan (馬鬱素夫/馬元, also known as 狄道老人/阿爺老人, i.e. “The Didao Old Man”). The group entered Russian territory by crossing the Tianshan (tian “heaven”, shan “mountain”) at the northwest of Aksu (in Xinjiang). Many died from the extreme cold while crossing Tianshan, the surviving 1116 people finally settled in late 1877 and the spring of 1878 in the village of Yrdyk (Ырдык/Erdaogou, 二道溝, some 15 km southwest from Karakol in Eastern Kyrgyzstan) (Liu, 2004: 15). The second batch, over 10000 fighters and their family members from Shaanxi Province, led by the legendary Mohammad Ayub Bai Yanhu/Bo Yanhu (白彥虎), first retreated to Kashgar in Southern Xinjiang and crossed the Tianshan, and reached the Russian territory on 6th December 1877, and then Tokmok (in northwestern Kyrgyzstan) on 27th December 1877, finally settled in the village of Karakunuz (later Masanchin) in Kazakhstan, about 8 km north from Tokmok. Only 3314 out of the original 10000 survived the
Tianshan ordeal on arrival (ibid.). The third batch consisted of those from Qinghai (Ts’inghai, 青海) and Xinjiang’s Turfan, led by Ma Daren (馬大人 / 馬大老爺, “The Great Master Ma”), who moved southward from Kashgar to Central Asia in early December 1877 and after a few months’ trekking reached Osh in February 1878 with a number of 1779 people. Some of them who were from Qinghai continued to move on to Zhambyl in Kazakhstan, while those who remained in Osh were later assimilated by the Uzbeks (ibid.).

“At the end of 1877 […]”, as recorded in the report of a Russian official, “around 12,000 Kashgaris and Dungans immigrated to our territories. Approximately 7,000 of them went to Semirechic region whereas the others went through Osh to the Fergana Valley.” (Zhaparov, 2008: 80)8 Upon arrival, the Czarist government gave these refugees 5000 hectares of land and 10-year exemption from tax.9 Beginning from Ingpan (later Masanchin), Dungan farming villages gradually proliferated to the surrounding areas.

The second phase of the Dungan Chinese migration was related to the Treaty of Saint Petersburg signed in February 1881, whose terms required the withdrawal of the Russian troops from the Upper Ili Basin (the Kulja area). With the return of Ili, which was annexed by Czarist Russia on 4th July 1871, to China in March 1882 and the leaving of the Russian troops, the Hui in Ili were in fear of vengeance by the Ch’ing army due to their sympathy for the 1862-1877 anti-Ch’ing northeastern Muslim rebellion (Liu, 2004: 16). Ili’s Hui merchant Ma Cong (馬聰) led six others on 3rd July 1881 to explore places including Verny (Almaty was called Verny before 1921, and Alma-Ata from 1921 to 1992), Zhambil and Bishkek, and finally selected the fertile Sokuluk by the Chui River, which was sparsely populated. Many hence moved to Sokuluk. Ili was returned to China on 18th March 1882. According to Russian customs record, on 20th March 1882 there was an exodus of
486 families (comprising 2457 people) from Ili, with 916 carriage of goods and furniture (ibid.). Many of the migrants settled in Almaty, Panfilov (Панфилов), Khorgas/Khorgos and Sokuluk. Following the departure of these wealthy residents, another group of Hui – mostly poor families – also migrated in the same direction in the spring of the following year. However, unlike the richer migrants in the previous year, this batch of 5000 people who migrated on feet – nick-named by the earlier migrants as diaowazi (掉娃子, i.e. the “left-behind kids”) – settled mostly in Panfilov and Huoerguosi, only about 80 km from China’s border (ibid.). According to the Russian statistics, a total of 4,682 Hui Chinese moved to the Russian Empire under the Treaty of Saint Petersburg. With these waves of migration, there were about a total of 15000 Dungan Chinese migrants in Russian territory by the year 1883.

The third phase of Dungan Chinese migration occurred during the period 1957-1962, and the migrants were Muslims from Xinjiang. A large number of Kazakhs, Uighurs and Hui Chinese Muslims crossed the border into Russian territory in early May 1962 and settled in the village of Sortobe and the town of Ivanovka between Tokmok and Bishkek in Kyrgyzstan. These new migrants from China were called “No. 8” by the local Dungans, probably following the contingent number of the Chinese border troop there at that time (ibid.).

We could add a fourth phase of migrants – these are the familiar new migrants (xinyimin) after China implemented the “Reform and Open” policy, especially after the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991.

While the present Dungan people are the third (ageing) or fourth generations of descendants of their forefathers who migrated from Shaan-Gan (China’s provinces of Shaanxi and Gansu) over a century ago, their have maintained their Chinese ethnic identity both through the
fiercely guarded traditions and way of life, including the Shaanxi dialect of the Chinese language uniquely written phonetically in the Cyrillic alphabet, and a strong sense of being the descendants of a prosecuted people, exiled in a foreign land, especially among the third generation who are today in their seventies or eighties. Unlike Chinese in Southeast Asia, Australia, Europe and the Americas who are in the main descendants of economic migrants from the eastern coastal region of China, the Dungs in Central Asia are mostly descendants of political/war refugees from northwestern China escaping the genocidal troops of the imperial Ch’ing dynasty government.

The term “genocidal” is not an exaggeration. Close to a million Hui Chinese Muslims were slaughtered in Shaanxi alone and 800 mosques burnt when in November 1869 Ayub Bai Yanhu led his Shaanxi Muslim rebels retreating to Jingjibao (金積堡, in today’s Ningxia, 寧夏) under the attack of the Ch’ing troop led by Zuo Zongtang (Tso Tsung-t’ang, 左宗棠) who had just suppressed the (Christian) Taiping (太平天国) rebellion (Liu, 2004: 24). When Jingjibao fell in November 1870, more than 170 members of the various generations of the family of Ma Hualong (馬化龍), the Muslim leader who surrendered, were executed. Ma Hualong was tortured and killed in 1872, his heart dug out, his head paraded and burnt. A total of 1800 people were mass slaughtered, and it was alleged that during the gruesome torture of Ma Hualong and his people, seven layers of carpets were used to avoid the “rebel blood” from getting into the ground and “breeding rebel seed” (ibid.: 25). When Zuo Zongtang’s troops took Suzhou (蘇州, in today’s Gansu), up to about 10000 Hui Muslims were slaughtered, including the old, the women and the children. Zuo’s military crime against humanity was so gruesome that it was even chided by the Ch’ing court’s civilian officers (ibid.). The imperial (Manchu) Ch’ing government was not known to be soft-hearted towards rebels. Between 1648 and 1878, around twelve
million Hui and Han Chinese were killed in ten unsuccessful uprisings, and the Ch’ing court’s harsh suppression of these revolts was nothing less than genocidal, including the mass slaughtering of several million Hui Muslims in the “Hui-cleansing” (xi hui, 洗回) policy that had been long advocated by officials in the Ch’ing government. Before the war against the rebels, there was a total population of about 13 million people in Shaanxi province, at least 1,750,000 of whom were Hui Muslims, but the province’s population dropped to just 7 million after the war. There was a mass exodus from Xi’an (西安), the capital of Shaanxi province, which was the holy city of the Hui Muslims before the revolt, and Shaanxi province’s once-flourishing Hui Muslim population suffered a decline of 93 per cent. The Ch’ing court’s Hui-cleansing campaigns, hence, were quite a success. However, to be fair to the Ch’ing government, while not denying the gruesome war atrocities committed against the Muslim civilians, the Ch’ing armies only massacred the Muslims in areas that had rebelled, and spared Muslims in areas which took no part in the uprisings. Many Hui Muslim generals who helped the Ch’ing court to defeat the Muslim rebels were rewarded and their followers were spared from the genocide. General Zuo Zongtang, who was a Han Chinese, even relocated the Han people from the Hezhou (河州) suburbs to reward the Muslims there who surrendered and were granted amnesty and allowed to live as long as they stayed outside the city. Muslims in eastern and southern China did not revolt and hence were not affected by the rebellion and experienced no genocide. In fact, in Henan (河南) province which was adjacent to Shaanxi, Muslim villages were said to be totally unaffected by the Shaanxi rebellion.
5. Dungans’ Challenges in the Transition Economies

Today’s Dungan people in Sortobe work mainly as traders (50 per cent) and farmers (30 per cent), followed by government employees (10 per cent) and others (10 per cent, mainly in companies and as entrepreneurs), according to information conveyed by Husei Daurov Shimarovich (達吾勞夫・胡賽・西瑪勞維赤) or An Husei (安胡賽), the president of the Dungan Association of Kazakhstan (and a member of the People’s Committee of Kazakhstan and the chairman of the Dungan Collective Farm of the Zambyl Oblast), over the telephone (10th February 2011). (Like all Dungans, he has a Russified surname Shimarovich (西瑪勞維赤) when he is outside the Dungan villages, as well as a Chinese surname An (安) known among the Dungan people.) Similarly, Dungans speak Russian outside the Dungan villages, but revert to the Dungan (Shaan-Gan) Chinese tongue when they return to the Dungan villages (Li, 2008).) Sortobe – known to the Dungans as Xingu – has 19000 people; 99 per cent of them are Dungans, and the rest are Russians and Uyghurs, but these other ethnic groups can also speak the Dungan language. According to Husei Daurov, 99 per cent of the population has education up to the secondary-school level, but today only 30 per cent have university education, in contrast to 60 per cent during the Soviet times. The latter fact that An conveyed is a reflection of the new challenges faced by the Dungans in the new-born Central Asian states after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The February 2010 Dungan-Kyrgyz ethnic clash in Iskra was the climax to which such new unease has risen since the leaving of the Russian overlord and the upsurge of the local Kyrgyz/Kazakh/Uzbek nationalisms from the peripheral in former Soviet Union to the mainstream in these new-born Central Asian republics after the dissolution of USSR. The rise of Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Uzbek nationalism since Kazakhstanz’s, Kyrgyzstan’s and Uzbekistan’s
independence in 1991, with alarming war cries like “Kazakhstan belongs to the Kazakhs” and “Kyrgyzstan is for the Kyrgyz”, and the leaving of many Russian (e.g., over 2 million Russians have moved to Russia, reducing Kazakhstan’s population from 17 million to 15 million) and the Kazakh-, Kyrgyz- and Uzbek-ization of the civil service in these three states where Dungans domicile do reflect the unmistakable objective ethnic situation these countries are undergoing. Before the unprecedented violent ethnic clash with the Kyrgyz in February 2006, the Dungans, partly due to their small number, usually stay out of such conflicts, such as the large-scale interethnic violence between the Kyrgyz and the Uzbek in southern Kyrgyzstan in 1991 which resulted in tremendous loss of lives.

Just like other communities of the Chinese diaspora worldwide, the Dungans are economically successful – and doing better economically in general than the local dominant ethnic group (Kyrgyz/Kazakhs/Uzbeks) but they are usually politically inactive, again, partly due to their small number. The mounting challenges the Dungans are facing right now in the post-Soviet Union era is most apparently reflected in the negative impact on education, as shown above by the figures conveyed by Husei Daurov about the Dungans in Sortobe. During the Soviet era, before the present rise of local ethnic nationalism, university education was encouraged and paid by the government, hence the number of Dungan university students was substantial and the Dungans as a whole enjoyed high education standards. In fact, it is truly remarkable that while the early political and war refugees escaping through Tianshan into Central Asia more than a century ago were mostly poor illiterate peasants, their descendants would soon boast of a rich body of poets, scholars, academics, teachers, medical doctors and other professionals. However, with the new-found independence of these Central Asian states and the accompanying economic and fiscal problems, the new governments no
longer pay for university education, and that has led to an apparent decline in the university enrolment of Dungans. Besides that, the Dungans are also facing new economic challenges because their wealth which depended formerly on high income from the sales of their vegetables and other crops is now badly hit by these new countries’ loss of the important Russian demand, leading to shortage of demand and low prices (Liu, 2004: 141). While there had been many Dungans working in the government departments and universities of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan during the Soviet era, this is no longer so today since the independence of these countries. In fact, many Dungan university graduates today are forced to become vegetable farmers or go into business. For example, in Kyrgyzstan in 2002, the monthly salary of a university professor is merely US$25, and the researchers in the renowned Institute of Dungan Studies of the Kyrgyzstan National Science Academy have a monthly salary of only about US$15, hence they are forced to supplement their incomes by working also as hawkers in the streets (ibid.). Some Dungan professionals in fact lost their jobs overnight at the dissolution of the Soviet Union and turned into hawkers. Take the case of a prominent descendant of Mohammad Ayub Bai Yanhu, the legendary leader of the 1877 “Long March” through Tianshan – Abdullah Ayub Bai Yanhu, now in Naryn (Нарын, 纳林, in eastern Kyrgyzstan, close to the Chinese border), the first resting place of Mohammad Ayub Bai Yanhu and his followers when they crossed Tianshan in December 1877. Originally a professional with university degree, now he is a restaurant owner (ibid.: 142). This is a common phenomenon today.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union has had adverse impact on the cultural domain too. During the Soviet times, publication of Dungan newspapers and school textbooks were the responsibility of the government. No longer now. Dungan presses virtually died overnight at
the disintegration of the USSR. The first Dungan newspaper, the *Dongfang Huoxing Bao* “Eastern Fire Seeds” (東方火星報) was born in 1932, the year the Dungan script switched from the Arabic to the Latin alphabet, which later was further converted into the Cyrillic in 1954 (Liu, 2004: 56). Due to the political environment, the paper was renamed Șiiyoti ți (十月的旗, in Russian Znamia Oktiabr’ia, i.e. “October Banner”). In 1980, it was rename again as the *Sulian Huimin Bao*, i.e. “Soviet Union Huimin Press” (蘇聯回民報; *huimin* means “the Hui people”, i.e. Muslims) . Other than a break during the Second World War, the Dungan newspapers had never stop publishing, and the operating expenses of the newspapers and the newspaper publishers were paid for and supported by the Soviet government. With Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan attaining independence upon the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Dungan Association of Kyrgyzstan took up the responsibility of publishing the “Huimin Press”, and Dungan Association of Kazakhstan took up the publication of the “Huizu Press” (*huizu* means “the Hui race”) or “Shaanxi Huizu Press” (陝西回族報). However, now without government sponsorship, the papers are sometimes forced to stop publishing due to problems with operating expenses (*ibid.*). The “Huizu Press” of Kazakhstan now only publishes an issue every three months. Besides, the Dungan Association of Kazakhstan also finances the publication of new Dungan-language textbooks and literature and sends them to the neighboring republics, though interestingly, according to Laruelle and Peyrouse (2009: 107), the relationship between the Dungan associations in the different Central Asian republics is relatively bad, in particular between those of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Laruelle and Peyrouse further note the difficulties facing these associations within the sociopolitical milieux of the post-Soviet republics:
The Dungans have an association in each of the four Central Asian republics (Turkmenistan excepted), but they are often limited to the organization of folkloric activities (songs, dance, cuisine) and, in Almaty and Bishkek, to the editing of association newspapers […] Like all the other minorities, the Dungans are dependent on their environment: in Uzbekistan, they are forbidden from engaging in political activities whereas in Kyrgyzstan, many associations competed against one another prior to unification in 2008, but this multiplicity impeded the Dungans from organizing and seeking out private sponsors.

(ibid.)

6. Preservation of Chinese Culture and Creation of New Ethnic Identity

While having been living for more than a century scattering around Central Asia which is inhabited by a great many ethnic groups, the Dungans’ cultural memory of their Chinese homeland has not bedimmed with the passage of time. Today, over 90 per cent of the Dungans still speak the Shaanxi and Gansu regionalects of China and follow closely their forefathers’ traditional way of life, whether in dietetic habits, dressing or housing, of the Hui Muslim region of northwest China.

From the original 10941 people who survived the exodus through Tianshan to move into Czarist Russia in 1877, 1878 and 1879, the Dungan Chinese Muslim population in Central Asia has today increased nine-fold over the hundred years. As the descendants of early migrants from Shaanxi and Gansu who escaped persecution and genocide at home and who were survivals of the ordeal through Tianshan (only about 30 per cent of those who set out on this “Long March” eventually survived; the rest died under the swords of the pursuing Ch’ing army, or from cold...
and hunger on the “Heavenly Mountains”), the Dungan Chinese have
long been noted for their fierceness in preserving the Chinese culture
within their diasporic communities. Besides, the Dungans also retain
the use of all traditional Chinese musical instruments like erhu (二胡),
banhu (板胡), di (笛), sheng (笙) etc. and traditional Chinese medicine
and medical practices, as well the use of nongli (農曆, the Chinese lunar
calendar) in farming activities (Zhi, 2004). Besides their preservation of
the Shaan-Gan regionalect (the so-called Dungan language written not in
Chinese characters but in a phonetic script) and the publication of the
Dungan language newspapers and the use of the Dungan language
textbooks from primary school to secondary school, the preservation of
the Chinese culture is also reflected in women’s attire and headgears that
are Ch’ing dynasty in origin which no longer survive in the Chinese
communities elsewhere, and Ch’ing-era bride and bridegroom costumes
in marriage ceremonies. Arranged marriage (through parents and
matchmakers) still survives in today’s Dungan communities, especially
rural.

Even everyday vocabulary reflects the archaic Ch’ing-dynasty
influence, e.g. calling a premier or president huangshang or huangdi (皇上 / 皇帝, i.e. “emperor”), government department yamen (衙門),
policeman yayi (衙役, i.e. “yamen runner”), complaining or petitioning
shang zhuangzi (上狀子), government officer daren (大人, i.e. “lord”),
shopkeeper zhanguide (掌櫃的), writer/poet xiejia (寫家), airplane
fengchuan (風船, i.e. “wind-ship”) or tiefengzheng (鐵風箏, i.e. “iron
kite”), dowry peifang (陪房), child wa (娃), girl niüwa (女娃), village
cadre bangban (幫辦), matches yanghuo (洋火, i.e. “Western fire”),
and people coming from China qingguoren (清國人, i.e. “people from
the Ch’ing Empire”). In short, the Dungans’ Chinese language has
remained the late-Ch’ing version. Yusuf Liu in his elegiac poetic
travelogue Bei yue Tianshan [sad exodus over the Heavenly Mountains]
(2004) told of hearing Shaanxi children’s rhymes, which are now mostly lost in Shaanxi, still being sung in the Dungan villages – a remarkable preservation of traditions of their forefathers who escaped to Central Asia more than a century ago, as described by Svetlana Rimski-Korsakoff Dyer (1981) as the most valuable aspect of Dungan conservatism. “The most valuable aspect of the conservatism of both groups”, said Rimski-Korsakoff Dyer (1981: 49), “lies in the fact that they have preserved many songs, riddles, legends, stories, ceremonies and customs brought from China one hundred years ago.” The two groups Rimski-Korsakoff Dyer referred to are the Shensi (Shaanxi) Dungans and the Kansu (Gansu) Dungans. Rimski-Korsakoff Dyer observed that the more conservative of the two were the Shaanxi Dungans whose women still observed the custom of foot-binding as recently as 1948 and who dislike their daughters marrying Kazakhs or Kyrgyz (even though all are Muslims) or even the Gansu Dungans who often live just nearby (Rimski-Korsakoff Dyer, 1981: 49) Hence, the Dungans have often been seen as the most conservative in terms of interethnic integration. Most Dungans, in general, still value intra-Dungan marriages.

Rimski-Korsakoff Dyer, while noting the remarkable conservatism of the Dungans, also described that in some way they could be the most progressive among the Chinese communities in terms of language. Firstly, while all the past attempts at alphabetizing the Chinese writing system, including Mao Zedong (毛泽东)'s, had failed, the Dungans have succeeded. Rimski-Korsakoff Dyer attributed this to several crucial factors:

While the Chinese are very attached to their characters, the Dungans, with the exception of the mullahs, arrived in Russian territory one hundred years ago as illiterate peasants. Consequently for them there
was no emotional trauma involved in changing their way of writing and abandoning the characters that mean so much to most Chinese [...] The reasons why the Dungans could survive without characters is because they knew no characters in the first place; because they speak only two dialects which are similar to each other; and because they live among people who are all familiar with the Cyrillic alphabet.

(Rimski-Korsakoff Dyer, 1981: 50)

Rimski-Korsakoff Dyer also gave a second reason why she considered the Dungans linguistically progressive: while all other varieties of the Chinese language have many classifiers, the Dungans are gradually abolishing most of the classifiers and are nowadays using only one general classifier *ki* (*ge*, 個) at least in speech. If it has been a fact that many Chinese speakers (including the speakers of the regionalects) frequently in informal speech unconsciously replacing the correct classifiers with *ge*, then the Dungans are indeed progressive in gradually phasing out all classifiers but one far ahead of the Chinese speakers elsewhere.

In fact, the Dungans also embody a microcosm of the Hui people of China. In terms of geographical origin, their forefathers came from mainly Shaanxi and Gansu, but also Qinghai and Xinjiang of China; in sectarian terms, the Dungans comprise Muslims of the Jahriyya (哲赫忍耶), Qadim (*Gedimu*, 格迪目) and Ikhwan (伊赫瓦尼) sects; in terms of language, besides the Shaanxi and Gansu regionalects, Dungans also speak the Qinghai and Hezhou regionalects of China. The majority of the Dungans in Yrдиk belong to the Jahriyya sect – one of the many sects of China’s Hui which also include Qadim, Khufiyya (虎夫耶), Ikhwan, etc. Like the Khufiyya, the Jahriyya is a branch of the Naqshbandiyya, the largest Sufi brotherhood in Central Asia. The Jahriyya is one of the four main groups of *menhuan* (門宦), which also include the
Kubrawiyya, the Khufiyya and the Qadariyya. *Menhuan* is the Sufi order of the Hui people. For instance, there are three main Khufiyya *menhuan* evolved in Ningxia since the end of the Ch’ing dynasty (Yeoh, 2006a: 9-10) – the Xianmen (鮮門), the Tonggui (通貴) and the Hongmen *menhuan* (洪門門宦) whose founder Hong Hairu (洪海儒) – also known as Hong Shoulin (洪壽林) – was said to have very close personal relationship with the Red Army (Sun, 2006: 202). In a way, the Dungan exodus can also be seen as an epitome of the Chinese migration overseas from the late 19th Century to early 20th Century, and the Dungans in Central Asia are but a microcosm of the Hui of China. In fact, the early Hui who escaped from China in 1877 seemed to have fled in batches according to provincial origin and sect. In terms of provincial origin (*jiguan*, 藉貫), they were almost all from Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai and Xinjiang. In terms of language, they spoke the Chinese regionallects common to China’s Hui, i.e. the local dialects of Shaanxi, Qinghai, Hezhou and Gansu. The Dungans’ food and cuisine are basically identical to those of the Hui people in northwestern China, and their Islamic sects include all sects of China’s Hui. Cultural memory is also, e.g., reflected in the building of the mosques. For instance, the “Shaanxi Grand Mosque” in Masanchi has its door facing east. According to Liuwa Baiyanhu (*liuwa*, 六娃, means “the sixth child”; usually the full name of the grandfather was turned into a Dungan surname by the third generation reflecting the process of Russification, and this surname might disappear completely and be replaced by a Russian surname by the fourth generation\(^{12}\)), the grandson of Bai Yanhu, who is a Qadim, “When we pray we face Mecca, while the door of the mosque faces our old hometown in China.” (Liu, 2004: 49).

Interestingly, the Dungans’ pattern of settlement and domicile is characterized by provincial origin and sect. The Dungans in Kazakhstan’s Masanchi (Ingpan) and Sotorbe (*Xinqu*) are of Shaanxi

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origin, those in Kyrgyzstan’s Sokuluk are mainly of Gansu origin, those in Kazakhstan’s Zhambyl are mainly from Qinghai, and those in Kazakhstan’s Zhalpak-tobe are mainly from Xinjiang. In 1877, when Ayub Bai Yanhu and his followers camped, at the foot of the Alatau ranges, about 9 km from Tokmok, the Russian government allocated 58000 rubles for them to build houses (Liu, 2004: 49). During the distribution of land, money and property, internal contradictions rose to the surface. The puzzled Kazakh officials in charge at that time divided these Chinese migrants into the pro-Bai Yanhu Ashi and the anti-Bai Yanhu Aman (meaning “bad” in the Kazakh language). The Dungans there, including those in Masanchi (Ingpan) and the neighbouring areas, have since consisted of the two factions of “Ashi” and “Aman” which also took on religious sectarian flavour – the “Aman” being Ikhwan and the “Ashi” being Qadim (ibid.)

Sortobe (Xinqui) is one of the five largest settlements of the Dungans – the other four being Masanchin (Ingpan), Zhalpak-tobe, Miliangchuan and Sokuluk (including the adjacent Aleksandrovka). The over ten thousand people of Sortobe are mostly descendants of migrants, hence the lingua franca there is the Shaanxi regionalect. Sortobe is the result of the branching out of the first major Dungan settlement, Ingpan, after the latter had grown too crowded. Later, more and more Dungan farms were born, branching out from Sortobe. Among them, two became new Dungan farms only after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 resulted in the exodus of their main population who were German descendants, their houses and land being then bought up by the Dungans. The Dungans in Sortobe are almost all vegetable farmers and vegetable vendors, though there are businessmen among them too. Some have moved to farm vegetables in Belarus, Ukraine, Moscow and Siberia, allegedly being attracted by high vegetable prices and hence good income there. There are also in Sortobe Sino-Kazakhs, Sino-
Kyrgyz and Sino-Uzbeks who can still speak fluent Shaanxi regionalect (ibid.: 9), who are known as erzhuanzi (二转子, i.e. those with the mixed blood of two ethnicities) and sanzhuanzi (三转子, i.e. those with the mixed blood of three ethnicities) – terms which are usually considered as somehow impolite or derogatory.

Living in compact communities is part of the legacy of the first generation of these political and war refugees from northwestern China. As related by Bai Liuwa, Mohammad Ayub Bai Yanhu’s grandson living in Masanchin (Ingpan), there had been unwillingness among these refugees of not settling in the cities but instead in the desolate Karakunuz (the former name of Masanchin, meaning “breeding place of black beetles” in the Kyrgyz language). His grandfather then convinced them that this was a good place to settle because, firstly, the terrain would facilitate their escape in case the Ch’ing army pursued across the border, and secondly, being such a huge number of refugees, conflicts would be unavoidable in the long term if they were to stay together with the local people; hence, staying apart from the locals was considered a better option (ibid.: 31).

According to Heiyazi Lan’ahong (黑牙子・蓝阿訇), an intellectual in Masanchin, Ingpan (i.e. Masanchin) was much higher in terrain than Tokmok. Watching out from Ingpan to the direction of Tokmok, which is on the ancient Silk Road that linked China in the East and Uzbekistan in the west, there was nowhere for the enemy to hide. For the refugee migrants led by Bai Yanhu, they were ready to escape into the mountains at the back of Ingpan on the first sign of attack. Leaving Tokmok to camp at Ingpan made strategic sense, and in fact, “Ingpan” meant an army camp – it was a compact community of the generation of comrades who had fought together for 17 years before fleeing the Ch’ing Empire to continue to stay closely together and take care of each other (ibid.). The plain, pastoral life of the Dungans is also reflected in their
impressive hospitality to guests especially those from their ancestral homeland of Shaanxi-Gansu, a unique characteristic that has been repeatedly pointed by visitors to their villages, for instance, as highlighted in Yusuf Liu’s sentimental lyrical travelogue, *Bei yue Tianshan* [sad exodus over the Heavenly Mountains] (2004). The same heartwarming hospitality was also vividly recorded by Rimski-Korsakoff Dyer who visited the Dungans twenty years earlier: “During my stay in Frunze, Alma-Ata and the kolkhozes, I was treated with friendliness and overwhelming hospitality [and the Dungans] went out of their way to make my stay as fruitful and interesting as possible […]” (Rimski-Korsakoff Dyer, 1981: 51).

While not using Chinese characters but the Cyrillic alphabet, the Dungan newspaper “Eastern Fire Seeds” (東方火星) can be considered one of the earliest Chinese newspapers published by the Overseas Chinese.

The Dungan language is particularly unique in the fact that it is the only variety of the Chinese language which is not written in Chinese characters. The drastic break with the Overseas Chinese in other parts of the world in writing system is incidental. The 50 000 speakers of the Dungan language in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan actually call their language “Хуэйзў ўїяњ” [xweitsu jyjan] (huizu yuyan, 回族语言) (or Romanized Huejzw jyian; in Russian “дунганский язык” / dungsanskij jazyk) which means “language of the Hui”. There are two, mutually intelligible, varieties of the Dungan language – the Gansu regionalect with three tones (to be more exact, three tones in the final position in phonetic words and four tones in the nonfinal position) which serves as the standard, official, textbook form of the Dungan language, and the other which is the Shaanxi regionalect with four tones. However, standard Dungan’s three tones are not indicated in writing, except in dictionaries and children’s primers, where

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the second and third tones are marked by the Cyrillics ъ and ъ respectively (e.g. ма, мат, маъ) or alternatively by adding I, II and III
(e.g. ма I, ма II, ма III). Originally using a version of the Arabic alphabet called “Xiao’erjing” (小兒經) and then a writing system
composed of 35 Arabic letters introduced by Muslim students in Toshkent in 1927 before the Soviet Union banned all Arabic scripts in
the late 1920s, it switched to the Latin alphabet in 1928 after that year’s
Convention on Turkic Studies in Baku, which spearheaded the
Latinization campaign in the Turkic world, produced a Latinized
alphabet of 31 letters for the Dungan language – the writing system in
which Yasir Shiwaza (Я.Шиваза/Ясър Shivaza, 萊塞·十娃子) (1906-
1988), founder of Dungan literature, published his first anthology of
Dungan poems in 1931. Shiwaza/Shivaza is from Chinese shiwazi (十娃子), meaning “the tenth child” – reflecting a usual way of naming a
child among the early Dungsans. Then at a conference on 27th May 1953
in Frunze, Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic (or Kirghizia, later the
independent Republic of Kyrgyzstan after 1991), a system of writing
Dungan in a Cyrillic alphabet with 38 letters was devised and has since
been in use from 1953 till today. The “Xiao’erjing” Arabic alphabet
which remains in limited use today by some Hui communities in China
is practically dead among the Dungsans.

Long isolation from China, written in an alphabet instead of Chinese
characters, and significant influence from Russian and the Turkic
languages of their neighbours have led to the Dungan language taking on
a distinctive identity of its own, though this archaic form of
Shaanxi/Gansu regionalect is today still mutually intelligible with the
present Shaanxi and Gansu tongues of the two Chinese provinces. Soviet
census statistics had revealed that the Dungsans seemed to have
maintained the use of their mother tongue much more successfully as
compared with the other ethnic minorities in the Central Asian SSRs.
However, that may no longer be the case in the post-USSR era since 1991.

The Dungan language is very similar to China’s *putonghua* (普通话, i.e. Standard Chinese Vernacular or “Mandarin”), being a variety of Zhongyuan Mandarin (中原官话 vis-à-vis Lan-Yin Mandarin, 蘭銀官話) spoken in the southern part of Gansu province and the western part of the Guanzhong (關中) valley in Shaanxi province. While basically mutually intelligible with today’s Gansu or Shaanxi regionaleects, like Bahasa Malaysia vis-à-vis Bahasa Indonesia or Urdu vis-à-vis Hindi, Dungan vocabulary contains many Arabic and Persian loanwords not present in modern Chinese, as well as, like being trapped in a time capsule due to the isolation, many archaic terms of the Ch’ing-dynasty era which are no longer in use in modern Chinese. On the other hand, the large number of political, scientific and other technical terms introduced during the 20th century, including neologisms and a huge number of earlier ones adopted from Japanese *kanji* (漢字) compounds, are unknown to the Dungan language (partly due to geopolitical isolation and partly to the orthographical barrier) which instead borrowed such related vocabulary from Russian, the language medium of political governance and higher education in the former USSR.

To use the term “time capsule” is not an exaggeration. Professor Wang Guojie (王國杰), a prominent scholar in China on Dungans, reported that in his first visit to an old Dungan in Uzbekistan in 1990, the old man, in full surprise, asked Wang, “Ni shi cong Da Qing Guo lai de? ... Zuo Zongtang de ren hai zai bu?” [Are you from the Ch’ing Empire? ... Are [the Ch’ing General] Zuo Zongtang’s people still there?] Today’s visitors to the Dungan villages sometimes still report the same question about Zuo Zongtang being posed to them. In fact, it is reported that in these villages culturally virtually trapped in the late-Ch’ing era, when children throw tantrums, sometimes the adults’
response to stop their crying is to warn them that Zuo Zongtang will come to kill them if they do not stop crying! (Li, 2008)

7. Dungans in the Local Environment: Identity, Relations and Interactions

While the Central Asian states are now facing the problem of sharp decline in birth rate, the Dungans’ birth rate remains high. The second generation usually had about 7 to 15 children per family, partly due to the encouragement from the Soviet government. Among the farming families in Masanchi, Sotorbe and Sokuluk, many Dungan women were “hero mothers” who had given birth to more than 10 children. As observed in Vansvanova (2000) in the case of Kazakhstan, a Dungan rural family each still had about 5 or 6 children, though in the 1980s the number was 7 or 8. Vansvanova also noted that there were more than 300 “hero mother” in Masanchi and Sortobe. These refugee-migrants were originally peasants in Shaanxi and Gansu, hence the vast land in Central Asia had proven to be to their advantage. For instance in Masanchi, the first-generation migrants purchased some farming equipments with settlement subsidies from the local government as well as crafted some others for the planting of vegetables and wheat, and were out of poverty in just a few years. Sharing the common trait of Overseas Chinese elsewhere, these hardworking and persevering Dungans had managed to enjoy a relatively high standard of living during the Soviet times. While being of Shaan-Gan peasant origin, the Dungans were also good at business besides farming. It was reported that before the October Revolution, the prosperous “Chinatown” in Bishkek, Kirghizia, was lined with restaurants. In the campaign against the rich after the Revolution, these shrewd Dungan businessmen were chased out of the city and became successful farmers of Miliangchuan.
In farming, the Dungans have preserved the primordial traditions of peasantry till the today. In Kyrgyzstan and in fact throughout Central Asia, the Dungans are well recognized as hard-working peasants producing high-quality rice, fruits and vegetables. Originally being the people who introduced farming and vegetable-growing knowledge and practices into a Central Asia populated with nomads, Dungan’s vegetables and other agricultural products practically dominate or even “monopolize” Central Asia’s local food markets in Almaty and Biskek and elsewhere, giving rise to the local joke that if the Dungans refused to work, there would be no fresh vegetables found on any family’s dining table.

Dungan (Shaan-Gan) cuisine is very well known in the Central Asian states where Dungans reside. According to Husei Daurov, the president of the Dungan Association of Kazakhstan, in a 2004 interview, there were more than 30 Dungan restaurants in Kazakhstan’s capital Astana and the business was very good. Astana is Kazakhstan’s capital since 1997, after the government moved the capital from the country’s largest city, Almaty.

During the hundred years of the Dungan’s residence in Soviet Central Asia, Dungan names have undergone distinctive transformation under Russian influence, usually with a Russified Muslim first name (with the typical Russian name-suffixes) followed by the paternal last name (family name). A typical Dungan family name is often a combination of a Chinese surname (e.g. Bai as in “Bai Yanhu”) and a distinctive noun (e.g. derived from ancestral calling, say, Baizhangguide and Suo’ahong whose ancestors could respectively be a shopkeeper and an imam). Some Dungans have kept the Shaanxi Hui tradition of nicknames, like Heiyazi (黑牙子, “black teeth”), Wuwa (五娃, “the fifth child”), Liuwa (六娃, “the sixth child”), etc. The second-generation and third-generation Dungans are very different from their first-
generation migrant forefathers. While the first-generation migrants were mostly illiterate peasants, the cultural level of the Dungans has risen since the second generation, during the Soviet times. According to the Soviet Union’s 1976 population census, out of the 80000 Dungans there were 4 professors and 40 associate professors – the Dungans hence at that time represented the ethnic group with the highest education level among the 120 ethnic minorities of the Soviet Union.

Phenotypically, alternate-generation heredity is common among the Dungans, partly because of the huge casualty incurred during the exodus through the harsh Tianshan – e.g. among Bai Yanhu’s followers, about three quarters or 27000 people were killed in the harsh climate on the snow mountains, only 3314 survived when they emerged on the other side of the mountains on 27th December 1877, days after they began the fateful trek through the 3800-meter high snow mountain in harsh winter – but partly also because there were among them less womenfolk many of whom were victims of footbinding at that time and were thus unable to scale the formidable mountain roads.15 Hence, with the approval of the Czarist government, many early Dungan migrants had married Russian, Kazakh and Kyrgyz women (Li, 2008).

The Dungans are good farmers. Due to the high prices of vegetables and fruits in the Central Asian region, and the short distance between the major Dungan villages such as Masanchi and Sortobe by the Chui River and the big cities like Bishkek and Almaty (just about 60 km and 268 km respectively), vegetable farming brought good income yearly for the Dungans. Hence, compared to their local Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Uzbek neighbours, the Dungans are comparatively rich, with an average of two private cars per family (Zhi, 2004). Hence, through farming and peasantry, Dungans are now among the wealthiest rural dwellers. Since 1994, through the effort and initiative of Husei Daurov, the president of the Dungan Association of Kazakhstan, modern technology and
equipments (e.g. greenhouse) for the production of vegetables, especially mushroom, brick, biscuits, paint etc. have been imported on a large scale into the Dungan villages from China’s Shaanxi province, a phenomenon that made the Dungan villages a sort of celebrity in Kazakhstan via newspaper and television reports and attracted the visits of Kazakhstan’s Members of Parliament, Minister of Agriculture, Governor of Zhambyl Province, and gained Husei Daurov an audience with the president of Kazakhstan (Zhi, 2004). For all these achievements, the efforts of Husei Daurov has to be positively evaluated, as here is a man, in the words of Laruelle and Sébastien Peyrouse (2009: 109), who “has skilfully turned himself into the virtually obligatory intermediary for Sino-Kazakhstani relations, not only thanks to his status at the People’s Assembly, which gives him access to administrative networks, but also thanks to his familiarity with economic circles […] and being] a member of the Sino-Kazakhstani interstate council of entrepreneurs, and [who] was part of Nursultan Nazarbaev’s delegation to China in 2004”. Such rise to community leadership is a common phenomenon among successful Overseas Chinese businessmen. The possibility of exploiting linkages with his counterparts in other Overseas Chinese Muslim communities for business and economic opportunities must be in his mind when in 2008 for the 130-year jubilee of the arrival of the Dungans in Central Asia, Husei Daurov canvassed the idea of creating a World Association of Dungans with the principal objective of developing contact not just with the Hui people of China, but also with those in Malaysia and Hong Kong (ibid.: 110). In fact, Husei Daurov’s rise to successful businessman and Dungan community leader found a parallel in his colourful counterpart in neighbouring Kyrgyzstan, where Esen Ismailov, president of the Dungan Association of Kyrgyzstan, was the founder of the first kung-fu (功夫, Chinese martial arts) school in the former Soviet Union, later on the director of a large martial arts
training centre at Bishkek, and then obtained the title of Kyrgyzstan’s national artist, followed by a political career of a elected deputy between 1995 and 2000, as well as becoming one of Kyrgyzstan’s 100 wealthiest men (ibid.: 108).

Besides economic success (doing better economically in general than the local dominant ethnic group), which has always been observed to be a common trait among the Overseas Chinese communities which tends to attract both admiration and envy from other locals, Svetlana Rimski-Korsakoff Dyer (1981: 43-44) has noted the Dungs’s’ ability to “Dunganize” people, i.e. to convert people of other ethnicities to Dungan food, custom and speech. Despite the multiethnic mixture of the kolkhozes she visited, they were regarded as “Dungan” kolkhozes for the fact 1) the Dungs were in majority, 2) the key figures (kolkhoz and village chairmen, doctors, librarians and teachers) were nearly all Dungs, and 3) this “Dunganization” ability through mixed marriages or just everyday contact with those around them. Rimski-Korsakoff Dyer wondered if such “Dunganization” of the people in close contact with the Dungs is connected to the similar historical ability of the Chinese culture that Sinicized the Mongols and the Manchu who at one time or another conquered Chinese territory. In Kyrgyzstan, the Kyrgyz have in fact adopted quite remarkably some features of the Dungan culture, especially the Dungan cuisine and farming skills which have actually been well incorporated in daily life throughout the northern part of the country.

8. Impact of the Chinese Xinyimin

The phenomenon of the Chinese xinyimin (new Chinese migrants) in Central Asia mainly began since the establishment of formal diplomatic relationship between China and the new CIS (СНГ – Союзное}

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Независимых Государств, Commonwealth of Independent States) countries in the region. For instance, the large-scale influx of the new Chinese migrants into Kazakhstan can be traced back to the establishment of diplomatic relationship between China and Kazakhstan in 1992. According to Liu (2009), advancement in bilateral economic relations, with trade volume increasing at an annual rate of above 30 per cent, and the steady increase of China’s investment in Kazakhstan, with over 300 Chinese enterprises having registered in Kazakhstan by the end of 2006 and the total amount of China’s foreign direct investment (FDI) in Kazakhstan reaching US$1.54 billion for the period of 2002-2007, have acted as strong stimuli for the huge influx of Chinese workers into Kazakhstan. Besides, since 1992, a total of over 3.1 million former inhabitants have left Kazakhstan to return to their “historic nation”, and out of the net emigrants totaling about 2 million people 63-65 per cent are within the working-age cohort and about 45 per cent are university graduates or those having professional diplomas. This has led to an acute shortage in the industrial, agricultural, education, medical and various other sectors in Kazakhstan especially during the economic recovery since 2000.

In terms of demography, the population’s natural growth rate has been unstable and in fact dropping. For instance, the population of Kazakhstan in 2005 was 15.1 million (with a natural growth rate of 0.01218 million), and was expected to reach only 15.4 million by 2025 but to decline to 13.9 million by 2050 (ibid.). Economic recovery has led to continuous increase in demand for labour from abroad given its acute domestic labour shortage, and in terms of attracting migrants, the World Bank has placed Kazakhstan as the world’s number nine. As Kazakhstan’s neighbour sharing a long land border, China is well poised as a migrant labour supplier for Kazakhstan. With visa exemption for Chinese business visitors since Kazakhstan’s independence from the
former USSR, the number of Chinese business migrants soon reached
the peak during the period of 1989-1993. In fact, Kazakhstan’s custom
figures show that from 1993 to 1995 there were 150-200 Chinese
“tourists” entering Kazakhstan every day, and out of these about 30-50
people were staying on in Kazakhstan, taking up permanent residence
there or moving on to other CIS (ex-USSR) countries or the Western
countries, while official estimates put the number of Chinese citizens
migrating into Kazakhstan or using Kazakhstan as a migration transit
point during the three-year period at not less than 0.13-0.15 million
(ibid.).

The Chinese new migrants in Kazakhstan have various unique
characteristics, as summarized in Liu (2009): the rapid increase in
number since the beginning of the 21st Century; the great varieties of the
pattern of mobility; the rapid expansion of the volumes of both legal and
illegal migrant labour; the coexistence of “commercial migrants” and
“mobile vendors”; the mixed ethnic composition of these migrants who
include not only the Han Chinese, but also China’s Kazakhs, Uighurs
and other ethnic groups; the continuous strengthening of Chinese social
networking in organizing migration and commercial activities.
Kazakhstan’s large-scale import of foreign labour began in 1993, mostly
from Turkey, China, Russia, the United States of America and the United
Kingdom. Of the 2100 foreign workers in 1993, a total of 559 (26.7 per
cent) were from China, and there was a rapid increase in foreign labour
during the period 2004-2006, reaching 40897 workers by 2006,
including 5008 (12.2 per cent) from China – hence from 1993 to 2006,
the number of Chinese migrant workers in Kazakhstan had increased
ninefold, while during the period 2004-2006 alone, the number of
Chinese migrant workers went up from 1457 to 5008, representing an
increase of 3.4 times (ibid.). Besides, according to Kazakhstan’s
immigration statistics, there were 46000 Chinese entering Kazakhstan in
2000, and 103700 during the first ten months of 2006, including a huge number of those without working agreements or contracts. Hence, the real number of Chinese migrant workers in Kazakhstan could be far higher than the official statistics released by both countries. While such migration is in fact two-way, with over 1.3 million Kazakhstan migrants now staying in China (99 per cent of them in Xinjiang), constituting Kazakhstan’s largest migrant community abroad, the large-scale Chinese influx into Kazakhstan has attracted acute resentment from the local Kazakhs and raised the fear of “Sino-cization” and of these new Chinese migrants being an instrument for China to reduce its population surplus, of resource exploitation and of Kazakhstan being a dumping target for Chinese goods (ibid.).

In the recent large-scale mass protest involving about 2000 people, organized by Kazakhstan’s opposition, including the United Social Democratic Party (Kazakhstan’s largest opposition party), Kazakh Communist Party, Kazakh Liberal Party, Progressive Movement, the independent labour union activist organization Social Defense and the Kazakh nationalistic forces, the participants demonstrated against “Chinese capitalist expansion” in Kazakhstan and the Kazakh government’s plan to lease land to China, referring to the Kazakh president’s revelation at an FDI meeting of China’s suggestion to lease one million hectare of land from Kazakhstan for planting crops and Kazakhstan’s counter-suggestion of reducing it to 200000 hectares for joint-ventures for this purpose. The land targeted for leasing are in four provinces including the province of Almaty and the province of South Kazakhstan. The protesters saw this leasing as a national security issue that would, in addition to the large-scale invasion by Chinese capital and the large-scale Chinese acquisition of Kazakh energy and resource company shares, lead to large-scale Chinese migration into Kazakhstan and the turning of Kazakhstan into China’s transport base for energy and
resources. On the banners in the demonstration, the protesters drew a Chinese dragon over the Kazakh national emblem and Mao Zedong’s head on Kazakh currency to signify Chinese capitalist expansion and the threat of Chinese colonialism. However, there were no extreme slogans that directly attacked China or asked the Chinese people to leave Kazakhstan.¹⁶

Similarly, in neighbouring Kyrgyzstan which was declared by the United Nations in 2005 as one of the world’s poorest countries, the over 10000 Chinese new migrants (mostly migrant workers) residing in Bishkek and the southern part of the country (mainly ethnic Uighurs from western China) had attracted resentment from the Kyrgyz, which was manifested in several attacks, often fatal, on the Chinese migrant workers, including a race-hatred murder that occurred shortly following the former Kyrgyz president Askar Akayev’s ceding of 87000 hectares of the country’s southern territories to China for the settlement of a border dispute (Marat, 2008). In fact, Chinese merchants and migrant workers (mostly Muslim Uighurs) were living in secluded areas in Bishkek, apart from the local Kyrgyz residents.

These latest events involving the influx of the new Chinese migrants will definitely have an impact upon the Dungans – an issue that will be discussed in the next, concluding, section.


The future of the Dungans in the Central Asian states especially in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan where they exist in large numbers depends on a nexus of many factors to which the impact of the phenomenon of the new Chinese migrants is but a latest addition. To think that the recent backlash by the Kazakhs and Kyrgyz against these new Chinese
migrants would also adversely affect the Kazakh-Dungan and Kyrgyz-Dungan relations may be premature. The close relationship developed between the Dungans and the Kazakhs/Kyrgyz over the hundred years of staying together in Kazakhstan and Kirghizia/Kyrgyzstan should be more closely examined in relation to the Dungans’ century-long isolation from China. The Dungans’ cultural memory includes an element of historical gratitude towards the Russians, the Kazakhs and the Kyrgyz who took their forefathers in when they had nowhere to go, freshly escaping from the genocidal army of Zuo Zongtang, gave them land and exempt them from taxes, thus giving them a new lease of life in this foreign land. On the other hand, the Dungans’ ethnic allegiance with the Chinese across the borders could be intriguing. Svetlana Rimski-Korsakoff Dyer recorded her surprise when during her visit she was told by her Dungan hosts that

[the Dungan language] was an independent language, phonetically and syntactically quite different from Chinese, and that there are two “Dungan” dialects – the Kansu and Shensi dialects, which are quite different from the Kansu and Shensi dialects in China. There was also “Dungan” food which the Dungans thought was different from the Chinese food and yet, to me, as one who lived in China for many years, many of the dishes were familiar ones I had eaten in China quite frequently.

(Rimski-Korsakoff Dyer, 1981: 51)

While Rimski-Korsakoff Dyer’s conclusion that “the Dungans have turned their backs on present-day China and have cut their ties with the country in which their ancestors lived” might be disputed by some other scholars of Dungan studies, especially those in China, it is worth noting that it was derived from observation at a time when the Dungans were
prospering, “both as city dwellers and collective farmers, under Soviet rule [and they] are happy and settled and have no need to look back into the past with longing” (ibid.). Ethnic allegiance is fluid. The Bosnian Muslims’ ethnic ties with Christian Slavs were supplanted by religious solidarity with the Muslim world only after the collapse of Yugoslavia brought about their agonizing defeat in the ensuing ethnic war, and similarly, the Pomaks’ ethnic identification with Muslim Turks rather than Slavic Christian Bulgarians results mainly from the socioeconomic discrimination they suffer (Yeoh, 2003: 27). When politico-economic circumstances undergo drastic changes, ethnic allegiance may not be as ascriptive as ethnic identity itself. “Based on the current situation I do not think that there will be a conflict, if so what can I do? Go back to China?” – a 23-year-old ethnic Dungan, Mahmud, was cited commenting on the uncertain future facing Kyrgyzstan’s ethnic minorities caused by the ethnic tension-filled presidential poll in 2005.17

Besides Dungan prosperity mentioned above, Rimski-Korsakoff Dyer had derived her conclusion of Dungans’ rejection of China based on the other four reasons: their century-long residence in the Russian empire/Soviet Union; their memory that Hui Muslims were suppressed and massacred by Chinese/Chinese government during the Ch’ing dynasty; being an exiled community attempting to preserve their ethnic identity had led to extreme conservatism and nationalism/ethnocentrism; being a small ethnic minority had led to the consciousness to be regarded as an independent community speaking an independent language, “hence their use of ‘Dungan language’, ‘Dungan dialects’, ‘Dungan people’, ‘Dungan food’, ‘Dungan vinegar’” (Rimski-Korsakoff Dyer, 1981: 51-52). However, the recent economic rise of China and the increasing contact between these once isolated people and Shaanxi and Gansu where their forefathers came from – in terms of both tourism and commerce – might have affected ethnic allegiance. According to Husei

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Daurov, the president of the Dungan Association of Kazakhstan, in the interview in 2004, after the president of the former Dungan Association of the Soviet Union returned to Kazakhstan from a visit to Shaanxi in 1989, news about the ancestral homeland of Shaanxi, China, had spread among the Dungans, thanks much to a special “home-going” feature in the *Dungan Press*, and there had been great interest and enthusiasm among the Dungans there to visit or return to the homeland, despite the troublesome procedures.\(^\text{18}\) Similarly, the feeling of the Dungans themselves towards the uniqueness of their language as being a Chinese language not written in Chinese characters could be much more mixed than as Rimski-Korsakoff Dyer reported earlier in 1981. As Husei Daurov said in the 2004 interview, there was no lack of the feeling of disadvantage and regret that while the Shaanxi(-Gansu) regionalect was very well preserved among the Dungans, it was indeed unfortunate that the Chinese writing system was not preserved as well, and there had been meetings and agreement signings during his trips to Shaanxi to set a priority for education, paving the way for Kazakhstan’s Dungans to come to China “to learn the mother tongue”\(^\text{19}\). In fact, the Dungan students were enjoying the preferential treatment provided by the Shaanxi provincial government who treated them as local rather than foreign students in terms of school fees. In the words of Husei Daurov, “We are scared that if we lose the language, then we would not be able to go home.” “Home”, as he referred to, was of course Shaanxi Province, China.

There is indeed a less romantic, rather mundane and practical aspect, as Husei Daurov also highlighted in the interview. As a lot of goods are imported from China today into Kazakhstan and Central Asia at large, it is thus useful for the Dungan youths to learn modern Chinese. Every year since 2000, Husei Daurov has been sending some children from the Dungan villages to Xi’an, China, to learn Chinese who will

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later come back to teach others, and it is considered by the parents as a
great honour if their children were selected for this. As one of the most
important contributors to cultural distinctions, education has been seen
as pseudoethnicity, said to be “a subcase of the same processes that also
produce ethnicity”, according to Randall Collins (1975: 86) who further
remarked:

Schools everywhere are established originally to pass on a particular
form of religion or elite class culture, and are expanded in the interests
of political indoctrination or ethnic hegemony. In these situations,
education is nothing more than ethnic or class culture, although it can
be taught to those who are not born into it.

(Collins, 1975: 87)

Seeing education, especially cultural and language education, in this
light, the long-term impact of such educational arrangement for Dungan
children on the re-Sinicization of the Dungans could probably not be
easily dismissed.

That said, there remains the possible contention between
ethnoreligious allegiance and ethnolinguistic allegiance – here referring
to the two “cultural” components of ethnic boundary as a process that
tends to be tenacious and uncompromising, the manifestation of the age-
old fourfold ascriptive loyalty of race, territoriality, language and
religion (Yeoh, 2006b: 224). The strength of the co-religionist ties
between the Dungans and their Muslim neighbours in the Central Asian
states may not be taken for granted. Such ties may break down during a
time of political instability and economic turmoil or deprivation, when
acute resource contest for politico-economic survival may take
precedence, as amply attested by the deadly Kyrgyz-Uzbek clash in
1991 that claimed more than 300 lives in Kirghizia (Kyrgyzstan).
Sectarian distrust is another crucial issue. Going back to the early history of Dungan migration, there had been an apparent sectarian element in the 1800s’ Muslim revolt. Infighting between different Muslim Sufi sects, namely the Khafiyya (Khafîya), the Jahariyya and the Qadim (Gedimû), allegedly had played an important role in the revolt. Intrusion of Sufism into China has been said to have led to massive tension among the Hui people, and the 1862-1877 Muslim revolt and a subsequent one have been attributed mainly to the Muslim inter-sect fighting. During the 1862-1877 revolt, Qadim Hanafi Sunni Muslims had tried to distance themselves from the Jahariyya Sufi rebels, and some of the Qadim Muslims even helped the Ch’ing government to crush the Sufi rebels. Hui Chinese Muslims also participated in attacks on the Muslim Uyghurs and several Chinese Muslim generals defected to the Ch’ing government and assisted Ch’ing forces in attacking the Uyghurs in Xinjiang. Commenting on the case of Xinjiang as being much more complicated than a simple Muslim struggle for independence against Han colonizers, Dru C. Gladney cautioned:

Poor past relations between the three main Muslim groups, Uyghur, Kazak, and Hui, suggest that conflicts among Muslims would be as great as those between Muslims and Han Chinese. Most local residents believe that independence would lead to significant conflicts between these groups, along ethnic, religious, urban-rural, and territorial lines.

Gladney (2003: 24-25)

While Geertz (1963: 109) saw that the “congruities of [the primordial attachments of] blood, speech, custom, and so on, are seen to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves”, the Weberian approach views ethnic group as being not
“natural” (as kinship group is) but “rational” and primarily political:

Ethnic membership (*Gemeinsamkeit*) differs from the kinship group precisely by being a presumed identity, not a group with concrete social action, like the latter. In our sense, ethnic membership does not constitute a group; it only facilitates group formation of any kind, particularly in the political sphere. On the other hand, it is primarily the political community, no matter how artificially organized, that inspires the belief in common ethnicity.

(Weber, 1968 tr.21: 389)

In this light, ethnicity can be seen in intergroup relations not as a “‘given’ of social existence”, but a political construct linked directly to power relations and resource competition, and a boundary marker frequently mobilized to meet the rising need of identity investment for economic and political purposes (Yeoh, 2010b: 576). If the recent Kazakh and Kyrgyz backlash against the perceived Chinese capitalist expansion and the influx of the new Chinese migrants were to spread to further adversely affect Kazakh-Dungan and Kyrgyz-Dungan relations, Mahmud’s worries, as cited earlier above, may not be farfetched, especially after the severe Kyrgyz-Dungan clashes in Iskra on 6th February 2006. In such a context, with increasing contact between the once isolated Dungans and their ethnic brethren in northwestern China, the prospect of a process of re-Sinicization – in a way representing the undoing of the long process of Dungan identity creation that germinated more than a hundred years ago when Bai Yanhu and his people first crossed the Tianshan, and culminated in a partly State-sponsored ethnogenesis during the Soviet times – cannot be ruled out, thus overturning the conscious isolation from China “by indifference on the part of most of the collective farmers and hostility on the part of some of
the Dungan scholars” that Svetlana Rimsky-Korsakoff Dyer observed two decades ago (Rimsky-Korsakoff Dyer, 1981: 51).

In fact, the resiliency of the unique Dungan language and culture could turn out to be a myth, as Marlène Laruelle and Sébastien Peyrouse noted:

Moreover, Dungans are divided between the Gansu and the Shaanxi dialects, while nearly half the young generation has no mastery at all of Dungan and can only speak Russian, sometimes also/or Kazakh and Kyrgyz. Lastly, the few still existing Dungan-language primary schools (approximately fifteen in Kazakhstan and in Kyrgyzstan) are lacking in means, textbooks, and teachers, and once again are divided in their linguistic strategy: some want to maintain the learning of the Dungan language, which since 1958 has been written in Cyrillic (and between 1929 and 1958 in Latin), and therefore the dialects of Northern China; others want to see a shift to putonghua (Mandarin). But here, once again, there is a division between those who endorse the learning of pinyin (Romanized Chinese) and those who prefer Chinese characters. The stake is not exclusively cultural; it is also economic: having writing skills in Chinese in fact opens multiple prospects for work with China, where the preservation of the Cyrillic writing hinders breaking out of the Soviet framework.

(Laruelle and Peyrouse, 2009: 105)

Even without the ominous shadow of impending majority oppression, such a re-ethnicization still makes economic sense, given the growing economic power of China. In fact, according to the representative of the Dungan Association of Kazakhstan at Xi’an, Nurik Ma, in an interview by Laruelle and Peyrouse (ibid.: 106), “approximately 30 percent of Dungans from Kazakhstan and from

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Kyrgyzstan work in the area of trade with China”, being involved mainly in four types of professions – in the shuttle trade; the tourist agency sector; serving the Chinese businesspeople as assistants, intermediaries or translators; and launching into commerce by opening stands at bazaars with some attempting “to get agreements signed directly with Chinese clothing and shoe factories based in Shenzhen and Guangzhou”. In contrast to the Uyghurs (51000 persons in Kyrgyzstan according to 2008 statistics, compared with 60000 Dungans), a significant number of Dungans are today involved in the trade niche with China. From China’s point of view, the Dungans are a “politically correct” “exotic” minority22 in Central Asia, in contrast to the Uyghurs who are seen as exiled agents of separatism from Xinjiang. From the point of view of the governments of the Central Asian republics, the Dungans, in contrast to the Uyghurs, are a well integrated “localized” minority and are not suspected of Islamist, jihadist activities and hence are not seen as a threat and do not elicit their reprobation. Nevertheless, that is not to say that the geopolitical “China threat” does not feature at all in assessing the local image of the Dungans, as evident in the occasional protests against China’s interests – in Kazakhstan too, but more frequently and more violent in Kyrgyzstan. Then there was the case of Uzbekistan, as highlighted by Laruelle and Peyrouse (2009: 107), when the Dungan Association of Uzbekistan tried at the beginning of the 1990s to develop contacts with the Chinese embassy to receive Chinese language teachers as well as agricultural aid, “Uzbek authorities’ suspicions of all collaborations that are not under their control quickly put paid to these special relations.”

On the other hand, many Dungans are also taking full advantage of their linguistic abilities and their cultural capacity to serve as intermediaries for people not familiar with China, aided in no small measure by entrepreneurial figures such as Husei Daurov or Esen
Ismailov who “have been skilfully able to take advantage of their associative positions […] in transforming cultural exchanges into commercial partnerships, and in going from the non-governmental sector to the governmental one” (ibid.: 111). Husei Daurov, the president of the Dungan Association of Kazakhstan, has talked about the plan to build a monument and a memorial hall for the great Tang-dynasty poet Li Bai (Li Po, 李白) in his Dungan village23, although the birthplace of Li Bai, the ancient Silk Road city of Suyab (Suiyecheng, 碌葉城), was actually a few kilometers away in present-day Kyrgyzstan at where is near today’s Tokmok. Cultural memory aside, the plan is of course good for tourism. Ultimately, the economic situations in these Central Asian states would play a crucial role in determining the future course of interethnic relations which would in turn impact upon the Dungsans’ dilemma between preserving a created identity – the fruit of their unique process of ethnogenesis – and re-Sinicization, for economic deprivation or desperate poverty tends to unduly heighten sensitivity and engender an atmosphere of unreasonableness and interethnic distrust, and as economic conditions deteriorates the greater would be the tendency for separate ethnic groups to coalesce along the lines of collective interests leading to acute societal polarization while the publics become more receptive to scapegoat myths (Yeoh, 2010a: 16, 62) like those going around blaming the new Chinese migrants for taking up jobs in Kyrgyzstan and squeezing out the local population – perceptions that were apparently behind those racially motivated brutal, sometimes fatal, attacks on the Chinese migrants in Bishkek.
Notes

Acknowledgements: The early history of Bai Yanhu leading his people on an exodus over the Tianshan mountains (as well as other batches led by Didao Old Man, Great Master Ma and Ma Cong, all in the late 19th Century) related in this paper, as cited, is mainly based on Yusuf Liu Baojun’s account in his 2004 elegiac poetic travelogue Bei yue Tianshan [sad exodus over the Heavenly Mountains]. Liu, who is from Gansu and a speaker of the Shaan-Gan regionalect, also helped as interpreter in speaking over telephone to Husei Daurov Shimarovich (An Husei) about the occupation structure of the Dungan people in Sortobe (see note 10). Fan Pik Shy has helped to locate some of the Chinese online references on the Dungans; Zhang Yemo and Chang Le have helped in locating further reference sources on the xinyimin (new Chinese migrants).

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1. For convenience, terms from the Dungan vocabulary are spelt in this paper in Roman alphabet with China’s pinyin system with putonghua (the
modern Standard Chinese Vernacular) pronunciation, instead of in the Dungan Cyrillic alphabet with the more accurate pronunciation of the Shaan-Gan region dialect (or alternatively in international phonetic alphabet).

2. “Overseas” here is used to mean “outside China” since Central Asia is linked to China by land, not “sea”.


4. The common estimate of 50000-50300 in Kazakhstan according to Chinese sources is doubtful (similar number in Kyrgyzstan), as the 1999 census gave only 36000 Dungans in Kazakhstan (see Laruelle and Peyrouse, 2009: 104).


6. Here in Uzbekistan the number varies from the highest estimate of 20000-20200 to a minimal presence of just about some sparsely populated 2500 persons, according to Laruelle and Peyrouse (2009: 104), mostly in the Tashkent region and in the Fergana Valley (Andijan).

7. Estimates of the Dungan populations in the Central Asian republics vary between sources of statistics. Such differences have been taken into consideration in this paper.


10. In the Shaanxi-Gansu region dialect, with Yusuf Liu helping as interpreter.


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21. Year refers to publication date of English translation. Weber’s original manuscript was written between 1910 and 1914.

22. In the context of the political economy of ethnic relations, it should be noted that the dominant group may perceive a subordinate group as “exotic” rather than “real” (Hoetink, 1973: 177-91). An example of such an “exotic” minority in Malaysia, besides the Orang Asli (i.e. “aborigines”), is the small Gente Kristang community (autoglossonym, from Portuguese “Gente Cristã”) in the state of Melaka, descended from the 16th century Portuguese settlers and occupiers. Defined as “deviating in somatic and/or cultural respects, without being conceived subjectively as a menace to the existing social order” (Hoetink, 1967), “exotic” groups (or Cox (1948)’s socioracial “strangers”) are not perceived as “real”, because they are not subjectively comprised within the “societal image” of the dominant. Thus they do not attract the latter’s hostility, as do “real” subordinate groups viewed as a menace. The case of the Ainu (アイヌ) and the “burakumin” (部落民) in Japan and that of the Amerindian natives and Afro-Americans in the United States today are good examples of these two polar subordinate situations – the Ainu and Amerindians being in some way viewed as “exotic” vis-à-vis the other two “real” minorities; instead of bitterness and hostility, they are met with “a mild benevolence, a condescending philanthropy” on the part of the dominant society (Hoetink, 1973: 179). Such distinction between the two types of subordinate groups was vividly described by DeVos in his study of the “burakumin”: “The basic attitudes held [by the dominant Japanese society] toward the Ainu are not as pejorative as towards the outcasts [i.e. the “burakumin”] [...] the Ainu have been treated ambivalently very much as the American Indians have been, in contrast to the caste distinctions which underlie the treatment of American blacks.” (DeVos, 1972: 326) Paradoxically, China’s largest minority, the Zhuang (�)，could actually be more “exotic” than “real”. Being the most assimilated of minorities, the Zhuang’s ethnic
consciousness was virtually created by the Han-dominated central
Communist Party-State in the early 1950s (see, for instance, Kaup, 2000).
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“Kazakhstani” Identity, Eurasian Regionalism and Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Biopolitics of Forced Migration, Modernity and Multilateralism

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Abstract

This paper examines a case of forced migration and its effects on the formation of national identity and the consolidation of state agencies, industries, and other formal organizations. A composite of several theories, namely “survival migration” and “biopolitical control” will be used to account for the case that features significant social transformation, conflict and even trauma. In the 1940s the population of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic underwent unprecedented migration of evacuees from the European parts of the USSR due to World War II. However in the same period the Soviet government conducted a “forced migration” policy for particular “ethnic groups” deemed politically unreliable in the context of World War II. In the 1950s-1960s, populations located in the European parts of the USSR were officially induced by the Soviet government to contribute to a massive industrialization initiative by relocating to industrializing
regions in the Asian parts of the USSR. At around the same period, population dislocations in the People’s Republic of China caused a diaspora of Uighurs moving to the Soviet Union. The life activities of these migrants would be the basis for a new collective “Kazakhstani” identity that continues to the present day. However, this identity is distinct from, and in some cases opposed to, the historic primordial “Kazakh” identity held by the Turko-Mongol ethno-linguistic societies that inhabited Kazakhstan prior to the Soviet migrations. The government of the present-day Kazakhstan recognizes the significance of the Soviet migrations, and modulates the shift of political power towards ethnic Kazakhs. Checking the newly assertive Kazakh nationalist movement and the unresolved Uighur nationalism in Eurasia through regionalist-technocratic means may increase the viability of the more inclusive and socially constructed multicultural “Kazakhstani” and regional “Eurasian” identities and may help resolve the latent ethnocentrism in the SCO regional order.

**Keywords:** biopolitics of identity, forced migration, Eurasian regionalism, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Kazakhstan

**JEL classification:** F22, F52, F53, F59

1. Introduction

This paper discusses a case of “identity transformation” from the primordial concepts of “ethnic identity” to multi-ethnic and multicultural “national identity” and finally to the emerging “regional identity” in the present day. The “Eurasian identity” in its most recent form appears to be the result of what may be generally termed as biopolitical actions of the Eurasian states intended to coordinate the
control, modernization and industrialization of the socio-economic life-systems of populations in the region and by that change the socio-cultural identity that the resident people-groups have held through generations. With its focus on Kazakhstan, the case consists of three episodes inherent to the modernization and industrialization of societies and their identities:

1) “Forced migration” or “deportation” of various ethnic groups from Europe and Asia to labour camps in Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic that occurred in 1930s-1940s and its effects on the consolidation of industrial development and associated initiatives of modern multi-ethnic and multi-cultural nation-building in Soviet Kazakhstan, which ultimately had an impact on the formation of “Kazakhstani” identity as opposed to the traditional primordial “Kazakh” identity;

2) “Economic migration” of the youth initiated by the youth wing of the Communist Party from all over Soviet Union to increase the “social mobility” of new generation of “Soviet citizens” and socio-economically modernize and industrialize the agriculture, mining and other sectors of the economy in Kazakhstan in 1950s-1960s as part of the “Sovietization” of the modern identity of the 1950s-1970s generation in Kazakhstan;

3) Contemporary “multilateralism” efforts led by China and Russia, but inclusive of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, to consolidate energy, transportation and infrastructure systems in the region and harmonize the “Eurasian identity” in the 21st century with the help of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and, most recently, the Silk Road infrastructure initiatives.
The specific “nation-building” project in Kazakhstan and the broader efforts of “region-building” initiatives throughout Eurasia correspond directly to the contemporary multi-cultural multi-ethnic identity of Kazakhstan in its most recent form. There is recognition within Kazakhstan of the contributions to the desirable national/regional conditions from ethnic/national identities such as “Uighur”, “German”, “Korean”, “Chechen”, “Russian”, “Ukrainian” and many others that have been conflictual elsewhere. Currently this socially constructed “Kazakhstani” composite identity is constitutive of the regional multilateral interaction of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization despite the controversies of Uighur ethnopolitics that include the national movement for the establishment of East Turkestan found both in China and Kazakhstan. However, the restoration and popularization of the primordial “Kazakh” ethnic identity and the associated “Kazakh” nationalism-primordialism, as opposed to the more multi-cultural “Kazakhstani” nationalism, can cause other ethnic identities to pursue similar divisive discourses. Thus, the questions related to “ethnic”, “national” and “religious” identities and their politicised rehabilitation and interpretations in post-totalitarian systems, as well as the attempts to answer these questions, can have an impact beyond the relations within the national “state” borders. Moreover, these discourses, and the policy-related decisions based on these, have a potential to intensify the complexity of cross-border issues among communities of people-groups attempting to construct a composite identity based upon historic and projected commonalities. The inability to take the constructive and pluralist route to form a regional identity might hinder the further development of the socio-economic “Eurasian” regional integration and associated initiatives of multilateralism, such as the “peaceful development” of the region through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
2. Traumatic Foundations of Transformation

Forced migration usually occurs during internal conflicts and state persecution, as well as during natural disasters or technological hazards (Hunter, 2005) when people are “forcibly displaced” (Wood, 1994) and are unable to alter the conditions of the displacement process. The reasons for forced migration differ widely, as for example “some flee systematic persecution while others flee life-threatening natural disaster” (Wood, 1994: 607). Of particular importance, however, are the radical cases of “forced deportation” of an entire “ethnic” population in some geographic areas during Soviet history. These deportations were not intended to provide an option of “fleeing”; rather, the population move was entirely coerced by the “disciplining” or “persecuting” state. At the present time, such a massive coerced migration is likely to be categorized as human trafficking or considered as a “heinous violation of human rights” (Feingold, 2005). However, notwithstanding the resistance of the deportees to the enforced relocation of entire populations in different geographic locations of the Soviet Union, Soviet officials initiated and implemented the policy under the legitimising context of the “state of exception” (Agamben, 1998) when all necessary actions were taken under the pretext of “saving the state” from military, economic and political challenges of the time. This case of “Kazakhstani” identity-building during the Soviet period shows how the Soviet industrialization and the associated “survival migration” resulted in the problem of “biopolitics” (Foucault, 2008) of “bare life” (Agamben, 1998). This was due to the state securitization (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998) of economic sovereignty of the Soviet Union periphery in the context of “development and underdevelopment” discourse (Duffield, 2007; Parfitt, 2009) of modernization. These concepts will be used to account for the case that features significant
socio-economic and cultural transformation with its initial social trauma of “forced migration” during the totalitarian system of population control and Marxist-Leninist (Balaam and Veseth, 2008) structure of planned economy-driven governance in the Soviet Union.

The Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic was one of the few republics of the Soviet Union that underwent a massive industrialization effort of the Soviet centralised economic planning that included “forced migration” of population from different parts of the Soviet Union. “Forced migration” under conditions of modernizing industrialization was of a diverse nature. This included the Stalinist forced move of “political prisoners” to the labour camps of Soviet military industrial “objects” of strategic importance such as mining and metallurgy during 1930s as well as during World War II and early Cold War. The World War II in the European part of the Soviet Union resulted in the “forced evacuation” of the major industries with its professional “population” to the East of the country. Furthermore, the Stalinist context of World War II included the “forced migration” policy of eviction or deportation for particular “ethnic groups” deemed politically unreliable in the War-time “state of exception” (Agamben, 1998), which included diaspora of Germans from the Volga region, Koreans from the Far East, Tatars from Crimea, Chechens from North Caucasus, Meskhetian Turks from Georgia and others that concluded with their enforced settlement in Kazakhstan as well as in other specified locations in Western Siberia and Central Asia. Later, in the 1950s-1960s, there was another wave of “survival migration” of young professionals and graduates of the higher educational institutions located in the European parts of the Soviet Union. These young people were officially induced by the Soviet government and particularly by the Youth League of the Communist Party, Komsomol, to avoid a corrupting “idle lifestyle” of the urban environment but rather contribute to the industrialization initiative by
relocating to remote regions in the Asian parts of the Soviet Union. Thus, from 1930s until 1960s, two generations of people with diverse identities migrated to Kazakhstan and played a crucial economic role in the period of industrialization and overall socio-cultural modernization drive of the Soviet Union that significantly affected the lives of the local population.

The life activities of these migrants would be the basis for a new collective “Kazakhstani” identity that continues to the present day. However, this identity is distinct from, and in some cases opposed to, the historic “Kazakh” identity held by the nomadic Turkic ethno-linguistic societies that inhabited Kazakhstan prior to the Soviet migrations. Although the government of the present-day Kazakhstan officially recognizes the significance of the Soviet migrations, the re-emergence and rehabilitation of the “Kazakh identity” lost under the Soviet totalitarian system of Russification, post-Soviet nationalism and shift of political power towards “titular nationality” of the newly independent country led to the preference of the Kazakh language and Kazakh ethnics in political, economic and social interactions. This has become a political response of cultural rehabilitation to the totalitarian Russification policies of the Soviet period that made Kazakhstan at the time of independence “the only successor state whose titular group was an ethnic minority (39.7%)” (Schatz, 2000: 489) and with the majority of its population speaking Russian as a native language. Still, if unchecked, the newly revived and assertive Kazakh nationalist movement may reduce the viability of the socially constructed multicultural “Kazakhstani” identity and may cause other disruptive circumstances and associated trauma for the multicultural diaspora within the state borders and beyond, particularly in the increased multilateral interaction with neighbouring states and societies of the Eurasian region.
3. Biopolitics of Development and Population Control

The notion of “forced migration” as presented here implies assessment conditions under which populations survive during adverse circumstances. These exceptional existential circumstances of “bare life” (Agamben, 1998) induce social groups to either cooperate, mutually assist for the purpose of collective survival or choose to live in the Hobbesian “state of nature” of continuous fear and threat of death, of “every man against every man”. The early geopolitics/biopolitics school, which worked under the assumptions of Lebensphilosophie or the philosophy of life, considered that under the circumstances of “ruthlessness of the life struggle for existences and growth … one can detect within the group a powerful cooperation for the purposes of existence …” (Kjellén, 1920: 93-94, in Lemke et al., 2011: 10). The critical discussion of life processes in the studies of Lebensphilosophie is conducted under the contextual assumptions of early 20th-century instrumental modernization in Europe, which are identified generally as “processes perceived as adversarial to life, such as processes of rationalization, civilization, mechanization, and technologization” (Lemke et al., 2011: 9). Thus, Kjellén’s concept of biopolitics was closely linked to the organicist idea of a “state as a form of life” rather than a state as “a legal construction whose unity and coherence is the result of acts of free will” (ibid.: 10), which was the prevalent “old institutionalist” discussion of the politics at the time. Furthermore, the focus on the biological concept of life system and its associated processes “eludes every rational foundation or democratic decision-making” of the legal and socio-political sphere of governance (ibid.: 10-11). The assumption is based on normative bonds of “living whole” that interconnect both society and government and that include everything “genuine and the eternal, the healthy, and the valuable” (ibid.: 10).
Furthermore, the concept of biopolitics complimentary to geopolitics or the *Lebensraum* (living space) was considered “the basis for a natural science of the state” (*ibid.*: 12-13). Unfortunately, the notion of biopolitics and geopolitics provided “the ideological foundation for the imperialist expansion of the Nazi Reich”, which was conceptualised and operationalised in the foreign policy by Friedrich Ratzel and other academics of the geopolitics school of the period. As a result, geopolitical analysis now includes states and territories and their interaction that is explained through the specific geographic context of space and position.

Biopolitics, on the other hand, evaluates the “livelihood systems and life processes” that support the aggregate level of population in the states, territories or regions of the World (*Duffield*, 2007: 5). The “livelihood systems” include the most essential components of human life support, such as food, environment, health, hygiene and sanitation and overall safety of the population, which are at the core of biopolitics. The control of these biopolitical variables of population welfare by the government or other actors necessitates the administration of “underdeveloped and developed” categories of modern life at the aggregate level of population, which determines the overall issues of nation-building and sovereignty (*ibid.*).

Therefore, the discussion of “forced migration” in the Soviet case of industrialization and modernization of 1930s-1960s include both the geographic aspects of industrial expansion to otherwise “underdeveloped” remote locations, as well as biopolitical aspects of population control for the purpose of “state survival” in the exceptional circumstances of World War II and post-war reconstruction. Similarly, contemporary regional geographic expansion of the China’s “peaceful development” initiatives to the “undeveloped” peripheries of Eurasia with energy, transportation and infrastructure projects will involve in the
future the biopolitical aspects of administration and development of the live-systems of diverse societies in Eurasia. Thus, the notions of biopolitics and geopolitics have been operationalized into the “technology of governmentality” to achieve particular goals of Soviet industrialization drive and overall modernization campaign in the Asiatic periphery of the country. And current developments of the multilateralism of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Silk Road infrastructure initiatives that will increase the economic integration and interaction of populations of diverse societies in the Eurasian region would most probably need to consider regional mechanisms in the future for monitoring and assessing the socio-cultural mobility and transformation of identities in the future generation.

This notion of biopolitics as a “technology of governmentality” had come from the 1978-1979 lectures of Michel Foucault with the concerns in liberal democratic system of public welfare as well as peace and order. In this modern system of public management of the population the “political economy introduced a formidable wedge into the presumption of the unlimited police state” that is never sufficiently aware that it may risk “governing too much”. However to identify “how to govern just enough” is also an enormous challenge (Foucault, 2008: 17). Foucault emphasises that in the contemporary state the biopolitical “equitable justice” had substituted the “prince’s wisdom” of the sovereign power. Biopolitics explains power as a “technology of governmentality” historically reconceptualised (1) from the seventeenth-century “sovereign power” that “allows and disallows life” to (2) more localised “disciplinary power” limited to the public institutions of medicine, education, military and jails to (3) all-encompassing “biopower” that regulates life on the collective level of population (Foucault, 2008). Hence the biopolitics with its three types of power also represents the change from the classical age to the modern age. However,
contemporary biopolitical “biopower” is differently expressed through allowing, improving and “managing life rather than threatening to take it away” as in the sovereign and disciplinary notions of power (Taylor, 2011: 41-54). Thus, modernizing initiatives of the state or multilateral organization to improve the living conditions of the population in the region through “disciplinary” measures of police and military deterrence or through “biopower” measures of improvements in infrastructure and technology of “managing life” has biopolitical consequence on the earlier identities of population.

Furthermore, contemporary discussion of the “security-development” discourse (Duffield, 2007), particularly as part of the recent biopolitics of “human security” initiatives (Roberts, 2010), which involves interaction between population of the wealthy and more vulnerable poor in developing countries can be biopolitically hierarchical and problematic. This is because population in some geographic regions, particularly in Asia, collectively had a limited comprehensive knowledge of the underlying reasons founded in “statist security” that constructed the circumstances for industrial expansion and forced population movement in their local territories and neighbouring regions in comparison with the wealthier states and regions, for example in Europe and North America. The regulatory biopolitics of state and “security-development” interaction between states as well as territories had “emerged out of the statistical, demographic, economic and epidemiological knowledge through which life was being discovered in its modern societal form, that is, as a series of interconnected natural, social and economic processes operating in and through population” (Duffield, 2007: 5-6). Thus, the understanding of the cases of biopolitically hierarchical migration and socio-economic integration through generations is essential to decrease the gap in the limited reflexivity in the non-Western knowledge on “national identity” as well
as population security and social development, in particular geographic spaces and times in Asia.


The questions of “race” and “ethnicity”, as well as “nationality” do not have simple straightforward definitions. On the contrary “they are not stable definitions of some static social reality, rather they are central concepts of identity that constantly change and adapt to social contexts”. Thus, reflexively about “recognising and deconstructing” our understanding of “socialised values” attached to the notions of nationality, ethnicity and race is essential as these concepts are neither “fixed” or “eternal” nor “positivist’s social fact, but products of history” (Spencer, 2006: 1).

However, the cases of “Kazakh” ethnicity in particular and to a lesser extent “Kazakhstani” nationality are not uncontested concepts, because these concepts feature the “attachments of kinship and heritage” as well as “harder primordial boundary” that include specific family histories, traditional customs and beliefs, which “have a deeper psychological effect on members of the group” (Spencer, 2006:77). The cause of “paramountcy of the titular nationality” are based on arguably consistent traditional family-oriented structure of Kazakh society that was persistent through generations, “which the Soviet authorities were never able to eradicate” (Kolsto, 1998) in spite of the Civil War of 1917-1921, mass starvation and suppression of the “livestock economy” of nomads due to the collectivization policies in the early 1930s (Pianciola, 2001). The pre-Soviet nomadic identity of “Kazakh” nationality included the division into three “Zhuz” or “tribal confederations”, the components of which are often controversially traced historically as far
as the Turko-Mongol identities of the Chengiz Khan Empire. Moreover, each of them is subdivided into “Ru” or “clan”, some of which are sometimes traced to the medieval Turkic identities or even ancient periods, where these people-groups belonged to the periphery of Persian or Hun empires. These types of pre-Soviet ethno-tribal identities are “collectively lineage identities” that are based on “genealogical kinship” (Schatz, 2000: 489-490). However this line of thought on identities follows the controversy of primordialism, which is in its most radical form assumes that “cultures are fixed and unchanging – almost genetic blueprints”. These primordialist controversial ideas can usually be used by “ideologically employed” nationalist movements that “fit with the dominant prejudices of the public” (Spencer, 2006: 77).

In the early days of independence from the Soviet Union, President Nursultan Nazarbayev made a considerable effort to focus however on the avoidance of any confrontation and conflict based on ethnicity, nationality, religion or race; the official position of the government was that Kazakhstan is a multinational secular society and at the same time a historic homeland of “Kazakhs”. Thus, there was a formal attempt to make a division between an “ethnic identity” and a “civic nation” of Kazakhstan (Kolsto, 1998: 56). However, the multinational aspect of the society was not only the product of Russian colonization of “Kazakh” homeland in 1800s, but more the result of the Stalinist forced migration of “ethnic” deportation and re-settlement through 1930s and 1940s, and the Khrushchev period of forced “youth” migration for the industrialization-related activities in 1950s and 1960s.

When the Soviet Union collapsed, Kazakhstan was one of the few successor states that had officially registered a titular ethnic group as a minority – the “Kazakhs” at 39.7% of total population, while the number of officially registered Russians were 33%, Germans and Ukrainians 4% each, and Belarusians, Uzbeks and Crimean Tatars 2% each (Schatz,
2000: 289). These statistics would come from the official registration system of “nationalities” that was written or stamped in the passport of the Soviet and now Kazakhstani citizens. When the passport is received by a citizen of Kazakhstan for the first time, the citizen has a choice to adopt either the mother’s or father’s officially registered “nationality”. Recently Kazakhstan’s passport system included an option of “not showing” the assigned and registered “nationality” in the passport face page, however the records still contain the information on a person’s “nationality” as well as parents’ “nationalities” that contemporary Kazakhstani identity presumes. Thus, Kazakhstan’s government consciously avoided the biopolitical “policies of affirmative action” that were popular in some countries of Asia. However, the state could not completely avoid the rising ideologies of nationalism and its associated trends among the titular “Kazakh” nation, where the assertiveness was justified by the historic Soviet “totalitarian repression” combined with earlier Russian “colonial oppression”. Interestingly, the communicative process in the government and media had used a “national-cultural revival” discourse rather than assertive anti-Russian or anti-Soviet nationalism. The discourse of “national-cultural revival” was also open for other “ethnic groups” and “nations” of the country with “observance of human rights” and “development of other nationalities on a basis of equal rights” (Schatz, 2000). Thus, the national-cultural revival of Uighur, Korean, German, Russian or Chechen identities were as important as the revival of Kazakh identity. The contemporary institutionalized illustration of this is the existence of schools, theatres, restaurants and cultural centres of ethnic groups in Kazakhstan.

However, the openness to the revival of other cultures and “ethnic groups” was not only due to the importance of “human rights” or “equal rights” discourse in the contemporary society, but also due to the traumatic history experienced by the other “ethnic groups” who arrived
in Kazakhstan because of the “forced migration” policies in 1930s till 1950s. In other words, the previous generations of current “non-Kazakhs”, who were born and grew up as citizens of the present-day Kazakhstan, in most cases did not have any choice of time for the “eviction” and “movement” or geographic location where the totalitarian state would “deport” them for military, political or economic reasons. This change co-occurred with what appears to have been a continuous rural-to-urban migration throughout Kazakhstan. Although over 90% of the population resided in rural areas in 1926, the rate of urban population growth appears to correspond to the rate of decline in the rural population. By 1970, the population of Kazakhstan was divided almost evenly between urban and rural areas. By 1979 the present condition of a mostly urban population was clearly set. However, another co-occurrence was the shifting ethnic profile of the population within Kazakhstan. Although comprising slightly over 60% of the population in 1926, ethnic Kazakhs comprised only slightly over 30% of the population in 1959. Ethnic Russians however in the same year comprised almost 50% of the population, while ethnic Ukrainians and Germans together comprised close to 15% and other ethnic groups such as Tatars, Uzbeks, Uighurs, Koreans and others comprised close to 5%. Only in 1999 did ethnic Kazakhs comprise a perceivable majority, slightly under 60% (Tolesh, 2012: 5-7). All in all, these changes that reflect the urban/rural and inter-ethnic dynamics in the recent past of Kazakhstan occurred from the repressive Stalinist period of 1930s, which coincided with the major industrialization drive and overall modernization campaign in the context of the Soviet planned and strictly controlled economic system.

From 1930s until 1950s during the Stalinist period of governance, there were “over three million Soviet citizens [who] were subjected to ethnic-based resettlement”. However, the ethnic-based forced migration
was not the only formal “reason” for deportation. The “population politics” of the Soviet Union had at least three categories of people-groups that were affected by the “forced migration” policies: (1) nationalities that have nation-states or large settlements or communities outside of the Soviet Union, for example Germans, Poles, Greeks, Meskhetian Turks; (2) nationalities that “resisted sovietisation”, that is socio-economic modernization and reform in “traditional cultures” and “ways of life”, for example Chechens, Ingush and other North Caucasian people-groups; (3) nationalities that might have lived in different “state configurations” with historic instability of borderlands, particularly before and during World War I and World War II, for example Ukrainians, Estonians, Lithuanians, Latvians in the European part as well as Koreans in the Far East (Werth, 2006). Thus, the geographic scale of “population politics” in the Soviet Union was unprecedented for the Eurasian continent. Nevertheless, this was not a completely original “population policy” in the history of the region. During the Russian Empire in late 19th century similar policies of “population resettlement” were conducted in Kazakhstan. General Kolpakovskiy stationed in Fort Verniy, present-day Almaty, was successful at the resettlement of Russian, Ukrainian and Belorussian peasants after the Peasant Reform in 1861 abolishing the serfdom system. There was also the migration of Muslim Uighur and Dungan ethnic groups due to rebellion against China’s authorities from Dzungaria and Kashgaria of the Eastern Turkestan, present-day Xinjiang, China, to the Semerechye region, present-day Almaty Oblast, Kazakhstan (Moiseyev, 2003).

As a result, this “population politics” was institutionalised through a number of legislative documents and implemented through public policies that are well documented in the Soviet archives. There are a number of authors who compiled the stories of archives into historic narratives. For example, Polyan (2001) provides a detailed account of
“forced migration” in the Soviet history starting from 1919 until 1953. Particularly in Part One of his book he provides an astonishing description on the extent of the state sanctioned “forced migration” and its biopolitical implementation in the Soviet Union. First he discussed the disciplinary “eviction” and “eradication” of the Kulak class (wealthy peasants) in 1930s in all parts of the Soviet Union. Then he provides the detailed narratives as well as statistical, institutional and legislative information in the Appendices on the way deportation was operationalised for the Kurdish, German, Polish, Finnish and Chechen populations and the Karachay-Cherkessians, Crimean Tatars and Meskhetian Turks from Western parts of the Soviet Union as well as the Korean and Chinese populations from the politically unstable “borderlands” in the Far Eastern parts of the Soviet Union.

Archival materials show that only in a few days of May in 1936 there were estimated 45,000 of Germans and Poles living in the bordering areas of Ukraine, who were deported to Karaganda Oblast in central Kazakhstan; in September and October of 1937 there were about 172,000 Koreans, who were evicted from the Far Eastern borderlands and deported to the cities and villages in Northern Kazakhstan; similarly in the same period there were about 9,000 Chinese deported from the Harbin area to Kazakhstan (Polyan, 2001: 245-246). Furthermore, in 1940 between February and June there were more than 200,000 Poles who were deported mostly to Kazakhstan and then to Uzbekistan (Polyan, 2001: 246). And in September-November of 1941, there was a large forced migration initiative, which included more than 500,000 Germans from the European part of Russia (from Volga German Autonomy Region, as well as from Moscow, Leningrad, and Rostov) who were evicted from their houses and deported mostly to the Central and Northern parts of Kazakhstan, as well as to Western and Eastern Siberia (Polyan, 2001: 246-247). It is essential to keep in mind that this
was the early period of the most traumatic periods of the “state of exception” caused by the World War II context. During this time the majority of Kazakh, Uzbek, Kyrgyz, Uighur, Dungan and other local Central Asian ethnic groups were mobilised to fight against the Nazi fascist forces in the Western part of the Soviet Union. Thus, while the “punished ethnic groups” were trying to survive in the barren steppes, deserts or taiga of Siberia, Kazakhstan and Central Asia, the majority of local Central Asian male populations were killed defending Ukraine, Belarus, Moscow or Stalingrad in Russia, while others surrendered themselves to the concentration camps in Nazi Germany.

The “forced migration” however continued: the period of 1943-1944 was characterised by the “forced migration” of punished ethnicities and people-groups from North Caucasus, Georgia and Crimea. Thus, in August-November 1943 over 70,000 Karachay-Cherkessians and in February 1944 close to 400,000 Chechens and Ingush ethnic groups were moved from Northern Caucasus mostly to Kazakhstan and partly to neighbouring Kyrgyzstan (Polyan, 2001: 247). Similarly in May-June 1944, the Crimean local population, such as about 182,000 Crimean Tatars, and about 42,000 of other Crimean minorities such as Greeks, Armenians, Bulgarians and Turks were forcefully evicted and moved to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (ibid.). And in November 1944, there were close to 100,000 Meskhetian Turks who were deported from Georgia mostly to Kazakhstan and partly to Kyrgyzstan (ibid.: 248). Thus, by 1950 the majority of more than 2 million people officially registered as “punished” ethnic groups were located in the “special settlements” of the industrial areas of Kazakhstan and other Central Asian republics (ibid.: 147-148). The objectivity and reliability of statistical information during the Stalinist period is currently debated and questioned by historians such as Bugai, Zaitsev, Popov, Nekrasov, Zemskov, Nokhotovich, Dugin, Yakovlev and many other academics as well as politicians,
journalists and government officials working on newly available declassified archives. The most contested academically are the exact numbers of people who were killed by the authorities in the first days of eviction due to protests or suicides, the number of people who died from natural causes such as starvation and disease in the livestock trains used for transportation and the number that died during the first months of resettlement due to natural causes or coercive measures of the government. Thus, the biopolitical dehumanised statistics of “forced migration” can have variations in thousands of people in different sources. However, the fact that “forced migration” occurred in the Soviet history at the time of industrialization drive and World War II that involved hundred thousands of people and the impact of this migration on the local population statistics, particularly the change in urban and rural shares as well as in ethnic composition of population in Kazakhstan, are quite obvious in population dynamics throughout 1920s-1970s (Tolesh, 2012: 5-7).

5. Biopolitics of Youth Migration: “Modern Identity” of Komsomol Generation

The youth organization of the Soviet Communist Party had an exceptional role in the “socio-economic transformation” as part of modernization drive and particularly in the industrialization policy. The Communist Youth League (also known by the more commonly used abbreviation – “Komsomol”) was constructed and developed into one of the main ideological and conformist instruments of the Communist Party to maintain the regime, to introduce new reforms, to prevent rebellion, and to socialise a norm of “Soviet culture” and “Soviet citizen” into the masses. The Soviet Youth organization was effective not only in contributing to the ideological training of young people, but also in
educating several generations of youth and their families about the economic, industrial and regimental procedures of the State Planning system.

Kassoff (1965) identified the main aim of “Komsomol” that was to exert political control over the youth, implement social transformation, conduct psychological reconstruction on the youth to fit them in the image of the new “Soviet Man”. The nature of the tasks assigned demanded that top staff of the organizations be paid functionaries, subject to orders and specific projects from the Central Communist Party apparatus, such as the construction of railways and industrial enterprises in the developing Siberia, Kazakhstan and Far East regions. One of the Soviet industrialization projects where the youth participated en masse was the Virgin or New Land campaign, where they had to participate in establishing the agrarian industrial complex in Kazakhstan. This involved participation in the short-term “stroi otryad” (construction brigades) as well as in the direct and more long-term industrial process of sowing and harvesting the large-scale fields of wheat in Western Siberia and Soviet Kazakhstan. The process of shaping the youth into the greater Soviet modernization plan was as challenging ideologically and psychologically as materially. The results of the Komsomol campaigns, such as “stroi otryad” (construction brigades) are still visible in the former Soviet Union through established infrastructure and industrial systems. The youth, particularly college and university students, were coerced by the authorities to spend required summer working-holidays in the remote regions of the industrialization campaign and in some cases were strongly advised or mandated by the Communist Party authorities to migrate to these remote regions after graduation.

The youth organization of the Soviet Communist Party was constructed and developed into one of the main ideological and conformist instruments of the Communist Party to maintain the regime,
the system of governance and to prevent rebellion. The establishment, development and promotion of the Communist Youth League and its socialization into the major political projects of the Soviet Union were important for the transformation and future of the new society. The Soviet educational system with the Communist Youth League support was structured to achieve this purpose. According to Kassoff (1965), the main aims of “Komsomol” (Communist Youth League) was to exert political control over the youth, implement social transformation, conduct psychological reconstruction on the youth to fit them in the image of the new “Soviet Man”. In order to accomplish these tasks, the educational system formalized youth institutions from the youngest Octobrist organization (from 7 to 9 years old) to Pioneer organization (from 9 to 14 years old) to Komsomol organization (from 14 to 28 years old). Kassoff (1965) outlines the four principal purposes of the youth programme in the Soviet Union: (1) political control, (2) social transformation, (3) psychological reconstruction, and (4) the formalization of youth institutions. Thus, the emphasis of instruction was on the notion of the new Soviet citizens who would be competent “builders of socialism and communism” (строители социализма и коммунизма), by force if required (Muckle, 1987:2).

Political control, social transformation, psychological reconstruction and formalization of youth institution were not only done through ideological training of young people, but also through educating several generations of youth in the economic, industrial and regimental systems and procedures of the Soviet State Planning system. In other words, Youth political education particularly during the Khrushchev era was an intermediary of the relationship between state mandate and socio-economic transformation of population. This was especially true for Komsomol members whose age – ranged between 14 and 28 years old – allowed them to participate in the major economic initiatives as young
professionals. The youth organizations had been certainly a part of the overall systemic reconstruction and industrial development of the Soviet Union particularly during crucial time of the post-World War II economic reconstruction and social transformation of 1950s-1970s. Interestingly, the Komsomol organization had stayed as conservative in the post-World War II period as during 1930-40s and had been exempted from the overall de-Stalinization initiatives and other reforms introduced by the Nikita Khrushchev government after the death of Joseph Stalin in 1953. This is because the de-Stalinization of Soviet Union did not include unconformity and critical attitudes of young people towards government officials and central authority (Kassoff, 1965).

The records of the Department of Komsomol Organs and the Komsomol Department of Agitation and Propaganda from around this time show that open criticism was still occurring among members of the Communist Party’s youth wing. A report sent to Vladimir Semichastnyi (at the time, a member of the Komsomol Central Committee but later to become KGB chairman) on 10 December 1956 stated that “Komsomol organisations have not drawn the correct conclusions from the XX Party Congress and need to strengthen their work amongst young people. As a result, in some Komsomol branches an unhealthy atmosphere has appeared with mistaken views on life, speeches alien to Marxist-Leninist views and a tendency to think in bourgeois terms” (Hornsby, 2008: 69).

Still, Komsomol was managed by the state and the aims were quite obvious for the Soviet Union of the Cold War environment of 1950s-1960s: to strengthen the control of the Communist Party over youth, prepare young people for future contributions to the economic and social modernization of the country and to prevent them from coming under the sway of dissident forces from the West (Kassoff, 1965). Thus, after the Communist Party of Soviet Union (CPSU) Congress XX in February 1956, the de-Stalinization policy of Nikita Khrushchev also included
changes in the disciplinary policy of the state towards the dissident attitudes in the society.

[There was] the trend of continuity between the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras in regard to both dissenting behaviour and the authorities’ responses. In this one can also see how pragmatism and rationalism rather than ideology (i.e. Khrushchev’s much-vaunted ‘return to Leninism’) or a sense of liberality set the agenda in dealing with the problem of dissent and that although at times its assumptions were based on fundamentally sound reasoning, the regime consistently exaggerated the threat posed to the state by dissenting behaviour and often overreacted to it as a result. Factors that are highlighted in regard to the changing relationship between state and society include evidence of people’s broadening philosophical horizons, declining respect for, and fear of, the authorities along with the gradual emergence of the tacit Brezhnev era social contract between society and the regime (whereby society remained docile as long as the regime fulfilled basic tasks such as providing employment and an acceptable standard of living).

(Hornby, 2008: 4)

Therefore this change from the entirely disciplinary to biopolitical social contract between the population and the state had started in the late 1950s with the de-Stalinization policies of Khrushchev. Virgin Land campaign was one of the first biopolitical “state experiments” to improve the food security and living conditions of the rural population facilitated by young professionals in the periphery of the Soviet Union that was problematic during the Stalinist disciplinary reforms. Kassoff (1965) also pointed out that his interest in Komsomol was primarily the content of the youth programme and the techniques through which it was
carried out. This was important in order to understand the socialization aspects of youth into mainstream government initiatives, such as industrialization. He also emphasised that the 1950s is the specific time-frame when the youth organizations in Soviet Union as a whole achieved a degree of stability and full institutionalization with the immediate tasks of post-war reconstruction and continuity in spite of the death of Joseph Stalin. Kassoff (1965) provides a detailed analysis of the programme which encompasses some 53 million members and evaluates the effectiveness of the regime’s efforts to shape the image of the future generation. The majority of the youth with the initial ideological enthusiasm and continuous fear of punishment followed the conformist path of Komsomol-supported educational institutions and professional careers in the government, army, health/educational sector of the economy or in the greater industrial complex of the Soviet Union. In that he admits there was a success of the Soviet youth programme that was integrated into the state economic system. Therefore, industrial modernization of the Soviet Union in the postwar time was run much on the ideological devotion, characteristic persistence and discipline, rigid organizational structure and processes, as well as often on the mere physical and intellectual power of the Komsomol youth (Kassoff, 1965: 143).

The mobilization of Komsomol during the incumbency of Khrushchev was central for the continuity of the industrialization campaign, as Stalin’s industrialization was dependent on the extensive system of labour camps (Gregory and Lazarev, 2003). Hence labour policies and practice “relied heavily on forced and semiforced labor to restore the country’s economy” (Fitzer, 2010: 131). However, with the de-Stalinization policy after 1956 that involved the amnesty of most of the political prisoners of labour camps who were crucial labour force during industrialization (Gregory and Lazarev, 2003), and the political
rehabilitation of deported “ethnic settlements” and other disciplinary institutions of modernization of the Soviet Union, the industry that was initiated had to carry on the development in spite of the lack of local labour force in remote peripheral locations such as Kazakhstan.

Nevertheless, some of the Soviet Youth at some point of their assignments were disillusioned and openly reacted with boredom, apathy and general resentment as they were deprived of almost any opportunity for spontaneous initiatives, apart from those directed to support the productive activities of the Central Plans, procedures and tasks that were established by the Moscow authorities. Often the discontent and boredom had been expressed in “hooliganism, juvenile delinquency, voluntary unemployment” and other stereotypical behaviour of what was defined as “idlers” (“bezdelnichestvo” – бездельничество). The Komsomol organization was in charge of making sure that the “idlers” were punished, and often punished by harsh years in jail, forced labour camps or volunteerism in major industrial campaigns mostly in Kazakhstan, Siberia and Far East (Kassoff, 1965: 144-170).

The other type of “idlers” that Kassoff curiously analyzed were of the urban middle and upper classes in the rigid Soviet societal stratification who financially lived off their parents and largely devoted their time to the quest of pleasure and fashion. They were called “stilyagi” derived from the word “stil” – стиль, that is translated as “style” (they were the close Soviet version of Britain’s Teddy boys). “Stilyagi” was a term conceived by Soviet citizens to negatively label “young comrades” who had an interest and passion in Western culture in 1950s and 1960s (ibid.). However, home-made Jazz LPs made from old X-ray images, movies of the era, and fashion in clothing patronised by the stilyagi show that the duplication was not the most accurate and realistic of either American or European styles of 1950s. Many of them displayed bizarre brightly coloured styles of dress and loud-checked
padded jackets, shoes sized too large, and elaborate and outrageous haircuts. They tried to speak English or French, listened to jazz, rock-n-roll, and particularly “anti-Soviet bands” such as the Beatles and Rolling Stones.

The basic philosophy of “stilyagi” was to get away with the minimum amount of study and work to enjoy their leisure time as much as possible and in the most unusual and shocking way possible. This behaviour was an attempt to imitate what they believed to be the “Western way of living” and popular youth culture grotesquely distorted in their imagination of particular British and American influences. This type of “idling” behaviour was not uncommon in large cities because of the persistence and rigor of press campaigns against them (Kassoff, 1965: 154-164). Therefore, the Communist Party “directives” enforced migration of professional youth as a disciplining measure for inadequate socio-political behaviour in public as well as for the need of industrialization in the remote areas of the Soviet Union.

The Komsomol values applied were applicable not only for the urban, but also for rural young people. Rural members of Komsomol were to embrace the values of the new society by “rejection of peasant traditions and patriarchal structures, loyalty to and self-sacrifice for the soviet state and the Komsomol, expectations for a better life and social mobility, and an implicit sense of entitlement”. Moreover, the rural communities had to adjust and absorb the formal state position on the new progressive modernised village and “to reinvent themselves in opposition to their peasant neighbors, old and young” (Tirado, 2001). Thus, the revised “Soviet way of living” obligated urban and rural young population to contribute by “migration” to the development of the industrial agriculture, for example in the “Virgin Lands” campaign under the collective farms systems and promoted the socio-cultural propaganda of the desirable Komsomol “worker” as part of the Soviet industry in the

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remote locations.

Even though the youth programme of the Soviet Union could be considered as incredibly successful in disciplining and conforming the youth to the government aims and plans, it was challenging to insulate youth from family influences and other political processes of liberalization that were associated with Khrushchev’s government. Thus, coercive mechanisms of governance such as enforced “professional migration” as a part of “special assignment” or “directive” after graduation were one of the ways to discipline the Communist youth into modernity and isolate them from “corrupting influences”. Moreover, for as long as the Soviet biopolitical plans for rapid industrialization and social “conformist” development remained in place the central values of the Komsomol programme that emphasised achievement, self-sacrifice, and the suppression of independent attitudes and behaviour were to persist. Therefore the mainstream attitudes towards the Soviet youth programmes and their disciplinary participation in the industrial development of the country would tend to become less repressive and probably more empathetic to the needs and shortcomings of the Soviet youth closer to 1980s and the end of the Soviet Union. Still, the generational transformation in accepting the Sovietised “identity” and associated instrumental values and norms of modernity such as the importance of socio-economic mobility, industrialization, technological progress, infrastructure and transportation in the region will affect other massive regional initiatives of “modern development” carried out by the “Komsomol” generation in their adulthood in 1990s-2000s. One of these large-scale development initiatives is the Eurasian regional economic integration, which under the institutional context of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) includes China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. The convergence of the ideas about biopolitical “life struggle for existence and growth” in the current
A generation of executives and managers in Russia, Kazakhstan and China who were born and grew up under the traumatic socio-economic and political circumstances of totalitarian “disciplining” state institutions during the Cold War has indeed developed into “a powerful cooperation for the purposes of existence …” (Kjellén, 1920: 93-94 in Lemke et al., 2011: 10).


6.1. New Regionalism and Identity

The consolidation of the People’s Republic of China after the Second World War, particularly after the 1946-1950 civil war, was also characterized by the displacement of large populations. Although more known for the massive recruitment, training and deployment of the “Red Guard” political cadres from the “Great Leap Forward” of 1957 and through the “Cultural Revolution” of 1966, China is also becoming more widely known for its biopolitical migrations. The first was the urban-to-rural migration of labour caused by the Great Leap Forward industrialization movement. The results of the increase in the total urban population in China from 99 million in 1957 to 130 million in 1960 were food shortages in urban areas and famine in rural communities that were depleted of workers. The second was the forceful repopulation of rural areas with urban migrants. An order issued by the Beijing government in 18 June 1961 required 20 million persons to be returned to rural areas, with half of the number to be sent by the end of the year. Among the population that sought to evade the urban-rural repression of Beijing were thousands of Uighur refugees who fled Xinjiang for the Soviet Union. In 1962 alone, about 64,000 refugees crossed the relatively loose Bakhta and Khorgos checkpoints at the China-Kazakh SSR border.
Rather than repatriated, these refugees were provided with basic welfare services by the Soviet government (Dikötter, 2011: 230-239).

Despite major socio-economic reforms in the past three decades in China, the “Uighur problem” persists till the present day; that is, the marginalization of religious, linguistic and cultural practices of the ethnic minorities in Xinjiang resulting in secessionist demand of the Uighur people for their own state outside of China or Kazakhstan. The Uighur people, who historically lived in geographic Central Asia, however have different biopolitical life-system control in Xinjiang, China, and in neighbouring Almaty Oblast, Kazakhstan. “Freedom of speech, religion and movement” for the 11 million Uighur people in China is strictly controlled by the state. However a quarter of a million of Uighur people in neighbouring Kazakhstan “enjoy relative freedom” (Qobil, 2015) in more tolerant multicultural environment. Thus, even if it was a relatively small disruption at the time, the displacement of large populations of Uighurs nowadays may become a major political concern for the states in contemporary Eurasia. That is, China appears to have done less than the former Soviet states at its borders – Kazakhstan and Russia, specifically – in incorporating the Uighur populations into their mainstream societies. This imbalance is likely to have an effect on the prospects of creating a “multicultural” identity that spans Eurasian societies, particularly if China continues to treat the marginalization of the Uighurs as a minor issue.

Contemporary China’s “Peaceful Rise” (Zheng, 2005) and the more recent “Peaceful Development” (PRC State Council White Paper, 2011) plans had brought much debate in the academic community about the impact China will have upon the regional stability in Asia. Multilateralism is generally perceived as not the most preferred way of interaction of China with other countries in the region. Nevertheless, China is one of the leaders of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO), which is a regional multilateral institution that includes China, Russia and four Central Asian states – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Mongolia (since 2004), India, Iran, Pakistan (since 2005) and Afghanistan (since 2012) have observer status in the SCO, while Belarus, Sri Lanka (since 2009) and Turkey (since 2012) are dialogue partners. More recently, the promotion of the idea of the Silk Road Economic Belt (Tiezzi, 2014) has made SCO to appear as a constructive venue for the promotion of the multilateral economic integration mechanisms to be operationalised in Central Asia and wider Eurasia. Furthermore, the SCO had “finalized procedures for taking in new members, with India, Pakistan, and Iran first on the list” (Tiezzi, 2014) to pursue the ambitious goal of “Eurasian” integration as once envisioned by Mackinder (1904) in “Geographical Pivot of History”; broadly, to ensure economic development, trade and stability in the Eurasian region (McCoy, 2015).

These integration processes involve particular transportation/infrastructure and energy projects. One of the centerpiece projects is the construction of a bullet train link between Lanzhou and Urumqi, to improve economic and socio-cultural links of Central and Southeastern China with the Central Asian countries via Xinjiang in Western China (Hsu, 2015). There are also initiatives between Russia and China to build a high-speed railway between Moscow and Beijing via Kazan in Tatarstan to upgrade the existing Moscow-Beijing passenger train link that was opened in 1954 (Business Insider, 2014). The other showpiece initiative that shares similar infrastructure vision for Eurasian integration is the 2700 km of the Western China-Western Europe international road transit corridor being built in Kazakhstan to link China with Russia funded by loans provided by major development banks such as World Bank, Asian Development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and Islamic Development Bank. Also, the most recent
ADB loan approved for China is to be used for the improvement of other Xinjiang infrastructure. This is part of the greater “One Belt, One Road” initiative to connect the international transit corridor that includes “Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-century Maritime Silk Road” (Liu, 2015). In addition to the existing financial platforms to support this grand infrastructural development in Eurasia, the new Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) was established as a “supplement to existing multilateral development institutions”. In spite of criticism and scepticism, the promise of the initiative seems to be “a far cry from monopoly or dominance”, but inclusive of other interested parties in the region and beyond to participate in Eurasian integration (Liu, 2015).

The infrastructure and above all railway and road transportation improvement combined with the recent simplified procedures for visa application at the Khorgos border crossing between China and Kazakhstan in the long term will increase the population interaction and socialization across the national borders (Bradsher, 2013). Furthermore the creation of “SCO university network” similarly to “ASEAN university network” for member-states that promote the integration processes in education and research will provide the arena for new student generation as well as professors to explore the “Eurasian identity” in practice through institutionalized interaction. Thus, there might be a need for a greater attention paid by all the states involved to the socio-cultural issues of divisive political nature, particularly within the SCO institutional context and throughout the overall Silk Road Economic Belt initiatives. The socio-cultural integration towards a more common “Eurasian identity” might be challenging if long-standing divisive “ethnic” or “religious” issues are institutionally ignored rather than peacefully politicized, discussed and founded on consensus-building in the region. Particularly because this generation of managers in modernizing development initiatives would not have the biopolitical
“disciplinal” instruments of 1950s-1960s initiatives in the Soviet Union or China to overcome the resisting tendencies towards new identity reconstruction in the 21st century. The careless use of outdated 20th century’s totalitarian state measures of “disciplining” the rebellious or disloyal through institutions of military and police rather than emancipating and empowering the marginalized through dialogue might hinder the more “peaceful” regional integration, improvement of economic/business competitiveness and overall political reputation of the Eurasian state and non-state multilateral entities in Asia.

More to the point, the economic integration processes within the SCO context, although following a multilateral approach towards the institutionalization of Eurasian regional economic interaction, do not presently provide any guidelines or indicate future plans for procedurally managing or institutionally communicating about various cultural, religious and ethnic identities and associated secessionist issues of the states involved, if they arise. The only SCO regional mechanism available to limit and punish the secessionist-related activities is the disciplinary mandate of Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. There are no provisions for institutionalized “peaceful” politicization, discussion and reflection about the potential of “identity transformation” through more positive biopolitical systems beyond the disciplinary deterrent mechanism of RATS. Thus, one of the obstacles to building mutual political trust and socio-cultural community among member-states and their populations for “peaceful development” is normative; that is, the cultural, religious, ethnic and linguistic diversity of values. Furthermore, the SCO region has a complicated and diverse periphery, which extends from Eastern Europe to West Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia and the Pacific Ocean. In other words, the SCO member-states have to face countries with very different political value systems and socio-cultural systems combined with the accelerated
integration of economic and infrastructural systems. These contextual issues put SCO in a difficult environment to conducting internal and external initiatives as a regional grouping (Yang, 2009).

6.2 SCO Multilateralism as Integrative Influence?

Still, the SCO is a unique multilateral institution that never claimed a European/EU model and analogue as most other regional institutions of the world did. In purely institutional terms, the SCO is quite the opposite from the European Union (EU) in being extremely inter-governmental with only minimal central institutions and centrally managed resources. This uniqueness, however, may be perceived as a weakness by those who hold the EU as the standard model for regional integration. This is because the SCO, despite being a regional multilateral institution does not follow and, moreover, does not aspire to follow the societal and non-functionalist norms of the EU. The SCO does not place central emphasis on issues such as democratization, the subordination of state functions to human rights concerns, the institutionalization of supranational governance, and the standardization of multilateral interaction through bureaucracies that are equivalents of the European parliament, the European Council, the Commission, the Council of Europe, and European Central Bank. Nevertheless, there might be legitimate claim against using the European construct to measure other regional multilateral institutions. The states and societies of the non-European or non-Western world, particularly the SCO-member states that industrialized in conjunction with, and reconstructed after, the Soviet system are not the same in terms of values and norms attached to international interaction and institutions as in the post-World War II Europe. More importantly, the SCO is not intended by its member-states as an alternative to the EU system not only because of contextual
differences but also because the economic utility of the SCO vis-à-vis the EU particularly depends on the SCO as a self-sustaining institutional system, controversies notwithstanding. Thus, the establishment of different social order through multilateral institution contradictory to the mainstream liberal institutionalist values can be justified due to different material conditions, national interests and ideational base of states and diversity of societies. However what this non-European and non-Western regional social order might be is a question for academic community to dwell upon, question and discuss.

What is more, the international relations theory does not offer a straight-forward explanation to the perfect model of multilateralism (Coparaso, 1992). There is a difference between a “multilateral institution” that presumes the formal organizational structure of international life and an “institution of multilateralism” that maybe represented in a particular organization, but often “appeals to the less formal, less codified habits, practices, ideas, and norms of international society”. Thus, “multilateralism” is a belief or an ideology that activities need to be organized on a particular basis for a “relevant” group, which promotes future “multilateral” cooperation (Coparaso, 1992: 603).

There are at least three ways to understand multilateralism: the first is the individualist approach, where states have contractual relations with other states; the second is the social-communicative approach with the focus on the “identities and powers of individual state”; and the third is an institutional approach founded on structural determination of a goal-oriented behaviour that is linked with the second approach on the “importance of communication, reflection, discussion, learning, and interpretation”. The individualist interaction is founded on the realist/neo-realist perspective and non-cooperative game theory framework with the strategic focus on the individual preference and no binding morality, norms or commitment (ibid.: 605-609). The social-
communicative approach to multilateralism does not only involve individual choice, but it is also where “the choosing agent reflects, discusses, trusts and distrusts, tries to build consensus, alters others’ perception of the world” (ibid.: 613). This interaction has been assessed by the political scientists and economists in the cooperative game theory, by the experimental psychologists in the study of persuasion, and by the sociologists in the study of norms and identities. The institutional approach is the goal-oriented interaction, where “the identities, preferences, beliefs, and behaviour of micro-units are given a structural determination” (ibid.: 623). Structures are considered useful as they can be more durable than individuals and they can preserve the consistent properties in the variety of participants. The social-communicative approach combined with the institutional approach to multilateralism has a resemblance to the Deutsch theory of “pluralistic security community”, where “communication is the cement of social groups” that enables them to share knowledge and express the “sense of community” (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 3-7). The institution of European Union demonstrates this third point, with its complex bureaucracy and processes that enable communication and persuasion among states that make institutionalization of numerous agreements, as well as supranational standards and policies possible. The SCO however currently closely represents the individualist approach with neo-realist perspective and inter-governmental interaction that involve strategic focus on national interests and preferences, high level of distrust among member-states and no common binding norms and values. However with more economic, business and trade interactions this initial socio-cultural divisive mistrust will need to be overcome by more pragmatic and functional socio-communicative approach to build conscious regional consensus.
Stephen Aris in *Eurasian regionalism* (2011) argues that the development of an emerging regional organization such as the SCO in the post-Soviet Central Asia, which was initiated by China and Russia, corresponds to the perceptions of its member-states about security, regional cooperation and multilateralism. He asserted that many theoretical frameworks for examining regional institutions and regional cooperation apply fixed assumptions to states’ perception of security, cooperation and multilateralism and neglect the importance of more dynamic regional contexts and perceptions. The assumptions for the study of regional institutions based solely on the European Union experience may not be true for all regions in the world. Aris has stressed that the development of the SCO is important not only to the member-states, but also to the wider global politics, security and economy. Russia and China are two prominent states of the international system, owing to their territorial size, economic capacity, military strength and status as permanent members of the UN Security Council. Moreover, the activities of the SCO have become central for Russia’s and China’s regional strategy towards wider Central Asia, South Asia and West Asia that include Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan and India as observers and Turkey as a dialogue partner. For its short history, the SCO – in comparison with the EU or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – has had visible achievements as a multilateral institution (Aris, 2011).

The SCO Charter was signed in 2002 and came into effect in 2003. In 2004 the SCO formally introduced its permanently functioning bureaucratic institutions such as the Secretariat in Beijing and the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) in Tashkent. The period of 2001-2004 was devoted to the institutional development of the SCO structure that operationalised the mandate of the Charter. This included the establishment of the Council of Head of States, Council of Heads of
Government, and Council of Foreign Ministers, as well as Meetings of the Heads of Ministries and Departments, and Council of National Coordinators. Furthermore, throughout the period of 2004-2007, the SCO primarily focused on addressing the non-traditional security issues commonly perceived by its members as threatening regional stability: terrorism, separatism and extremism. And after 2007, the goal was officially “to consolidate the consensus reached up to this point before moving on to the next stage of agenda development” (Aris, 2011: 4-6). Hence, the establishment of different normative, legal and institutional basis for the SCO in comparison with other regional institutions such as the EU or ASEAN can be considered as an important milestone for the development of regional multilateralism.

Kyrre Elvenes Brækhus and Indra Øverland (2007) are even more optimistic about “A Match Made in Heaven”. SCO member-states’ material compatibility and overlap of key interests regarding the long-term developments in world politics is considered as the strategic convergence between two leaders of the institution, Russia and China. The compatibility between Russian natural resources and Chinese manufacturing markets seems particularly important. Russia is the world’s second largest oil producer, after Saudi Arabia, and China the world’s second largest oil consumer, after the United States (US). However the compatibility in “material factors” such as physical and economic aspects of cooperation are as important as compatibility in “ideational factors” such as accepted political and societal norms and views on separatism, politicized Islam, democratization, human rights, regional stability and US hegemony. In other words there is no certainty that a successful regional “multilateral institution” would result in constructive “multilateralism” among people-groups.

The SCO as a multilateral organization is undeniably exceptional for both Russian and Chinese history. This is the first attempt by both
countries to establish a regional institution on equal leadership standing. The positive outlook of this relationship is comparable to the optimism at the start of the EU project with the steel and coal cooperation between France and Germany after World War II. Even though China and Russia, and previously the Soviet Union, did not go to war against each other, the historic bi-lateral relations had still suffered due to the Sino-Soviet doctrinal divergence between Maoism and Marxist-Leninist Communism in 1961, the Soviet Army presence at the disputed Sino-Soviet border and in Mongolia, and the Soviet support of the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea. Likewise by the fall of the Soviet Union, there were still disputes over the delimitation of common borders between China and Russia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Considering the historical context of Sino-Soviet relations and realist-prone interaction of both countries in international affairs, the attempts of contemporary Russia and China to engage with other states in the multilateral institutional setting of their construction can already be considered as a regional security enhancement through multilateralism.

Mikhail Troitskiy in “A Russian perspective on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization” (2007), similar to Kyrre Elvenes Brækhus and Indra Øverland, uses the notion of convergence that is necessary for multilateral interaction among states. He also shares the views of Stephen Aris about the importance and uniqueness of the SCO for member-states and the rest of the world. The SCO has three basic features that make it unique in Russia’s history of international relations. Firstly, the organization embodies its members’ converging policy approach towards socio-economic stability and security in a particular geographical region. Secondly, although developing a security dimension, the SCO is not a collective security or defense bloc. Thirdly, Russia is only one of the two powerful states within the organization. Neither the Warsaw Treaty Organization (Warsaw Pact) of the Soviet
times, the post-Soviet Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) nor
the present Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) has ever
met all three of these criteria (Troitskiy, 2007). Overall, the “Russian
perspective” towards the SCO puts emphasis on the advantages of
interdependence for national interests and possible future development
using structural realist framework of analysis. Furthermore, the SCO is
regarded in Russia as a means to add weight to member-states’ common
positions on key security issues in the international arena. And more
importantly from a realist perspective, Russia has been able to retain the
prestige and influence of one of the two SCO founding partners, as
Russian membership constitutes (no less than China’s) part of the
organization’s initiatives and strategies. Interestingly, both China and
Russia understand that, should Russia feel sidelined within the SCO
activities, the organization will lose much of its legitimacy and purpose
in the eyes of the smaller and economically/militarily weaker Central
Asian member-states. (Troitskiy, 2007: 30-44) Therefore, the strategic
convergence of Russia and China on issues such as regional non-
traditional security, economic and energy cooperation as well as
skepticism about Western military interference for democratization and
human rights promotion is central for the SCO’s future institutional
enhancement.

Similar to the Russian perspective, the Chinese view on the SCO’s
potential for future development as a regional multilateral organization
is positive though for somewhat different reasons. Guang Pan in “A
Chinese perspective on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization” (2007)
suggests that the SCO symbolizes the entry of Chinese diplomacy into a
new stage, with an orientation towards multilateral interactions. The
SCO enabled China to build unprecedentedly strong security, political,
economic and cultural ties with Central Asian states, thus creating the
conditions for it to play an active and constructive role in the region.
Moreover, the cooperation within the multilateral framework makes it possible for China to avoid friction with Russia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan as neighbouring countries while preserving and pursuing its own national interests. However, the next phase of the SCO development is critical for a multilateral institution to overcome a number of sectoral and structural issues of the internal environment (Pan, 2007: 45-58).

Shu Yang’s article, “Reassessing the SCO’s internal difficulties” (2009), provides the Chinese academic perspective on the importance of the Central Asian regional stability, normative harmony and economic development for the SCO’s institutional progress. The SCO countries possess a great amount of resources and capabilities, and there is much room to improve multilateral economic and social cooperation under the SCO framework. However, the integration among the SCO members still remains weak. The SCO member-states have very diverse levels of economic development. This to some extent restrains the use of the SCO framework more effectively, particularly on the issue of economic cooperation. One of the impediments to building mutual political trust and social community among member-states is cultural and linguistic diversity. In other words, the issue of the Uighur people’s identity that is closer to the Turkic identity of the Kazakhs and other ethnic groups in Central Asia being different from the Han Chinese in Beijing and Slavic Russian in Moscow can hinder the societal integration as part of the regional “community” of SCO. Yang (2009) suggests that the SCO members should work more towards deepening economic, cultural, transport, and communication systems within the region to overcome the contextual issues of each state. Central Asia has its own unique geopolitical, socio-economic and cultural characteristics that are useful for “practicing” multilateral institutionalism. Yang recommends that China and Russia should devote more effort to promoting their interests
in Central Asia, where “the linkages can be matured and expanded to other areas” of the region such as Afghanistan (Yang, 2009: 17-23). Thus, the success of economic development and cooperation of Central Asian states as well as their interaction with the neighbouring countries in the region determines the future of the SCO.

6.3. SCO as a Regional Peacemaker?

The most challenging state in terms of regional security in both traditional (balance of power, militarization, hegemonic influence) and non-traditional (heroin drug trafficking, terrorism, Islamic extremism and other transnational crimes) forms in Central Asia still continues to be Afghanistan. As the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)’s exit strategy of Afghanistan in 2014 has not yet translated into conclusive decisions about the “operational future” of the security and socio-economic development of the country, the role of neighbouring states might be central for bi-lateral and multi-lateral cooperation and constructive improvement in security. Interestingly all neighbour-states of Afghanistan are members, observers or dialogue partners of the SCO, except for Turkmenistan. Nevertheless, Turkmenistan had participated in almost all of the SCO meetings as a guest attendant and been open as a “neutral state” for regional cooperation that does not restrict its national interests. Thus, the choice and methods of interaction for the SCO with Afghanistan after 2014 would probably indicate the effectiveness of this type of multilateralism. Richard Weitz (2012) wrote in “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Afghanistan” about the possible expansion of the SCO activities to Afghanistan. Afghanistan has become a formal observer and Turkey has become a dialogue partner of the SCO in the June 2012 heads-of-state summit in Beijing. The immediate neighbours of Afghanistan, such as Iran, India and Pakistan have already
been observers in the SCO for the past few years. The author argues that only this regional multilateral institution has a more comprehensive set of members and affiliates to address Afghanistan’s regional security and economic integration within Eurasia. This would be a significant change to the organization’s strategy, as until recently the SCO has pursued a very narrow approach towards Afghanistan that focused primarily on countering narcotics trafficking and anti-terrorist measures under the Regional Anti-terrorist Structure (RATS) office in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.

Commonly perceived sources of non-traditional threats such as opium cultivation, production and trade as well as spread of radical Islam in Eurasia are compounded by the political instability of Kabul’s central government. Its key failure is the inability to control and manage all the provinces of Afghanistan. Furthermore, the expansion of radical Islamic influences associated with the Taliban movement is likely to promote the ideas of terrorism, extremism and separatism in the region. And exactly these threats to the regional “peaceful development” are included into the SCO’s post-modern security agenda. These factors may prompt SCO to more actively pursue preventative policy and development measures in Afghanistan. According to the 2012 report of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Afghanistan produces more than 90% of the world's opium. Despite an aggressive campaign to destroy the crop, the total area under poppy cultivation increased by 18% in 2012, reaching 154,000 hectares compared with 131,000 hectares in 2011, although the estimated overall production of opium in Afghanistan decreased by 36% – from nearly 6,000 tonnes in 2011 to around 3,700 tonnes in 2012. The UN report concludes that there is a correlation between insecurity and opium cultivation that has been apparent for the past several years. Thus, the future involvement of the SCO in the stability and development of Afghanistan would show if this type of multilateralism is capable of expansion in the culturally diverse,
politically unstable, anti-Western and militarised contexts of Afghanistan. 

Furthermore, the “Afghanistan” issue is closely linked to some aspects of the unresolved internal “Uighur problem” of Xinjiang, China. There were 22 Uighurs captured by NATO forces in Afghanistan in 2001 (Savage, 2013). When these men were captured in Afghanistan, the “U.S. did not list a little-known Uighur group, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), as a terrorist organization”. However a few months later the US needed the UN approval for the Iraq war; thus, relatively unknown ETIM had appeared on the US terrorist watch list to satisfy China. Uighur detainees in the Guantanamo Bay jail were one of the most complex cases for release and resettlement, as “few countries are willing to step up and suffer financial or political reprisals from China” (Shephard, 2013). The freed Uighur detainees from the Guantanamo Bay jail who were unable to return to China for the fear of imprisonment and torture had to be resettled as far as in Bermuda in the Atlantic and Palau in the Pacific (Talmadge, 2013). These exiles were unable to support themselves financially, unable to travel without passports and necessarily cope with being far away geographically from the society and culture with which they are familiar. This resettlement policy of twenty-first century brought the Uighur people to similar biopolitical conditions of the Stalinist ethnic resettlement policy in 1940s-1950s Kazakhstan. 

In reference to this case, it is not unlikely that China’s intensified interaction with the Central Asian states as part of the SCO multilateralism would involve greater socio-communicative approach of “communication, reflection, discussion, learning, and interpretation” among people-groups (Coparaso, 1992: 613). This will require greater levels of openness to politicization, reflexivity and discussion among population groups in order to alter others’ perception about China’s
policy towards the Turkic ethnic minorities, such as the Uighur, Kyrgyz and Kazakh ethnic groups, in Xinjiang and to build regional dialogue and consensus. The promotion of a cosmopolitan inclusive “Eurasian identity” for China’s “Peaceful Development” with Central Asian neighbours would require greater efforts on resolving the conflictual “ethnic discourses” and “religious discourses”.

The SCO as a multilateral organization and its member-states do not perfectly fit into the frames of liberal institutionalist expectations about shared social and political norms of democracy and human rights. However the majority of SCO states (except for Uzbekistan and Iran) accept the norms of liberal international economic order of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, Asian Development Bank (ADB) and more recently the World Trade Organization (WTO), such as commitment to private property, free markets, and restricted government role for monetary, trade and industrial regulation. Hence, despite the political limitations on democracy and human rights, the SCO still partially upholds the beliefs of liberal institutionalists that the international regimes promote cooperation in areas where there is high degree of interdependence, such as monetary and trade relations, business interaction, and sustainable development (Keohane and Nye, 1977: 53-56). This provides a solution to the “anarchical society” (Bull, 1977) in the region by introducing “the security practice of co-binding”, which enables transnational relations to be mutually beneficial despite the power politics (Deudney and Ikenberry, 1999: 181-184). In other words, the goals of the member-states of the SCO could still be achieved through international multilateral cooperation rather than through military force and security strategy regardless of socio-political norms.

More notably, the development of the SCO can conveniently fit into the contemporary notion of multilateralism of Morten Bøås and Desmond McNeill in *Multilateral institutions* (2003). This is a critical
approach to multilateralism that focuses more on the dynamic development of the system, its underlying structures, forces and processes of world politics rather than individual states. Even though the end of the Cold War represented the success of liberal democratic ideals for the Kantian “universalist tradition” of states’ interaction with the potential for “democratic peace” in the international community (Layne, 1994), recent “failures of political liberalism” particularly because of the American and European hegemonic military interventions in Iraq, Libya and Syria had been reflected in the dynamics of international multilateralism development. That is, the SCO’s development with its normative limitation is the reflection of the recent world events that diminished the optimism of liberal political values (Geis, Brock and Müller, 2006). The critical approach of Morten Bøås and Desmond McNeill looks at the establishment of social order that depends on the material conditions, interests and ideas of participants. In contrast, the liberal institutionalists believe that the establishment of multilateral institutions can have an independent positive effect on state behaviour. However, critical theorists agree with the neo-realists that initially power relations are part of the establishing process of multilateral institution in the particular historic context and circumstances. Nevertheless, the outcomes of this institution are not determined simply by the distribution of power among member-states, but by the dynamic development of “multilateral institution itself, which can affect how choices are framed and outcomes reached”. (Bøås and McNeill, 2003: 1-9)

Furthermore, “regionalisation is an important trend in the global political economy, and it is also putting its mark on the debate about the future role of multilateral institutions” (ibid.: 151). The critical approach developed by Robert Cox also, similar to Bøås and McNeill, directs the discussion of multilateral engagement towards dynamic interaction and mutual influence. This interaction and mutual influence however is
between three layers: social forces of production, forms of state and world order. The forms of state influence production modes, while production modes influence social forces, as well as the world orders. It provides a “non-mainstream alternative to those who subscribe to a worldview, which emphasises social equity (across identities such as gender, race, ethnicity and class), civilisational diversity (or plurality), and environmental sustainability” (Leysens, 2008: 1-10). Thus, the multilateral initiatives of energy, infrastructural and transportation will affect the “production modes” of the region and as a result influence the “social forces” of identities or ideologies of the population.

In short, the emphasis of the SCO’s multilateral institutionalism on the non-traditional security, infrastructure, energy and economic development rather than on the democratization and improvement of human rights records is the indication of the general trend in the critical understanding of multilateralism. This multilateralism is exceptional due to the “inclusion” of states that are not generally considered as having a positive liberal institutional influence on world affairs. Furthermore, the SCO member-states as well as observers and dialogue partner states have historically accepted different contextual values and norms that affect political systems, religious affiliations, ethnic and linguistic diversity, as well as different economic production systems. Therefore these different material conditions, national interests and ideational bases of countries are reflected in the SCO’s choice of issues possible for multilateralism and regional cooperation. Thus, the importance of SCO as an alternative multilateral institution that affects the identity of diverse populations in Eurasia must not be neglected in this generation of modernizing reforms.
7. Conclusion

The traumatic history of biopolitical “forced migration” of different types of people-groups to Kazakhstan in the period of 1930s-1960s brought change in the population statistics, as well as in the socio-economic conditions of the country. This was due to the industrialization drive that was mostly accomplished through the complex network of totalitarian repressive system of labour camps and enforced “settlements” of diverse ethnic groups and professional youth who migrated on the disciplinary “directives” and “orders” of the authorities. Nowadays the contemporary “Kazakhstani” identity, which was modernised through the introduction of the Soviet ideology as well as industrial system of production, is very different from the national identity of the “Kazakh” nomads and their life-system in the pre-Soviet period. Because this contemporary identity also includes the incorporation of the Uighurs, Koreans, Germans, Chechens, Russians, Ukrainians and other ethnic influences, and is linked to the possibility of a broader Eurasian identity under the SCO, Kazakhstani society necessarily confronts, accepts and goes beyond the disruption caused during its Cold War and totalitarian past. With the possible exception of China, societies in Eurasia have widely accepted that their industrial development included traumatic socio-cultural and political disciplinary measures for “forced modernization” of identities through biopolitical eviction, deportation and settlement of diverse ethnic and professional groups in the modern history.

Since independence from the Soviet Union, despite the rise of nationalism in the post-Soviet republics, President Nursultan Nazarbayev attempted a socio-political construction of “inclusive” multi-cultural and bi-lingual identity of the “Kazakhstani citizen” and thus, was successful in avoiding ethnic conflicts and any political “ideological” confrontations based on the notions of ethnicity,
nationality, religion or race. The importance of this multi-cultural approach is underlined by the growing pressure upon the SCO-member states to (1) create and promote a shared Eurasian identity and to (2) resolve the ethnicity-based resentment of the Uighurs and other people-groups that were biopolitically repressed throughout Eurasia in the modern history. The contemporary technocratic approaches at functionally linking the states and populations of Eurasia may prove helpful in resolving these identity issues, and succeed only if “inclusivity” and “equitability” are able to replace primordialism, ethnocentrism, chauvinism and other sectoral values as the bases for economic, political and socio-cultural interaction, communication and development in the region.

**Note**

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Ethnic Chinese Remigration from Southeast Asian Countries since 1960s: A Case Study of Malaysian Chinese Outflows

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Abstract

Total outflows of Chinese from Southeast Asian countries since the Second World War reached around 3 million. They headed to the developed countries such as the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Australia, France and Singapore. As for the case of Malaysia, large number of Malaysian Chinese remigrated to Singapore, United Kingdom, United States, Canada and Australia for new residence since the end of the Second World War. They left Malaysia because of political discrimination, economic restrictions, and unequal educational and cultural treatment. According to Malaysia census data and natural population growth rate, this paper made estimation that by 2010 a total of 1.13 million ethnic Chinese had migrated out of Malaysia. After deducting the number of ethnic Chinese moving to Malaysia, the Malaysian Chinese migrating abroad reached 1.05 million. Malaysian Chinese left Malaysia in the manner of permanent residents and short-term migrants. Permanent residents include those in the skill stream,
family stream and those with special eligibility. Short-term migrants refer to visiting scholars, foreign students, guest labor, business expatriates and expatriate professionals. As a matter of fact, there has been a serious brain drain through Chinese remigration from Malaysia.

**Keywords:** Malaysia, ethnic Chinese, remigration

**JEL classification:** F22, J15, J61, O15

1. Introduction

Ethnic Chinese studies among Chinese academics have been focusing much on outflows from Mainland China and these migrants’ descendants for quite some time, while ethnic Chinese remigration from other parts of the world were not given enough attention. Ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asian countries were always at the center of international ethnic Chinese studies. Currently, cognition of ethnic Chinese societies in Southeast Asia is mainly in studying ethnic Chinese residents within Southeast Asia.

However, Chinese outflows from Southeast Asian countries have constituted a part of world Chinese migration and international migration in general since 1960s. It is the ethnic Chinese who earlier migrated from Mainland China to Southeast Asian countries and their descendants that make up this Chinese remigration. Such Chinese remigration has increased with in the fast development of globalization since the late 1960s. This paper intends to discuss first the numbers, distributions, causes and influences of Chinese remigration from Southeast Asian countries around the world. By drawing the whole picture of Chinese remigration, it will then be significant to learn about population migration in the Southeast Asian areas especially to explore
the Malaysian Chinese remigration, current situation of ethnic Chinese, distribution of world Chinese population and relationship between the sending countries and the receiving countries.

2. Ethnic Chinese Remigration from Southeast Asian Countries since 1960s

It is the ethnic Chinese who earlier migrated from Mainland China to Southeast Asian countries and their descendants that make up this Chinese remigration. A large number of Indochinese refugees, Indonesian Chinese and Malaysian Chinese have remigrated to the European, American and Oceania countries since 1960s. Malaysia was one of main destination of Chinese migration in history. Ethnic Chinese played significant roles in Malaysian political, economic and social development. Large number of Malaysian Chinese, roughly of the second to the fifth generation, started migrating to Singapore, United Kingdom (UK), United States (US), Canada and Australia from the postwar to the recent period.

Total outflows of Chinese from Southeast Asian countries since the Second World War reached around 3 million. Specifically, outflows of Singaporean Chinese reached 260,000, Malaysian Chinese 1.05 million, Filipino Chinese 77,882; Indonesian Chinese 136,800, Thai Chinese 700,000, and outflows of Vietnamese Chinese, Lao Chinese and Cambodian Chinese altogether reached about 700,000. The estimation is just a rough calculation because of inadequate accurate statistics.

In addition, destinations of Chinese outflows from Southeast Asian countries were the developed countries such as US, Canada, UK, Australia, France and Singapore. The total ethnic Chinese remigration reached 1.63-1.66 million. Adding those migrating to other developed countries and New Zealand, the number will total more than 1.7 million.
The other destinations of ethnic Chinese remigration were Taiwan, Mainland China and Hong Kong. Some ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asian countries were discriminated by local residents and had to return to China, but the most important reason being that China and Southeast Asian countries were having economic and trade cooperation, especially involving ethnic Chinese enterprises’ investments in China. Most of them lived in the capital, big cities and commercial areas, and some others were distributed among the counties of China. In the Southeast Asian area, the more developed country like Singapore is a receiving country, while the Philippines, Indonesia, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam are the sending countries. Malaysia and Thailand are ethnic Chinese migrant sending countries but are meanwhile also receiving entrants. Ethnic Chinese outflows from Southeast Asian countries lived mainly in big cities for the convenience of doing businesses.

Chinese outflows from Southeast Asian countries are much younger and more than 70% of these ethnic Chinese are at the age of 20 to 45, only 17% of them are above 65 years old. This is the typical pyramidal patterns which are broadly covered at the age of 15-19 and 55-59. Ethnic Chinese remigration is in the manner of permanent residents and short-term migrants. Permanent residents include those in the skill stream, family stream and those with special eligibility. Short-term migrants refer to visiting scholars, foreign students, guest labor, business expatriates and expatriate professionals. Ethnic Chinese from Southeast Asian countries outflowed in the manner of skilled migration, student migration, family reunion, labor migration and refugees. Those heading to developed countries such as US, Canada, UK and Australia were mainly skilled migrants, labor and students. Some others migrated through family reunion and refugee channels.

Academic level of Chinese from Southeast Asian countries was relatively high. Chinese above 25 years old with the bachelor, graduate
and professional degrees surpassed 42%. Permanent residents and students were majority of the outflows with higher academic levels. Those refugees and workers were less educated, and 44% of them were having high school diploma and below. Chinese outflows from Southeast Asian countries had widely occupational structures. The well-educated worked in management and other professions. The less educated worked in primary industries like mechanical operation, manufacturing industry and semi-skilled jobs. Students usually can work as a white-collar employee after graduation, while refugees, family reunion members and contract workers had to survive in primary labor markets.

Discriminatory policies against ethnic Chinese have led to the primary remigration of ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asian countries. Many countries in Southeast Asia experienced a wave of anti-Chinese movements after the Second World War that led to the forced migration of local Chinese to the North American and European countries. For example, Chinese from Indonesia headed to the Netherlands. Chinese from Singapore (part of Malaya/Malaysia before 1965) and Malaysia migrated to United Kingdom and ethnic Chinese refugees from Indochina flowed largely into France. Economic downturn, conflicts, political upheavals, anti-Chinese policy and social discrimination pushed Chinese out of the area. Generally speaking, the economic crisis in 1997 was one of significant driving factors for migrating to Western countries. In addition, positive immigration policy, demand of semi-skilled labor and high-level technical talents, and pressure of aging society in the destination countries were pulling Chinese outflows from Southeast Asian countries.

Chinese outflows from Southeast Asian countries are significant in the study of the current situation of the ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia and around the world, and in evaluating ethnic Chinese talents. At the same time, economy, society, politics, culture, population, education and
religion of the sending countries and the receiving countries were deeply influenced by Chinese outflows from Southeast Asian countries. For the sending countries, Ethnic Chinese from Singapore and Malaysia represent professional talents and hence lead to loss of talents in the process of emigration. As a result, it is urgent for Singapore and Malaysia to attract science and technical talents to promote economic development. The Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand depend on labor export and receive remittances as foreign currency to promote consumption, obtain startup capital and provide knowledge and resources. There are only few Chinese among foreign workers and local Chinese families in the Southeast Asian countries are not living by remittances sent through by family members and relatives abroad. Large-scale ethnic Chinese entrepreneurial businesses made foreign investment to boost domestic economic development for the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand. The majority of Overseas Vietnamese are ethnic Chinese, and these Chinese Vietnamese returning to Vietnam for visiting friends, making a tour, investing and doing business can bring profits for the Vietnamese economy. For the receiving countries, European and North American countries are attracting professional migrants to promote employment, production and gross domestic product (GDP), and primary labor to fill the jobs that local residents are reluctant to do. In addition, the innovative capability of well-educated migrants can upgrade the productivity of the receiving countries. However, policymakers and public opinion in the receiving countries often project passive views on migrants in terms of increasing employment pressure, creating burden on public services, leading to tension in social relationship and crime.

In the present situation, migration from the developing countries to the developed countries is the mainstream of international migration. Chinese outflows from the Southeast Asian countries to the United
States, Canada and Australia, even the migration inside the Southeast Asian areas, followed this migration pattern and policy. Chinese outflows from the Southeast Asian countries will not decrease in the short period. The push and pull factors had ensure the increase of migration all around the world. By looking at Malaysian Chinese outflows, it will help in understanding the whole picture of Southeast Asian ethnic Chinese remigration.

3. Quantity Assessment of Malaysian Chinese Outflows

Malaysia government did not publish the number of Chinese migrants in official publications. This paper relies on collected statistics of birth place in censuses to reveal the situation of these Malaysian migrants. However, there were not any statistics of Malaysian emigration in the census reports. According to five population censuses from 1963 to 2010, population of Malaysian Chinese was growing at a slow rate. Meanwhile, the birth rate was lower than that of Malays and Indians. In fact, one of the most important reasons of Chinese population decline was due to remigration.

According to the birth and mortality rate of Malaysian Chinese from 2009 to 2010, natural population growth rate of Chinese was 7.4‰ and 5.9‰ respectively (Table 4). At the same time, natural population growth rate of total population was 17.4‰ and 16.6‰ respectively (Table 2). Natural population growth rate of Chinese accounted 42% and 35% for the natural population growth rate of total population. This means that the natural population growth rate of Chinese was much less than that of Malays which accounted for the absolute majority of total population. Professor Saw Swee-Hock pointed out in his book, The population of Peninsular Malaysia, mortality rate of Malaysian Chinese was basically kept between 5.83‰ and 4.8‰ from 1969 to 2005.2 This
Table 1 Number of Malaysian Chinese

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Population (million)</th>
<th>Malaysian Chinese (million)</th>
<th>% of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>13.83</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>26.39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>15.76</td>
<td>4.04</td>
<td>25.63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>18.21</td>
<td>4.45</td>
<td>24.43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>20.73</td>
<td>4.91</td>
<td>23.68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>23.30</td>
<td>5.36</td>
<td>23.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>26.21</td>
<td>5.81</td>
<td>22.16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>28.30</td>
<td>6.24</td>
<td>22.04%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 2 Birth and Mortality Rate of Malaysian Population, 1970-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Birth Rate (%)</th>
<th>Mortality Rate (%)</th>
<th>Natural Population Growth Rate (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>25.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2) Index Mundi. [Portal](http://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?c=my&v=25)
tiny change referring to the natural population growth rate of Chinese was mainly influenced by birth rate. According to the declining trend of Chinese fertility in Table 3, the natural population growth rate of Chinese showed a decreasing curve.

**Table 3** TFR of Malaysian Ethnic Groups, 1991-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Malay (%)</th>
<th>Chinese (%)</th>
<th>Indian (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Table 4** Birth and Mortality Rate of Malaysian Chinese, 2009-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Birth Rate (%)</th>
<th>Mortality Rate (%)</th>
<th>Natural Population Growth Rate (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Malaysian population censuses from 1980 to 2010 included total population of ethnic groups and natural population growth rate. Malaysian Chinese population growth from migration (foreign Chinese immigration and local Chinese emigration) and natural population growth together determined the total number of Malaysian Chinese. Based on the available literature, this paper found there were just hundreds of thousands of Chinese moving to Malaysia during 1980-2010 including Chinese student, marriage migrants and some professional Chinese attracted by the Malaysian Silver Plan. Most of these Chinese migrant were not officially residents and not calculated in the official population census. There was no large-scale migration of Chinese from other regions to Malaysia. Therefore, this paper concludes that the quantity change of Malaysian Chinese was basically determined by ethnic Chinese’s natural growth and the volume of emigration. According to the reached quantity of population by natural growth rate and the calculated quantity of population, the difference in numbers was recognized to be the volume of emigration.

According to the report of World Population Year, 1974 – “The Population Of Malaysia”, Malaysian Chinese from the Malaysian Peninsula outflowing to other countries reached 250 thousand from the independence year of 1957 to 1970s. Meanwhile, Malaysian Chinese outflowing to Singapore totaled 64,000, while there were 185,000 Malaysian Chinese outflowing to UK, US and other countries. Malaysian Chinese who outflowed in this period were between 15 and 29 years old. Male Chinese were the majority at 60%. Most of them were younger skilled talents with higher education background. They outflowed to continue study or seeking new employment opportunities. In addition, according to Malaysian population statistics published by IPUMS International6 ethnic Chinese totaled 3,651,196 in 1980. Total outflows of Malaysian Chinese from 1980 to 2010 reached 876,839.
### Table 5 Volume of Chinese Outflows from Malaysia, 1980-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chinese Outflow</td>
<td>3,651,196</td>
<td>4,041,357</td>
<td>4,459,971</td>
<td>4,910,183</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chinese Outflow</td>
<td>5,363,139</td>
<td>5,810,258</td>
<td>6,245,361</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Natural Population Growth Rate (%)</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>2.57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Natural Population Growth Rate (%)</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>1.73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total Outflows | 876,839 Chinese |

Formula of outflows: Outflow number of 1980-1985 = Number of Chinese in 1980 \( \times (1+2.85\%)^5 \) – Number of Chinese in 1985 (same formula for other periods).

4) IPUMS International. [https://international.ipums.org/international/index.shtml](https://international.ipums.org/international/index.shtml)
Based on the above statistics, this paper approximately predicts that the volume of Malaysian Chinese outflows during 1957-2010 was about 1.13 million. Accordingly, deducting Chinese from other countries moving to Malaysia during 1957 and 2010, the total emigration of Malaysian Chinese should be about 1.05-1.11 million.

4. Quantity Assessment of Malaysian Chinese Inflows in Destination Countries

Malaysian Chinese mainly migrated to the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and Singapore. According to The Asian Population: 2010, total number of Chinese in the US was 4.01 million. Meanwhile, Malaysian migrants entering the US totaled 26,179. Given that Malaysian Chinese shared a certain proportion of 24% in total Malaysian population, it can be estimated that there were 15,095 Malaysian Chinese in the US.

The 2011 Australian Population Census reported that Malaysian migrants were reaching 116,196. As the ratio of Malaysian Chinese was 62%, Malaysian Chinese totaled 72,157, which accounts for 8.3% of the total number of Chinese in Australia (866, 205).\(^8\)

UK’s population census report Focus on Ethnicity and Religion (October 2006) pointed out that the total number of Chinese in England and Wales was 0.4 million (0.7% of the total population).\(^9\) Chinese in UK mainly came from Hong Kong (29%), Mainland China (19%), Malaysia (8%), Vietnam (4%), Singapore (3%) and Taiwan (2%).\(^10\) Chinese in UK from Southeast Asia reached 60 thousand while those Chinese from Malaysian totaled 32,000.

Malaysian migrants headed to Singapore as the main destination which made Singapore the most favorable receiving country for Malaysian migrants. In Singapore, Malaysian migrants usually worked...
in the transportation industries.\textsuperscript{11} Large numbers of Chinese left
Malaysia for Singapore and other countries in the aftermath of the May
13 ethnic conflict in 1969.\textsuperscript{12} According to estimation from the Malaysian
Human Resources Department, there were 0.15 million migrants from
Malaysia in Singapore.\textsuperscript{13} Most of the migrants were Chinese and they
are highly skilled professionals working in construction and electronics
industries.\textsuperscript{14}

From the point of view of Singapore, Chinese migrants in Singapore
were mainly from Malaysia and China. According to the estimation of
Xie Meihua, a research fellow, there were 0.318 million Malaysian
Chinese flowing to Singapore between 1990 and 2000. The statistics
were calculated by permanent resident, non-resident, population growth
rate and Malaysian Chinese population data.\textsuperscript{15} In addition, former
diplomat Dennis Ignatius made estimation that more than 1 million
Malaysian migrants outflowed to other countries as by December 4,
2009. The Star newspaper reported that Malaysian migrants were
distributed in the UK (0.3 million), the US (0.2 million), Australia
(95000) and Canada (50000). A. Kohilan Pillay, deputy minister of
Malaysia Foreign Affairs Department, indicated that there were 304,358
Malaysian migrants outflowing abroad including 50000 students from
March 2008 to August 2009.\textsuperscript{16} Based on the above estimation, Malaysian
migrant mainly headed to the UK, the US, Australia and Canada, while
only a small part (less than 0.3 million) went to Singapore after the year
of 2000.\textsuperscript{17} Moreover, according to the statistics of “Population and
Ethnic Group” in the Yearbook of Statistics Singapore, 2011, Malaysian
Chinese were accounting for 78.6\% of Malaysian migrants in the
category of Non-resident\textsuperscript{18} Singaporeans.\textsuperscript{19}

According to population census in Singapore, Malaysian
immigrants were the largest number among immigrants in Singapore
during the postwar period. In the category of Singaporean residents,
Table 6 Malaysian Chinese in Other Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961-2006</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>32,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-2010</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>15,095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986-2011</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>116,196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-2010</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>0.33 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 493,290

Malaysians increased from 44,878 in 1947 to 233,163 in 1980. If calculating by the percentage in the total foreign-born population, Malaysians increased from 10.9% to 44.2%. Most non-residents in Singapore came from Thailand, the Philippines and India as short-term guest workers, and Europe, America, Japan and Australia as skilled professionals. The 2000 Singapore Population Census indicated that more than 258,406 Malaysian Chinese, accounting for 59.2% of Chinese residents of foreign-born population, ranked the first in 436,756 Chinese residents of foreign-born population.20 In addition, the 2010 Singapore Population Census showed that Malaysian Chinese increased to 338,501.21

In general, Malaysian Chinese in Singapore reached more than 0.33 million, accounting for 84.6% of total number of Chinese from “Other Southeast Asian Countries” by the end of 2010.

As stated above, Malaysian Chinese remigration reached 1.05 million from the perspective of Malaysian calculation. From the perspective of receiving countries, Malaysian Chinese migrants totaled 493,290. As a matter of fact, the number of Malaysian Chinese in the receiving countries was underestimated. Malaysian Chinese statistics in the US and Australia were calculated by the percentage of Chinese
among Malaysian migrants. This percentage was according to percentage of Chinese among Malaysian ethnic groups. In addition, the paper made estimation of resident population of Malaysian Chinese in Singapore. All the other Chinese who were not registered in census, registered by birthplace rather than ethnic identity, were not counted. Finally, other receiving countries including Japan, South Korea, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Sweden, Austria, Russia, and New Zealand were not stated in this paper because of the difficulty of getting the accurate number or percentage of Malaysian Chinese there. Besides, Taiwan, Mainland China and Hong Kong were also most important destinations of Malaysian Chinese heading to for living, studying and doing business. For example, there were many ethnic Chinese business groups investing in Taiwan, Mainland China and Hong Kong. However, those Chinese returned to China are not discussed in this paper.

If the number of Chinese migrants not stated in this paper were added, differences in estimation of Chinese migrants between the sending country and the receiving countries are reasonable.

5. Causes of Malaysian Chinese Remigration

Malaysia is a multiethnic nation-state whose population includes Malays, Chinese and Indians. Malaysia is one of the countries with the largest number of Chinese in Southeast Asia. Malaysian Chinese reached 6.24 million in 2010 accounting for 24.6% of the total population (28.30 million). Chinese is the second largest ethnic group following Malays in Malaysia. Since independence in 1957, Malaysia gave the first priority to Bumiputera (Malays and aborigines), which led to the ethnic politics in Malaysia. Malaysian government implemented a policy of assisting Malays and limiting Chinese development, leading to the neglect of the
elementary rights of Chinese in political, economic and social life and the marginalization of the Chinese in politics. The principle of “Bumiputera First” was strengthened which established Malay as the national language, Islam as the national religion and Bumiputera as the national leader. In addition, reservation system for Bumiputera and quota system in government position were identified; moreover, Bumiputera can receive business license in special industries. As a result, the concept of “Bumiputera First” was systematically legalized.\textsuperscript{23}

The NEP had the stated goal of poverty eradication and economic restructuring so as to eliminate the identification of ethnicity with economic function. The initial target was to move the ratio of economic ownership in Malaysia from a 2.4:33:63 ratio of Bumiputera, Other Malaysian, Foreigner ownership to a 30:40:30 ratio. This was to be done by redistributing the wealth to increase the ownership of enterprise by Bumiputeras from the then 2.4% to 30% of the share of national wealth. The 30% target for Bumiputera equity was proposed by after the government was unable to come to a consensus on an appropriate policy goal.\textsuperscript{24}

Alongside this redistribution of wealth was the goal of increased economic growth. This economic growth would allow the non-Bumiputera share of the economy to decrease, while permitting the growth of non-Bumiputera business interests in absolute terms. In some quarters, this was referred to as “expanding pie theory”: the Bumiputera share of the pie would increase, without reducing the size of the non-Bumiputera slices of the pie. This theory was first enunciated in the Second Malaysia Plan.\textsuperscript{25} In 1975 the government created incentives to expand large-scale manufacturing industries and energy-intensive industries, targeting these industries and building policies around them. The Heavy Industries Corporation of Malaysia (HICOM), for example, was formed to assist in the manufacture of pig-iron, aluminium die
casting, pulp and paper, steel, cement, motorcycle and heavy engineering. At the same time, export incentives were initiated.

This Policy was conceived as a two-pronged strategy of eradicating poverty for all Malaysians as well as reducing and subsequently eliminating identification of race by economic function and geographical location. The Policy seeks to achieve its objectives through rapid expansion of the economy over time and set its target of substantially reducing incidence of absolute poverty by 1990. To achieve this, the Policy called for aggressive improvement of economic status and quality of life for all Malaysians through access to land, physical capital, training and public facilities. Historically, Malaysian government made policies on the basis of the economic gap between Chinese and Malays. During 1957-2005, the Malaysian government pursued in turn the laissez-faire policy, New Economic Policy, National Development Policy and National Vision Policy in order to promote economic and political position of Malays. Although the economic gap between Chinese and Malay was shortened, the middle class and the poorest section was widening resulting in imbalance of political and economic development in Malaysia. The government promoted economic status of Bumiputera but compulsorily restrained economic development of Chinese and other ethnic groups. Especially, the New Economic Policy hindered social and economic development of the Chinese community. On one hand, Chinese New Villages was excluded from national economic development strategy. On the other hand, Chinese in these New Villages did not receive any assistance from the policy and the traditional industry, construction, transportation and business, were faced with competition from Bumiputera which could get special assistance from the government. The New Economic Policy changed cooperation between Chinese entrepreneurs and Bumiputera who had much more protection from centralization in government policy and actual
operation. Therefore, interests of those Chinese enterprises without the protection of special political powers were jeopardized by these policies. As a result, some Chinese entrepreneurs were forced to migrate to other countries for new career opportunities and to seeking new sense of belonging.

Education is one of the more controversial aspects of the New Economic Policy because of Malay’s protection in higher education policy. In order to satisfy demand for ethnic equality and for Bumiputera’s education advancement, Malaysia government specifically implemented preferential treatment for Malays in higher education policy. In 1970s, the constitution of Malaysia was amended so that the head of state (King) could designate any universities or colleges to accord quotas for admission to public universities. According to the regulation of Education Department, a hard quota system was formulated for all higher education institutions. The guidelines for Malaysian education were to unify the system of education and promote Malay language so that the soul of national culture could be created in the nature of Bumiputera (Malay) culture. Education policy of Malaysia has the goal of giving priority to Bumiputera in the following specific measures. Firstly, Bumiputera were accorded quotas for admission to public universities. These quotas were fixed as the ethnic population figures to allot. Meanwhile, some universities or departments were accorded quotas for Bumiputera only such as Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (UKM) and the National Institute of Technology. Departments of science, engineering and medicine in public universities were also trying to raise the percentage of Bumiputera. Secondly, examination subjects were adapted for Malays. Malay language replaced English as the university candidate test subjects, which benefits Malay students. Under the protection of quotas, Bumiputera were increasing rapidly in universities. As a result, the quotas were considered by many
non-Bumiputera especially Chinese and Indian students as unfairly rewarding the Bumiputera.\textsuperscript{30} With the enrollment quota limitation, large number of Malaysian Chinese student studied abroad, heading to Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Canada, UK, US and some other countries. Thirdly, Malaysian Chinese remigration had reflected a high level of professional development. Especially those migrants since 1990s, they mostly had received higher education diploma, professional training and social position. Forced to remigrate, they were also attracted by the demand for skilled professionals in the receiving countries. In addition to those Chinese who went abroad for study, most of these Chinese migrants were skilled, wealthy and with good English proficiency. Besides, they were familiar with the social development, political system and lifestyles of the receiving countries. So they can rapidly integrate into the mainstream of their local society. Moreover, there has been a serious brain drain of Chinese remigration from Malaysia. Major pull factors have included better career opportunities abroad and compensation while major push factors included corruption, social inequality, and lack of educational opportunities, and the government's Bumiputera affirmative action policies.\textsuperscript{31} As of 2011, Bernama has reported that there are a million talented Malaysians working overseas.\textsuperscript{32} Recently the brain drain has increased in pace: 305,000 Malaysians migrated overseas between March 2008 and August 2009, compared to 140,000 in 2007.\textsuperscript{33} Non-Bumiputera, particularly Malaysian Indian and Malaysian Chinese, were over-represented in these statistics. Popular destinations included Singapore, Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom.\textsuperscript{34} This has contributed to the fall of Malaysia’s economic growth rate to an average of 4.6% per annum in the 2000s compared to 7.2% in the 1990s.\textsuperscript{35}

In addition to internal causes in Malaysia, policy changes of the receiving countries also pulled Malaysian Chinese to outflow abroad.
Firstly, the receiving countries such as US, Australia and UK changed migration policy one after another since 1960s. US made amendment to its 1965 Immigration Law which opened the door for Asian migrants. UK issued a point system of receiving migrants, which to some extent gave special priority to migrants from Malaysia and Singapore which were formerly its colonies. Australia abandoned its White Australia Policy and welcomed international migration from Asia. These receiving countries were favourite destinations for Malaysian Chinese migrants due to their high level of economic development, huge demand of labor, and relatively equal social policy and legal environment.

6. Conclusion

In conclusion, more than one million Malaysian Chinese with higher education and skills had emigrated abroad, hence creating brain drain and capital loss for Malaysia. Brain drain resulted in weak development of technology, science and industry, especially due to the lack of high-level human resources. Even though Malaysia receives remittances from migrants, migrant families often spend the remittances in unproductive consumption. Malaysian government took several kinds of measures to attract highly skilled professionals to work in Malaysia and promote economic development such as the establishment of Talent Corporation. However, compared with the racial discrimination policy, such policies to attract highly skilled professionals tend to have insignificant effects. Chinese talent and capital outflow could only be halted if the Malaysian government were to act appropriately to address the causes of Malaysian Chinese remigration.
Notes

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1. In ethnic Chinese academic studies, ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia flowing to Mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan are defined as “returned ethnic Chinese”, which is distinct from the definition of ethnic Chinese remigration. As a matter of fact, “returned ethnic Chinese” were mainly from the Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia after the Vietnam War. Many refugees had fled to Mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan. Ethnic Chinese from Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines were mainly short-term entrants for business, travel, study and official work such as ambassadors and their accompany relatives. It is difficult to make estimation of short-term entrants because of less published statistics. Meanwhile, some “returned ethnic Chinese” finally remigrated to other developed countries like US, UK and Australia, which made the quantity assessment of “returned ethnic Chinese” much more difficult. Generally Speaking, it is widely accepted by ethnic Chinese scholars in China that
the “returned ethnic Chinese” from Southeast Asian countries totaled 0.3 million since 1960s and most of them were from the Indochina area and were distributed in the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region and the provinces of, Guangdong, Fujian, Yunnan, Jiangxi and Hainan.


6. “IPUMS International” is the abbreviation of “Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, International”. (当前全球最大的人口普查数据库，总部位于美国明尼苏达州大学明尼苏达州人口统计中心。IPUMS International将世界各国的人口统计微观数据整合成统一的模式，方便不同的年份和国家间进行比较。IPUMS旨在通过提供微观数据进行对分析，方便了解全世界各国社会和经济发展变迁。)


18. “Residents” in Singapore’s population census include citizens, permanent residents and non-regular residents including migrants. (新加坡人口统计中的居民包括公民和获得永久居留权的居民，以及非常住居民。移民类数据被划归至非常住居民栏进行统计。)


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30. The Malaysian government introduced in 1978 the “quota system” in student enrolment. (马来西亚政府在1978年出台了规定土著学生不超过55%和非土著学生不低于45%的学额分配制，即“国打制”。)


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Public Policy, Societal Outlook and Community Development
Media Representation of Taiwan’s New Female Immigrants in Documentaries

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Abstract

Today the new female immigrants mainly from China and ASEAN countries have become large ethnic groups in Taiwan, accompanied by the negative labels and stereotypes of “money marriage”, “commoditized female” and “mercenary marriage” reproduced by the media. Above all, the rhetoric of “foreign bride” hinted that the underprivileged “Others” are hard to integrate into the Taiwan society. To explore the image of these immigrants, this article aims to discuss about the meaning of the media representation of Taiwan’s new female immigrants in documentaries. It takes two documentaries as the main texts to be discussed and by interpretation of shots, language and political/social implications used in these documentaries to produce representation and reflection on these immigrants, it analyzes how these documentaries present the various issues of Taiwan’s new female immigrants and the implication for multiculturalism and the transforming process of these new female immigrants’ position from “outsiders” to “insiders” in the Taiwan society.
Keywords: media representation, Taiwan’s new female immigrants, documentaries, community empowerment

JEL classification: F22, I31, J15, L82

1. Introduction

In the contemporary information society, the public recognize attributes of the other ethnic groups from the media such as TV news, newspapers, journals, movies, TV series and network so as to construct the image and rough sketch of these other ethnic groups. Today the new female immigrants mainly from China and ASEAN countries have become large ethnic groups in Taiwan, accompanied by the negative labels and stereotypes of “money marriage”, “commoditized female” and “mercenary marriage” reproduced by the media. Above all, the rhetoric of “foreign bride” hinted that the underprivileged “Others” are hard to integrate into the Taiwan society.

Among the diversified media, the documentaries are different from feature films at the groundwork of real figures and plots striving to represent the objective atmosphere and lifestyles of Taiwan’s new female immigrants. To explore the image of these immigrants, this article aims to discuss about the meaning of the media representation of Taiwan’s new female immigrants in documentaries during 1996-2012 and takes two documentaries as the main texts to be discussed. Moreover, it analyzes how these documentaries present the various issues of Taiwan’s new female immigrants like housework, lineage, ancestry and civic rights and the immigrant’s multiple roles such as daughters-in-law and wives, etc. By interpretation of shots, language and political/social implications used in these documentaries to produce representation and reflection on these immigrants, we can arouse the respect and tolerance
for the multicultural phenomenon of Taiwan’s new immigrants and promote the transforming process of their position from “outsiders” to “insiders” in the Taiwan society.

2. Representation, Media Representation and the “Construction of Reality” about Taiwan’s New Female Immigrants

S. Hall notes that representation means structuration, molding and meaningful praxis and production.\(^1\) Besides, the process of “representation” are often circumscribed to culture, institution, society, language, norms and consensus.\(^2\) Therefore, to realize representation is to realize the choice of the masses from the dimension of mass media. Since it is impossible to describe each detail of anybody, the characteristics and appearance must be highlighted or even exaggerated in pictures or feature films.\(^3\)

“Representation” is a cyclic triangle process composed of three fixed points. No matter whichever factors, such as age, gender, ethnicity or social class, are taken into consideration, “representation as process” consists of three cyclic steps: (1) Reference: what sort of realities are depicted? (2) Production: what part do these factors play in text production? (3) Reception: what influence do these factors have on interpreters?\(^4\) This process involves the interactive influence of subject and object (media and audience) and the producing step of representation.

As to the definition, “media representation” implies “media that portrays the particular group, community, experience, ideas and themes in special ideology and value perspectives.”\(^5\) To explore this meaning we cannot initiate simply from considering it as the reflection of reality or the mirror of reality. On the contrary, we should inspect to the extent that how the representation authentically makes a real new reality.
For instance, the advertisements of beer and perfume all create idealized experiences to make “representation” closely linked to the use of these products and cannot be substituted with the other vacillating images. This can also be exemplified by the giant global entrepreneur that bears ingrained perspectives for the White, the West and middle class image in fairy tales. By way of Disney World or Disneyland, it creates “artificial realities” through the shaping of paradises that can idealize and purify the discrepancies among diversified political and cultural ideologies in different countries.\(^6\)

The representation of the new female immigrants in the Taiwan media can be observed from TV news, articles in magazines and journals, website, feature film, textbooks and publications which all pilot the public to recognize in the new female immigrants. As mentioned above, representation is inevitably optional – it can conceal some aspects while spotlighting the other aspects. Therefore, representation involves our modality of interpretation and judgment on things. No matter how realistic, all of the contents of texts still need to construct representations rather than just represent as reflections, records, transcriptions or reproductions of “pre-existing reality”.\(^7\)

With comprehension of this prerequisite, most of the media representations of Taiwan’s new female immigrants were accompanied by description of negative label effects such as “money marriage”, “commoditized female” and “mercenary marriage”; it exaggerates the incapable, economically dependent, knowledge-deficit and second-class citizen signs or signals and conceals some real aspects so that the “construction of reality” may leave gaps to our apprehension. Therefore, this article will analyze the text of the documentaries on Taiwan’s new immigrants and how they construct the reality. This article aims to explore the meaning of the documentaries during 1996-2012 on
Taiwan’s new female immigrants and take two documentaries for their main texts to be discussed.

3. Form, Spirit and Factor of Documentaries

Bill Nichols (2001) classifies documentaries into six forms: (1) the observational mode; (2) the participatory mode; (3) the reflexive mode; (4) the performative mode; (5) the poetic mode; (6) the expository mode, and these forms may blend or integrate to shape the unique style of each documentary. For example, the reflexive mode and the performative mode could be compatible in the same film, such as the documentary film Ai Weiwei: Never Sorry (2012) which used the reflexive mode and the performative mode at the same time.9

The evolution of documentaries makes it difficult to distinguish them precisely from the feature film. As A. Rosenthal (1988) mentions in the “Introduction” of New challenges for documentary, the viewpoints about documentaries have transformed from emphasizing on reality into focusing on their forms and languages. Besides, Rosenthal also points out that in the signal system which documentaries used was “language” that makes it approximate to the feature film.10

Besides, Paula Rabinowitz takes a point of view from the politics of documentary to position it as both a creation of esthetics and information, half real and half fictional, demonstrating among the public, private and political spheres. In addition, one can view it as basically a creature of economics and culture. Precisely because of this trans-boundary characteristics, he persists that “gender” is also one important rhetoric in documentaries while it was always neglected and repressed.11

In addition, one of the factors in documentary or art is “exchange”. Likewise, social photographer Dorothea Lange describes one of the conditions of composition in her Migrant Mother photography series as
“exchange”. She said, “... she (the actor) knew maybe I will do something for her and she will do something for me in return, too”. This is the economics of documentaries. Furthermore, Paula Rabinowitz indicates that the most sensitive factors are position, meaning, interpretation and narratives. Documentaries need to be narrated no matter what it contains in reports, static image or dynamic image. The presentation of subjects, section-cuttings and subtitles were all narrating. The photography may be mute but the documentary is always talking to express the value of specific topic.¹²

4. An Overview of Characteristics of Documentary Films about Taiwan’s New Female Immigrants

4.1. Factors Contributing to the Sudden Increase of Documentaries about Taiwan’s New Female Immigrants

There are several factors that contributed to the sudden increase of documentaries about Taiwan’s new female immigrants in the late 1990s: the emergence of immigrant marriage, the enlargement of channels and organizations for immigrants to engage in the Taiwan society and that the filmmakers were deeply interested in the related subjects. For example, The Bride from the Opposite Site (1996) delineated exogamy of the case of a Kinmen and Xiamen couple that brought massive conflicts and arguments. All of the documentaries (and feature films) about immigrants and immigrant labor had broad subjects and contents and most of the films illustrated in the next section are documentaries (while a few of them were feature films) to present a macroscopic view. The characteristics of these documentaries during 1996-2012 can be summarized as in the following subsection.

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4.2. Characteristics and Subjects of the Documentaries

immigrants in the Taiwan New Immigrants Association (*The Power of Women* (2009), *Out/Marriage* (2012)), political praxis process of the Trans-Asia Sisterhood Association in Taiwan (*Let’s Not Be Afraid!* (2010)).

Secondly, it is noteworthy that the volume of documentaries overwhelmed feature films in this period. Documentaries are more adept in interpretations of culture politics and in the field of struggle. Furthermore, these new immigrant films are sharply critical of the manipulation of representation in meaning, identity, values, signature, memory, desire and horror and some are involved in the arguments of power operating and resource distributing.\(^{13}\)

Thirdly, the establishment of the new immigrant organization, Trans-Asia Sisterhood Association, which did push the wave for the development of documentaries of Taiwan’s new female immigrants. Activities of Trans-Asia Sisterhood Association bridged the stages and social/political channels in Taiwan’s society. Precisely, the documentaries produced by the organization did not only seek collective identities and destigmatization of new immigrants but were also used to be an empowerment instrument\(^{14}\) for reshaping their identities and status.

5. **Documentaries as Main Texts To Be Discussed:**

   (1) *My Imported Wife*, (2) *Let’s Not Be Afraid!*

5.1. **My Imported Wife**

From the beginning the title, “My Imported Wife”, revealed the satirical meaning of this film and it described the story of a Taiwanese male suffering from cerebral palsy who married a Cambodian bride and explored whether such marriage is a kind of “mercenary marriage”. The main filming techniques were mixtures of the observational mode and
participatory mode.\textsuperscript{15} In the performance of observational mode, lots of off-screen penetrated the whole film. Although guided by observational views, it is undoubtedly permeated with the director’s subjective judgment about immigrant marriage.\textsuperscript{16} The other technique for representation of observational mode would be the insert of the conversations between the photographer and Huang (the Taiwanese male suffering from cerebral palsy) which was mentioned lightly and less subjective in the process of a trip of accompanying the “Imported Wife” to visit her country and relatives.

Moreover, the director and photographer of this film were all males so as to represent less philanthropy for new female immigrants and less feminism. They interviewed one lady working at a night club who had a more positive view on Huang; however, the bureaucracies and scholars showed more negative views and tagged the label of “commoditized marriage” on Huang and his wife.\textsuperscript{17} The mode of antithesis was so unambiguous that it consists of several sets of factors for sharp contrast: the disabled and the normal, poverty and wealth, the age gaps of this couple, Taiwanese culture and Cambodian culture\textsuperscript{18} – to highlight the core of “commoditized marriage”.

Furthermore, this film went along the narrative axis of “commoditized marriage” by describing two accidents: the first one is when Huang brought his wife back to the Cambodian village, the villagers cast contemptuous vision on Huang; however, Huang’s mother-in-law anticipated much about the material capacity Huang would bring and which Huang was also deeply proud of himself. The second event was the visit of Huang’s mother-in-law to Taiwan, accompanying murmurs of discontent resulted from the couple’s life and economic situation. This made Huang, his mother-in-law and his wife falling into continuously furious quarrel so as to omit the existence of cine camera and this was similar to the “scenario” of “performative mode” of
documentaries. Indeed, there were some implications that they desired the camera to record and witness.\textsuperscript{19} Hence, these two events present that the standing of new female immigrants was so humble, servile and abject that equates trade-off in money. The possibility to escape from poverty formed the basis of this foreign marriage and the trip of visiting the wife’s mother country further proved this argument.

5.2. \textit{Let’s Not Be Afraid!}

The subject of this film was the history of Trans-Asia Sisterhood Association (TASA) and its social praxis process. The most important feature of this film was that the filmmakers and the actors are from the same group. According to Wei-Hsuan Chou, the social praxis process of TASA can be divided into three periods: (1) period of initiation (1995-2003); (2) period of transformation (2003-2007); (3) period of political involvement (2007-).\textsuperscript{20} In the period of transformation, TASA turned into a non-profit organization (NPO) from “The Literacy Program for Foreign Brides in Mei-Lung” (美濃新娘識字班) period of initiation and began to enlarge its social involvement. As to period of political involvement, these new female immigrants went beyond the previous experience to practice their public engagement with strategies of protest, demonstration, public hearing, symposium and urged the government to revise the related law to enhance their social positions and protective mechanism of human rights.

The techniques of this film also corresponded to the above three-stage process of enhancing their social positions and human rights. The English title of this film “Let’s Not Be Afraid!” (in the Thai language, ไม่ต้องกลัว (mai tong glua)) and the scene of releasing sky lanterns which pointed out their belief that “sky lanterns signify the hope”\textsuperscript{21} all encouraged the new immigrants to going forward without fear. The other
techniques of such belief can be traced with, for example, the following sections:

“The government set up National Immigration Agency without discussing publicly and 75% of the human resource deployment were policemen who obviously regarded immigrants and immigrant labors as potential criminals. Besides, there’s no human rights protective mechanism that could help to bring about this protest.” (action drama on the street that protested the coercion of the Taiwan Garrison Command)

“We didn’t have maternal home in Taiwan and the Trans-Asia Sisterhood Association (TASA) is our maternal home.” (the dining together of new female immigrants in Trans-Asia Sisterhood Association (TASA))

“This was a good chance to vocalize for ourselves. I was tramped accidentally on action drama and nevertheless was stepped on in real life more seriously.” (action drama and protest on the street)

“We need to engage in international activities of immigrants and immigrant labors.” “Migration in society is like a mirror which reflects pre-existing values and advocates the real democracy, human rights and multiculturalism; everyone should take part in the human right movements of immigrants.” (subtitles at the ending of this film)

Besides, this documentary aims to construct social positions and try to confront the cultural hegemony of mainstream viewpoints. The specialty in this film still included the insert of folk songs to represent the essence of “multiculturalism”. The folk songs of their countries
were not representation of exotic savor anymore but the constructive
display of cultural values about their mother countries. Actually, since
*Let’s Not Be Afraid!* (2010) was released, there had been an incremental
focus on this type of films directed by immigrants themselves although
there was no high volume of production. They can be exemplified by the
subsequent documentaries *Out/Marriage* (2012) and *The Dancing
Children* (2012).

Owing to the fact that the filmmakers are also the photographed
people, the narrative language and view points were polarized and
sequential with singular logics that often centered around the appeal of
the character of “Others”. This filmmaking and film-editing by
immigrants themselves sharply exposed the neglect and stigmatization
that immigrants have been treated with and what they strive for. This
also broke through the statement by Laura Mulvey that females are
always “Others” on the film from the angle of “male gaze”. The new
female immigrants had embarrassing circumstances of “Double Others”
but the director turned this adverse circumstance into a positive action of
community empowerment.

6. Conclusion

Owing to the unique narrative language that documentaries bear,
combinations of subjects on immigrants and immigrant labor attracted
the filmmakers so much. How to elaborate the “reality” and speak with a
special story had become challenges in documentaries of new female
immigrants since the late 1990s in Taiwan. The themes of human rights
became the core concept of this type of films. For instance, in *My
Imported Wife* (2003) the director dealt the “commoditized marriage”
with subjective and plain language and shots.
Another film, *Let’s Not Be Afraid!* (2010), that this article analyzed had provided an angle of view based on the concept of “empowerment”. The documentaries gave the new female immigrants a more active role that can handle the power of telling stories and reshape their perspectives about working rights, education rights of their children and the other human rights, etc. The process of “empowerment” cannot be separated from the process of their establishment of NPO and social/political praxis. Thus, the combination of Trans-Asia Sisterhood Association (TASA) and *Let’s Not be Afraid!* (2010) could be a fine example. To sum up, in retrospect and from reviewing those documentaries we can observe that what the new immigrants require was not just to be treated equally with multiculturalism but also what they are appealing most for will be the complete civic rights and human rights.

**Notes**

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5. CI5472 Teaching Film, Television, and Media. <http://www.tc.umn.edu/~rbeach/teachingmedia/module5/2.htm>
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16. Interview with Tsung-Lung Tsai, director of My Imported Wife, 8th October 2014.

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19. Interview with Tsung-Lung Tsai, director of My Imported Wife, 8th October 2014.

21. 2011 Female Movie Exhibition (2011 女性影展) –《姊妹，賣冬瓜！》 (Let’s Not Be Afraid!), 16th September 2011. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mSHQTH-DH-o>

22. Ibid.

23. In Wan-Ching Ke’s Ph.D. thesis, she described about the film that in the ending part the song was sung in turn in several languages like Vietnamese, Thai, Indonesian language, Filipino language, Cambodian language and Chinese. The texts of the song revealed their decision to go forward and fight for the dreams of tomorrow. (影片最後結束的歌曲以越語、泰語、印尼語、菲律賓語、柬埔寨語，及中文輪流演唱：「每一個天燈都帶著祝福與希望往上飛，姊妹賣冬瓜，姊妹不要怕，天燈飛得越高，越遠，我們越接近夢想。」影片在充滿街頭戰鬥力的音樂、歌曲：「起來，堅強勇敢的姊妹，越語：起來，全世界受苦的人，泰語：滿腔的熱血已經沸騰，印尼語：要為真理為鬥爭，菲律賓語：舊世界打得落花流水，英文：姊妹們起來，起來。柬埔寨語：不要說我們一無所有，中文：我們要做天下的主人，這是最後的鬥爭，團結起來到明天，Internationale 就一定要實現，這是最後的鬥爭，團結起來到明天，Internationale 就一定要實現。」) Ke, Wan-Ching (柯婉青) (2013).〈南洋新移民女性錄影自拍學習歷程及其影音再現之研究〉[research on self-filming by female immigrants from South East Asia: learning process and self-representation], Ph.D. thesis submitted to the Graduate Institute of Adult Education at the National Kaohsiung Normal University (國立高雄師範大學成人教育研究所博士論文), July 2013. <https://www.gender.edu.tw/upload/Academy/Thesis/%E6%9F%AF%E5%A6%A7%E9%9D%92%E8%AB%96%E6%96%87.pdf>

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Mixed Supply Model of Public Service Provision in “Village to Residence” Community: An Empirical Case Study in Jinan+

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Abstract

China is experiencing rapid transition of urbanization. From the 1980s till now, the transformation of “village to residence” has become a prominent approach for numerous villages in the urban-fringe areas of China. This paper discusses the mixed supply model of public service provision, on the basis of an empirical study of two cases in Jinan City, by illustrating the transformation of urbanization and how public services in the communities are delivered. The paper also considers existing challenges in the model and accordingly provides a series of policy suggestions, including defining responsibilities of government, speeding up the joint-stock reform of collective assets and innovating the public service provision mechanism.

Keywords: “Village to Residence”, new-type urbanization, mixed supply model of public services

JEL classification: H41, H44, O18, R51
1. Introduction

The three decades of opening-up and administrative reforms have witnessed dramatic urbanization in China. From the 1980s to the present, the transformation from “Village to Residence” (cun gai ju, 村改居) has been an important approach for local peasants in urban-fringe communities to turn into urban residents overnight. While there have been significant improvements in the public service provision for the special type of urban community, a good many problems have also risen in practice. As a matter of fact, from the perspective of transition, problems that have been exposed in the process of “Village to Residence” reflect the complexity and comprehensiveness of breaking the systematic barriers that have long rooted in Chinese rural-urban dual structure. Having been put forward in the eighteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC), the new urbanization strategy emphasizes the urbanization of citizens, allowing the shift from agricultural surplus labor in the countryside to non-agricultural industry and cities, along with enjoying the same basic public services as urban residents. And these include social security, health care, education, culture and others. Therefore, it has been a crucial standard for ‘Village to Residence’ communities whether public service provision can be successfully unified between urban and rural areas.

2. Literature Review

Experimentations in “Village to Residence” have drawn much attention of Chinese scholars, policy-makers and practitioners. Researches have been focused on many aspects. Initial scholarship had focused on the individual rights and interests, as well as collective asset restructuring. Currently, the main concern has been expanded to the issues of social
security, resident participation, community culture, community organization, public service provision, community construction and management, as well as grass-roots party construction. Empirical studies of public service provision in “Village to Residence” have attempted to answer the following set of questions:

- Who are the providers of public services in “Village to Residence” community? Are there any differences from each other in the delivering of services?
- What are the problems in practice on the issues of public service provision in “Village to Residence” community?
- How to improve public service delivery as policy-makers in municipal governments?

Chinese scholars tend to have agreements on the differences between the “Village to Residence” communities and other types of urban communities. Influenced by the original tradition of village autonomy, the collective economy has become the most solid economic sources, even the “unlimited liability” for public affairs in the “Village to Residence” community (Zhou, 2011; Pang and Wang, 2011). In practice, many problems have been found in regard to public service provision in this type of community, including the insufficiency of input, dislocation and absence of providers, and the lack of the mandatory and normativity in government investment, which result in the imbalance and equality of resources between urban and rural area, as well as different groups in urban community (Tang, 2010; Liang, 2013; Wang, 2014). Chen (2003) proposes the establishment of a new public goods supply mechanism – public pilot private run. Tang (2010) and Wang (2014) put forward multi-center providers of public service in “Village to Residence” community. Whereas theoretical framework has been provided for the
existence of the complexity of public service provision, existing studies have not yet approached the provision of public services in a systemic, integrated way. In addition, it is not sufficient to account for the significance of the public service provision for this specific type of community. Therefore, the research aims to describe the process of transition of “Village to Residence” community in Jinan (濟南) from the historical perspective, and analyze the characteristics of mixed supply model of public services by conducting investigations in two communities. It also identifies the problems in the practices of public service provision and seeks to draw conclusions on the mechanisms of public services provision in the community.

3. The Development of “Village to Residence” Community in Jinan

The first “Village to Residence” community in Jinan has appeared at the end of 1980s. By the end of 2004, the number has increased to 102. The rapid growth of “Village to Residence” communities is closely related to the rate of urbanization¹ in the same period in Jinan. It is historically recorded that Jinan has been leading a role in the area of restructuring into joint-stock system for collective assets. QT community has been awarded as “Huaiyin Pattern” (Huaiyin moshi, 槐陰模式) by the Central Government in the year 2002. In 2010, in order to standardize registration of “Village to Residence” community, municipal government of Jinan issued “Opinions on Further Strengthening the Community Construction”, which hindered the rapid growth of registration. According to the statistics of The Civil Affairs Bureau of Jinan, the number of “Village to Residence” communities has undergone a slower growth from 102 to 129 over the past 10 years.
Located in the west-north suburbs of Jinan with a coverage of 150 acres (mu, 亩), Village Committee QT was registered as Residents’ Committee (jumin weiyuanhui, 居民委员会) in 1989. In history, there were no village enterprises and vegetable planting that sustain most of the villagers. The change from “agricultural to non-agricultural” has resulted in the loss of land for young people aged from 18 to 30, who were employed by state-owned industries such as cement plants, ceramics plants and building materials plants. In 1998, in order to improve the living condition of the residents, QT Committee undertook the remodeling of old village, which produced a lot of collective assets by renting housing properties along the street. In 2002, QT Committee launched the joint-stock reform of these collective assets. Afterwards, the value of collective assets has increased smoothly due to the urbanization and especially the rise of rental income. Notably in 2009, Jinan West Railway Station Planning was completed and QT was included in the core of the planning area. Currently, approximately 4,700 residents live in QT Community, of which about 700 are the original villagers.

Another case is HT Community that locates in the north suburbs of Jinan with a coverage of 2,000 acres (mu). In 2004, HT Residents’ Committee was registered. In the early years of reforms, while other villages distributed land among the peasants, HT took back the dispersed lands to invest into 12 business enterprises. In the mid-1980s, HT village had taken a significant leap from agricultural village to industrial village. Along with the rapid development of urbanization in Jinan, HT strived to develop the service industry such as logistics, occupation education and commerce, which has become the mainstay of the collective economy. Around 14,200 residents currently live in HT Community, of which the original villagers are about 4,200.
4. The Characteristics of Mixed Supply Model of Public Services in “Village to Residence” Community – Investigations of Two Cases in Jinan

In general, the provision of public services in “Village to Residence” community have been improved significantly ever since it was started in Jinan during 1980s. However, as a special transition community in urban areas, “Village to Residence” community demonstrates distinct differences from other urban communities with a mixed supply model of public services, which involves collective economy, private economy and government supporting projects, especially its heavy dependence on the village collective economy. Besides, the difference between two “Village to Residence” communities is remarkable in terms of the supply model of public services due to the social and economic basis in the history, the scale of the community, and the geographic position, etc.

In order to elaborate the characteristics of public service provision in “Village to residence” community, we will refer to two cases of HT Community and QT Community in Jinan, illustrating the providers and provision mechanisms of three types of urban infrastructure, basic public services, and public affairs and public services within the community.

4.1. Multiple Providers of Public Services

4.1.1. Main source of provision: The village-level collective economy

Having growing out of villages, “Village to Residence” communities have clearly showed differences in living environment, industry, and residents’ income composition from the traditional village. However, the collective asset of “Village to Residence” community has been continually accumulating and improved due to the geographical advantages in urban suburbs and the aggregation effect of city resources.
For example, total collective asset of HT Community is worth more than one billion yuan (renminbi), and its annual net income is above 20 million yuan. The annual collective housing rental income of QT Community is about 8 billion yuan, and is increasing more than 5 percent per year. The collective economy logically becomes the main source of public service provision in “Village to Residence” community. In addition, the platform of investment and management in the residential area for a long time is “whoever developed, who matched”. The surrounding municipal facilities (such as parks, water, electricity, roads, kindergartens and clinics, etc.) in HT and QT Community were invested and constructed by their collective economic organizations. According to the statistics of Jinan Statistical Yearbook 2013, there were respectively 4,218 and 3,523 employees in collective economic units in the fields of education, health and social work. It shows that the collective economy is still playing a role in public service provision and public affairs in Jinan. Some basic public services and a variety of social welfares, and social insurance largely rely on the collective economy. Most landless young villagers of HT Community were employed by its collective enterprises. Thirty percent of the collective net income is annually spent on villagers’ welfare (over 20 million) and the residents’ committee operation (10 million, the property service is free for villagers). Moreover, the collective economic organization is responsible for the reinvestment and management of the community kindergarten, apartment for the elderly, park, etc. Public toilets are invested equally by both the collective economy and the local governments. In QT Community, 8-million-yuan annual income of the collective economy is needed to pay for property costs, 2 million yuan for villagers’ welfare, and about 2 million yuan for annual year-end bonus, 1.8 million yuan for the two committees’ cost (vehicle expenses, staff wages, etc.), and consequently the total expenditure accounts for 70% of its net income.
For the individual-paid portion of the old-age insurance, 85% is reimbursed by the collective economy, and the percentage of the individual-paid portion of medical insurance, which is 300 yuan per year, is 100.

4.1.2. The recurrence of government responsibility

Under the guidance of “Urban and Rural Harmonious and Public Finance Construction”, governments at all levels in China have constantly widened the investment in urban-rural public services. The continuous development in public employment, service for the aged, fundamental public health, and community culture provides a favorable environment for the promotion of public service in “Village to Residence”. According to our investigation, the government has provided equal access for all urban residents, such as low-security, disability payments, social insurance, unemployment registration, re-employment training, and home-based care for the aged.

In the past of HT Community, the village collective economy was alone responsible for the refuse collection and public toilets, and now the municipal government shares one half of the investment and bears all of the maintenance costs. As a result, the condition and environment of public toilets have been improved greatly. As for educational facilities, the old arrangement that the government only undertook the wages of formal faculty has changed since 2012. In this year, the primary school in HT village was transferred free to urban education bureau; meanwhile the government bears all the cost of relative inputs. While the government’s responsibility is strengthening, there is a great disparity vis-à-vis residents’ actual demands at the level and quality of public service. Some problems are more prominent, such as the deficiency of employability of residents, serious shortage of facilities for home care,
lower standard-reaching rate of public health services and facilities, and increasing tension of educational resources, etc.

4.2. The Diversity of Public Service Provision Mechanism

4.2.1. Highlight the decentralization to grassroots government

In the early times, the transformation of “Village to Residence” was conducted by village collective organization itself in most cases. Later, the government began to spare more responsibility in the process of transformation. According to the new policy “The Opinion on Accelerating the Renovation of Urban Village in Jinan 2014”, the municipal government further improves the operational mechanisms and management systems. District or county governments hold the main responsibility of organization and implementation while the municipal government is responsible for planning, coordination, supervision and guidance. As a supportive measure, 60% of land leasing fees will be allocated to each district as the cost of reconstruction of urban village, and 70% of the land leasing net income will be allocated to each district, which would be used for renovating infrastructure and balancing fund in urban villages. Considering the advantages of grass-roots government, this arrangement is conducive to the promotion of efficiency.

4.2.2. The continuity of village autonomy mechanism

Although the villager communities have already shifted to the neighborhood committee, village autonomy has not disappeared in many “Village to Residence” communities. Most native villagers believe that they conduct their private and public affairs in accordance with village regulations and rules made by the trinity, namely village collective economic organization, village committee and village party branch. Only native villagers living in the traditional village are qualified to
participate in residents’ committee election and other public affairs.

In HT Community, apart from members of neighborhood committee, who have specific duties, members of community Party Committees and collective economic groups are appointed with the same list. Offices under neighborhood committee offer reception service to the native villagers and solve their concerns and problems. The collective stake still accounts for 60 percent in collective assets, while the proportion of workers is 40 percent. Only the native villagers have access to participate in the election of the “two community committees”.

Although joint-stock reform of collective assets was completed in QT Community in about 2002, residents only share out bonus to quantifiable assets, and the rights will be withdrawn by the company when they retire, which lead to the new problems of the vacancy of the subject of ownership. In addition, residents’ committee creates a property management company to operate services for the residents in a self-regulatory and self-serving system.

4.2.3. Multiple mechanisms for other participatory forces

Firstly, compared with ordinary urban communities, “Village to Residence” communities have stronger sense of community belonging with traditional culture of mutual help in the neighborhoods. In the process of urbanization, the thriving collective economic ties further consolidate the common interests among the native villagers. Secondly, estate developers have become necessary participants in the construction of infrastructure for the “Village to Residence” community, which has alleviated a huge financial pressure for municipal construction; however, their bias towards profits rather than growth and development results in that commercial projects of high rate of return are abundant while projects of low earning rate, even non-profitable one such as park, green
land, hospital and education facilities, are in short supply. Thirdly, some public utilities are privately provided and run by more and more companies and nonprofit organizations, such as private nursing home, private clinic and kindergarten and so on. Jinan municipal government initiated beds and living subsidies for the inspiration of private nursing homes since 2011. Lixia District (歷下區) government provides fiscal subsidies of children nursery fee to the residents since 2013.

5. Challenges and Solutions of Mixed Supply Model of Public Services in “Village to Residence” Community in Jinan

Basically, big progress has been achieved in the public service provision for “Village to Residence” in Jinan. However, the mixed supply model of public services is still in a chaotic status lacking in stability of rules and norms, and with remaining contradictions and problems. Thus, systemic reforms are urgently needed.

5.1. Clarification of Government Responsibility

As mentioned above, two levels of governmental responsibility are employed in the transformation of “Village to Residence” in Jinan. The decentralization is helpful to motivate local governments and to promote the service provision based on local conditions. However, decentralization is not a substitute to centralization and coordination. In fact, there are extreme disparities in public financial strength between the five districts of Jinan. Meanwhile, collective economic basis of different communities varies widely, so too much emphasis on decentralization may not be conducive to achieving equalization of basic public services but may instead exacerbate the gap.

Some advices can be given to tackle these problems. Firstly, municipal facilities and public service facilities should be well designed
before the transformation, which is the primary responsibility of municipal government. Secondly, appropriate mode for infrastructures and facilities should be selected at the basis of different conditions during the transformation of villages. The well-developed villages should be encouraged to participate in the investment and construction of municipal facilities and public services, and local government is responsible for necessary regulation on the quantity and quality of the construction. Thirdly, after the transformation, it is needed for local governors to make a universal urban management for all of communities according to the equalization of basic public services. Central and provincial governments should take on more responsibilities for basic public services such as primary education, public employment, social insurance, social services and health care. Municipal governments should strengthen its roles in investment and management of municipal facilities and local public services, especially in bridging the gap between rich and poor districts by financial transfer payments. In our survey, we learned that the Shandong Province government came up with a special fund to subsidize infrastructure improvements within the old community (including sewer, street lighting, landscaping, pavement, fitness equipment, refuse vehicles, etc.) from the beginning of fiscal year 2012. “Village to Residence” community can also apply for this subsidy according to their needs. We suggest that such transfer payments should be normalized and institutionalized in the future. The under-developed communities should be especially financed according to the equalization standards of basic public services.

5.2. Keynote: Collective Property Right Reform

It seems obvious that the collective economy is closely linked to the welfare of native villagers and the public service provision for all
residents in “Village to Residence” community. And the collective economy, which has been strengthened by urban economic aggregation, has also made great contributions to the urban construction and community public service provision in the transformation of “Village to Residence”. But the trinity - village collective economic organization, village committee and village party branch has displayed some distinct defects. Firstly, it is believed that monopoly and autocratic management are derived from the confusion of villager committee’s functions for public service provision and enterprise business management (Pan and Zhou, 2004). We also found that some villages prefer the distribution to accumulation of collective economy, and there is no clear restriction on the proportion of working funds for the community’s neighborhood committee in the total collective assets income. This will inevitably affect the competitive power of the collective enterprises which are mainly distributed in the secondary industry. Secondly, collective property rights in many “Village to Residence” communities is also incomplete (Zheng, 2010), which has resulted in undesirable phenomena such as unregulated management, insufficient disclosure of financial information and black-box problems of collective economic organizations. However, the restructuring of collective economic organizations are often underpowered, and grass-roots government has to bear increasingly severe pressure of social instability.

5.3. Suggestions: Innovation Mechanisms of Public Service Provision

The transfer cost of rural labor spending in the public service provision was estimated as about 130,000 yuan in Shandong Province. The urbanization ratio will reach about 68 percent in 2015 and 72 percent in 2020 according to the planning in “Development Program of Urbanization in Jinan (2014-2020)”. Obviously, it is utterly inadequate
to only rely on governmental expenditures to fill the supplying gap of public service of urbanization. How to use the various economic factors and mobilize all sectors of the society is a big challenge for every urban government. Generally speaking, “whose matter, who is the most concerned about”. In the investigation, we found that the strong collective economic organizations in “Village to Residence” community have invested heavily in the construction and management of infrastructure and public service facilities, such as parks, education, medical treatment, pension, health and others in the case that early government finances are not in place. They have received a substantial return as well as the promotion of public interests of community residents. It tells us that collective economic organizations has advantages in the provision of public services as it gains a better understanding of the needs of the community residents and the pursuit of long-term economic benefits. There can be a win-win economic and social benefit under the incentives of the land and taxation policies. Meanwhile, other tools such as franchising, financial subsidies, and government procurement of services can be innovated to attract private and social organizations’ investments in education, health care, pension, garbage collection and others.

6. Conclusion and Prospect

Ever since the new-type urbanization strategy was officially put forward by the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2012, the equalization of public service provision (including the equalization of supply and demand, as well as with different groups) has become the focus of public attention. As a special way of urbanization, the process of “Village to Residence” still demonstrates a traditional village governance pattern which has a strong inertia in the transformation of
public service provision, a high reliance on the collective economy for the public service financing, the closed nature of public service beneficiaries, and absence of government responsibility. This is obviously incongruous with the diversified, opening and democratic trend of urban development in China. However, the public service provision in “Village to Residence” community is influenced by multiple factors including the collective asset restructuring, community governance ability, clear responsibility of government, coordination of public policies, and development of social power. We suggest that firstly government function in public service provision should be clarified; meanwhile spending responsibilities between central and local governments, whose aim is to equalize the responsibility between the two in basic public services, should be rationally readjusted The joint-stock further reform should be made in the collective assets in order to establish a modern enterprise system. It needs to construct democratic, open, transparent, and efficient community public service governance mechanism on the basis of village governance. Public policies as well as the financial and investment system should be improved to motivate the collective organizations and other social forces in the public service provision. This research has reference value for the transformation of “urban villages”. Finally, this paper can be further improved in some aspects in the future, for example in the directions of diversified case studies and a comprehensive study of public policies.

Notes

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1. It refers to the share of household registered urban population in the total population.

References


Indigenous Communities and Cross-Strait Rapprochement: A Case Study of Chun-ri and Shih-wen

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Abstract
Absent from most public debates on Taiwan’s embrace of neoliberal capitalism are the potential consequences of economic liberalization for Taiwan’s indigenous peoples. Deregulating markets and unfettering capital and resources are tied inextricably with cross-Strait politics. With a deep-seated apprehension of China still felt in many corners of the Taiwanese society, these issues are often framed with particular emphasis on the “China Factor”, overshadowing other relevant economic and societal considerations and thereby narrowing the scope of debate over government policies. Nevertheless, the potential influx of foreign capital investment, long- and short-term migrant labor and international visitors may have profound effects on Taiwan’s most vulnerable citizens, including the indigenous peoples. This paper will report the results of field research conducted among the Paiwan ethnic group, assessing actual and potential future changes affecting their individual families and communities. Preliminary assessment indicates
that official policies liberalizing visitation and trade between China and Taiwan have already affected the Paiwan communities. Whether these changes become handicaps or opportunities depends on realistic evaluation, strategic planning, education, implementation, and periodic re-evaluation. This paper will contribute to the larger discussion of possible responses to the effects of inter-regional migration and transformations on minority societies by providing an assessment of current and potential conditions among the Paiwan of Taiwan.

**Keywords:** Paiwan, aboriginal communities, economic liberalization, cross-Strait politics

**JEL classification:** F15, I31, J15, Z13

1. Introduction: Paiwan Communities in the 21st Century

Comprising two percent of the population of Taiwan, yuanzhumin (原住民, “original residents”) are a small and marginalized social group. The Paiwan is the second largest (17 percent) among the fourteen officially recognized tribes. Paiwan communities are located primarily in Pingtung County (屏東縣). Villages are also found in Taitung (台東), Kaohsiung (高雄), and Hualien (花蓮) Counties, and individual members have migrated throughout the island. Population size and territorial range make the Paiwan uniquely suited for observing the interplay between neoliberal policies and indigenous peoples.

Members of the Paiwan aboriginal community are being absorbed into market economies to increasingly greater degrees by expanding privatization and trade liberalization exemplified by Taiwan’s ascension to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. Integration with the global economy has created social costs and refashioned longstanding
economic structures. On the one hand, tribal cultural identity is under persistent threat of dilution by a dominant Taiwanese culture, while on the other, reliance on wage incomes has intensified among Paiwan households. In an age of neoliberalism and globalization, outmigration for wage income, withering native language fluency, conversion of traditional cultural practices into token ceremonial rituals, and loss of traditional lands to commercial interests are widespread phenomena among Paiwan villages.

At the forefront of these adverse trends has been the process of national transformation from a closed market economy guided by an authoritarian regime into an export-oriented economy managed under a two-party system. The Kuomintang (國民黨, KMT) government began promoting commercial agriculture on aboriginal lands in the 1960s (Minority Rights Group International, 2014). Legislation passed in 1969 ostensibly to protect aboriginal land rights, actually opened a legal channel for commercial interests to acquire traditional aboriginal territory. In effect, communal lands not used for growing cash crops were confiscated by the state or made available for lease by Taiwanese of Han descent (Simon, 2002). Hong Yu-hua (洪玉花) works in the social affairs department of the local township office and moved back to Chun-ri (春日) after growing up outside of the village:

In the past, aborigines who had land didn’t necessarily have money. Outsiders who had a lot of money would come looking for land to rent from aborigines. Gradually, the village lost usage rights to its surrounding land. In addition, most villagers were not highly educated and unfamiliar with technology. With the transfer of ancestral land rights, villagers lost their main source of livelihood. At the same time, aborigines couldn’t compete with others in the free market.
Young aborigines began leaving their villages in droves in search of work in the 1970s. Those who ventured out were driven by a desire to improve the family’s standard of living, by the limited opportunities in the village and conversely the availability of jobs outside engendered by favorable economic and societal trends. Taiwan’s economy took flight in the 1970s, with much of the growth captured by export industries. The authoritarian KMT government invested heavily in infrastructure to facilitate its export-led strategy of economic development. In 1973, the government announced the “Ten Major Projects” program, which included constructing a major highway system, harbor facilities, power plants, and making other improvements to the island’s infrastructure (Mattlin, 2011).

Aboriginal villagers responded opportunistically to the sudden need for workers. Many found jobs as cheap laborers in the factories of small and medium-sized enterprises, the growth engine of Taiwan’s economy. Others found jobs working on construction crews, putting together the necessary infrastructure for a thriving export-driven economy. Lin Jin-Li (林金利) departed from Shih-wen (士文) in 1983 and held several jobs while living outside of the village:

I started working in Taichung when I was 17. I worked for 11 years until there was an economic downturn. Prices rose and salaries were low. In 1998, my boss asked me to go to China for a generous salary, but I didn’t want to go, so I went into building construction.

You Guang-ming (尤光明) left Chun-ri and began working outside of the village from a young age. His story reveals an inadequate standard of labor protection that was common in many of the industries into which aborigines ventured:
My company was afraid that I would take early retirement and collect a large sum of money, so they were smart and got rid of workers with large funds accumulated toward their pensions. Severance pay always costs the company less money than retirement pay. I was the only one out of 8 or 9 other workers who received early retirement. The last month, they tried to coerce me into signing a resignation letter. They told me to wash the roof every day. It was unbearably hot up there, but my wife told me to endure it. Washing the roof is usually contracted out to an industrial cleaning company, and at least 10 people work together to finish all of the buildings. I made it through the month, so I was able to collect my retirement pay.

Alternatively, public sector jobs were coveted for the job security and generous benefits they provided. The authoritarian KMT government guaranteed lavish pensions, social welfare, and tax breaks to the military, teachers, and civil servants as a gambit to secure allegiance from these key groups (Fell, 2005). Chen Han-ji (陳漢吉) grew up in Nei-wen (內文) and attended Central Police University, the highest learning institution for police cadets:

At the time, the economy of the village wasn’t that great, so most aborigines chose to become soldiers, police officers, and teachers because of the fixed income. The public sector is a lot more stable. Most of my classmates are police officers and noncommissioned officers. My wife is from the same village, so we bought a house closer to home. For those who live in different counties, it’s harder to come back, so they can only visit once in a while on holidays.

Native language fluency has eroded steadily throughout this period of outmigration. A striking number of adult Paiwan villagers who grew
up in the 1970s and 1980s when community members began looking outside the village for work are more capable in Mandarin than in their native tongue. Chen Han-ji, as a native of Nei-wen, lamented that:

Even though our native language is being taught in schools, Chinese is being spoken at home. Some parents might be more accustomed to speaking Chinese throughout the day, and so have become rusty at their native tongue. If they have trouble speaking, then of course they are going to use Chinese with their children.

Meanwhile, government-sponsored indigenous language programs designed to reverse the trend of language loss among aboriginal villages starting with the youngest members of the community have produced mixed results at best. First experimented with in 1996, indigenous language courses are now available in all elementary and junior high schools. Aboriginal students are required to take indigenous language courses in elementary schools in accordance with a 2001 law. The same law stipulated that junior high schools must offer indigenous language education as an elective course (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007). Beginning in 2016, aboriginal languages will be offered along with Hoklo (福佬，Taiwanese) and Hakka (客家) as part of a compulsory native languages curriculum (Lin and Pan, 2013). Aboriginal students also have added incentive to achieve a basic level of fluency in their native tongues, receiving bonus points on school admission examinations contingent upon passing an evaluation test (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007). In addition, the Council of Indigenous Peoples has published official written systems for indigenous languages, making them more accessible to educators and learners (Pawan, 2004).
Indigenous language programs are fraught with intrinsic and environmental difficulties. Poor and fragmentary teaching resources, curriculum content that focuses almost exclusively on language structure to the detriment of cultural practices, and a dearth of qualified teachers in rural areas collectively cripple the effectiveness of government-sponsored indigenous language programs. Furthermore, a general perception exists even among aboriginal communities that native language instruction is a waste of valuable time and resources. Instead, indigenous language courses play second fiddle to English, regarded as an essential component to educational and career performance (Sung and Hsiung, 2010). The result has been languishing native language fluency among aboriginal youth, and a continued drift toward extinction for indigenous languages.

Aside from imperfect language fluency among aboriginal youth, nearly all elderly Paiwan are illiterate in the newly created Romanized forms of their native language. Looking to the future, these obstacles paint a bleak picture for indigenous languages. Taiwan’s indigenous peoples have traditionally relied on oral anecdotes to disseminate history and socialize children. Although this oral tradition can be communicated through Mandarin, unique cultural traits are lost or obscured in translation. Tjuku Revuci (Weng Yu-hua, 翁玉華), head of the social affairs division in the Chun-ri Township Office, attributes the decline in oral recitation to the proliferation of communication technology in villages:

Storytelling occurs less frequently now. Even though the government has begun promoting cultural education in public schools, kids study outside of the village and are seldom at home, so they don’t have as much time to interact with elders. When they do come home, they play computer games, watch television, and surf the Internet. In the
past there weren’t these types of activities, so after finishing dinner, everyone would listen to elderly people tell stories. Wisdom from older generations is difficult to pass, because young children don’t have firsthand experience of that kind of lifestyle. It makes it more likely that children will find the stories irrelevant.

With illiteracy widespread among the older generation and children and middle-aged villagers less than competent in their native language, formidable barriers exist hindering the passing on of culturally sensitive portrayals of family and village history. Internet access is expanding rapidly in Paiwan villages, allowing external influences to creep more deeply into aboriginal societies and replacing traditional forms of socialization with online communities. Knowledge of family and village history has deteriorated, and the collective oral tradition, including stories, myths, and beliefs has also faded. Losing such sources, the narratives of aboriginal communities will be told more and more frequently by academics and outsiders rather than by community members themselves.

2. Comparison of Chun-ri (春日) and Shih-wen (士文)

Embedded within these broader trends, individual communities and community members develop distinct identities and economic strategies to persevere through cultural change and economic dislocation. Although members of the Paiwan ethnic group are part of the second largest aboriginal tribe, they account for only a slim portion of Taiwan’s population. Nevertheless, there are striking differences among Paiwan villages in depth of cultural assimilation with Han Chinese as well as patterns of inclusion in the market economy based on marked diversity in terrain, population spread, and distance from urban centers. Although
it is possible only to speculate on the effects of Taiwan’s deepening integration with the global economy forged upon a thriving relationship with China, presently observable differences between villages may be harbingers on the future of indigenous cultures and communities.

Paiwan villages sprawl across the southern chain of Taiwan’s central mountain range and in the hills and coastal plains of southeastern Taiwan. Paiwan society relied traditionally on hunting and subsistence agriculture, with each village having economic rights within acknowledged territorial boundaries. Prior to the period of Japanese administration, members of the Paiwan tribe had a tenuous tribal identity, lacking an ethnic name with which to describe their peoples. Identification among Paiwan members was based upon home village (Tung, 1995). Further complicating tribal ascription, the name “Paiwan” has been used to describe different groups of people at different times (Chiang, 1993). Nevertheless, there are close relations among clusters of Paiwan villages, including between Paiwan members in Chun-ri Township (春日鄉).

Nestled at the southern tail of Taiwan’s central mountain range, Chun-ri Township was established in 1950 as an amalgamation of several Paiwan villages, including Chun-ri (春日), Gu-hua (古華), Shih-wen (士文), Gui-chong (歸崇), Li-li (力里), and Ci-jia (七佳). Several of the villages within Chun-ri Township have been uprooted prior to settling at their current locations. In 1934, the Japanese colonial administration had encouraged aboriginal families from Shih-wen to move from their mountain hamlet to a new settlement in the vicinity of Fangliao (枋寮), the nearest predominantly Han Chinese community. A total of 119 households chose to relocate, forming six smaller villages collectively called Chun-ri (春日) in honor of Kasuqasang (甲中春日), the Japanese police officer in charge of aboriginal affairs in the region. At the same time, population growth and a dearth of available
land prompted villagers from Shih-wen to create a branch village at Gu-hua. A devastating typhoon struck southern Taiwan in 1972, causing extensive damage to Chun-ri, Gu-hua, Ci-jia and Li-li villages. Villagers then collected what remained of their belongings and moved to rebuild their communities at their present-day locations (春日鄉部落誌 [tribal records of Chun-ri Township], 2010).

The removal of Chun-ri from the inner mountain to the outskirts of Fangliiao occurred at a time when job opportunities were limitless and good wages were paid to laborers. Accustomed to relocation, village members were undaunted by the difficulties of embarking for unfamiliar settings for wages. Jobs in labor-intensive industries and on construction crews offered gainful employment to the working-age population of Chun-ri, and made consumer goods widely available to households within the village. Living in the vicinity of coastal towns and bustling transportation networks allowed individuals to find jobs while maintaining a support system in the village. Families from Chun-ri were thereby well-positioned to take advantage of Taiwan’s economic transformation. Hong Yu-hua remembers the dramatic changes that took place in Chun-ri:

When the village moved from its former location in 1973, houses were still one-story and built from stone and mud. In the early 1980s, the economy started to take off, and people re-built their houses. When villagers from my generation got married, they built two-story houses. Back then, it didn’t matter what your occupation was, you were sure to make money. Houses were constantly being built, so there was always a need for more workers and wages were high. You could make 2,000-3,000 NT\(^1\) a day, and, occasionally if there was a deadline to meet, you could make up to 10,000 NT. My husband was a professional soldier and had Sundays off. From 1989-1990, he

\(^1\) NT = New Taiwan Dollar
would go with neighbors to erect houses outside of the village, and
one time, he made 6,000 NT.

Leaving the village for wages bore fruit for Chun-ri households,
with many using their earnings to invest in housing renovations,
household appliances, and commercial goods. Consequently, the
standard of living in the village has risen dramatically and social
advancement has become a priority for Chun-ri villagers. A significant
number of middle-aged villagers have bought houses and settled in
urban areas to take advantage of the greater social benefits available:

Villagers were poorer before. Everyone's house was built with basic
materials, and children went to school in bare feet. Things cost a lot
less as well. Now, even lifestyle habits are gradually changing.
Villagers are educated now, and the economy has improved greatly.
We also have a good deal of contact with Han Chinese, and learn from
these interactions ... I hope that my grandchildren will attend junior
and senior high schools in Kaohsiung (高雄). I want them to be able
to learn a lot from the outside environment, and to enjoy public
resources from the city. Of course, just studying in an urban
environment doesn't guarantee success, but there are a lot more
opportunities and better access to resources compared with the
village. Children are exposed to different cultures and intellectual
stimulation in the city that aren't as readily available in Chun-ri or
Fangliao.

Compared with Chun-ri, economic development in Shih-wen
cleaves more closely to traditional practices. The permanent residents in
Shih-wen are composed primarily of school-age children and the elderly.
Working-age villagers are more likely to live outside of the village or be
absent much of the time, leaving the village before daybreak on weekdays and not returning until the twilight hours. Trap hunting is still prevalent, and residents maintain inherited plots of land for subsistence agriculture. Ko Han-chiang (柯漢強) is a civil servant in the economic affairs division of the township office:

The township office is in Chun-ri and it is located closer to Fangliao, so resources are more accessible and the economy is better. Children from Chun-ri have a greater opportunity to become civil servants or teachers because they come from families with better financial situations. In Shih-wen, only the older generation and young children live on the mountain. There is no market economy to speak of, so villagers look for jobs elsewhere. The younger generation comes back to celebrate festivals, or if there is some emergency like a death. Villagers also often come back when they get paid to share their earnings with family.

Traditionally, villagers from Shih-wen are more likely to find menial labor jobs in construction rather than in manufacturing industries. According to Li Jin-yu (李錦玉), the higher wages available in construction are more appealing, despite the heightened safety risks and grueling physical labor. Temporary contract work may also be preferable to villagers from Shih-wen, who can join a construction team with other village members and survive on their earnings for a period of time after completing the project.

Housing the township office is also a boon to cultural capital in Chun-ri. The Township office has discretionary control over various resources including subsidies from various funding sources and administrative support that can be allotted toward organized cultural projects. Both individual artists and groups of community event
organizers can apply to the township office for stipends to promote their work. You Guang-ming noted that:

The local township office offers generous stipends to promote aboriginal culture. You can get a subsidy if you decorate your front door with carvings. There is a strict standard on the quality of the engraving, so they are always beautifully done. Doorframes have to be quite wide to meet the size standard. But you don’t have to pay for any of it. The government covers all of the expenses, so they are supporting artists.

In addition, the township office coordinates with institutions of higher learning to sponsor joint programs bringing together distinguished members of the village and students interested in aboriginal culture. Tjuku Revuci offers classes in aboriginal artwork:

I teach weaving classes in Pingtung (屏東). The township office cooperates with National Pingtung University of Science and Technology (屏東科技大學) to arrange classes on aboriginal culture. Although our class sizes are small, we have some outstanding students who produce wonderful artwork.

Located higher in the mountain and with a smaller population, Shih-wen is rarely the site of cultural activities. Instead, volunteers from social organizations travel to the village to arrange classes and activities for the children prioritizing religious and lifestyle education. Residents also have less intimate relationships and more infrequent interactions with officials in the township office than their compatriots in Chun-ri, presumably making it harder for Shih-Wen to receive grants for activities preserving cultural artwork. Therefore, although villagers from
Shih-wen have more infrequent contact with Han Chinese compared with their counterparts in Chun-ri, there is a more concerted effort to preserve material culture in the latter.

The benefits of commercial agriculture have also been distributed unevenly between Chun-ri and Shih-wen. Situated at the base of Da-Han Mountain (大漢山), Chun-ri is in an ideal position to grow mangoes to sell to the market. Highway One lies just outside of Chun-ri, linking the village to major transportation networks leading north-south and westward. Mrs Leehey observed that:

Life is different after relocating closer to Fangliao … The land that previously might have been used for growing traditional crops is allocated to growing mangoes now. It’s rare to see anyone growing millet or that kind of thing.

According to the government’s “Regulations on Development and Management of the Lands Reserved for Indigenous Peoples” (原住民保留地開發管理辦法) promulgated in 1968, aboriginal land cannot be bought or sold by non-aborigines (Simon, 2002). Rather, non-aborigines negotiate with aboriginal communities to obtain cultivation rights for a period of time on indigenous lands (Land Rights (05-40), 2014). As a result, villagers in Chun-ri engage in commercial agriculture directly as well as lease land to outsiders. Ko Han-chiang described the development of commercial agriculture in Chun-ri:

Chun-ri and Gu-hua are on nearly level ground. About 80 percent of the agricultural land is used to grow mangoes. Wax apples are also grown commercially in Chun-ri Township … In some cases, the owner of the land might be getting older, or they might have jobs outside of the village. Therefore, Han Chinese from outside of the
village come to take care of the mangoes. After they reach an agreement, maybe for five or six years, the land is managed by Han Chinese. About 40-50 percent of farmland in the village is contracted out to Han Chinese by private landowners, while another 10-20 percent is owned by the Township Office and rented to Han producers. The rest of the land is left for aborigines to cultivate themselves.

Whereas the land surrounding Chun-ri has been converted for commercial agriculture, agricultural production in Shih-wen occurs on a smaller scale and is operated by community members. A handful of households sell taro to the market, while the majority of agricultural products grown in Shih-wen are consumed locally:

It isn’t common to grow mangoes on the mountain. The road to Shih-wen is long and winding, and is often damaged during the typhoon season. Mangoes also require more care, and the cost of inputs is high, so agriculture on the mountain is still very traditional … Shih-wen is a mountain district, so the transportation networks aren’t convenient. Chun-ri is just across a major road from Fangliao, so villagers have closer relations with Han Chinese. This area has warm relations with Han Chinese, but Shih-wen is deep in the mountain, so there aren’t as many Han businesses. Over 90 percent of the economic activity in Shih-wen is still operated by locals.

Traditional Paiwan society is hierarchical and composed of four social classes, including the chief, nobility, warriors, and commoners. Regardless of gender, the eldest child of the chief inherited the position after the latter’s passing. In the past the chief was the most important figure in the village, responsible for the general welfare and tasked with
supervising ceremonies, managing affairs both between village members and with outsiders, conducting war, and administering other affairs. Village members offered a portion of the harvest and a share of hunted animals as tributes to the chief (Huayu World, 2014). In both Chun-ri and Shih-wen, the divisions between classes have largely faded. However, the position of chief has been retained in both villages under varying circumstances. In Chun-ri, the duties of the chief have largely been appropriated by local government. Tjuku Kavluwen (Weng Yu-hua, 翁玉華)^2, a civil servant in the social affairs division suggested that:

The four classes still exist, but the differences between them have declined. A number of factors have diminished the importance of traditional classes, including assimilation with Han Chinese culture, elections and government intervention. Before, the village chief held all power over land rights. The local government is in charge of managing land now. Because of these changes, the social system headed by the village chief has been replaced.

Compared with Chun-ri, Shih-wen is removed from local government by its remote location and sparse population. The absence of police stations and government offices affords the village chief a degree of sway in managing social affairs. However, many of the chief’s customary tasks have been effaced by economic and social transformations. Li Jin-yu, who is a relative of Shih-wen’s village chief, has observed these changes in her lifetime:

The chief has ceded a lot of authority over village matters to the village head. After all, the village head is elected by the residents of the village, and his stamp is required on all official documents. You have to go to the village head if you want to apply for unemployment

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benefits or resolve legal disputes. Almost every household in the village receives some form of aid from the local government. The chief also used to act as a mediator in disputes, and his or her word was always final. Now, there are all sorts of organizations that have encroached upon areas formerly under the auspices of the village chief. For example, the patronage system wherein villagers gave a proportion of the harvest or the hunt to the village chief in return for livelihood protection has declined and been replaced by social organizations.

As mentioned earlier, both Chun-ri and Shih-wen have witnessed a steady decline of native language fluency, with pernicious consequences for cultural continuity. Vestiges of traditional cultural characteristics of the Paiwan tribe have still survived despite this handicap. Villagers can still arrange to have a shaman perform rituals to recover from illnesses. Many villagers own at least one set of traditional clothing that can be worn for special events. In addition, important festivals such as the five-year festival and millet festival continue to be celebrated as community events. However, Western religions have penetrated aboriginal communities and diluted the significance of rituals and beliefs. Missionaries and preachers began proselytizing in Chun-ri Township in 1957, and the first permanent church was established in 1960. The vast majority of villagers in both Chun-ri and Shih-wen are of Catholic or other Christian denominations. Mrs Leehey is a long-time resident of Chun-ri and believes that:

Some of the changes in culture have been because of religious conversion. People were superstitious before. There weren’t any doctors, so if you got sick, the village sorceress would come and perform rituals. If you wanted to plant taro and you sneezed, you had
to stay home that day. There is a type of bird that was considered bad luck and, if you saw it on the way up the mountain, you had to turn back. Before people converted, there were many types of folk beliefs. Children weren’t permitted to eat certain types of food. But now most people follow Christ and the old superstitions have disappeared.

Religious conversion has made an indelible impact on aboriginal culture, notably in dampening the original meaning of cultural rituals. Festivals and related cultural activities have become more symbolic in nature, deprived of their workaday value and serving now primarily as tributes to their erstwhile prominence.

3. Cross-Straits and Domestic Economic Policies under the Ma Administration

After eight years of frozen relations during the Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) administration, discussions between Taiwanese and Chinese negotiators to reciprocally open borders began soon after Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) took office. Talks were held in 2010 under the auspices of the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS), representing Taiwan and China respectively. The negotiations culminated in the signing of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). Although a historic milestone in cross-Strait relations, the ECFA was oriented more toward establishing targets and timeframes for future economic cooperation than implementing concrete measures per se (Mainland Affairs Council, 2009). Articles three and four dealt with future economic pacts, with the two sides agreeing to commence separate negotiations covering goods and services within six months of the entry into force of the ECFA (Cross-Straits Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, English
translation, 2014). Accordingly, the SEF and ARATS met again in Shanghai in 2013 for the ninth round of cross-strait talks and came to an agreement on the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2014).

The tortuous path of the CSSTA since leaving the negotiating table has shone a spotlight on the ramifications of regional economic integration. A botched attempt to force the CSSTA through committee review into a plenary vote ignited the Sunflower Movement, a nearly month-long siege of the Legislative Yuan by social activists. Public anger was fueled by indignation over clauses contained in the accord as well as a multitude of other grievances with the development of Taiwan’s political economy under President Ma. Ignoring widespread grassroots backlash, the Ma administration has continued urging the Legislative Yuan to expeditiously approve the trade agreement.

Apart from the Ma government’s determined effort to pass the bilateral CSSTA, politicians on both sides of the blue-green divide have expressed interest in joining other multilateral free trade agreements, notably the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Regional Economic Comprehensive Partnership (RECP). The common perception that the Chen Shui-bian administration’s economic failures were a result of intransigence in liberalizing Taiwan’s economy has empowered business-oriented factions within his party to promote their own policy positions. Both the TPP and RECP are extensive free trade agreements that would go much further in exposing Taiwanese businesses to international competition, de-regulating a myriad of industries, prohibiting Taiwan’s government from banning risky financial products, and granting international corporations considerable legal standing to invalidate domestic health and environmental laws (How the Trans-Pacific Partnership Would Impact Democracy, 2014). The affinity that both major parties have shown for deeper economic integration would
seem to suggest that ensuing Taiwanese administrations will seek inclusion in neoliberal economic agreements regardless of the party in power for the indefinite future (Kuo, 2014). Entering into such agreements is likely to impact economic, social, and political relationships in Paiwan communities in light of the changes that have already taken place following previous expansions of economic liberalization.

Although the presently unratified CSSTA is not the only forthcoming bête noir for opponents of Taiwan’s heightened economic integration with the global economy, it has drawn the most strident protest. Among the dissenting voices are several grassroots groups defending aboriginal interests, including the Association for Taiwan Indigenous Peoples’ Policies, the Indigenous Peoples’ Action Coalition of Taiwan, and the Pangcah Amis Defense Alliance. These groups have issued a joint statement objecting to the Council of Indigenous Peoples’ toeing of the government line. A separate group, the Aboriginal Youth Forum Against Service Trade Pact, denounced the Council for suggesting that the CSSTA would have negligible adverse impacts on aboriginal communities, thereby betraying the aboriginal rights movement and abandoning its duties (Loa, 2014b).

At first blush, the repercussions of the provisions spelled out in the CSSTA appear to be innocuous for the Paiwan villages surveyed. Only an extremely narrow segment of the population of Chun-ri and Shih-wen is engaged in the less competitive service industries and small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) likely to be the hardest hit after the CSSTA is put into effect. Under such circumstances, it is improbable that an influx of Chinese investment will cause a sudden unemployment crisis in these aboriginal communities. Thomas Lin, a Paiwan pastor of sixteen years and graduate student at National Sun Yat-sen University observed that:
Although Taiwan will open its borders to Chinese investment, the impact on aboriginal workers will be limited. It’s important to consider the nature of the cross-border labor flow. Taiwan will import high quality labor from China, so there won’t be a noticeable effect on the majority of aboriginal communities.

Perhaps echoing this sentiment and outlook, there is little concern among interviewed village members that unemployment will increase in the future. Many expressed a belief that jobs will always be available, despite facing a tougher labor market than in the past. In every case, the loneliness of living far away from the village was described as a greater worry than the threat of unemployment. Job hunts routinely take villagers far away from Pingtung County to commercial hubs in northern Taiwan. Ko Han-chiang has experienced these changes firsthand:

Taiwan’s economy was better in the past. Take my uncle, for example. He left the village and found steady work, so he settled down outside of the village. At that time, the construction industry was booming, so there was a need for a lot of manpower. Jobs were very stable, so people could buy a house and raise a family. My uncle became an urban aborigine, but he left as a young man, so he retained aboriginal culture and language. Jobs have become much harder to find now because of foreign workers and industrial relocation. Aborigines face more competition in the labor market now as well, so we have to go wherever the work is. Most villagers go to central and northern Taiwan, from Taichung (台中 ) northward.

Even in the event of unemployment, returning to the village is a bulwark against the typical privation associated with job loss. The
village provides a social support system and means of subsistence, and offers livelihood protection for those who are unable to find adequate working conditions outside. As a rule, Paiwan who have relocated from Chun-ri and Shih-wen maintain land rights and keep up homes in the village. Ties to the community are preserved through a surviving form of primogeniture, in which the eldest child is obligated by custom to inherit the family home. Village members who have migrated and returned are thus guaranteed to have their basic needs furnished. Temporary or seasonal work in and around the community is also abundant, furnishing village members with sufficient access to basic consumer goods. Li Jin-yu was born in Shih-wen but now lives in Fangliao. She believes that:

Salaries are low and prices keep rising, but you won’t be unemployed as long as you’re willing to do the work. Since wages can be so low, some people think it’s better to be unemployed than get paid so little for doing such exhausting work. Social welfare is really good now. If you don’t have a job, you can apply for unemployment benefits. It’s possible to get by doing odd jobs around the village for five days and collecting social welfare, so some people choose that lifestyle.

At the same time, implementing the CSSTA has the potential to create new jobs for indigenous peoples. Some proponents of the CSSTA argue that, coupled with burgeoning cross-Strait travel, permitting Chinese investment in Taiwan’s tourism industry will nurture a thriving tourist industry in aboriginal communities (Hsiao, 2014). Indigenous peoples thus stand to reap a windfall from the ratification of the CSSTA according to this line of reasoning. However, the expected gains in the tourism industry are minimal for villages such as Chun-ri and Shih-wen. According to Ko Han-chiang:
Not many Chinese tourists travel to Chun-ri, and the ones who do are at most passing through. Except for the old slate houses in Ci-jia, there are no famous attractions to draw Chinese tourists. The most precious aspect of the slate houses in Ci-jia is that they preserve primitive aboriginal life, including the road to get there. If you want to develop the tourism industry, you need to provide running water and electricity and have convenient transportation. The Ci-jia slate houses don’t have electricity and the roads aren’t accessible … The number of tourist attractions in Chun-ri Township is limited, so the majority of Chinese tourists who come to the area don’t stop here.

The anticipated benefits to aboriginal communities receiving a surge of Chinese tourists are also dubious. A recent visit by Chinese official Zhang Zhijun (張志軍) to Wu-lai (烏來), an aboriginal district in northern Taiwan, highlighted the perils to aboriginal culture that may arise with intensified tourism. Visiting Taiwan in his official capacity as the Minister of China’s Taiwan Affairs Office, Zhang was treated to a traditional aboriginal dance performed by Atayal aborigines. The dancers were adorned in clothing resembling that of the Amis tribe, although the headwear of the female dancers was characteristic neither of the Amis nor Atayal (Loa, 2014a). Perhaps a harbinger of things to come, the incident provoked vociferous criticism for being a perversion of aboriginal culture for commercial benefit, or the “projectization” of cultural artifacts (Chu et al., 2014).

Chinese investment in Taiwan’s tourism industry may also contribute to the loss of ancestral lands and accelerate the demise of indigenous languages (Lee, 2014). Aboriginal groups have posited that mainland investors are more likely to sacrifice aboriginal interests in order to secure maximum profits on their investments. As a
consequence, these groups fear that Chinese-invested hotels and other tourism ventures will encroach upon aboriginal communities without due respect for indigenous land rights. They argue further that the penetration of Chinese tourists into traditional aboriginal territory will threaten local culture and language as the economy is reoriented toward accommodating Chinese visitors (Hsiao, 2014).

While the controversial CSSTA has drawn sharp criticism from aboriginal activists, it is by no means the only neoliberal policy threatening aboriginal communities. The Ma administration has touted Free Economic Pilot Zones (FEPZs) as indispensable to preventing Taiwan’s economic marginalization. A draft plan to establish the FEPZs was approved by the Legislative Yuan in August 2013. The purpose of creating the FEPZs is to escalate economic liberalization by creating business-friendly investment enclaves. In order to facilitate this goal, restrictions on the flow of goods, people, capital, and knowledge will be loosened within FEPZs, and generous tax incentives and conditions for land acquisition will be granted to investors (National Development Council, 2014). According to the draft of the Special Act Governing Free Economic Pilot Zones, six major ports, Taoyuan (桃園) International Airport, and Pingtung Agricultural Biotechnological Park are set to become FEPZs (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014b). Article four designates the Ministry of Economic Affairs as the managing authority within the proposed FEPZs, suggesting that business interests will hold sway over labor and environmental considerations within these zones (Tai et al., 2014).

A number of strands of opposition to the FEPZs parallel similar concerns raised with the CSSTA. Detractors condemn the Ma administration for willfully carrying out policies congruous with China’s effort to exert political influence on Taiwan through economic dependence. Many regard FEPZs as a Trojan horse for unification with
China facilitated by deepening economic integration. As evidence they point to the ECFA, which so far has produced ambiguous economic results, but established a general framework through which trade and investment with China were normalized (Chiu, 2014). Additionally, critics suggest that implementing the FEPZs will accrue benefits to a slim minority of Taiwanese by allowing corporations to rake in large profits while degrading workers’ rights, causing serious financial losses to farmers, and crippling the healthcare industry (Hsu, 2014).

Notwithstanding these points of similarity, the CSSTA and the FEPZs differ on a number of crucial aspects. Whereas the CSSTA deals exclusively with Taiwan’s service industries, the FEPZs target the island’s agricultural, medical, education, financial, and high-tech industry sectors. A second follow-up trade pact similar to the CSSTA but covering trade in goods was originally scheduled to be concluded by the end of 2014. The eruption of the Sunflower Movement has stalled progress on the trade-in-goods agreement, as China has suspended discussions in order to soften the spotlight on cross-Strait negotiations. Taiwanese government officials have expressed skepticism publicly about reaching an agreement anytime soon (Huang and Low, 2014). Beijing may choose to monitor Taiwanese civil society’s reaction to the unfinished legislative review of the CSSTA and perhaps, if necessary, bide its time until a regime change in Taiwan.

A second key divergence is the legal foundation of the two exemplars of neoliberal policy. The CSSTA is a bilateral agreement signed between representative offices of Taiwan and China, while the FEPZs were formulated by the Ma administration as domestic economic policy. Partly as a consequence, public outcry in response to the CSSTA has been conspicuously shriller than to the FEPZs. In Taiwanese politics, the China factor is a cumbersome impediment to forging clear-cut positions on economic policy. Politicians frequently resort to platitudes

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about the influence of China to obscure their own economic policy preferences. The China factor allows politicians and the media to gloss over glaring contradictions in politicians’ stances on priorities for economic development. As an example, prior to the Sunflower Movement, opposition politicians shamelessly leveled criticism at the CSSTA, while expressing support for the FEPZs insofar as it behooved them to do so (Wu, 2014).

Similarly, the highly politicized nature of the Taiwanese polity persistently obscures politicians’ convictions. Constituents rarely punish politicians for making a volte-face in economic policy preference without offering substantive explanation. For reasons of personal interest or fear of public reprisals, several prominent opposition politicians withdrew their support of the FEPZs after the Sunflower Movement. While lambasting the Ma administration for pursuing the CSSTA and the FEPZs, they have offered little in the way of viable alternatives and have relied instead on hackneyed narratives. Although neoliberal policies such as those embodied by the CSSTA and the FEPZs are legitimate targets of criticism, much of the rancor on the side of the opposition has focused on the China threat or the incoherence of the Ma administration’s plans. The Sunflower Movement has been instructive in showing that only when the presence of China is unequivocal or when civil society is aroused are there interstices in which groups opposed to economic liberalization can pressure politicians to reconsider support for neoliberal policies (Wu, 2014). However, even in these cases the opposition still derives its objections mainly from political rather than economic grounds.
4. Conclusion

The preceding assessment of economic policies under the Ma administration reveals a convoluted alignment of interests tilting lopsidedly toward escalating economic liberalization. If such conditions persist, there will in all likelihood be deleterious consequences for large swaths of Taiwanese society. Aboriginal communities are particularly susceptible to social transformations and economic dislocation as a result of the implementation of neoliberal policies. With no end in sight to the pursuit of free trade agreements, special economic zones and economic integration, many of the aforementioned crises besieging aboriginal communities will only intensify in the future.

Already in sharp decline, Taiwan’s industrial sector will continue to be hollowed out as a result of diminished restrictions on cross-Strait trade and investment. The massive Chinese market, low wages, and lax environmental and business regulations have proven irresistible to numerous Taiwanese companies. The era of plentiful remuneration in industrial jobs for migrant aborigines has perforce drawn to a close. At the same time, unabated regional income inequality will continue to push aboriginal community members out of their home villages in search of work in commercial hubs. Aborigines who heretofore may have found more stable and safer work in the industrial sector are left with construction jobs as the only alternative for unskilled labor. If the CSSTA is passed, many of the construction companies employing aborigines in the future will be Chinese-owned. Such an employment situation runs the risk of workers’ rights violations, in which contract and working condition disputes are prone to political interference to protect mainland investors.

At the same time that neoliberal policies have already created a tighter labor market for aboriginal villagers, they simultaneously pose a mounting threat to the natural environments sheltering aboriginal
communities. From the outset of Taiwan’s economic transformation in the 1970s when the groundwork for capitalism was being laid, aboriginal land rights have been in a precarious state. In recent decades aboriginal territory has been disproportionately spoiled by the imperatives of economic growth as environmental regulations are often skirted or arbitrarily enforced. Numerous cases of malfeasance, including illegal dumping of toxic waste, excessive development of ecologically sensitive areas, and unlawful construction projects in restricted areas have been exposed in recent years.\(^3\) Aboriginal communities, having already borne the brunt of negative externalities associated with rapid economic growth, absorb the detrimental effects of these practices most acutely (Simon, 2002). This trend is likely to continue in the future, as many aboriginal communities are located in sensitive environmental areas coveted for resource extraction and reservoir construction. Likewise, researchers have recorded a pronounced deterioration in environments surrounding aboriginal communities exposed to prolonged development of tourism industries.\(^4\)

Moreover, commercial agriculture may incur losses stemming from the easing of restrictions on imported agricultural goods proposed under the Special Act Governing Free Economic Pilot Zones. Although most Chinese agricultural products will still be generally prohibited from entering Taiwan, the proposed pilot zone bill allows Chinese raw food materials to be imported tariff-free into free economic pilot zones for processing and export. Local farmers would thus be thrust into competition with Chinese producers, whose lower costs are expected to crowd Taiwanese farmers out of the market (Lee, 2014). Although the bulk of the flourishing commercial agriculture on aboriginal land is destined for the domestic market, there is a credible fear that future agreements will further ease restrictions on overseas agricultural products entering Taiwan’s market (Yeh, 2013). Such a development
would have a devastating effect on the agricultural industry in Chun-ri.

Hosting the township office and in close proximity to Fangliao and major transportation networks, Chun-ri is in a better position than Shih-wen to navigate the financial pressures wrought by expanded economic liberalization. The economy in Chun-ri is on much more stable footing when compared with that of Shih-wen. Employment as teachers, police officers, civil servants, and within the professional military is common in Chun-ri. These occupations provide stable work, good pay, and generous benefits that go far beyond what is available in the private sector. Children living in Chun-ri are more able to maintain robust ties with both the Han Chinese community and fellow Paiwan while attending junior and senior high schools in nearby towns. The ease with which village members can take advantage of transportation routes also makes it more convenient for villagers who have left Chun-ri to visit home routinely.

At the same time, however, the thriving local economy has not shielded Chun-ri from cultural dilution and has perhaps exacerbated the shortcomings of cultural assimilation. Having witnessed firsthand the opulence of material rewards accrued from moving up the social ladder, there is a prevailing tendency among village residents to prioritize economic enrichment above cultural preservation. Conversely, clear traces of traditional practices are still alive and well among the remaining population in Shih-wen. Rather than pecuniary ambition, the greatest threat to aboriginal culture in Shih-wen is a population drain that has deprived the village of middle-aged community members, leaving behind mostly the elderly and very young on the mountain.

Both Chun-ri and Shih-wen have begun experiencing the transformative effects of pervasive long-term outmigration triggered by earlier waves of economic liberalization. The direction of migration, however, is not fixedly unidirectional. In the past decade, as wages in
Taiwan have stagnated while prices of basic goods continue to climb higher, it has become more economically viable for many middle-aged migrant aborigines to return home to receive social welfare benefits while taking up subsistence agriculture or engaging in temporary and seasonal employment. These villagers have joined many of their compatriots from the first wave of migration in the 1970s and 1980s, who have already left the workforce and re-settled permanently within their home communities. While some may choose to retire to the village, the experience of venturing out has opened a Pandora’s box. In many instances, children of village members who migrated in the 1990s have become accustomed to life in an urban setting and feel more familiar with city life than with life among compatriots. Having grown up with better educational resources, many aspire to employment in high-end service jobs, or to become small business owners themselves.

Young aborigines still based in the villages also continue to respond to the allure of superior resources and hope of a better livelihood in urban areas. The urban landscape these young aborigines face, however, is changed from that which their predecessors encountered. De-industrialization and the concomitant growth of Taiwan’s service industries have obliged this cohort to take up more permanent residency in cities and to engage in employment with fewer benefits. The interests of aboriginal communities have therefore become even more intricately woven within the structures of neoliberalism and economic integration. As Taiwan becomes more deeply entrenched in these structures, with inclusion in free trade agreements, creation of special economic zones, and expansion of privatization in the offing, the disparate outcomes for aboriginal communities will exacerbate exogenous social and economic divisions already visible among aboriginal villages and village members.
Notes

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1. 1 new Taiwan dollar is equivalent to about US$0.0316.
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National Identity and Evolvement of Strategic Relations
Taiwan’s Security Calculus of Cross-Strait Migration

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Abstract

Migration across the Taiwan Strait is relatively insignificant by its scale but it is indeed indisputably politically sensitive. Given the long-term political separation and military rivalry across the Taiwan Strait in the past six decades while both sides of the Taiwan Strait nevertheless intensively engaged each other economically, commercially and culturally, a social trend of cross-Strait migration inevitably results. There are various interpretations on such a demographic development which has raised security concerns, which are in turn creating a biased judiciary arrangement on the migration activities. What are the factors behind the security calculus of cross-Strait migration? How can the security calculus justify its arguments and subsequently maintain unequal treatments with respect to cross-Strait immigrants? Are the rationales for maintaining a tight grip on cross-Strait migration in line with the political ideal proclaimed by the political factions in Taiwan still sensible? What is the potential for the trend of cross-Strait migration affecting the security calculus in the future? On the other hand, for the
migration from Taiwan to Mainland China, how influential can it be on the security decision-making process of the Beijing leadership? Is there any impact possibly caused by cross-Strait migration – and is it essentially overstated? Or alternatively, is the overstated influence potentially caused by cross-Strait migration an intentionally staged political myth? What are the substantial impacts actually ever achieved by cross-Strait migration on the security dimension? What is the self-fulfilled conviction of cross-Strait migration? For all the inquiries noted above, the author of this paper would like to scrutinize the truth and separate it from numerous myths ever advocated by the different factions in Taiwan politics. A sound and neutral judgment to tell the exact influences likely enacted by cross-Strait migration would ensure no misunderstanding and neither the intentional tarnish will serve as a good basis for cross-Strait policy formulation.

**Keywords:** security, migration, Taiwan Strait, China

**JEL classification:** F22, F52, F59, K10

1. Introduction

This research paper will start with reviewing the definition of security as the basis for further discussions. An attempt to develop a generalized definition for the multiple-facet concept of security will be presented in this paper. Based on the definition of security, the author will subsequently propose criteria or approaches for developing factors suitably reflecting the security calculus on specific issues.

As for cross-Strait migration, the author would like to suggest that all the judiciary arrangements such as laws, regulations, rules and administrative codes to either promote or restrict cross-Strait migration
will be exactly turning to be factors within the security calculus. The reason why the judiciary arrangements can be recognized as the factors of the security calculus will be explicated. The causation relationship between the security factors and these judiciary decrees regarding cross-Strait migration will also be elucidated.

To illustrate a comprehensive picture for the security calculus of cross-Strait migration, it is essential to examine how the public concern delivered via various channels may eventually convert into these formal legal mechanisms that govern the treatment of the emigrants and immigrants across the Taiwan Strait on the Taiwan side. How these judiciary arrangements can be modified according to the substantial demands reflecting the dynamic cross-Strait relationship is the essential element to acquire better understandings of Taiwan’s cross-Strait migration security calculus.

All factors of the basic legal mechanism in Taiwan associated with migration activities noted above will be examined in order to appropriately apprehend the security concerns and legal restraints on the migration tendencies Taiwan ever established on both directions. Features extended from the legal mechanisms which may indicate the security calculus will be noted in this paper. The potential for the trend of cross-Strait migration affecting security calculus in the future will be estimated as the conclusion of this paper.

2. Definition of Security

There are various approaches to define national security. Sometimes, academic debates on this matter may still occur. Nevertheless, many may only argue from specific angles but miss the comprehensive picture. The concept of national security is literally linked with many kinds of national interests. To define the national security, or even only the
concept of security itself, should inevitably adopt the multiple-facet characteristic of the national security issues as the basis so that we may appropriately propose a basic definition of security suitably which fits into various aspects.

The multiple-facet characteristic of national security essentially originates from the historical experiences. Given the solid evidences shown by the history of the struggles in the human society, many measures are always adopted in order to defeat the adversaries. These measures may include diplomacy, economic embargo, propaganda, cultural assimilation and of course the military war-fighting. It is very reasonable to expect that struggles among the modern states will certainly extend to different components of the society.

Further, after the Industrial Revolution, economic production relies entirely on the division of labor. Social organizations and ideologies turn out to be much more plural. Interactions and integration of citizens in the same society become more intensive and tight. Failure of operation ever occurs in any segment of the society may lead to an overall disorder of the whole society or an imbalance of national governance. We therefore need to assure that none of the dimensions in the society can be utilized by our adversaries to take as leverage to acquire the overall success in the struggle.

This fact has been fully recognized by strategists for a long time.¹ As advocated by Erich Friedrich Wilhelm Ludendorff in his masterpiece of Der Totale Krieg, “the entire physical and moral forces of the nation should be mobilized”,² the multiple-facet nature of the national security concept is justified indirectly. Likewise, the originator of the term “Total Strategy”,³ French General André Beaufre also emphasized elements other than the military in the security and strategic formulas. The scope of the strategic thinking should extend to all different aspects associated with national powers. The soft power argued by Joseph Nye and the so-

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called “unrestricted warfare” initiated by two People’s Liberation Army officers may also indicate the multiple-facet nature of the national security concept from different angles.

There are various aspects contained by the scope of the national interests and all these aspects are virtually intertwined. As already noted, should failure occur in any segment, it may lead to a total breakdown. It therefore will not allow any element to be left behind by negligence. On the other hand, to guarantee the maximum leverages of national powers, it is essential to keep the best coordination among all these national powers in various dimensions. National security is fundamentally a multiple-variable equation. The best solution and the perfect result can only be acquired after calculating or assessing all the factors related and really mattered.

We also need to note here that the perception of national security is literally quite diversified. Generally speaking, the military security or defense security is the most frequently recognized item. Security in diplomacy and external politics is another item not hard to be apprehended. Security issues in economic activities, financial exchange and monetary or finance are directly linked with the welfare of the general public, and ordinary citizens may have a certain level of sensitivity toward this aspect. Nevertheless, the security awareness regarding transnational crimes, pollution and epidemics possibly affecting the environmental security, social security or the security of public sanitation may turn out to be rather diversified into various degrees in people’s perceptions.

Moreover, whether the impacts on the traditional culture or value framework caused by mass media, network, publications or cultural exchange activities can be defined as a kind of threat toward the culture security is literally a matter of judgment since this argument cannot easily forge the social consensus. It therefore needs to specify the base
tone or main theme of these events before actually label their categories. This is exactly the reason why some French people treat the speed food culture such as McDonalds as a threat to their traditional culture and certain political or religious leaders always view the value frameworks accompanied with Western commercial practices with suspicions and keep high alertness. Yet, based on the same reason, such secular mentalities may not be necessarily to gain the universal recognition successfully.

Given that the essence of security is fundamentally multiple-faceted and its contents are also primarily sophisticated, whether we may establish a general and conceptual definition for security that is suitable for various aspects but with no controversy or without missing any element in the coverage of such a definition can really be a challenge. As what we have presented above, it is quite hard to judge the real significance of a national security issue simply by the citizens’ general perceptions. In many cases, these perceptions will fall into the trap of plausible speculations thus mislead the direction of efforts for managing the national security threats. Hence, we need to consider the definition from the fundamental functions of the governments that are in charge of the national security policies.

As the governments safeguarding the national security, there are two segments as the major missions and functions: policy formulation and policy implementation. As such, we therefore propose the definition of security as the following: “freedom of choice in formulating policies; freedom of action in implementing policies” or “freedom of choice in policy formulation; freedom of action in policy implementation”. From this basic definition extending to specific aspects, it can be modified with more flexibility that is suitable to be the definition of “OOOOO security” as: “freedom of choice in formulating OOOOO policies; freedom of action in implementing OOOOO policies” or “freedom of
choice in policy formulation of OOOOO affairs; freedom of action in policy implementation of OOOOO affairs”.

With this standard formation of the security definition, OOOOO can be replaced with wordings representing various aspects existing in the scope of security concerns such as the military, diplomacy, economic, finance, social, public sanitation, environment or even culture. After filling OOOOO with different terms noted above, we may conclude that defining the security concept on specific aspect can be very comprehensive and flexible. This formation is essentially suitable to fit with various topics existing within the scope of national security.

The reason why the author would like to propose a generalized definition for security and by adding terms in the definition which may meanwhile satisfy the implications of security concerns on specific aspects is literally preparing the basis for further examining the factors reflecting security calculus in the following paragraphs. The general definition structure may retain its flexibility as it may need to cope with various dimensions of security concerns in the modern states.

3. Factors Reflecting Security Calculus

As noted above, the security concerns of any individual state may actually influence its policy formulation and policy implementation process. As deciding the national policies, states are confined by their resources available and national powers in various dimensions. They need either to adjust their aims or to acquire more resources. To match their power with their goals, states may adopt strategies to enhance their position through alliance, coalition or trade-off with other powers.

How can we identify factors actually affecting the security calculus of a state? For any state to take effective administrative measures to cope with those security concerns, the legal bases for these measures are
always needed. After all, it is the essence of the rule of law concept for all democratic states. Even for those states that might not be necessarily fully democratic and practicing the ideal of the rule of law, certain judiciary foundation for taking substantial actions will still be needed.

Indeed, many elements within the societies may reflect the security concerns. Public opinions are vital vehicle to express the security concern. Nevertheless, public opinions can also be misleading. Some widely known perspectives might not be fair statements. Some arguments may not be truthful. Most importantly, to identify the effective factors within the security formulas should be in line with the expectations of the general public. We therefore need to find a neutral and fair yardstick to verify these elements.

Based on an assumption that should these security concerns are influential enough then they ought to be the suitable driving force to establish judiciary arrangements for directing subsequent administrative measures needed. Elements representing security concerns can be various. Nevertheless, if these elements really matter, they will eventually turn into proper judiciary arrangements in order to attain as the legal basis for subsequent and substantial actions to tackle security challenges. We therefore conclude that we need to examine judiciary arrangements associated with certain aspects in order to identify whether these security concerns had ever successfully turned into legal bases for further actions. As long as the security concerns can be converted into contents noted in judiciary decrees, or even other forms of code and order, they are inevitably accepted as the factors of the security calculus.

The author would like to further emphasize that the driving force for a legislative action are either from the public pressure or the requirement submitted by the governmental agencies, or both. Comparing with these two sources, the public pressure is driven by general perception but the requests from the administrative branches will be relatively substantial.
Governments may initially manage the security threats by contingency measures, should no judiciary basis may be suitably there to cope with these newly appeared threats. Nevertheless, an initiative will be soon taken to establish appropriate legal ground, in another word, decrees or codes, to deal with these latest security issues. This is exactly the reason why the judiciary decrees can be the best reference to reflect the significance of the security concern.

It is essential to note here that some security concerns may attract public attentions but may be factually less influential. Impacts of certain high-profile features or events can be overstated. The process for establishing judiciary arrangements are actually reflecting the substantial necessities of taking proper measures to cope with specific security concerns. Regardless of the general perceptions of issues associated with the security matters, the judicial arrangements are specifically addressed on issues actually matter, not issues most popular or well known. To avoid misperceiving factors not really existed in the security calculus, adopting contents clearly noted in the judiciary arrangements may fairly identify factors in the security calculus.

On the other hand, we also need to observe whether the space of policy formulation is confined by the judiciary arrangements as noted above. All the executive decisions reflecting present policies need to follow the framework set by the relevant laws. The actual administrative practice of policy formulation, the freedom of choice is inevitably regulated by these associated laws and regulations. Likewise, the freedom of action in the process of policy implementation is also restricted by the legal decrees. It is clearly to see that the judiciary arrangements may suitably reflect the security factors since it affects the freedom of choice in policy formulation and freedom of action in policy implementation.
4. JudiciaryTermsAffecting Cross-Strait Migration

The judiciary decree most significantly affecting all activities across the Taiwan Strait should be “Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area”, which will be addressed as “the Act” in the following text of this paper. Principally, it is the basic law to regulate the interactions across the Taiwan Strait. Before analyzing the terms set by this act deciding cross-Strait migration, several features of this act itself should be noted here.

First, the basic assumption of this judiciary arrangement is setting the terms for “the security and public welfare in the Taiwan Area, regulating dealings between the peoples of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area, and handling legal matters arising there from before national unification”5 in Article 1 of the Act. It is obvious that this judiciary mechanism does not intend to establish a permanent legal structure since it has explicitly noted with the phrase of “before national unification”. It is fundamentally a provisional judiciary mechanism to regulate cross-Strait interactions before any long-term arrangement can be settled.

Second, it has been revised for many times, thus it can be proven as an indisputably dynamic judiciary mechanism matching with the realities of cross-Strait relations.

Third, this act has set certain terms which may not be consistent with the Constitution of the Republic of China. Although it is clearly addressed by Article 10 of the ROC Constitution that “The people shall have freedom of residence and of change of residence”6, yet this constitutional right has still been substantially negated by this act. However, the legitimacy of doing so is still justifiable. The legality of declining the constitutional right will be discussed in the following paragraph of this paper.
Fourth, in theory, the identity of “peoples of the Mainland Area” and the applicability of this judiciary mechanism will not be altered by their actual residences since it is noted by Article 3 of the Act that “The provisions of this Act pertaining to the people of the Mainland Area shall likewise apply to the people of the Mainland Area who reside outside the Mainland Area”. Last but not the least, although Hong Kong and Macao now in theory should a part of the territory under the authority of the Beijing regime, yet, the legal mechanism for managing the interactions between Taipei and these two areas are different from the judiciary arrangements mentioned above since there is another act called “Act Governing Relations with Hong Kong and Macau” to serve this function. Cross-Strait migration will naturally exclude the migration between Taiwan and these two former Western possessions.

From the features addressed here, the Act itself indicates a serious attitude on regulating the interactions across the Taiwan Strait. The content of the Act substantially defying the basic citizens’ right granted by the ROC constitution is purely a political decision but realized by the legal statute. It therefore reflects the political realities and indicates the security concerns with the contents of the Act. All the terms listed in the Act affecting the actual practices of cross-Strait migration should be the solid evidences revealing the factors in the security calculus in this aspect.

Dual citizenships can be an influential factor in the migration activities. Yet, the dual status of these identities is generally a negative factor in the security calculus since it may affect the judgment of loyalty and judiciary jurisdiction. According to Article 9-1 of the Act, “The people of the Taiwan Area may not have household registrations in the Mainland Area or hold passports issued by the Mainland Area”, the possibility of holding dual identities of both people of the Taiwan Area and Mainland Area is in principle denied. It is intentionally to define
these two identities as mutually exclusive. The consideration of national security is obvious. The likelihood of confusions caused by identity shifting originated from cross-Strait migration is primarily excluded. Nevertheless, certain pragmatic considerations for solving some already existing status as noted in the following text after the main statement of Article 9-1 may further prove that the concern of national security does exist.

Except for the situations deemed necessary by the authorities concerned out of special consideration, any person who has a household registration in the Mainland Area or holds a passport issued by the Mainland Area in violation of the provisions of the preceding paragraph shall be deprived of its status as the people of the Taiwan Area and its rights of election, recall, initiative, referendum, serving military service or public offices, and any other rights derived from its household registration in the Taiwan Area, and its household registration in the Taiwan Area shall be annulled by the household registration authorities; provided that the responsibilities and obligations resulted from its status as the people of the Taiwan Area are not excused or exempted.

Any of the people of the Taiwan Area who has a household registration in the Mainland Area or holds a passport issued by the Mainland Area before the coming into force of the amendments to this Act is not deprived of its status as the people of the Taiwan Area provided that it submits to the Ministry of Interior relevant proofs that it has had its household registration in the Mainland Area annulled or abandoned its passport issued by the Mainland Area within six months from the coming into force of the amendments to this Act.\(^8\)
The consequence of having a household registration in the Mainland Area or holding a Mainland China passport is not only that the identity of the “people of the Taiwan Area” will be deprived but also the citizens’ privileges of “election, recall, initiative, referendum, serving military service or public offices, and any other rights derived from its household registration in the Taiwan Area” will be excluded. Ironically, as noted by the text of Article 9-1, “the responsibilities and obligations resulted from its status as the people of the Taiwan Area are not excused or exempted”. The intention of deterring peoples in the Taiwan Area to hold dual identity, which is perceived as a negative feature to the national security, is explicitly shown by the text.

It is worth of note that the deprivation of identity noted in Article 9-1 is not totally irreversible. As noted by Article 9-2 of the Act, “Any person deprived of its status as the people of the Taiwan Area in accordance with the provisions of the preceding Article may apply to the Ministry of Interior for permission to recover its status as the people of the Taiwan Area and to reside in the Taiwan Area after its return provided that it has its household registration in the Mainland Area annulled or abandons its passport issued by the Mainland Area”.

It reveals that dismissal of the status as the people of the Taiwan Area for whatsoever the reason was will not be defined or interpreted as disloyalty to the ROC. Otherwise, it is less likely to grant the privilege of holding the status of people of the Taiwan Area again.

From the baseline of declining the dual identities across the Taiwan Strait, the Act further expresses a hard grip in its Article 10, “No people of the Mainland Area may enter into the Taiwan Area without permission of the competent authorities”. Frankly speaking, the content of this article is seemingly against Article 10 of the ROC Constitution that specifically guarantees the basic citizens’ right: “The people shall have freedom of residence and of change of residence”.

Nevertheless,
according to Article 10 of the ROC Constitution, “All the freedoms and rights enumerated in the preceding Articles shall not be restricted by law except by such as may be necessary to prevent infringement upon the freedoms of other persons, to avert an imminent crisis, to maintain social order or to advance public welfare”. It does preserve the possibility to put certain restrictions on these privileges.

Further, it is also specifically noted in Article 11 of the Additional Articles of the Constitution of the Republic of China, “Rights and obligations between the people of the Chinese mainland area and those of the free area, and the disposition of other related affairs may be specified by law”\(^{10}\). The legitimacy of Article 10 of the Act therefore is unquestionable though politically controversial at the beginning. Although this basic right clearly noted in the ROC Constitution has not been clearly violated, yet, a request of constitutional interpretation did occur in 1999 to question the legality of the Act governing the relations between these two areas. It was obviously a challenge to the legitimacy of the restriction specifically on the people from the Chinese mainland area. Nonetheless, according to the interpretation given by the Justices of the Constitutional Court, Judicial Yuan, ROC, noted as the No. 497 with the title of “Is the regulation enacted by the Ministry of the Interior constitutional in specifying the qualifications, conditions, permission procedure, and length of stay for people from mainland China who apply for entry into the Taiwan area?”\(^{11}\), the legitimacy of the legal term was further confirmed.

As text addressed by the holding of the interpretation, “...the Regulations Governing Permanent or Temporary Residence Permission for the People from Mainland China, which Regulations stipulate the qualifications, conditions, permission procedure and length of stay concerning the entry of said people into the Taiwan area, are to protect the security and welfare of the people of the Taiwan area, and are in

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accordance with the legislative purpose of the Act. It is essential to maintain the social order and to advance the public welfare …”\textsuperscript{12}; all these rulings associated with the Act are genuinely reflecting the security concerns of cross-Strait migration.

The position was again readdressed by the text of reasoning of the interpretation, “On February 8, 1993, the Ministry of the Interior in Tai-(82)-Interior-Police-No.-8273466 promulgated the Regulations Governing the Entry Permission to Taiwan Area for the People from Mainland China and in Tai-(82)-Interior-Police-No.-8273459, the Regulations Governing Permanent or Temporary Residence Permission for the People from Mainland China, wherein the qualifications, conditions, permission procedure and length of stay concerning the entry of the people of the Mainland area into the Taiwan area are clearly set forth. Essential to maintain the social order and to advance the public welfare, these regulations are to protect the security and welfare of the people of the Taiwan area. They conform to the legislative intent of the aforesaid Act and are within the scope of the delegation. Therefore, the above regulations are not in violation of the Amendment and Article 23 of the Constitution”\textsuperscript{13}. The intent of protecting “the security and welfare of the people of the Taiwan area” is clearly specified.

Nonetheless, a proviso is attached to the same article to emphasize that all the peoples of the Mainland Area need certain proper excuse to justify their entry to the Taiwan Area. According to the terms noted in Article 10, “Any of the people of the Mainland Area who are permitted to enter into the Taiwan Area may not engage in any activity inconsistent with the purposes of the permission”\textsuperscript{14}, which indicates that the constitutional right of freedom of residence and freedom of change of residence is substantially restricted by the Act. Moreover, there is no legislative overseeing process on the process of deciding whether the permission of entry to the Taiwan Area will be granted or not since the
authority is delegated to the administrative arm of the government as noted in the text of Article 10, “Rules governing the granting of permission referred to in the preceding two paragraphs shall be drafted by the competent authorities concerned and submitted to the Executive Yuan for approval”.

The administrative power dominating the process of issuing entry permission to the Taiwan Area may suitably facilitate the substantial demands of safeguarding the national security. This part of the text listed in Article 10 of the Act may well reflect the factors associated with the security calculus of cross-Strait migration. Although the permission of entry to the Taiwan Area is mandatory, yet, it does not imply that the possibility of migration is totally denied simply because of the security concern. On the contrary, the texts in Article 10-1 of the Act are explicitly noted with the conditions needed in the process of seeking residency in the Taiwan Area as “Any of the people of the Mainland Area who apply to enter into the Taiwan Area for family reunion, residency, or permanent residency shall be interviewed, fingerprinted, and registered for record; where it fails to be interviewed or fingerprinted, no permission shall be granted to its application for family reunion, residency, or permanent residency. Governing rules thereof shall be prescribed by the competent authorities”. The possibility of seeking residency in Taiwan is therefore conditional.

The qualifications for applying for permanent residency in the Taiwan Area are first noted by Article 16 of the Act as follows:

In any of the following situations, any of the people of the Mainland Area may apply for permanent residency in the Taiwan Area:
1. Being a lineal relative by blood or the spouse of any of the people of the Taiwan Area, and of the age of no less than seventy or no more than twelve.
2. Being the surviving spouse of any of the people of the Taiwan Area who needs to provide care to any of the underage children born by the deceased spouse.

3. Being any serviceman of the Taiwan Area who was sent over to the Mainland Area for military service and has been staying there since 1945, and its spouse.

4. Being any former officer or enlisted man of the armed forces captured in battle or in the execution of special missions after the Government moved to Taiwan in 1949, and its spouse.

5. Being any person who was sent over to the Mainland Area to study on Government scholarships before the Government moved to Taiwan in 1949, and its spouse.

6. Being any fishermen or crew who, by reason of breakdown of their vessels, shipwreck, or force majeure, have stayed in the Mainland Area since any date by November 1, 1987 and had household registrations in the Taiwan Area before.15

A proviso of enacting restriction on the application that reflects security concern is immediately attached to the terms noted above as “An annual quota may be imposed on the number of permanent residency in the Taiwan Area to be granted to the people of the Mainland Area who apply in accordance with the provisions of Sub-paragraph 1 of the preceding paragraph”. It is a typical model of granting favorable terms initially but with preservation in the calculus of security.

Apart from Article 16, Article 17 of the Act has further granted other possibilities of acquiring the status of a permanent residency in the Taiwan Area. Article 17 first addresses the privilege of the spouse of any of the people of the Taiwan Area to apply for spouse residency with the term of “Any of the people of the Mainland Area being the spouse of any of the people of the Taiwan Area may apply to enter into the Taiwan
Area for family reunion in accordance with laws and regulations and may apply for spouse residency in the Taiwan Area after obtaining permission to enter into the Taiwan Area”. We should not put the equal sign between the spouse residency and the permanent residency. A progressive conversion process is still needed for acquiring the eventual permanent residency from the status of spouse residency. There is a stereotype bias on cross-Strait marriage to categorize it into finite cases. The security concern is therefore quite implicit for the case of acquiring the permanent residency through marriages.

Other approaches for acquiring permanent residency status in the Taiwan Area are also noted in Article 17 of the Act. People of the Mainland Area may acquire long-term residency from employments in the Taiwan Area or through business-related activities according to the following terms:

Any of the people of the Mainland Area other than those referred to in the preceding paragraph may apply to stay in the Taiwan Area in accordance with laws and regulations; in either of the following situations, he/she may apply for business or work residency in the Taiwan Area for a period of no more than three years, which may be extended upon expiration by application:
1. Being any of the people of the Mainland Area who is employed to work in the Taiwan Area in accordance with Article 11.
2. Being any of the people of the Mainland Area who enters into the Taiwan Area for business related activities in accordance with Article 10 or Paragraph 1 of Article 16.
Any person having a spouse residency in the Taiwan Area, which is permitted in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 1, for at least four years, and during which its lawful residency in the Taiwan Area each year is no less than 183 days may apply for long-term
residency.
The Ministry of the Interior may permit specifically on a case-by-case basis any of the people of the Mainland Area to have a long-term residency in the Taiwan Area out of political, economic, social, educational, science-tech or cultural consideration and may restrict the categories and quota for residency applications; the referred categories and quota shall be drafted by the Ministry of the Interior and approved by the Executive Yuan for publication.¹⁸

It is clearly noted that the political, economic, social, science-tech or cultural consideration may affect the result of application. And the categories and quota for residency applications can also be restricted. Factors of the security calculus are obviously contained in the text of the Act. It is also worth of note that most of these governing regulations attached to the Act are totally delegated to the administrative authorities. No explicit legislative oversight had ever unambiguously been noted in the texts of the Act.

It is also worth of note that the “business related activities” in this article may not include investment. It has been explicitly excluded by the Investment Commission of the Ministry of Economic Affairs that “Mainland Chinese people are not eligible to enroll in the immigration investor program or apply for permanent residency” though the investment activity has never specified by the Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area.¹⁹ Meanwhile, a promise of “… both scheduled and unscheduled visits to mainland Chinese companies to check if they are in any way conducting activities that may influence national security or public interest. Chinese executives, managers, supervisors and technicians will also be examined to ensure they are not engaging in any unlawful deeds …”²⁰ which was granted by the National Immigration Agency and the Investment
Commission may also reflect the concern of national security.

Conditions for converting the long-term residency to the permanent residency in the Taiwan Area are also listed within the texts of Article 17 as follows:

For any person who has obtained permission for long-term residency in the Taiwan Area in accordance with the provisions of the preceding two paragraphs, the period of residency shall be unlimited. Any person who has obtained permission for long-term residency may apply for permanent residency in the Taiwan Area provided that the following provisions are met:

1. Having resided lawfully in the Taiwan Area for two consecutive years and the residency period is no less than 183 days annually.
2. Having integrity and no criminal record.
3. Submitting a proof of losing its original household registration.
4. Serving the national interests.

The Ministry of the Interior may impose and publish after approval by the Executive Yuan the quota and categories for spouse residency, long-term residency and permanent residency.

For any of the people of the Mainland Area permitted to have a spouse residency, long-term residency or permanent residency in accordance with Paragraph 1, if there exist sufficient evidences to establish that his/her marriage is false due to collusion, the permission for his/her spouse residency, long-term residency, permanent residency and household registration shall be revoked and, in addition, he/she shall be deported.

From the terms shown above, it is explicitly indicated that the privilege of residency in the Taiwan Area and the right of household registration still can be reversible, should any fraud existed in the
marriage relationship as the basis to acquire these privileges and rights be proven. Most importantly, for anyone who would like to apply for permanent residency, their status of residency in the Taiwan Area as they are submitting the application should not have any flaw since the terms listed in Article 17 of the Act, “For any of the people of the Mainland Area who stays or resides in the Taiwan Area beyond the authorized duration or enters into the Taiwan Area without permission, the provisions of the preceding Article and Paragraphs 1 to 4 of this Article shall not apply to such person during the period of his/her stay or residency in the Taiwan Area”\textsuperscript{21}, has completely excluded the possibility of revising the status of residency whilst the applicants are not possessing legal status at the beginning.

Actually, those quite flexible conditions for applying for residency in the Taiwan Area are contained within Article 17 of the Act. The administrative rule defined by Article 17 governing the application for permanent residency status in Taiwan known as “The Rules Governing Permits for People from Mainland China Setting Up Permanent Residence or Residence in Taiwan”\textsuperscript{22}, which will be addressed as “the Rules” in the following text of this paper, has further revealed how flexible the fourth condition of applying for permanent residency, “serving the national interests”, can be. From Article 18 to Article 23 of the Rules, certain exceptional conditions for granting the status of permanent residency in the Taiwan Area that serve the national interests have been established from the aspects of politics, economics, education, science-tech, culture and society accordingly. Meanwhile, Articles 14, 15, 26, 27, 33 and 34 of the Rules also contain conditions associated with criminal records, improper behaviors, and career experiences as the public servant or employee in the party, military, administration or other political apparatuses or institutions in the Mainland Area as the basis for declining the application for long-term residency in the Taiwan Area. As
noted in Articles 14, 26 and 33, any possibility of affecting national security and social stability may justify the decision of declining the application.23

Moreover, if there are sufficient evidences to indicate the possibility of threatening national security or social stability, the people of the Mainland Area who have entered the Taiwan Area may still be deported by the constable authorities, as noted in Article 18 of the Act listed below:

In any of the following situations, any of the people of the Mainland Area who enters into the Taiwan Area may be deported by the police authorities; provided, however, that prior approval shall be obtained from the judicial authorities where the judicial proceeding thereof is pending:
1. Entering into the Taiwan Area without permission.
2. Entering into the Taiwan Area by permission and staying or residing beyond the authorized duration.
3. Engaging in any activity or employment inconsistent with the purposes of the permission.
4. There exist sufficient evidences to establish that a crime has been committed.
5. There exist sufficient evidences to establish that there is a threat to national security or social stability.

As a matter of fact, all the subparagraphs listed above may indicate various levels of threats to the national security. Factors of security calculus have been fulfilled into executable judicial arrangements in this case. Substantial actions can be taken to eliminate the threats possibly undermining the welfare of the people in the Taiwan Area. Nonetheless, a fair treatment of the people of the Mainland Area who are accused of
violating the terms noted by subparagraphs 3 to 5 shown above exists. According to the terms listed in the following content of Article 18 of the Act, it addresses the following:

Before the National Immigration Agency of the Ministry of the Interior deports any of the people of the Mainland Area who, having obtained permission to reside in and to enter into the Taiwan Area, has any of the situations specified in Sub-paragraphs 3 to 5 in the preceding paragraph, it may convene a review meeting and provide an opportunity for the person concerned to state his/her opinions.

However, for those who have ever committed misconduct noted by subparagraphs 1, 3 and other criminal acts, treatments of them can be more decisive since there is no grey area which existed at all. Measures are specifically listed in the following content of the same Article 18:

Any of the people of the Mainland Area referred to in Paragraph 1 may be put in temporary custody before deportation or ordered in addition to perform labor services.

Any of the people of the Mainland Area referred to in Paragraph 1 who breaches the Social Order Maintenance Act but does not involve in any other criminal offense by engaging in any activity or employment inconsistent with the purposes of the permission as specified in Sub-paragraph 3 of Paragraph 1 may not be transferred to a summary court for ruling after relevant investigation.

Where any of the people of the Mainland Area entering into the Taiwan Area and involving in criminal cases is ordered for custody by judges or prosecutors to be put in the accommodation centers for
custody referred to in Paragraph 3, and found guilty by a irrevocable court judgment, any single custody day may be counted as an imprisonment or detention day, or converted into the amount of fine as prescribed by the decision referred to in Paragraphs 3 and 6 of Article 42 of the Criminal Code.

Apparently, the attitude reflected by the Act is solemn and the position is firm since there is no flexibility within the concern of the national security. As compared with “a review meeting and provide an opportunity for the person concerned to state his/her opinions” that signifies the respect of human rights, the unyielding position shown by the strong treatment of those who obviously commit certain wrongdoings may well keep a good reputation for the government in Taiwan while well safeguarding the national security and social stability at the same time.

To deter the tendency of achieving de facto migration by illegal entry or failure to leave by the expiration of the authorized duration of stay, certain measures are established by Articles 19 and 20 as listed below. The content of Article 19 regarding deportation of those who fail to leave on time is as follows:

Any of the people of the Taiwan Area who guarantee for any of the people of the Mainland Area for the latter's entry into the Taiwan Area shall assist the authorities concerned in deporting the latter in the event of the latter's failure to leave by the expiration of the authorized duration of stay, and shall bear the expenses incurred in connection therewith.

The deporting authorities may notify the guarantor to pay the expenses referred to in the preceding paragraph within a specified
time limit by providing photocopies of relevant receipts and a
calculation statement, and shall forward the case in accordance with
the laws for compulsory execution in the event of the guarantor's
failure to pay by the expiration of the aforementioned time limit.

And the contents regarding the deportation expenses of people of illegal
entry to the Taiwan Area and the illegal employments in the Taiwan Area
are noted by Article 20:

In any of the following situations, any of the people of the Taiwan
Area shall bear the expenses for deportation:
1. Making any of the people of the Mainland Area enter into the
Taiwan Area illegally.
2. Illegally employing any of the people of the Mainland Area.
3. Employing any of the people of the Mainland Area who are subject
to deportation in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 2 or 3
of Article 14.

Where there is more than one person liable for the expenses referred
to in the preceding paragraph, these persons shall be jointly and
severally liable.

The deporting authorities may notify the guarantor to pay within a
specified time limit the expenses referred to in Paragraph 1 by
providing photocopies of relevant receipts and a calculation statement,
and shall forward the case in accordance with the laws for compulsory
execution in the event of the guarantor's failure to pay by the
expiration of the aforementioned time limit.
Penalties of paying the expenses of deportation are not only in consideration of compensating the operational cost but also increasing the cost needed for hiring illegal work forces from the Mainland Area. Nevertheless, the untold reality behind the text of these articles is still the concern of the national security.

The most critical term established within the Act should be Article 21 regarding the exclusion of the involvement of national security-associated activities. It puts certain restrictions for the people of the Mainland Area to acquire specific qualifications relevant to the national security functions or to conduct particular activities potentially affecting the national security. Durations for restriction listed in Article 21 are categorized by the nature of the activities or qualifications associated with various degrees involved in the national security affairs. The content of Article 21 of the Act is listed as follows:

Except otherwise provided for in any other law, any of the people of the Mainland Area permitted to enter into the Taiwan Area may not register itself as candidate for any public office, serve in the government, educational institutions or state enterprises, or organize any political party unless it has had a household registration in the Taiwan Area for at least ten years; unless it has had a household registration in the Taiwan Area for at least twenty years, it may not serve in the intelligence agencies or institutions, or serve in the national defense agencies or institutions as any of following personnel:
1. Recruited military officers, sergeants and soldiers.
2. Drafted military officers and sergeants.
3. Civilian, educational and military contracted personnel.
The criterion for evaluating the suitability to be involved with the national security matters is nothing else but quarantine. The conviction of acquiring a household registration in the Taiwan Area for a certain period of time may naturally eliminate the possibility of undermining the national security. Actually, two arbitrary dividing lines, one is ten years and the other is twenty years, are set to differentiate the levels of concern.²⁴ Comparatively, registering as candidate for public office, serving in the government, educational institutions or state enterprises or even organizing political parties are relatively less sensitive than serving in the intelligence agencies or institutions, or serving in the national defense agencies or institutions as military personnel or civilian employees.

However, as already mentioned before, certain exception treatments have been noted by Articles 18 to 23 of “The Rules Governing Permits for People from Mainland China Setting Up Permanent Residence or Residence in Taiwan” as long as treating the specific subject may serve the national interests as noted in Article 17 of the Act. It is specifically noted by Article 21 of the Act that the faculty member of any university, researcher of any academic or research institution or specialist of any social education institution will not be subjected to the restriction of having a household registration in the Taiwan Area for at least ten years as long as other statute or ruling can be applicable. It is specified as listed below:

Any of the people of the Mainland Area who is permitted to enter into the Taiwan Area and has a household registrations in the Taiwan Area may serve as faculty member of any university, researcher of any academic or research institution, or specialist of any social education institution according to relevant laws and regulations without being subject to the limitation to have a household registration in the Taiwan.
Area for at least ten years as referred to in the preceding paragraph. Any person referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not assume any responsibility or perform any work involving national security or confidential science-tech research.

Although the permission for these faculty members, researchers and specialists are kindly granted, yet the restriction for excluding their involvement in research tasks containing the significances of national security or confidential science-tech research still firmly stands. Actually, another term for further excluding the possibility of the people of the Mainland Area but with the household registration in the Taiwan Area to be the public servant in Taiwan or acquiring professional and technician qualifications is noted in Article 22 of the Act as “No people of the Mainland Area having household registrations in the Taiwan Area without permission may be eligible for participating in civil servant examination or professional and technical examinations”. It is fundamentally adding another condition for those people of the Mainland to seek the possibility to be the public servant or conducting professional occupations even after they have already held the household registration for over ten years as noted in Article 21. The period of household registration is only a necessary condition. The sufficient condition for the eligibility is still a permission granted by the appropriate authorities. The national security concern reflected by this term is literally obvious.

After inspecting all the terms listed in the Act regarding the constraints put on the migration from the Mainland Area to Taiwan, we will also examine several terms specifically established for the former public servants, faculty members, state enterprise employees and military personnel who are eligible for life-long pension as they would like to settle in the Mainland Area after their retirement. It is quite hard
to identify whether the essence of these legal arrangements are based on
the security concern or not. One point is for sure. Should any retired
personnel from the public service would like to settle in the Mainland
Area and to change their household registration or even to hold a
passport issued by the Mainland Area, their original pension treatment
will need to be changed according to the Act. The terms of these
alternations are basically listed in Article 26 below:

Any of the retired personnel from the military, government,
educational institutions, or state enterprises who receives monthly
retirement benefits and intends to go to the Mainland Area to reside
there for a long term shall apply to the competent authorities for a
lump-sum payment of the retirement benefits, and the competent
authorities shall calculate the lump-sum payment the applicant is
entitled to based on the applicant's originally approved length of
service and the amount of monthly payment received by any person of
the same rank presently employed or in service during the month
when the application is filed and pay the balance with the aggregate of
the monthly retirement benefits the applicant has already received to
be deducted from the referred lump-sum payment; if there is no
balance or the balance is less than one half of the referred lump-sum
payment, the applicant shall be paid in either case with an amount
equal to one half of the referred lump-sum payment.
Where any of the personnel referred to in the preceding paragraph has
any dependent in the Taiwan Area, it shall acquire the consent of its
dependent(s) before its filing of the application.
Where any of the personnel referred to in Paragraph 1 has a household
registration in the Mainland Area or holds a passport issued by the
Mainland Area but fails to apply for a lump-sum payment of its
retirement benefits in accordance with the provisions, its entitlement
to the retirement benefits shall be suspended until its status as the people of the Taiwan Area is recovered in accordance with the provisions of Article 9-2.
Where any of the personnel referred to in Paragraph 1 applies for a lump-sum payment of the retirement benefits by fraud or any other unjust means, the authorities such personnel is retired from shall reclaim the amount such personnel has received and refer the case to the judicial authorities if there is any criminal liability involved. Rules governing the matters related to the application referred to in Paragraph 1 and the suspension and recovery of retirement benefits referred to in Paragraph 3 shall be prescribed by each competent authority.

Comparing with the status eligible for pension, regulations for veterans receiving the subsistence benefit and injury compensation are relatively flexible. Particularly, for those who already resided in the Mainland Area with approval before the amendment of the Act came into force, the Act does grant a privilege to retain the original treatment. Nonetheless, a stricter code does apply ever since as noted in Article 27 of the Act.

For those veterans formerly housed in Veterans Homes for care by the Veterans Affairs Commission, Executive Yuan and approved to enter into and reside in the Mainland Area for a long term, the subsistence benefit and injury compensation they are entitled to shall continue to be paid; the same provision shall to those permitted to enter into the Mainland Area for permanent residency prior to the coming into force of the amendment to this Article.
Where a veteran under care is not approved in accordance with the provisions of the preceding paragraph to have a household registration
in the Mainland Area or to hold a passport issued by the Mainland Area, its entitlement to the subsistence benefit and injury compensation shall be suspended until its status as the people of the Taiwan Area is recovered in accordance with the provisions of Article 9-2.

Rules governing the matters related to the payment, suspension and recovery of payment of the subsistence benefit and injury compensation referred to in the preceding two paragraphs shall be drafted by the Veterans Affairs Commission, Executive Yuan and submitted to the Executive Yuan for approval.

It is also worth of note that the retirement benefits can be recovered together with the status as the people of the Taiwan Area. More detailed terms regarding the process of recovering the status are delegated to the administrative branch of the government to establish as noted in Article 9-2 of the Act listed below.

Any person deprived of its status as the people of the Taiwan Area in accordance with the provisions of the preceding Article may apply to the Ministry of Interior for permission to recover its status as the people of the Taiwan Area and to reside in the Taiwan Area after its return provided that it has its household registration in the Mainland Area annulled or abandons its passport issued by the Mainland Area. Rules governing the permission requirements, procedures, means, restriction, revocation, or annulment of permission and any other requirements referred to in the preceding paragraph shall be drafted by the Ministry of Interior and submitted to the Executive Yuan for approval.
After examining the terms associated with the migration noted by the Act, we may only disclose the basic elements reflecting the security concern of cross-Strait migration. Actually, there are many legal arrangements already established to regulate all cross-Strait activities. Other legal decrees such as Article 11 of the Immigration Law also indicate situations for declining the application for permanent residence in Taiwan as follows:

National Immigration Agency may deny the application for residence or registered permanent residence submitted by a national without registered permanent residence if he or she meets one of the following circumstances:
1. Has been strongly suspected, on the basis of sufficient factual evidence, to endanger national security or social stability.
2. Has been sentenced to punishment of imprisonment or greater.
3. Has entered the State without permission.
4. Has used another person's identity, or has applied with illegally acquired, counterfeited, or altered documents.
5. Has assisted other people to illegally enter and/or exit the State or has provided other people with identification documents for the same purpose.
6. Is believed, on the basis of sufficient factual evidence, to have conspired with another person to have a false marriage.
7. Is relatively connected to the adopter because he/she is adopted the adopter; and he/she does not reside with the adopter after entering the State.
8. Has failed to pass a medical check for items designated by the central competent health authority. This provision does not apply to an applicant who is younger than the age of twenty (20).
9. Has been involved in activities or employment that is different from
the purposes of his or her entry.
10. Has overstayed a visit.
11. Refuses to attend an interview without justifiable reasons after he/she was notified legally.
12. Avoid, obstruct or refuse an investigation executed under Article 70 without justifiable reasons.
13. Other circumstances recognized and promulgated by the competent authorities.

If a person has been determined to be subject to any of Subparagraphs 1 to 8 of the preceding Paragraph after the permission for his/her residence, or after the permission for his/her residence, he/she is discovered that the information provided by him/her at the time of his/her application for residence is false or untrue, National Immigration Agency shall revoke the permission for his/her residence. If a person has been determined to be subject to any of Subparagraph 4 or Subparagraph 6, Paragraph 1 after the permission for his/her registered permanent residence, or after the permission for his/her registered permanent residence, he/she is discovered that the information provided by him/her at the time of his/her application for residence is false or untrue, the permission for his/her registered permanent residence shall be revoked or repealed. If the person has registered his/her permanent residence at a household registry, the household registry shall also revoke or repeal his/her registration.

With respect to any person whose residence permit or permanent residence permit is to be revoked or repealed pursuant to the provisions of the preceding two Paragraphs, the person’s residence permit or permanent residence permit shall be revoked or repealed within five (5) years starting from the time when National Immigration Agency determines to revoke or repeal his/her said permit; otherwise, his/her said permit shall be revoked or repealed.
within two (2) years starting from the time when he/she knows that
the said permit is to be revoked or repealed. This provision shall not
apply to the circumstances set forth in Subparagraph 4 or
Subparagraph 6 of Paragraph 1.
The period of the denial pursuant to Subparagraphs 9 and 10 of
Paragraph 1 shall be at least one (1) year from the day after his last
exit from the State and shall not exceed three (3) years.
Subparagraph 12, Paragraph 1 shall apply mutatis mutandis to the
circumstance that people of the Mainland Area, residents of Hong
Kong or residents of Macau apply for residence or registered
permanent residence in the Taiwan Area.26

Three points should be addressed here. First, circumstances
described in paragraph 1 suitably reflect the security concerns towards
the immigration. Second, the item 13 of the paragraph 1 preserves the
flexibility of administrative interpretation for any unexpected situation
already noted by the previous twelve items. Third, it is explicitly noted
that “Subparagraph 12, Paragraph 1 shall apply mutatis mutandis to the
circumstance that people of the Mainland Area, residents of Hong Kong
or residents of Macau apply for residence or registered permanent
residence in the Taiwan Area”. It simply reminds all the readers that the
“Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and
the Mainland Area” is the initial element for examining the security
concern of the migration across the Taiwan Strait. In other words, to
check with the terms noted in the Act is nothing but a necessary
condition to apprehend the whole issue but never good enough to be the
sufficient condition.
5. Conclusion

From reviewing all the legal terms listed in this paragraph, conditions and terms for governing cross-Strait migration by the Republic of China government on the Taiwan side reflecting the security concerns are quite transparent. Factors of the security calculus can also be easily identified. Actually, there are many plausible speculations and accusations towards cross-Strait migration activities though no solid evidentiary support had ever been found to prove these allegations. This kind of speculation may also extend to question other irrelevant cross-Strait agreements that would contain implicit immigration terms.27

As shown by the questions or concerns in the abstract of this paper, there are many imaginations and conjectures about cross-Strait migration but no firm indication can be available as the foundation for further discussion. One thing is for sure: there is no mainland immigrant ever involved in any espionage case to undermine the national security in Taiwan so far. This can either be a proof to justify the tight grip on cross-Strait immigration which is functioning perfectly well, or, on the other hand, be a counter-proof to show that the security concern on the Mainland immigrants was literally overstated. Likewise, it may be a question with no firm answer, either.

The logic of this paper will be readdressed in order to conclude the effort of research. Public sector needs to conduct administrative or judiciary actions according to legal establishment. If the security concerns towards any specific matter can be validated, then it should also acquire the momentum as the driving force to establish judiciary mechanism through legislative actions. The legal arrangements such as law, code, regulation, rule, and administrative order therefore may verify that the existence of the concern is serious enough to take substantial actions. Otherwise, void and plausible speculations cannot be adopted as the evidence to prove the existence of the security challenges within any
specific issue. Factors of Taiwan’s security calculus of cross-Strait migration can be suitably identified by examining all the judiciary arrangement established by the Republic of China government, and hence, can be recognized.

Notes

* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2014 International Conference on Asia-Pacific Studies, hosted by the National Sun Yat-sen University in Kaohsiung, Taiwan, Republic of China, on November 13-15, 2014. It was soon published by the Institute of PLA Research, FHK College, National Defense University, Taiwan, in a publication titled *2014 Essays of PLA Studies* in December 2014, after minor revision. The present text of this paper represents a new edition further revised from its progenitors noted above.

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engineering gained from the University of Colorado at Boulder in the United States, and a Doctorate in politics and international studies conferred by the University of Hull in the United Kingdom. Apart from the posts in the naval fleet, Dr Chang also attained the position of staff officer at various levels in the defense hierarchy. With nobility granted by the defense authority of the Republic of China, Dr Chang has been selected as the teaching staff in the Chinese Naval Command and Staff College as well as the War College of the ROC National Defense University (國防大學, Taoyuan City, Taiwan, ROC). Dr Chang also owns a honor to be the speech writer for the Defense Ministers of the Republic of China and in charge of the Office of Policy Coordination for the Defense Ministers for two years. Dr Chang has concluded his military career with the rank of navy captain five years ago, thus acquired a privilege called the “Honorable Citizen of the Republic of China”, and was invited by the ROC Society for Strategic Studies (中華戰略學會, Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) to be a research fellow. Further, Dr Chang is also an active columnist and Internet TV program host for commentary on strategic issues. <Email: chingchang@hotmail.com>


8. Act governing relations between the people of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area (*op. cit.*).


10. The Additional Articles of the Constitution of the Republic of China (*op. cit.*).


13. Ibid.
14. Act governing relations between the people of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area (op. cit.).
15. Article 16 (ibid.).
17. It was noticed by a foreign commentator with the following comment, “…the China factor will strongly influence Taiwan’s immigration policy. Current migration policy toward Chinese spouses and foreign spouses is discriminatory, and a strong pressure comes from China and domestic NGOs to have equal treatment between these two groups….”. Sullivan, Jonathan (2012). Taiwan’s immigration policy after 2012. Ballots & Bullets. School of Politics & International Relations, University of Nottingham. At: http://nottspolitics.org/2011/12/20/taiwans-immigration-policy-after-2012/ (data accessed time: 0900, May 7, 2015).
18. Article 17 (ibid.).
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. The same administrative rule is also known as the “Regulations governing permanent or temporary residence permission for the people from Mainland China”. Please see: No. 497, Interpretation of the Constitutional Court, Judicial Yuan, ROC (op. cit.). There is no official translation of this
governing regulation.


24. Commentator may only notice or address the first dividing line regarding national security, such as “Even when they are naturalized, they are suspected to be communist Chinese spies, and are not allowed to be civil servants within the first ten years of naturalization.”, said Jonathan Sullivan. Please see: Taiwan’s immigration policy after 2012 (op. cit.).


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China, Japan, and the United States in World War II: 
The Relinquishment of Unequal Treaties in 1943

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Abstract
This paper aims to examine how the United States transformed its foreign policy to promote China as an “equal state” in international politics during World War II, with focus on the process of the American relinquishment of its unequal treaties with China in 1943. In particular, it concentrates on analyzing the conflicts between the United States and Japan in the process of relinquishment. By examining the rivalry between the United States and Japan in the social warfare – propaganda – we can see that the relinquishment of the unequal treaties in 1943 not only marked a historical turning point in America’s China policy, but also had a great impact on the transformation of East Asian politics in World War II and its influence in the world politics.

Keywords: unequal treaty, extraterritoriality, propaganda, legal equality, Sino-American alliance, Sino-Japanese relations, nationalism

JEL classification: F51, F54, F55, F59
1. Introduction

World War II was one of the most monumental events in world history and was also the most significant event of the twentieth century. It was the largest and deadliest war ever fought in human history. Meantime, it marked the beginning of the end of colonialism. The issue of colonialism was one of the few major matters dividing the Allies and the Axis during the war. Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor and American entry into World War II in December 1941 led to changes in the overall direction of American foreign policy, particularly its policy toward China. Because of the war, the United States came to embrace a vision of a “strong” and “independent” China emerging in post-war Asia. How did this new policy emerge in the America’s global strategy?

For a long time, scholarship on U.S.-East Asian relations during World War II has concentrated on the complexity of political, economic, and military strategies while issues concerning the social and psychological warfare have been overlooked. In time of war, there is fighting, killing, violence, and hatred, all stirred up from within. War is no longer only between soldiers on a battlefield but between nations and their ideas. In order to make a whole nation of people support the war with mind and spirit, there needs to have influence. That influence is propaganda, a silent but formidable weapon. The widespread use of propaganda became an important practice during World War II. As many historians have pointed out, World War II witnessed the greatest propaganda battle in the history of warfare.¹

This paper aims to examine how the United States transformed its foreign policy to promote China as an “equal state” in international politics during World War II, with focus on the process of the American relinquishment of its unequal treaties with China in 1943. In particular, it concentrates on analyzing the conflicts between the United States and Japan in the process of relinquishment since Japan's factor in the

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relinquishment of the Powers’ unequal treaties in China has been overlooked. By examining the rivalry between the United States and Japan in the social warfare – propaganda – we can see that the relinquishment of the unequal treaties in 1943 not only marked a historical turning point in America’s China policy, but also had a great impact on the transformation of East Asian politics in World War II and its aftermath in the world politics.

2. Chinese Struggle for Legal Equality before 1941
The extraterritoriality system was established in China by the treaties followed the Opium War of 1842. The Qing (Ch’ing, 清) Dynasty signed the first unequal treaties under the Treaty of Nanking (南京條約) in 1842 with Great Britain during the First Opium War. Under the treaties, Great Britain established the British Supreme Court for China in Shanghai. Under the most-favored-nation clause contained in the existing treaties, all of the foreign Powers operating in China were permitted to seek the same concessions of China that Great Britain achieved by force. As a result, France, Russia, the United States, and Japan all signed treaties with China and enjoyed the same privileges. The agreements reached between the Western Powers and China following the Opium Wars came to be known as the unequal treaties since in practice they gave foreigners privileged status and extracted concessions from the Chinese. Foreign Powers’ extraterritorial rights, whereby foreign nationals in China were immune from Chinese law, increased China’s semi-colonial status.

Chinese desire for the abolition of the unequal treaties with the Powers had a long history. Since the establishment of the Chinese National government by Dr Sun Yat-sen (孫逸仙/孫中山) in 1911, it had been one of the most important political goals for the Nationalist
government in international politics. After World War I and the Washington Conference of 1921-1922, the issue of extraterritoriality became the focus of Chinese nationalists because it damaged China’s sovereignty. The Nationalist government negotiated with the foreign Powers to revise the treaties, but Chinese efforts did not succeed. To convince China’s determination, the Nationalist government opened negotiations for the abolition of extraterritoriality with the Powers in 1929. The United States and Britain both demanded evidence that China had actually improved its judicial system and that the rights of foreigners in China were properly protected. Only after that, they would be willing to gradually rescind extraterritorial rights. Finally the Chinese government proclaimed unilaterally that all foreign jurisdictional rights in China would be terminated on December 31, 1929, which caused the resentment of the foreign Powers. Furthermore, on December 23, 1933, the Nationalist government informed the United States that the Sino-American Commercial Treaty of 1903 should be revised. The American government expressed its willingness to deal with the treaty issues, but no real progress was made and negotiations ended almost as soon as they had begun. Soon after, the Chinese government continued to negotiate with the United States about American extraterritorial rights and related privileges in China; these efforts, however, were not successful.

The efforts of the Chinese government never ended, but the result was far beyond expectations. After the outbreak of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident (盧溝橋事變 / 七七事變) on July 7, 1937, the Chinese Nationalist government evacuated Nanjing (Nanking) and moved westward to Chongqing in 1938. Although there was no declaration of war, China clearly had the sympathy of the United States and Britain. The two governments continued to recognize the government at Chongqing, under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石), as the government of China, despite the fact that it retained
control only over the southwestern part of the country. With regard to the Chinese demand for the revision of the unequal treaties, the United States considered the exercise and continuance of extraterritoriality and other similar privileges in China to be increasingly useful after Japan’s large-scale aggression in China. In December 1937, U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull expressed his view clearly that the American government should complete its responsibilities and obligations in China. He held the opinion that the presence of American armed units to protect American nationals in China had become more necessary than ever before because the situation in China was rapidly deteriorating. In particular, Hull stated that at the moment to withdraw American troops in China “would appear like abandoning China to her fate.”

On the other hand, Japan began to utilize extraterritorial rights in its newly occupied areas as a means to attack the Western Powers to exclude their forces involved in these regions. After establishing two puppet regimes in northern and central China, on December 22, 1938, Japanese Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro (近衛文麿) stated in the Imperial Diet that Japan not only respected “China’s sovereignty”, but also was willing to “take an active measure to proceed with the issues concerning the abolition of extraterritoriality and the rendition of concessions and settlements, which would be necessary for the recognition of China’s independence.” Furthermore, on January 26, 1939, Japanese Foreign Minister Arita Hachirō (有田八郎) clarified in the Imperial Diet that Japan was considering “abolishing extraterritorial rights with the new government of China.”

On March 30, 1940, Wang Jing-wei (汪精衛) escaped to Shanghai, which was under Japan’s military control, and this action finally resulted in a new puppet regime – “the National Government of the Republic of China” in Nanjing. On November 30, Japan officially recognized that Wang Jing-wei regime was “the only
government of China”. According to Article VIII of the Sino-Japanese Treaty signed in November 1940, Japan announced that it would “abolish extraterritorial rights possessed by Japan in China and make concessions to the Chinese government.”10

As soon as Japan recognized the Wang puppet regime, the United States responded vigorously by aiding Chiang Kai-shek through the lend-lease project. With regard to extraterritorial rights in China, the attitude of the American government underwent a subtle change. In April 1941, when Chinese Foreign Minister Guo Tai-qi (Quo Tai-chi, 郭泰祺) arrived in Washington he expressed the strong Chinese desire for abrogation of extraterritoriality and requested that the United States take the initiative to “abolish the unequal treaties and complement an agreement based on mutual interests and equality” with China.11 On May 13, 1941, Hull made an announcement that the American government would not change its policy of surrendering extraterritoriality in China because “the time had not come to dispense with the protection that American forces stand ready to accord to American citizens there.”12 On May 26, Chinese Foreign Minister Guo Tai-qi reiterated the stance of the Nationalist government that Chinese people intended to terminate the unequal treaties. He stated that China believed in “non-discrimination in international commercial relations” and Chinese people demanded “in the broad principles of cooperation and equality.”13 On May 31, Hull stated that the American government understood “China’s aspirations for readjustment of anomalies in its international relations” and promised that the United States would solve this matter with the Chinese government when “conditions of peace again prevail” in China.14

Compared with the ambiguous attitude announced before, this policy was rather more progressive, at least it shows that the United States was willing to solve the unequal treaty issue although it was limited only to a special period after the restoration of peace in China.
As the war developed in Europe and Asia, the attitude of the American government towards independent self-government became much more explicit than ever before. On August 14, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill signed the Atlantic Charter, in which the two governments proclaimed that they respected the right of all peoples who “wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived to them” after the war.\textsuperscript{15} The charter set forth the concepts of self-determination, end of colonialism, freedom of the seas, and the improvement of living and working conditions for all people and became a public declaration of war aims of the Allies during World War II. However, how to respect the right of all peoples who “wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived to them” was considerably equivocal for the United States and Britain. Japan’s sudden attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, led to a transformation of America’s China policy.

3. Transformation of Powers’ Attitude Toward China

Pearl Harbor strengthened the tie of a new relationship between China, the United States and Great Britain. As soon as the United States entered the war in December 1941, an alliance between China and the United States was established. The day after the attack, China, together with the United States and Great Britain, declared war on Japan. This special wartime alliance between the two countries resulted in a crucial transformation of America’s policy in East Asia.
3.1. A Special Sino-American Alliance

In the early part of the war, the United States adopted a “Europe First Policy”. This policy implied that the war in Asia was secondary to America’s global strategy. President Roosevelt continued to focus his attention on the war in Europe, persisted in his belief that Germany was the greatest danger and Britain his most important ally. Notwithstanding, Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor altered American concerns and forced the United States to focus on the war in Asia. China was allotted the role of keeping Japan busy until the major task was completed in Europe. Thus, the wartime strategy of the United States was to tie China into the war as tightly as possible.

For the United States, China’s importance was twofold. The United States intended to make full use of Chinese resistance forces to fight against Japanese aggression. Meanwhile, from the perspective of America’s own military strategy, bases on the Chinese mainland would permit American bombers to strike Japan. Admiral Harry E. Yarnell, former Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet, testified before the House Committee that the Chinese mainland was “the only area from which long-bombers can reach Japan”. This led to the conclusion that Allied success against Japan required the continued participation of China in the war.

In doing so, the United States attempted to support China. Politically, one of the most important measures taken was to support China’s participation in international affairs, recognizing China as a “Great Power” in world politics. This strategy emerged in the spring of 1942. On May 2, 1942, President Roosevelt declared that “in the future an unconquerable China will play its proper role in maintaining peace and prosperity not only in Eastern Asia but in the whole world.” Soon after, in discussions with Soviet Foreign Minister V.M. Molotov in late May, Roosevelt further reiterated the significance of post-war
cooperation among the “four policemen”, which included China together with the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{18}

The newly established alliance, however, could not alter unequal relations between China and the Allied Powers in international politics. In many ways, China was an unequal ally to the United States and Britain. One outstanding feature of this inequality is the fact that the United States and Britain still exercised over China rights accrued from the unequal treaties which China had been forced to sign a century ago. The unequal treaties provided extraterritoriality, the opening of foreign trade of treaty ports, in some of which were even demarcations of areas directly administrated by foreigners, foreign control over the Chinese customs tariff, foreign possession of based territories, the stationing of foreign navigation along the coast and inland waterways in Chinese territory.\textsuperscript{19}

After America’s entry into the war, legal discrimination against Chinese was brought to the attention of American public, in particular to the concern of pro-China intellectuals. Pearl S. Buck (赛珍珠), for example, America’s first female Noble Prize winner, who spent most of her life in China and was known as the most influential Westerner to write about China since Marco Polo,\textsuperscript{20} emerged as one of the strongest wartime defenders of freedom and equality for the Chinese people. For instance, on March 14, 1942, addressing the celebration of India-China Friendship Day in New York, Buck urged her audience that “our democracy has been marred by imperialism” because we did not treaty our Asian allies equally.\textsuperscript{21} Approximately two weeks later, on March 26, in a radio address, Buck repeatedly denounced American discrimination against the Chinese and pointed out that “China will fight for the Allied cause as long as that cause is a truly democratic one and will give real freedom and human equality to all peoples.”\textsuperscript{22}
On the other hand, Chinese demands for abolition of the unequal treaties emerged. Typical of these voices was Madame Chiang Kai-Shek’s. On April 23, 1942, Soong May-ling (宋美齡 ), Chinese First Lady, who was educated in the United States, published an article in The New York Times condemning the evils of the extraterritorial rights of Western Powers in China and pointed out that “the Westerners must change their attitudes towards China” and “give Chinese real freedom which is based on principles of equality.”

Immediately these voices, particularly Madame Chiang Kai-Shek’s demand, aroused awareness in the State Department. Two days later, on April 25, Secretary of State Hull discussed with British Ambassador Edward Halifax in Washington and exchanged their views on extraterritorial issues and related rights in China because Madame Chiang’s articles, which were considered “China’s state papers” in the American press, extremely criticized the Western Powers’ extraterritorial system in China. Having exchanging views with Britain, the State Department concluded that negotiation with the Chinese government would not be taken up at the moment until peace was restored in China.

This policy became the dominant tone in the American government. Early in 1942, Maxwell M. Hamilton, Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, gave the following four reasons for not abandoning American extraterritorial rights and related privileges. First, the United States had promised the Chinese government its readiness to abolish extraterritoriality after the war ended. Second, because of the Japanese military occupation, extraterritoriality could no longer be put into practice. At this moment, if the United States decided to abolish the extraterritorial rights in China, it meant “nothing but a gesture conceived in and manifesting weakness” of the United States. Third, under a period of unsettled conditions, there would be a special need for American nationals to have the protection accorded by extraterritorial rights.
Fourth, when the war was over the United States would deal with the Chinese government in accordance with what the American government needed, and retention of extraterritorial and related rights could give the United States a “bargaining factor of some importance”. Finally, Hamilton concluded that there would be “more to be lost than gained by abolishing extraterritoriality now” and insisted on revision of treaties with China “after the termination of hostilities in the light of conditions then prevailing”. Nevertheless, he pointed out that the United States was fighting not only for self-preservation but also for human rights and democracy, as well as for greater equality in the general political, economic, and social systems that had previously existed. Relinquishment of extraterritoriality would explicitly manifest the war aims of the Allies. Therefore, Hamilton suggested that the United States take the initiative in setting up a small committee to do some preparatory work toward the drafting of a suitable treaty with the Chinese government in the “not too distant future”.

In addition, Stanley K. Hornbeck, Adviser on Political Relations in the State Department, agreed with Hamilton’s proposal and insisted that “there was no special need for special action on our part in support of Chinese morale or by way of conciliating the Chinese” at the moment. In particular, he emphasized that there were no good reasons and necessities for the United States to play “this China card” during the wartime. “There may come a time when we will need a card and when it would be advantageous for us to have this card and opportunity for us to play it,” he said, “We should make such preparations as would put us in position to move promptly and well if, when and as occasion arises.”

In the meantime, in response to Madame Chiang Kai-shek’s demand, the British government was also taking into account the same matter. On May 12, 1942, British Ambassador Halifax called on Hull in Washington and requested American collaboration to proceed with their
extraterritorial rights in China since Madame Chiang Kai-shek continued to publish articles in the American press strongly condemning the extraterritorial system. Eventually, the two governments reached the conclusion that “the present time would not be favorable” for them to abolish extraterritoriality in China. Furthermore, in June 1942, American Ambassador John G. Winant in London discussed this matter again with Antony Eden, British Foreign Minister. The two governments reached a conclusion that it was not “an opportune time” for abolishing their extraterritorial rights in China. However, Japan’s challenge to the interests of the Allied Powers in the occupied areas led to the United States to alter its policy and began to play this “China card”.

3.2. Rise of Chinese Nationalism and the Japanese Propaganda Campaign

Soon after the outbreak of the Pacific War, another front, which used propaganda, started. On this battlefield to establish a new world order, the conflicts between the United States and Japan became aggravated as the war developed. Even before the war broke out, Japan had targeted Western imperialism, appealing to other Asian countries to cooperate with Japan to construct an “Asia for the Asians”.

Five days after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Japan began to call the war “the Greater East Asia War” and proclaimed that its war purpose was to “overthrow the American and British imperialists who have oppressed and squeezed one billion Asians to establish an ideal order of co-prosperity and co-existence in East Asia”. Meanwhile, Japanese propagandists utilized “psychological weaponry”, emphasizing the discriminatory policy and the unequal treaties, to fight against Roosevelt’s Four Freedom, from which racial equality was excluded.
To reinforce the propaganda effect, in February 1942, with the guidance of the Japanese army, FRONT, one of the most important wartime propaganda magazines, began publication, condemning Western imperialism in Asia. “Asia must be one,” It propagated, “When Asia becomes one, a new order of co-prosperity will be born in the Greater East Asia.” Meantime, an article entitled “A New Step towards Emancipation of Asian Peoples” came out in another wartime propaganda magazine, Toa Kaihou (Tō-a Kaihō, 東亜解放) [emancipation of East Asia], which proclaimed that the essence of “injustice and inequality” was rooted in the exploitation by the Western Powers of Asian peoples. Later, in June 1942, a series of “Open Letters to Asian Peoples” continuously came out in Japanese newspaper, the Asahi Shimbun (朝日新聞), in which exploitation and oppression of Asians by the European Powers were severely denounced. In another editorial, “Shake Hands – Japan and China”, on June 25 of the same year, the author saw hypocrisy in the Allied democracies and appealed to the Chinese to “share hardship” with the Japanese in this war for “China’s independence and freedom”. Japan’s propagandists characterized America’s “equality” as a sham, with the United States discriminating against the Chinese in its immigration laws. This accusation had been mostly true at the time since Chinese people were not allowed to enter American shores.

Japan’s campaign of “Asia for the Asians” aroused an immediate response from its agents in China. Before the coming of the 100th anniversary of the Treaty of Nanking, the ratification of the first unequal treaty between China and the Western Powers in 1842, various anti-Anglo-American campaigns took place in the Japanese-occupied areas. On August 10, Lin Bo-sheng (林柏生), Minister of Propaganda of the Wang Jing-wei puppet regime, issued a radio address: “From the Opium War to the Greater East Asia War”. “Our Chinese have had deep hatred...
towards British and American imperialists after the Opium War,” he addressed his audience, “Now it is a crucial moment for us to liberate East Asia from Western oppression and remove this humiliation.”36 To reinforce Chinese determination to cooperate with Japan, the Wang puppet regime declared a special week, which started from August 23 to 29, to batter the sins of Western imperialism in order to “wake up Asian peoples to kick out the Anglo-American imperialists in the Greater East Asia War”.37

The anti-Allied propaganda was highlighted in late August in the Japanese-occupied areas. On August 29, on the 100th anniversary of the ratification of the Treaty of Nanking, the Wang Jing-wei regime in Nanjing convened a momentous mass rally. At the meeting Wang Jing-wei, Chairman of the Nanjing regime, condemned the evils of the unequal treaties and highly extolled Japanese achievements in assisting the Chinese to “overthrow the oppression of the Western imperialism”. Furthermore, Wang appealed to the Chinese, uniting with the Japanese, to “expel all the Western imperialists from Asia” in order to “vitalize East Asia”.38 With the resurgence of Chinese nationalism, a tremendous anti-Anglo-American movement, known as “Down with Anglo-American Imperialism” prevailed in the Japanese-occupied areas.

3.3. A Shift of America’s Policy toward China

Immediately Japan’s propaganda weapon to utilize the unequal treaties to batter the Allied Powers raised American concern. On May 18, 1942, an article entitled “Exclusion and Extraterritoriality” came out in Contemporary China. The author denounced the racial discrimination against the Chinese in American legislation and the evils of extraterritorial rights in China and demanded that “the era of the unjust system” toward China must “come to an end”.39 In order to silence
Japanese propaganda, on August 10, another article entitled “This Is No Racial War” was published, which clamored for freedom and equality for “all the oppressed races and nations”. The author stressed the significance of terminating unequal treaties to counteract Japanese propaganda which was impeding America’s good relations with China, American ally in East Asia.40

In response to the increasing demand of abolition of extraterritoriality, on August 13, Roger S. Greene, a former U.S. diplomat in China, wrote to his friend Stanley Hornbeck, requesting that the State Department concern itself with this issue since it would “help to convince some doubters in Asia that we really do mean that the Atlantic Charters shall apply to the Far East as much as Europe.”41

In addition, on August 17, Senator Elbert D. Thomas, a member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, urged Congress to abolish the unequal treaties with China since it would be advantageous for the United States to establish a new partnership with the Chinese people and to win the war quickly. He addressed the Senate:

As a war measure, the United States and Great Britain should say to China that they renounce their extraterritorial rights. I cannot conceive why we should wait until peace comes to negotiate an extraterritorial agreement with China, when the Japanese have rushed us, and the Chinese with us, as the British, and practically all the extraterritorial law, out of China at the present time … I know of no better time to renounce our rights than on August 29, 100 years after the imposition of the Opium War Treaty.42

In light of growing popular sentiment in favor of action toward abolition, the State Department decided to consider the extraterritorial issues in China. Since Hull insisted on “a common interest” among the
Allied Powers, he suggested cooperating with Great Britain. On August 27, Hull discussed with British Ambassador Halifax possible abrogation of extraterritoriality. The American and British governments conceded to conclude brief treaties with China, which would provide for abolition of extraterritorial rights. On September 5, Hull urged Winant in London to convince the British government to take an affirmative step in the matter of abolition. The United States insisted that this strategy would accomplish the following three principle objectives. First, it would have psychological and political benefits to the cause of the Allied Powers, which would be of concrete assistance to China and strengthen the determination of the Chinese war efforts. Second, it would eliminate an existing anomaly in relations with China. Third, it would enable the United States to earn Chinese trust in the post-war era. The United States put heavy pressure on the British government to relinquish its extraterritoriality to improve relations between the three countries. Finally, the British government agreed to abolish its extraterritorial rights in China. Both the governments decided to inform the Chinese government on October 10, the National Day of the Republic of China, when they would abolish their extraterritorial rights and related privileges in China and issued common statements in the press in the three countries in order to strengthen the propaganda effect.

This new gesture of the Allied Powers won great enthusiasm from the Chinese government. On October 9, President Roosevelt informed Chiang Kai-shek that the United States would rescind the unequal treaties with China. Chiang, greatly moved by this unexpected action, sent a telegram to Roosevelt immediately: “Certainly, it will bolster the morale of our Chinese people to fight against Japanese aggression bravely.” He added, “Any other action cannot compare with the abolition of the unequal treaties.” Subsequently, in a radio address, Chiang stated that the abolition was not only “an important milestone in the
history of the revival of the Chinese nation,” but was also “a brilliant
lighthouse erected by Britain and America to guild a great progress on
the road toward freedom and equality for all mankind.” 47 The U.S.
Ambassador in Chongqing, Clarence Gauss, reported to the State
Department on the Chinese enthusiasm for the abolition and stated that
this Anglo-American strategy would be “a blow to Japanese propaganda
efforts”. 48

Notwithstanding the propaganda effect of the Allied Powers far
exceeding their expectations, little progress was made in negotiations.
The United States had drafted a brief agreement before the
announcement was issued. It mainly consisted of the following articles:
relinquishment of extraterritorial rights; abrogation of the Sino-
American Treaty of 1901, also called the Boxer Protocol; and return of
the International Settlements at Shanghai and Amoy to China, etc. 49 The
State Department began to negotiate with the British government for this
draft treaty.

Since Britain enjoyed more privileges than any other Power in
China except Japan, it was cautious about each word of the draft. The
British government agreed to relinquish its extraterritorial rights, but it
considered the American draft “unwise” because it included “many
restrictive provisions designed to safeguard American interests” in China
and requested a revision to defend their rights. 50 After amendments to
the draft, the American and British governments began to negotiate with
the Chinese government.

During the negotiation, Chiang Kai-shek told T.V. Soong (Soong
Tse-ven/Soong Tzu-wen, 宋子文), Chinese Foreign Minister, “All
unequal treaties must be completely abolished apart from extraterritorial
rights.” 51 The unequal treaties included extraterritoriality, special
commercial and other rights in relation to inland navigation and
cabotage privileges enjoyed by American naval vessels in Chinese
territorial waters, American and British nationals in China, and the issues of British colony in Hong Kong, etc. The Chinese government prepared for a draft treaty which focused on abolishing all special privileges enjoyed by American and British nationals in China. The American and the British governments agreed to rescind their extraterritorial rights. However, as to other special rights and interests involved in China, various problems and conflicts surfaced. The United States persisted in maintaining privileges for its nationals such as real property and “impartial treatment” for its nationals; Britain insisted on “non-discrimination” against its nationals in international commerce and business and firmly refused to negotiate issues of Hong Kong.\textsuperscript{52} It was at this moment that an invisible war between the Allied Powers and Japan started.

4. Japan’s Challenge to the Allied Order

In October 1942, with the rapid increase of Chinese nationalism, the Allied Powers decided to abolish their extraterritoriality and related rights in China. At approximately the same time, Japan attempted to use this unusual opportunity for another propaganda offensive on the ideological battlefront and began to adjust its China policy.

In August 1942, when the Chinese nationalist movement known as “Down with Anglo-American Imperialism” prevailed in the Japanese-occupied areas, Shigemitsu Mamoru (重光葵), Japanese Ambassador in Nanjing, sent a confidential telegram to the Foreign Ministry on August 17. He gave a detailed description of the rise of Chinese nationalism and urged his government to “catch this golden opportunity” for an offensive against the Allies. “To abolish the unequal treaties,” he suggested, “would have a great value for our future.”\textsuperscript{53} The key point of this new China policy proposed by Shigemitsu was to recognize “China’s
independence and sovereignty”.

Soon after, the Japanese Foreign Ministry accepted Shigemitsu’s proposal. On August 19, Japan decided to abolish the unequal treaties with the Wang Jing-wei regime. The Japanese government considered that the abolition could have three advantageous effects. First, the abolition of the unequal treaties, the first step in the Western invasion of East Asia, would give Japan “a psychological success”. Second, Japanese conquest of Hong Kong, a British colony in East Asia, would have great political value for the campaign of “Asia for the Asians”. Third, Japan could use this abolition to condemn the double standards of the Allied call for democracy and freedom.

Japan’s policy immediately won enthusiasm from the Wang puppet regime. In his address on August 29, Wang Jing-wei expressed his “great gratitude” for Japan’s action and appealed to “four hundred million Chinese, uniting with the Japanese, to fight for ultimate victory in the Greater East Asia War.” Moreover, Japan paid great attention to the Allies’ action on extraterritoriality. When news of the official announcements issued by the United States and Great Britain came out on October 10, 1942, the Japanese government concerned itself with the issues relating to the “abolition of Japan’s special privileges” and giving the Chinese “equality” and “independence”. On October 15, the Japanese consulate in Beijing sent a confidential telegram to the Foreign Ministry, requesting the government to abolish extraterritorial rights since “it would greatly benefit our campaign for the liberation of East Asia” and would have “immense propaganda value to attack the Allied Powers.”

To escape from the deteriorating situation in China, the Japanese government insisted that abolition would be increasingly necessary to “obtain Chinese cooperation and enhance Chinese morale in the Greater East Asia War”. On November 10, Japan decided to abolish
extraterritorial rights and related privileges in China and began to implement a new strategy – “China’s entry into the Greater East Asia War”. Subsequently, negotiations between Japan and the Wang regime were carried out in extreme secrecy.

By late November, a draft treaty was completed in Japan. In “A Policy of China’s Entry into the Greater East Asia War”, the Japanese government decided to “catch a very proper political opportunity to force China to declare war on the Allies”. With respect to the significance of Japan’s strategy, the Foreign Ministry prepared a detailed policy of propaganda for the abolition. This strategy focused on “the great influence and political effect towards peoples in ‘the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere’ and those who were oppressed by American and British imperialists in the world”.

In order to bolster Chinese morale for entry into “the Greater East Asia War”, Wang Jing-wei was invited to visit Japan on December 20, 1942. In a conversation with Wang the next day, Japanese Prime Minister Tojo Hideki (東條英機) expressed his “great sympathy for the Chinese people” who were oppressed by British and American imperialists for over one hundred years. Tojo requested the Chinese, cooperating with the Japanese, to contribute themselves to the construction of the “Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere” (Dai-tō-a Kyōeikan, 大東亜共榮圈). Wang reaffirmed the Chinese commitment to “share hardship” with Japan. He also expressed Chinese determination to contribute to the war, to fight with Japan together. Tojo “gladly accepted Wang’s proposal.” In regard to the date of “China’s entry in the Greater East Asia War”, they decided that the best opportunity would be late January 1943.

While Japan and the Wang regime undertook their preparatory work for a new treaty, the United States and Britain were also negotiating with Chiang Kai-shek’s government. Negotiations between China and the
United States were being undertaken smoothly. However, negotiations between China and Britain confronted barriers and finally had to be suspended in late December 1942 since Britain would not give up some special commercial interests in China. Furthermore, Britain sternly refused to deal with the issues concerning the future of Hong Kong. On December 29, the British government informed the State Department that it was “highly regrettable” that Britain was unable to reach an agreement with the Chinese government. Since the United States insisted on signing a new treaty at approximately the same hour with Britain, the original American plan, which the United States and Great Britain had intended to announce publicly to abolish the unequal treaties with China on January 1, 1943, had to be postponed. However, it was at this moment that another unexpected incident occurred.

The reactions from the public in China were immediate and favorable. To the Chinese, it was a historic event to abolish the unequal treaties with the Western Powers. It had been one of the most important objectives for the Chinese government in international relations since the Republic of China was established in 1911. Therefore, within the process of preparatory work for a new treaty, the Chinese government paid great attention to the political effect of abolition and was vigorously preparing for its propaganda value in order to enhance China’s position in world politics, though this action was undertaken in secrecy. However, the Allies’ abolition strategy, which was considered “top secret”, was revealed suddenly.

The incident occurred before the coming of a new year. On December 27, 1942, an editorial entitled “Salute to President Roosevelt” came out in Zhongyang Ribao (中央日报), official newspaper of Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist government. The author expressed China’s great gratitude for the American lend-lease project, which financially had supported the Chinese people to fight against Japanese
aggression, and surprised his readers by reporting that “new agreements to relinquish unequal treaties with the United States and Great Britain will be signed on January 1, 1943.” The news spread quickly. Chiang Kai-shek was extremely embarrassed when the United States criticized the Chinese government for the leak of the news. Immediately, Tao Bai-chuang, chief editor of Zhongyang Ribao, was discharged.65

Nevertheless, this unexpected incident provided Japanese propagandists with a golden chance for an offensive on the ideological battlefront. The failure of the Allied Powers to renounce the unequal treaties on January 1, 1943, accelerated Japan’s preparatory work to conclude a new treaty with the Wang Jing-wei regime. On January 3, 1943, Japanese Ambassador Shigemitsu called on Wang Jing-wei. During their conversations, Shigemitsu obtained information that the United States was dealing with the abolition of extraterritorial rights with Chiang Kai-shek’s government. Immediately, he sent a confidential telegram to the Foreign Ministry, requesting his government to “maximize the political effect of abolishing extraterritorial rights as soon as possible.” Immediately, the Japanese government accepted his proposal and was actively preparing for an agreement with the Wang Jing-wei regime. On January 5, Shigemitsu negotiated with Wang Jing-wei and requested China’s immediate action to “enter into the Greater East Asia War”. Wang accepted Shigemitsu’s proposal. The next day an official announcement to “Declare War on the Allies” was completed by the Wang Jing-wei regime.67

In addition, Japan further accelerated its preparatory work to conclude a new treaty with the Wang Jing-wei regime. On January 7, Shigemitsu, Japanese Ambassador in Nanjing, sent a new proposal to the Foreign Ministry, in which he suggested moving the agreement to an earlier date. “If our announcement is later than the United States,” he urged his government, “it would be completely disadvantageous to our
strategy.”68 Having considering the political, and especially propaganda value and significance of China’s entry into the war, the Japanese government decided to reach a new treaty with the Wang Jing-wei regime in advance. On January 8, as soon as Shigemitsu informed his government that the preparatory work for a new treaty in Nanjing had been completed, the Japanese Imperial Diet decided to conclude a new treaty with the Wang puppet regime immediately.69

On January 9, 1943, Wang Jing-wei and Shigemitsu Mamoru signed the Sino-Japanese Agreement in Nanjing, which stipulated that Japan would relinquish its extraterritorial rights in China. At approximately the same time, Wang Jing-wei issued an announcement that China had declared war on the United States and Great Britain. After signing the treaty, Wang and Tojo made a radio address in the two countries simultaneously, saying the two governments would “cooperate and fight against Anglo-American imperialists who squeezed one billion Asian peoples in order to eradicate the calamity caused by Anglo-American imperialism” and “devoted ourselves to the peace of the world.”70

Japan’s action surprised the Allies. Having heard the news, Chiang Kai-shek wrote in his diary on January 10, “It is deeply regrettable that our treaty was postponed.” He added, “A new treaty will be concluded soon, but its effect would no longer be significant.” Meantime, Chiang showed his great frustration and realized China’s real status in international politics.71 Subsequently, on January 11, 1943, at Washington D.C., Secretary of State Cordell Hull, representing the United States, and Wei Tao-ming (魏道明), Ambassador of the Chinese Nationalist government, signed a new treaty abolishing American extraterritorial rights in China and a number of related privileges. Simultaneously a similar treaty was reached in Chongqing by Sir Horace James Seymour, British Ambassador to China, and Dr. T.V. Soong, Chinese Foreign Minister. For the first time since extraterritoriality had
been introduced a hundred years ago, a regime of legal inequality existed between China and the foreign Powers was removed. Briefly, the terms of the Sino-American treaty are follows:

- Article I abrogates all those provisions of previous Sino-American treaties which authorized the United States to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction in China.
- Article II relinquishes special rights accorded to the United States under the “Boxer Protocol” of 1901, including the right to station troops in China and rights in the diplomatic quarter in Beijing. However, it makes provision for the continued use by the American government for official purposes of the land in the diplomatic quarter which was allotted it in according with the Protocol, and upon which stand buildings belonging to the United States.
- Article III provides for the cessation of American rights in the international settlements at Shanghai and Amoy, and states that the United States considers that the settlements should revert to Chinese control and administration.
- Article IV makes provision for the protection of existing rights or titles of American nationals to real property in China, but such property is to be subject to Chinese laws and taxation.
- Article V accords Americans in China rights to travel, reside, and carry on trade throughout China, and provides for nondiscriminatory treatment by each country of the nationals of the other.
- Article VI accords for consular privileges and functions normal under international law, as opposed to the special privileges and functions hitherto enjoyed by American consuls in China.
- Article VII states that the two countries will enter into negotiations for the conclusion of a comprehensive treaty of “friendship, commerce, navigation and consular rights” within six months after the war ends. The new treaty should be based upon the principles of international law.
and practice.
• Article VIII provides for the ratification of the treaty and the exchange of ratifications, and for the treaty’s entry into force on the day of the exchange.

In an accompanying exchange of notes, the United States relinquished special rights in relation to inland navigation and cabotage and special rights enjoyed by American naval vessels in Chinese territorial waters. In all, the new treaty gave up all provisions of treaties or agreements which authorized the United States to exercise jurisdiction over its nationals in China. In addition, it terminated the Unites States’ rights in the international settlements of Shanghai and Amoy, and U.S. special rights of navigation and naval police in the coastal and inland waters of China.72

5. Conclusion
The abolition of unequal treaties by the Powers in China in 1943 ushered in a new era in China’s relations with foreign countries. It not only terminated abnormal relations that had existed between China and the Powers for a century, but also marked the moment that China took its first step toward legal equality and independence in international relations. Most significantly, it indicated the emergence of an independent and sovereign China in world politics. In this sense, the abolition was an epoch-making event in Chinese history.

Nevertheless, this first step was made in another unequal situation. It is obvious if we review the motives and intentions of the United States and Japan during the process of abolition. Superficially, the Powers did lose some privileges by the abolition. However, it should be noted that those privileges actually were not effective or could not be put into practice because of Japan’s conquest of China. Japan, unquestionably,
gained more than it lost by its military occupation of China.

Therefore, abolition itself did not mean that the Powers had no intention of maintaining their special rights or interests in China. On the contrary, it was for more political interests that the Powers renounced their unequal treaties with China. U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull wrote in his Memoirs later that the abrogation of the unequal treaties would be advantageous in weakening Britain’s dominant position in China so that America’s influence in East Asia could be maintained in the post-war era.\(^{73}\)

To Japan, the renouncement of the unequal treaties was indeed a symbolic gesture. In fact, after Japan’s large-scale invasion of China in 1937, most areas in China occupied by foreign Powers were under Japanese domination. The abolition itself reflected Japan’s ambition to subjugate China. Thus, Japan’s abolition strategy became an indispensable means for the further conquest of China. In sum, abolition became a necessary method for both the United States and Japan to enhance their political capitals in East Asia, especially in regard to seeking hegemonic position in the post-war world.

However, Japan’s propaganda value was tremendous. For almost a century, the foreign concessions and settlements had existed as visible evidence for the Chinese of Western dominance and of limitations of China’s sovereignty. Japan proclaimed that with their help, Wang Jingwei had achieved a Chinese objective which Chiang Kai-shek, with all his allies of the Western democracies, had never been able to accomplish.\(^ {74}\) Japan’s action was further fortified by the cooperation of its European allies. On January 14, 1943, the Italian government notified the Wang Jingwei regime of its intention to renounce Italian extraterritoriality in China. The Vichy government of France declared its relinquishment of extraterritorial rights in China on February 23, 1943.
Soon after, in a series of treaties negotiated between 1943 and 1947, the Nationalist government of China regained jurisdiction over the nationals of Belgium and Luxembourg, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland. Subsequently, China ended a century of legal inequality and semi-colonialism.

As a matter of fact, it was not a simple matter for China to readjust its political and economic relations with the Powers. As soon as the war was over, the United States immediately concluded a new agreement with Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist government in which some American special privileges in China were guaranteed again. The Chinese people had to endure many further hardships while struggling for non-discriminatory treatment in international politics, such as in American immigration legislation.75

Notes

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32. *Toa Kaihou* [emancipation of East Asia], February 1942, p. 62.


34. *Asahi Shimbun*, June 25, 1942.

36. *Zhonghua Ribao* [Central China daily], August 10, 1942.


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48. The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State (Hull), October 12, 1942, FRUS, 1942, pp. 311-312.
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50. Ibid., pp. 301-302.
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China’s Outward FDI in Africa: 
Enterprises with Different Ownership Types+

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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the consequences of China’s outward direct investments in Africa in terms of enterprises with different ownership types. First, this paper contributes to the examination of a large number of Chinese enterprises’ investment projects in Africa. Second, in addition to the investment activities of central state-owned enterprises, investment activities initiated by local state-owned enterprises and private enterprises are also addressed in this paper. Third, this paper demonstrates the diversity of Chinese investment in Africa through the discussion of a large number of cases. We find that the motives of central state-owned enterprises comply with government
policies. However, most private enterprises and non-central state-owned enterprises invest in Africa for profit considerations. This paper concludes that China’s investments in Africa are diverse and complex and cannot be explained using a single model of the extant theories.

**Keywords:** China, outward FDI, Africa, state-owned enterprises, private enterprises

**JEL classification:** F21, F35, F54, G11

1. Introduction

As a country associated with sustained economic growth, China’s direct investment in Africa has developed rapidly in recent years. In particular, because of its implementation of the “going global” strategy and accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), China’s direct investment activities in Africa have accelerated and caused widespread concerns about institutional changes in African countries. On one hand, China’s imbalances in trade and economic relations with Africa have replicated the asymmetrical relationships between the continent and Western colonists in past decades. In essence, China’s economic activities in Africa are the same as those engaged in by Western colonists. Those countries treated Africa as a supplier of natural resources and a consumer of industrial products (Brooks, 2007: 1-5; De Oliveira, 2008; Tull, 2006). However, because of China’s politically non-interventionist stance that includes investment without preconditions, there are arguments that the African countries that have forged economic and trade relations with China have little incentive to improve their political governance mechanisms (Brooks, 2007; Obiorah, 2008). Accordingly, some argue that China’s trade and investment
activities in Africa have not contributed to promoting peace, prosperity and democratic development in the region (Taylor, 2004: 99).¹

On the other hand, many emphasize the differences between Africa’s close economic relations with China and those with developed Western countries. This argument is that China’s government aid, investments, and infrastructure loans are conducive to African countries’ development. The uniqueness of “China’s transformation experience with development” or “China Model” that can be associated with China’s support for Africa’s development leads to more recognition for China than that the Western countries receive (Sautman and Yan, 2007). Some believe that China’s direct investment in Africa has improved the conditions of the regional economy (Broadman, 2006; Goldstein, Pinaud, Reisen and Chen, 2006; Kaplinsky and Morris, 2009; Wang, 2007). Furthermore, Chinese investment has stimulated the diversification and upgrading of Africa’s industrial structure and reduced poverty. In fact, the mainstream Western media and some scholars take an ideological perspective that lacks a concrete comparative analysis and only portray “China in Africa” very negatively (Sautman and Yan, 2009). Our study argues that the usual blanketed criticism of China’s aid and investment has a significant outreach to many undemocratic regimes in the developing countries which find alliance with China as a balancing safeguard against Western sanctions over their domestic human-rights conditions.

Most of the extant literature on China-Africa trade and investment assumes “a homogenous China with a homogenous Africa” (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2009: 551). This paper, however, is different from the previous literature. Most importantly, our study does not take the perspective of a “homogenous China” that conducts direct investment in Africa. Our study points out the important feature of the diversity and complexity of China’s direct investments in African regions, which is the
often neglected complex dynamics of the relationship between China and African development. First, we investigate a large number of Chinese companies with a variety of investment plans, as reflected in the different forms of China’s enterprise ownership. Second, in addition to the investment activities of central state-owned enterprises (SOEs), we also examine the investment activities of local SOEs and private enterprises that have different motives than the central SOEs. Third, we examine the diversity of Chinese direct investment in Africa through a more micro-enterprise level research approach of the investment plans of enterprises with different types of ownership. Central SOEs undertake investment plans to comply with the policies of China’s government. However, private enterprises and entrepreneurial local SOEs are more rational and consider profit margin when they invest in Africa. Fourth, consistent with suggestions from the previous literature, this paper demonstrates that China’s direct investment in Africa does not represent a new “colonialism”. On the one hand, resource-oriented investments launched by China’s central SOEs usually accompany large-scale infrastructure construction investments in the host country, which is one of the most significant features of China’s investments in Africa. On the other hand, a large amount of private investment from small- and medium-sized enterprises is closely linked with local economic activities in Africa. Finally, we argue that China’s investments in Africa are extremely diverse and complex, which is partially consistent with existing theories of foreign direct investment.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The second section is the literature review. We provide a general overview of China’s investment in Africa in the third section. The fourth and fifth sections discuss the characteristics of China’s investments in Africa, and the sixth section concludes.

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2. Literature Review

The existing literature on China’s outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) in Africa can be broadly categorized into three viewpoints. First, some studies discuss China’s OFDI in Africa within the broad framework of China-Africa trade and investment activities and argue that the rapid development of relations between China and Africa is an important dimension of China’s development toward new and global international strategies (Power and Mohan, 2010; Tull, 2006: 462). However, official data often overestimate the Chinese SOEs’ investment in Africa. Extensive investment by private enterprises, which are rarely influenced by China’s policy guidance, is an important factor in the economic and trade relations between China and Africa (Wang, 2007). Thus, the rapidly growing trade and investment activities initiated by China’s enterprises in recent years in Africa have more economic motivations, rather than only political and diplomatic considerations. Meanwhile, the evidence shows that China’s investments in Africa are concentrated on energy and fundamental industries to supplement China’s domestic energy supply, exploit Africa’s huge foreign exchange reserves and provide aid to the continent (Besada, Wang and Whalley, 2008). In addition, the relevant literature summarizes the characteristics and trends of China’s OFDI in Africa as well as its positive and negative impacts on Africa’s economic development (ACET, 2009: 20-32; Ademola, Bankole and Adewuyi, 2009; Renard, 2011).

Second, some studies provide micro-discussions that focus on the pursuit of Africa’s natural resources and infrastructure sectors by China’s large SOEs and the policy implications of China’s investments in Africa (Butts and Bankus, 2009; Jiang, 2009). Previous studies have noted that China’s investments in Africa mainly are initiated by large central SOEs that concentrate on Africa’s resource-abundant countries (Ajakaiye, Kaplinsky, Morris and N’Zue, 2009; Alden and Davis, 2006; Broadman,
2006; Burke and Corkin, 2006; Kaplinsky, McCormick and Morris, 2007). Therefore, because these investments do not require any preconditions, the host countries with weak political governance enter a stagnation trap with respect to the “resource curse” (Butts and Bankus, 2009; Sparks, 2011). Some research has stressed that China’s investments in Africa’s energy and minerals industries are not essentially different from those of Western countries, which are designed to meet the domestic needs of the developed countries rather than to achieve sustainable growth in the host country (Alden and Davis, 2006; Taylor, 2006). In fact, China’s investments in Africa’s infrastructure usually bundle energy investments for the purpose of facilitating China’s energy investment and trade (Corkin, Burke and Davies, 2008; Foster, Butterfield, Chen and Pushak, 2008). These authors demonstrate that the complexity of Chinese investments in Africa is a reflection of the internal contradiction of political and economic development in China. By investigating the investment motivations and behavior patterns of SOEs and individual entrepreneurs, some scholars argue that the investment activities of Chinese investors in Africa represent the epitome of China’s domestic transitional experience (Jiang, 2009).

Third, compared with studies that mainly focus on the investments of large central SOEs, few studies provide evidence regarding the investment activities of local government-owned and private enterprises in Africa. In fact, the investment motives of private enterprises in Africa are more entrepreneurial and more market-oriented than the SOEs’ (Gu, 2009; Song, 2011; Wang, 2007: 17-19). In addition, local governments in Africa have undergone economic expansions that play multiple roles in China-Africa economic and trade interactions. The central SOEs that are actively involved in African trade and investment activities must comply with the Chinese government’s diplomacy and trade policies. However, the enterprises owned by provincial governments have their
own economic interests. Thus, the motives of the locally owned state enterprises pose challenges to China’s foreign policy in Africa (Chen and Jian, 2009).

Some studies indicate that the motives for China’s OFDI in Africa can be explained using conventional FDI theory. These motives include market-seeking, resource-seeking, and risk aversion (Cheung, de Haan, Qian and Yu, 2011). Moreover, the “going global” policy, which was initiated in 2002, has also had important effects on the rapid growth of China’s OFDI in Africa. It is worth noting that the host countries’ natural resources do not affect the probability of receiving direct investment from China. However, China’s OFDI flows into oil-abundant countries much more extensively. Another empirical study notes that the host country’s market size, infrastructure level and legal environment are important factors in China’s OFDI in Africa, which explains why Chinese investors tend to invest in oil-abundant countries (Dong et al., 2011). These empirical studies provide the common conclusion that China’s OFDI in Africa has no obvious preference and is consistent with the normal investment motives described by FDI theory.

3. China’s OFDI in Africa

In 2002, the Chinese government implemented its “going global” policy, which had a significant impact on Chinese enterprises’ ability to invest in Africa (Cheung et al., 2011). From 2003-2008, China's direct investment in Africa accounted for 7% of foreign investment flows. After Asia and Central and South America, Africa has become China’s third largest foreign direct investment recipient. In the first decade of the 21st century, China’s direct investment in Africa showed an average annual growth of 46% (African Development Bank, 2010). For example, in 2010, China’s investment in Africa was $ 2.11 billion, which grew
46.8% from 2009 and accounted for 3.1% of all of China’s foreign investment. Chinese investment in Africa has mainly been directed to South Africa, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Niger, Algeria, Nigeria and Kenya. Among these countries, South Africa has attracted the most investment from China; in 2010, China’s direct investment flows to South Africa were US$411 million (see Table 1).

Table 1 Top African Recipients of China’s Outward FDI in 2010 (USD million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Accumulated Total</th>
<th>2010 FDI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>4152.98</td>
<td>411.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>1210.85</td>
<td>184.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>943.73</td>
<td>75.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>937.26</td>
<td>186.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>630.92</td>
<td>236.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>613.36</td>
<td>30.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>379.36</td>
<td>196.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>368.06</td>
<td>58.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>351.77</td>
<td>101.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>336.72</td>
<td>51.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Africa Total</td>
<td>13042.12</td>
<td>2111.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Africa’s Share of China’s OFDI</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>China’s Share of Africa’s Total FDI</td>
<td>2.35%</td>
<td>3.84%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNCTAD (2011); Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (2010).
Overall, direct investment in Africa from mainland China shows several characteristics. First, Chinese investment in Africa is still in its initial stages, and the proportion of foreign direct investment flows is still small (see Table 1). Africa received US$55.04 billion in total FDI flows in 2010, and China accounted for 3.84% of that total. In 2010, FDI in Africa amounted to US$5,539.72 billion, and China accounted for 2.35% of that total. Second, China’s direct investment in Africa in recent years has shown rapid growth. During 2000-2009, the average annual growth of China’s direct investment in Africa was 46%, and China’s mainland investment stock in Africa reached US$13.04 billion in 2010, which was 8.2 times the total from 2005 (see Figure 1).

Third, China’s direct investment in Africa has been focused on energy-rich countries. China has invested in most of the African countries (of the 59 African countries, 50 have received investments

**Figure 1** China’s OFDI in Africa, 2003-2010

Source: UNCTAD (2011); Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (2010).
from Chinese enterprises), but the investment funds have focused on the energy-rich countries of Nigeria and Angola, among others. The largest investments in terms of amount have been in the resources industry; however, investments in manufacturing and services have been the largest in terms of number of enterprises (International Money Fund, 2011; Sebastian, 2008). Fourth, a large number of private enterprises from mainland China have invested in Africa. By the end of 2010, 1,955 Chinese companies were established in Africa, with more than 100 state-owned enterprises. The remainder were private enterprises. Fifth, to promote investment in manufacturing activities, the establishment of special economic zones (SEZs) provided new forms of investment for Chinese enterprises. After 2006, China established six economic zones for the African continent (African Development Bank, 2010). Finally, China’s direct investment in Africa is closely related to the growth of China’s trade and development assistance to the continent (see Figure 2) (Renard, 2011). Since the late 1990s, China-Africa trade and investment has grown at an annual rate of nearly 30% (Besada et al., 2008), while during 2000-2009, China’s direct investment in Africa grew at an average rate of 46% per year.

4. Does Ownership of Enterprises Matter?

Previous studies based on official economic data from China’s government underestimate the actual investment activities of Chinese enterprises in Africa. First, many state-owned enterprises investing in Africa use the company’s own retained earnings that are not leveraged by loans from the state-owned Commercial Bank or by loans from policy banks, which are not included in China’s official statistics. Second, the direct investments of China’s private enterprises rely more on informal financing arrangements, which are not included in the
Figure 2  China’s Trade and OFDI in Africa, 1996-2010


official data. Third, many of China’s enterprises investing in Africa raise funds using offshore financial centers or tax havens such as Hong Kong, the Cayman Islands, and the Virgin Islands. Finally, private SMEs account for 90% of the current Chinese enterprises investing in Africa. China’s government lacks accurate statistics on these investment activities.

This study fills the gap caused by the insufficient official data and uses case studies to examine the ownership structure of China’s enterprises in Africa, which can be categorized into three types: central state-owned enterprises (CSOEs), non-central state-owned enterprises (NCSOEs), and private enterprises (PEs) (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2009). CSOEs are affiliated with China’s central government and are
established under the direct control of the 2003 “State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission”. There were initially 150 CSOEs, and after several adjustments, there are currently 117 such enterprises. NCSOEs are affiliated with the local government or central ministries and are under the direct control of a local “State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission”. PEs are the creation of their own public or private entities and also include a number of former township enterprises and state-owned enterprises from the restructuring of enterprises in the mid-1990s.

4.1. Central State-Owned Enterprises (CSOEs)

Central state-owned enterprises are under the direct control of China’s central government. The foreign investments of CSOEs often reflect China’s governmental policy intentions, such as diplomacy and energy security. China has formally implemented the “going global” policy after 2002. To comply with the policy, the foreign direct investments of CSOEs are particularly significant, especially large-scale investments in African natural resources. Table 2 provides summaries of the investment cases initiated by CSOEs investing in Africa with the purpose of providing foreign aid.

Table 2 shows that China’s central state-owned enterprises focused their investments on the petroleum, nonferrous metals and infrastructure sectors in Africa, which complies with the mission of energy security. Their investment funds are mainly leveraged through financial assistance from the central government or loans from state-owned policy banks, and these investments must ensure China’s domestic energy demands (Jiang, 2009; Wang, 2007). Because of Africa’s generally poor infrastructure, the investments of China’s CSOEs in energy development are often affiliated with infrastructure investments in specific countries (Kaplinski and Morris, 2009). Consequently, the CSOEs’ energy and
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Country or region</th>
<th>Investment Project</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>CSFAGC (中國農墾 (集團) ) invested in Zambia’s Friendship Farm at the price of US$300,000 in 1990.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>CSFAGC invested in Zambia’s second Friendship Farm at the price of US$800,000 in 1994.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>CSFAGC invested in Zambia’s third Friendship Farm at the price of US$140,000 for meat products in 1998.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>CSFAGC invested US$38,000,000 in Ghana from 1997 to 2004.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>CNMC (中國有色礦業集團公司) invested US$20 million in the acquisition of the Chambishi copper mine in Zambia and then invested US$160 million in buildings in 1998. The project was put into operation in July 2003.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>In March 1997, CNPC acquired the right to develop oil blocks in Sudan. In June 2002, the Malaysian national oil company, the Canada SPC Company, and Sudan’s national oil company set up a joint operating company – the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating LLC. Since 2009, the Khartoum refinery has become China’s largest overseas oil refinery. Sudan has become the focus of investment in upstream products such as oil refineries and pipeline operations throughout the integration business.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Country or region</th>
<th>Investment Project</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Sinopec Corporation (SINOPEC) paid US$2.4 billion to acquire a 27.5% stake in an oilfield in Angola in 2005.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>CNOOC (中海油公司) paid US$22.68 billion to acquire a 45% stake in the Nigeria OML130 oilfield in 2006.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) invested US$5.46 billion to acquire a 20% stake in South Africa's Standard Bank, Africa's largest bank, and became the single largest shareholder in 2007. This investment is currently China’s largest financial investment project in Africa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Petroleum Group’s (CNPC) Investment Nigeria Agadem oilfield plans to build a refinery and a 2,000 km oil pipeline to handle one million tons of crude oil annually for a total investment of US$5 billion within three years starting in 2008.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>CNOOC Corporation (CNOOC) and the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation jointly acquired a 23.5% stake in the Ghana Jubilee oilfield for up to US$5 billion in 2010.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Country or region</th>
<th>Investment Project</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>China Railway Materials Corporation (CRM) invested US$247 million to acquire a 12.5% stake in African Mining (African Minerals), becoming its second largest shareholder and gaining access to the Tonkolili iron-ore project priority development rights in 2010.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>China Water Conservancy and Hydropower Construction Group Corporation won the bid for a Tanzania road project. So far, China Resources Group has invested approximately US$500 million in the project since 2010.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation Nigeria Limited constructed a concrete sleeper factory in 2010. Turkey’s concrete sleeper factory in Ibadan, Nigeria was the first narrow-gauge concrete sleeper production plant dedicated to the Nigerian railway reconstruction project.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ compilation.

Infrastructure investments provide aid, and China’s government is committed to assisting the development of African countries, which promotes political stability and improves the living standards of the African people (Besada et al., 2008: 18).

4.1.1. CSOEs’ petroleum investments in Africa

The consequences of China’s petroleum investments best demonstrate the characteristics of the CSOEs’ investments in Africa. As early as
1993, China became a net oil importer (see Figure 3). After 2003, China surpassed Japan to become second in the world in oil consumption after the United States, and most of China’s spending on oil consumption must be met by imports. China's oil imports were 1.7 million barrels per day in 2001 and 4.2 million barrels per day in 2010 and will increase to 980 million barrels per day in 2030. Oil imports accounted for 34 percent of China’s domestic oil demand in 2001, and this proportion will increase to 82% in 2030 (International Energy Agency, 2002: 253). Therefore, energy security to ensure a steady supply of oil has become an important target of China’s foreign economic and trade activities, and CSOEs must undertake this responsibility.

The majority of the CSOEs’ investments in Africa are concentrated in the industries of mining and energy, with a particular focus on oil development. In addition, Table 2 shows that the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) invested US$5.46 billion in the acquisition of a 20% stake in Standard Bank of South Africa, which represents an investment in the financial services industry. In fact, the CSOEs’ investments in Africa’s oil have shown significant progress. In 2008, sub-Saharan Africa supplied 31 percent of China’s imported oil needs. Today, Angola, Sudan, Nigeria, the Congo, and Gabon have become major suppliers of oil for China. However, China’s petroleum acquisitions are also tied to African infrastructure construction project loans from China (Sautman and Yan, 2009: 5).

4.1.2. Strategic advantages of CSOEs investing in Africa

Compared with multinational investments from Western countries, the investments of China’s CSOEs have several advantages. First, because of China's policy of non-interference in internal African affairs, the CSOEs can invest in any African countries, including those that Western countries’ domestic enterprises are prohibited from investing in and
those that are excluded by other international regimes. Second, because of their lower labor costs, the CSOEs have a comparative economic advantage over other enterprises from developed and emerging countries. Third, the CSOEs have a diplomatic advantage that is not affiliated with their other characteristics (i.e., non-interference in internal affairs). Fourth, the CSOEs have financial advantages because they mainly raise funds from China’s state-owned banks (such as the Export-Import Bank of China and the China Development Bank) (Tull, 2006). Finally, the biggest difference between China’s and Western countries’ investments in Africa is that China's direct investments are often associated with development assistance programs in the host countries, including low-interest or interest-free loans and large-scale infrastructure construction (Alden and Davis, 2006: 90-92; Sautman and Yan, 2009).
4.2. Non-Central State-Owned Enterprises (NCSOE)s

The NCSOE}s of the provincial or municipal governments tend to have more diversified investments in Africa. Table 3 shows that the NCSOE}s investing in Africa have some characteristics that are different from those of the CSOE}s (Chen and Jian, 2009). First, compared with the energy industry, which the CSOE}s focus on, the NCSOE}s mainly invest in the home appliance manufacturing, mining, automotive, agriculture, infrastructure and communications sectors. Unlike the CSOE}s’ investments, which are concentrated in Africa’s resource-rich countries, the NCSOE}s are investing in more dispersed regions.

Second, the investment behavior of the NCSOE}s reflects the multiple roles of local governments in Africa. On the one hand, the NCSOE}s may act as an agent of the Central Executive for Central Policy for diplomatic arrangements or aid plans to invest in Africa’s infrastructure (electricity, water, transportation, agricultural development, etc.). On the other hand, the rapid growth of China’s domestic economy has caused high demand for a variety of minerals, and China’s local governments actively seek overseas energy supplies, so the NCSOE}s have invested in Africa’s natural resources. Furthermore, similar to traditional multinationals, the NCSOE}s investing in Africa can use their ownership advantages to open up African markets and maximize profits.

4.3. Private Enterprises (PE}s

The investments by large CSOE}s in African energy resources have drawn more attention, but private corporate investment activities may have more significant impacts on many African countries (Brautigam, 2007; Wang, 2007: 17-18). Most private enterprises investing in Africa are small- and medium-sized enterprises that focus on light and retail
Table 3 Investments by China’s Local State-Owned Enterprises in Africa, 1990-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Country or region</th>
<th>Investment project</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Home Appliance</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>South African companies invested in the establishment of the Shanghai SVA washing appliance company and South Africa Ltd in 1997.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textile</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Huayuan invested US$24 million to acquire an 80% stake in a French textile company to circumvent quotas in Europe in 1997.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automobile</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Changan Automobile Holding Company, Dongfeng Motor Group, Chery Automobile Co., Ltd. And Guangzhou, South China Motorcycle Industry invested in Ghana with the local large enterprise Sneda Automobile Co., Ltd. To create a joint venture automobile production base in 2004.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cement</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>In August 2010, the Ethiopia Huangshan Cement Chuanhui Guangdong Science and Technology Development Group invested more than 1 billion yuan to build four production lines. It was the first Chinese enterprise to invest in a cement factory in Ethiopia.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3 (continued)

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<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Country or region</th>
<th>Investment project</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agro-processing</td>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>“China-Africa Cotton Malawi Cotton Company” was officially inaugurated in Malawi’s Baraka region. A total investment of US$19 million was made in the Central African cotton industry by the China-Africa Development Fund Co., Ltd, Qingdao Ruichang Cotton Co., Ltd, Qingdao Kingsway Textile Co., Ltd, China Cotton and others. Group Co., Ltd. Was founded with the four companies’ investments. In addition to Malawi, the Central African cotton industry is also responsible for Mozambique’s cotton industry investment projects. The total investment in these two projects will reach US$34,721,000 in 2009.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>China National Machinery Industry Corporation (CMEC) reconstructed Sudan’s largest hydropower station in Fula. The power station was projected to cost US$680 million and the duration was 45 months. Upon completion, the power station will not only meet local needs but also provide electricity to neighboring Darfur in 2010.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telecommunication</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Ethiopia Telecommunications Company signed a US$1.5 billion loan agreement with ZTE to upgrade communications networks. In addition to the loan, ZTE has also taken a series of measures to expand its African business. To date, the company has invested US$5.2 million to build a mobile phone factory in northern Ethiopia in 2013.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Country or region</th>
<th>Investment project</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Machinery</td>
<td>South Africa, Ivory Coast, Benin</td>
<td>Heavy-Africa Investment Limited (China First Tractor Group and China-Africa Development Fund to jointly build) is committed to investing in several African countries to establish an agricultural machinery and construction machinery assembly marketing center. China-Africa Investment Limited Heavy Industries, located in South Africa, Ivory Coast, Benin and other countries, will establish five assembly plants and marketing service centers that will provide one million units of farm equipment for local agriculture and directly employ nearly 200 machinists from a variety of local technical schools and train hundreds of students starting in 2010.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>Hebei Tangshan Jidong construction company invested US$5 million to develop a copper-gold project in Zambia in 2010.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Anhui Foreign Economic Construction (Group) Mining Renan Ministry invested in an official diamond mine in 2010.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Shandong Iron and Steel Group invested US$1.5 billion to acquire a 25% interest in an African mining company’s (African Minerals Ltd) Tonkolili project in 2010.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Ningbo Milk Group invested 500 million yuan in collaboration with the Nigerian Lee Group to invest in a dairy plant in Virginia Lagos City in 2010.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Country or region</th>
<th>Investment project</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cement</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>China-Africa Development Fund and Jidong Development Group will help South Africa build a cement plant for at least US$200 million in 2010.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Shandong Electric Power Construction Corporation of Nigeria Papalanto’s construction of two gas turbine power plant projects is progressing smoothly after beginning in 2010.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Chinese companies aided in the post-war reconstruction in Angola for its “new model of community life” beginning in 2010.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ compilation.

industries. In the absence of reliable official statistics, the investments initiated by private enterprises have been underestimated (Brautigam, 2007; Renard, 2011).

Table 4 provides evidence that the motives of PEs investing in Africa include being close to the local market due to fierce domestic competition, the transfer of excess capacity to avoid Chinese enterprise restrictions by the United States and Europe and the development of raw materials. Private enterprises tend to invest in more profit-oriented products, including scarce commodities and minerals that have high demand in China’s domestic market. In fact, the investments of most private enterprises in Africa are very small (less than US$1 million) (United Nations Development Programme, 2007).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Country or Region</th>
<th>Investment project</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Water</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Dalian CWAY invested US$1.8 million in 2000 in Nigeria to establish water purification treatment plants and a fruit drink factory. At present, the company has become the largest Nigerian pure water production and marketing enterprise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Footwear</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Zhejiang Wenzhou Hazan shoe company invested US$1 million to establish a shoe factory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Footwear</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Shuangsheng Footwear and Rubens Hazan Shoes successively set up factories in Nigeria. Semi-finished products will be shipped for domestic assembly. In 2007, Hazan’s total investment reached US$13 million for a 40,000 m2 plant with an annual output of 6 million pairs of shoes as one of Africa's largest shoe companies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Footwear</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Zhejiang Taizhou Good Brothers Shoe Co. invested US$1 million in 2001 to set up factories in Egypt. In 2006, the investment in Egypt had increased to US$12 million, and the company intends to supply more than 50% of Egypt’s shoe market.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Estate</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Phoenix Group Corporation and Sichuan Overseas Investment invested in real estate development in South Africa in 2004.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Country or Region</th>
<th>Investment project</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Sichuan building materials enterprises in Ethiopia built a large-scale building materials industrial park and covers an area of 225 acres. After completion, sales are projected to reach 50 billion yuan. After Southeast Asia, Africa has become Sichuan’s second-largest foreign investment enterprise market. The number of investments reached 31, and half of all new investments were made mainly in mineral resources, agriculture, manufacturing, real estate and other industries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>North Pass invested US$250 million to purchase a stake in South Africa’s Nawa copper mine located in Namibia in 2008.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>Ningbo Xinglong Bicycle Co., Ltd developed a copper and cobalt mine in the Congo and achieved sales of US$20 million in 2006.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telecommunication</td>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>In the past 10 years, Huawei has invested more than 1.5 billion U.S. dollars in Africa. Currently, the company has two regional departments, 20 offices, two research and development centers, six training centers, and a total of more than 4,000 employees in Cairo, Egypt. Huawei also established new regional training centers and invested in equipment worth over 20 million U.S. dollars.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Country or Region</th>
<th>Investment project</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Private entrepreneurs in Zhoushan established Yu Heng Investment Management Limited in Zhousan City in 2010 and, in the name of the company, established Hongyu Steel Limited in Tanzania. The scale of the investment was US$7.5 million, which was primarily for machinery and equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home Appliance</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Meidi participated in a US$57.48 million acquisition of the Egyptian air conditioning company Miraco in 2010 and took a 32.5 percent stake in the company. The company has become the United States’ Miraco brand promotion platform in Africa.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ compilation.

4.3.1. The characteristics of PEs’ investments in Africa

Private enterprises’ investments in Africa have several features. First, private enterprises essentially act independently of government policy intentions, which is sometimes even encouraged by the government (Brautifam, 2003). Indeed, the relationship between private enterprises and state investments in Africa (represented by non-resident embassies) is not harmonious. PEs’ wide range of investment categories includes light industry, processing and manufacturing, retail, real estate development, agriculture and mining. Second, private business owners have a strong entrepreneurial spirit. They enjoy close cooperation with local businesses, especially local Chinese companies (and in the 1970s and 1980s, companies from Taiwan and Hong Kong), and are very
familiar with African market conditions and local networks (Brautigam, 2007). Third, the private enterprises investing in Africa are mainly located in China’s southeast coastal economically developed provinces such as Zhejiang, Guangdong, Fujian, Jiangsu, and Shandong.

Fourth, China’s private enterprises act as new investment models in the formation of industrial clusters because Africa’s infrastructure and industrial development has lagged behind, and many products and intermediate inputs must be imported from China or other countries (Brautigam and Tang, 2011). For example, Chinese companies in Ethiopia, Mauritius, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana, Sierra Leone and other countries have established six special economic zones since 2006 (African Development Bank, 2010). Because of the large number of private enterprises, they face more intense competition from each other than from local businesses (Gu, 2009).

5. Discussion

Table 5 summarizes the characteristics of the enterprises of different ownership types that invest in Africa. For China’s state-owned enterprises, especially the CSOEs, the main purpose of investments in African natural resources is to sustain the growth of the Chinese economy. Because resource-based industries act as the basis of other sectors of the economy and rarely impact the local economy, the CSOEs have limited connections with other Chinese enterprises in the local community. Therefore, the human resources spillover effect is small.

Thus, CSOEs have helped to establish complete industrial chains in host African countries. For example, from 1997 to 2009, the CNPC Petroleum Corporation established a completely self-sufficient gasoline industry, including exploration, production, refining, transportation, and sales in Sudan (see Table 2). In contrast, Western countries have been
Table 5 Different Ownership Types of Enterprises Investing in Africa: A Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CSOEs</th>
<th>NCSOEs</th>
<th>PEs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy mission</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk aversion</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profit motive</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local linkage</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Responsibility</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ elaboration.
Notes: ++ = strong; + = semi-strong; 0 = weak.

drilling for oil in Nigeria for half a century, but most of the country’s gasoline is still imported today. The investments of state-owned enterprises can serve as the engine of economic growth if the governance policies of the host countries embrace a more comprehensive system, such as that for the huge mineral revenues, making it a source of potentially valuable resources that can be harnessed (e.g., Botswana).

In fact, although Africa offers the world’s highest returns for foreign direct investment (World Bank, 2003: 95), Chinese corporations have lower earnings than corporations from other countries investing in Africa because many Chinese companies (mostly SMEs) adopt joint ventures and must share their profits with African companies (United Nations Development Programme, 2007: 57-59). More importantly, while most Western companies are completely focusing on the mining industry,
Chinese state-owned enterprises investing in Africa also construct a large amount of infrastructure, such as roads, railways, ports, dams and bridges. Western companies are often reluctant to make investments in African countries to improve their investment environment, improve people’s living standards, and promote local economic growth in the host countries.

Private enterprises investing in Africa are more active. Private investment mainly involves the retail industry, flexible operating and low-tech primary processing industries that have more significant impacts on economic development in Africa. First, private enterprises investing in Africa seek market-based solutions and attempt to avoid deepening local dependence on a single resource. Second, because private enterprises have deeper connections with local economic networks than state-owned enterprises, they provide more opportunities to develop human capital and employment in a host country. Third, private enterprises produce and sell mostly cheap goods, which helps to reduce the cost of living for the African people (Sautman and Yan, 2009). Fourth, private enterprises investing in Africa also reflect the flexibility of private business. For example, in 2006, Ningbo Xinglong cobalt mining companies invested in the Congo (see Table 4) because the Congolese government banned exports of cobalt ore, so private Chinese enterprises that had previously imported cobalt ore immediately established factories in the country. Nevertheless, compared to state-owned enterprises, private enterprises have many disadvantages regarding social responsibility, such as not attaching importance to environmental protection and selling inferior products.

In recent years, China’s direct investment in Africa has aroused widespread attention, and it has also raised the argument that China is acting as a “neo-colonialist”. In addition, China’s foreign direct investment has special institutional and cultural characteristics that are
different from the traditional model of foreign investment activities. In this section, we discuss these two important issues concerning China’s direct investment in Africa.

5.1. Whether China’s Direct Investment in Africa Represents a New Colonialism

This study suggests that referring to Chinese investment in Africa as “neo-colonialism” is not correct. First, it is difficult to assess the long-term effects of China’s investment in Africa. China’s large-scale investment in Africa began in 2002, but the scale of the flow of Chinese investments in Africa is still small. For example, in 2010, China’s direct investment in Africa accounted for only 3.84 percent and 2.35 percent of foreign investment flow and stock, respectively (see Table 1).

Second, although the CSOEs’ investment location choice is mainly resource-rich countries, mining investments by China are also often accompanied by infrastructure improvements. Chinese investments in Africa’s mining and infrastructure not only meet the needs of China’s domestic energy policy and fulfill its energy security considerations but also continue the traditional diplomatic relationships between China and Africa (Brautigam, 2011; Corkin et al., 2008). In fact, the emphasis on infrastructure development is the most significant difference between China’s and Western countries’ investments in Africa. This difference is important because although infrastructure improvements are conducive to China’s return on investment, China was once a semi-colonial country, it has a legacy of socialism, and it remains a developing country, so China’s policy, unlike that of Western countries, helps Africa (Sautman and Yan, 2009: 2).

Third, infrastructure investment is an important part of China-Africa economic and trade cooperation. Since early in the 20th century, China has assisted in the construction of infrastructure in Africa, such as the
1976 completion of the Tanzani-Zambia Railway (Foster et al., 2008: 3-4). From 1956 to 2005, China provided US$44 billion in low-interest or interest-free loans for 900 infrastructure projects in African countries. In 2009, 45.7 percent of mainland China’s foreign aid funds were invested in Africa, where 61% of the concessional loans were for economic infrastructure. As of the end of 2009, China had worked on more than 500 infrastructure construction projects in Africa, including the completion of 2,233 kilometers of railway, 3,391 kilometers of highway, 52 stadiums, and 11 bridges, as well as docks, ports, water facilities, electricity infrastructure, airports, and telecommunications facilities (Naswari, 2006; People’s Republic of China State Council Information Office, April 2011). These investments will help improve the investment climate in Africa, promote economic growth and reduce poverty. Thus, in comparison with Western countries, China’s investments are more favorable for Africa (Sautman and Yan, 2007).

Fourth, mainly because of the profit motive, NCSOEs and especially the large number of private enterprises that invest in Africa pay more attention to Africa’s vast market and geographic advantages (location advantages). Meanwhile, the Chinese government is also aware that some African countries worry about becoming China’s product supplier, or they fear the impact of Chinese investment on local industry and employment. Thus, the Chinese government provided policy responses including automatic investment restrictions, tariff and debt reductions, the promotion of technology transfers and industrial upgrades in Africa. Finally, as commentators have described the importance of China in Africa, they have also noted that Western countries and companies may need to look more closely at their own roles in the continent (Sautman and Yan, 2009: 15). Moreover, evaluations of China’s economic and trade relations should not separately consider geopolitical issues from the geo-economic and

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technological development issues. The Western world should abandon its inherent intolerant perception of China and recognize the similarities between China’s development concept and that of Western countries (Power and Mohan, 2010: 487).

5.2. The Presence or Absence of Foreign Direct Investment: Is There a “China Model”?

Chinese enterprises do not invest overseas to seize the market and reduce costs but to obtain local natural resources, technologies or brands to strengthen their competitiveness in the domestic market and achieve production sustainability (Huang and Wang, 2011; Morck, Yeung and Zhao, 2008; Yao and Li, 2011). Therefore, to obtain energy, Chinese enterprises invest in resource-rich developing countries, and to access key technologies, they invest in technologically advanced developed countries. China’s investment approach is different from the traditional theory of foreign direct investment that multinationals (MNCs) invest in other countries to gain the ownership advantages of foreign investment enterprises, to enter local markets, or to take advantage of cheap factor inputs to reduce production costs. Thus, some commentators call China’s foreign investment patterns the “China Model” (Huang and Wang, 2011). This study on Chinese enterprises’ investments in Africa suggests that for the CSOEs, their investments are indeed focused on African countries that are rich in natural resources, and they therefore meet the definition of the “China Model”. However, investments by local SOEs have more diverse policy motives and consideration of the interests of local governments. For the numerous private enterprises, the motive is the pursuit of profit, and such enterprises are therefore more respectful of market opportunities in Africa. Therefore, the NCSOEs’ (including local enterprises and private enterprises) investments in Africa do not meet the definition of the “China Model”.

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6. Concluding Remarks

Unlike Mao’s ideology regarding the promotion and support of African countries in the anti-colonial movement and beginning in the early 1990s with the development of a single official aid program, trade and investment from mainland China has become the main avenue for relations with Africa in recent years (African Development Bank, 2010; Wang and Bio-Tchane, 2008). This study uses the perspective of enterprise-level investment plans to discuss China’s direct investment activities in Africa.

The analysis showed that, first, official data do not exist to capture the entire picture of Chinese enterprises’ investments in Africa. Second, China’s direct investment activities in Africa are still in their early stages, and it is difficult to judge the long-term effects of Chinese investments in Africa. Third, China’s direct investments in Africa are diverse and complex, and simply judging whether investments by China are good or bad based on the development of African countries may miss the complex dynamics of the relationship (Jiang, 2009: 607). Fourth, both the Chinese enterprises and the African countries are diverse, so we cannot describe a single model for Chinese investment activities in Africa. The complexity of Chinese investments is reflected in the different forms of enterprise ownership (e.g., CSOEs, non-medium-sized state-owned enterprises, and private enterprises) and their different investment motives and purposes. Fifth, Chinese investment in Africa has both pushing forces, such as the factors affecting the market (domestic market competition and industrial restructuring) and policy-side factors (encouraged by the government), and pulling forces. For example, for the majority of the African markets, the profit potential is high, and China’s transformation experience is attractive to African countries.
The analysis in this paper also shows that for a more thorough study of China’s foreign direct investment in its political and economic context, we must adopt a more micro-enterprise level research approach. Meanwhile, analyses of China’s investment impact on the local economy must also consider China’s industrial and foreign policy, the development strategies of Chinese enterprises, host countries’ political governance mechanisms, local cultures and other multi-shaped trajectories.

Notes

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1. In February 2006, Britain’s then foreign secretary, Jack Straw, remarked that what China was doing in Africa now was much the same as Britain had done 150 years before. See Straw (2006). Some authors believe that China’s economic and trade activities in Africa represent a new imperialism. See Marks (2006).

2. In fact, it has been a traditional foreign policy of China since 1955’s Bandung Conference.

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Book Reviews

This book is the 27th book of the China Policy series of China Policy Institute, University of Nottingham, United Kingdom. It consists of four parts with 13 chapters focusing on inequality and migration, social exclusion and integration, international migrants in China and social capital, Chinese migrants outside China and transnational spaces. Most of the chapters in this book are based on the survey findings on the migrant workers at various places of China. Quite a number of the chapters in this book focus on the impact of global financial crisis in 2007 on the local migrant workers in China.

This book begins with the impact on work situation and social attitudes of migrant workers in China. Inequality in income, social security, types of works, and work unit occurred among non-migrant and migrant workers. Chapter 2 examines the effect of household registration system in China (*hukou, 户口*) on social mobility of migrants and non-migrants. Findings revealed that the existing institutional arrangements are important causes of economic stratification for non-migrants but have little effect on the migrants; these migrants have been tracking special paths and following informal rules to achieve upward mobility,
though the upward mobility rate of migrants is lower than that of non-migrants. These paths and rules have formed the non-institutional pattern of socioeconomic status attainment. The chapter on the impact of remittances on rural poverty reduction and on rural households’ living expenditures revealed that remittances from rural migrant workers reduced the rural poverty rate and most of the remittances were spent on the current consumption living expenditures rather than for investment purposes.

Chapter 4 gives a detailed description on the institutional arrangements of the existing old-age insurance programs for migrant workers and the impact of the system on the livelihood of rural migrant workers. It also covers the effect of global financial crisis on the contributions towards old-age insurance program. The low participation rate of rural migrant workers in old-age insurance is due to the inability of the migrant workers to pay the high contribution rate. This chapter highlights that to promote employment and reduce old-age poverty and gender inequality in retirement income distribution, it is necessary for the central government (a) to set up public pensions funds with fiscal resources; (b) to entitle migrant workers to maternity insurance, childcare services, and facilities that target low-income groups; (c) to provide social assistance for old-age security; and (d) to reduce tax rates on small and medium-sized enterprises as it is necessary to continuously make contributions to the old-age insurance for migrant workers. Chapter 5 focuses on the temporary labor migration in Lhasa, Shigatze and Zetang of Tibet. The difficulties in terms of living costs, and getting a job and a place to live are the main concerns of the temporary labor migration. The issues of official work contract and health/work injury insurance among the temporary migrant labor were also brought up. The integration of the migrants’ children into the urban society was examined in Chapter 6 through the life satisfaction of migrants’ children, which
was found to be affected by income and experience of discrimination. Even if the children of migrant workers have higher incomes than their parents, structural relations in the city dampen their life satisfaction. Thus, the life satisfaction of the children is similar to that of their parents. The integration of migrants’ children in the city is not much better than that of their parents.

On the international migrants in China, there are three chapters on African traders in Guangzhou. The African trading post emerging in Asia in mid-1980s began with the precious stones. The African tradesmen move from one marketplace to another, depending on the comparative advantages that they encounter here and there. Dubai was the first marketplace, followed by Bangkok. After the 1997 financial crisis, African tradesmen moved to Hong Kong and then came to Guangzhou by train from Hong Kong since Mainland China opened its door in December 2001. Due to different cultures and living habits, tension and conflicts occurred between the Africans and Chinese citizens. The mutual adaptation, adjustment, and cultural understanding are important to maintain harmonious social relations between the Africans and Chinese. Chapter 9 examines the internationalization of higher education in China. The increasing number of Chinese students studying abroad from 1993 onwards, mainly to the United States of America, Japan, Australia, the United Kingdom and Germany, and the change of policy since 1999 led to an increase in the number of international students studying in China, mainly from the Asian countries – Korea, Japan, Vietnam and Indonesia – as well as from the United States. Reasoning for studying in China and continuing to stay in China after completing the study were carefully examined through qualitative investigation.

The last part of this book focuses on the Chinese migrants outside China and transnational spaces. Chapter 11 touches on the Chinese and Brazilian entrepreneurs in the Portuguese labor market and the key
factors for Chinese entrepreneurs to be successful in Portugal: Chinese migrants had the highest rate of entrepreneurship in Portugal between 1981 and 2001. It acknowledges the arrival of the Chinese, and Asians in general, contributing to the diversification of both the nationalities and the occupations of immigrants in Portugal. It explains the Chinese entrepreneurial success in Portugal: access to labor, financial support, entrepreneurial advice, and links to suppliers. The theoretical and methodological challenges in mapping the new migrants between China and Africa is presented in Chapter 12. Since the 1980s, increasingly frequent flow of people between China and Africa has promoted deepening bilateral relations. The establishment of the Forum of China-African Cooperation in 2000 created new opportunities for both the Chinese and Africans in job creation in each other’s territory. In the case of the new migrants in Europe, the Chinese community in Italy is considered to be the largest in Europe. They are more spatially concentrated and segregated with respect to settlement features than other immigrant groups in Italy. They maintain strong internal links across Italy and are employed in Chinese firms and businesses. While being poor in linguistic and communication skills, the Chinese immigrants are nevertheless the most successful in developing businesses and in buying workshops and firms sold by Italian entrepreneurs – they are not so specialized in ethnic businesses but in the mainstream of Italian business.

In the last chapter on the migration, plural economies and new stratifications in Europe and China, Roulleau-Berger concludes that international migrations in Europe and internal migrations in China reveal economic segmentations and fragmentations that seem to become ever more pronounced, giving rise to new societal narratives in the process. He rightly states that as contemporary societies are getting much complex, economies local and global are becoming more and
more multi-polar. International migrations in Europe and internal migrations in China have led to the consideration of inequalities in multiple contexts, and these inequalities are considered as non-static, multi-sited in different local and societal spaces, and thus complex and dynamic.

Nevertheless, the main focus of this book is on the migrants in China, with little coverage of the Chinese migrants outside China. Considering the huge number of Chinese migrants outside China, this book thus does not fulfill the interest of readers who want to know more about what has happened to Chinese migrants in other countries, such as Canada, the United States of America, the European countries and others.

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This is a book written by a British journalist, remarkably coming face to face with China’s contradictory hotspots of discrimination related to registered permanent residence, land requisition, weak consumer spending, and population migration. As a foreigner, Tom Miller with outsider’s point of view completed a book on the largest migration in human history. Through this book, the readers might again be amazed by the insights of this seasoned “China hand”. The national policy guidance on urbanization, shackles of the household registration system, confinement of land policy and the mismatching of fiscal and taxation system were pointed out one by one by the author.

This book has six chapters. Chapter One shows the poor living conditions of migrant laborers in the city, including housing, welfare and children’s education, which have resulted in a limitation of the laborer’s spending power. Highlighted in the second chapter is the fact that the household registration system makes migrants unable to become a real citizen. The third chapter and fourth chapter respectively bring to the fore the social problems caused by the demolition and rural land reform, and the harsh environment of Chinese cities. In Chapter Five, the author
shows us how huge investments have paradoxically created an artificial “ghost town” without popularity. Finally, in Chapter Six it is brought to our attention the plight of the migrant laborers whose low spending power is constraining consumer demand.

The author’s arguments are both strengthened via detailed data and the use of real cases from witnesses. More importantly, it reveals to the world how China is engaging in this biggest “movement” in human history. Miller lived in China for more than a decade and traveled around China. With his reporter’s identity, he had been to many big cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen and even the fifth-tier small mountain villages to conduct interviews and produce reports covering a wide range of the general public for in-depth investigation and exposure. With rich life experience and solid journalism skills, Miller had a special perspective to observe contemporary China.

While critical, Tom Miller is nevertheless not accusatory in this book. There exists certain remarkable degree of understanding of the policies of the Chinese government. He strongly questions the rationality and legitimacy of segregation system of registered permanent residence (户口隔离制度), revealing the widespread phenomenon of corruption in demolition and rural land acquisition, as well as taunting shortsighted city designers about traffic planning and ugliness of buildings. Notwithstanding, he also points out that these sacrifices have served to support China’s economic development without the worse malaise of crash and famine. There are no malnourished children in China’s cities or towns, but such achievements cannot be possible by allowing free migration without social cost. It may even result in liquidity difficulties. Additionally, Miller also corrected unfair myopic reports from some Chinese and foreign medias on the “ghost towns”. He points out that these so-called “ghost towns” are gathering popularity, and even some new districts have a bright future as well.
Since the beginning of the Xi Jinping-Li Keqiang Administration, especially during the last two years, the government has hoped to use the new version urbanization policy to replace the original economy policies based on huge investments and real estates. Previously under the Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao Administration, urbanization had turn out to mean selling the farmers’ land, and then compelling the migrant workers to become second-class citizens in the cities. However, the migrant workers have turned out to be the main labor force of urban construction and business services. This is a method in which the city annexes the countryside. The present new version of urbanization is to upgrade the countryside into towns, rather than the annexation of countryside. Firstly, it is necessary to determine the land ownership. The farmers can reap the benefits in line with economic growth through the land, so that they can support themselves. Secondly, the new version of urbanization aims to deregulate the household registration system to make migrant workers citizens who enjoy equal benefits like others. Of course, this is still just a blueprint and beset with difficulties. It is worth mentioning that the government has accepted this suggestion, which Miller raised, that is to deregulate the household registration system. On 30th July 2014, the government canceled the “agriculture account” and “non-agriculture account” in the document “Suggestions about Furtherance of the Household Registration System Reform”. Besides, Miller also raises the government’s preference to use the gross domestic product (GDP) to reflect political achievements. In the year 2013, the leading official of the Communist Party of Chins (CPS) Central Committee Organization Department pronounced “Notice about Improving the Government Performance Examination in the Leading Team and Leading Cadres of Local Party and Government”, which emphasized that government performance examination is not simply with regard to GDP.
The author, as a non-Chinese, might have certain limitations in fully understand the national conditions and political environment of China, but his portrayal of the Chinese urbanization and migration issues is penetrating. Besides, some of his recommendations is now also reflected the government’s latest policy changes. Certain parts of the author’s thoughts and suggestions could be debatable, including the forecast of the future of the “ghost towns”, which may be lacking a more comprehensive analysis. Nevertheless, as a foreign journalist, Miller’s effort in this book is commendable for paying attention to such a focal point which not only involves China’s current economic development, but also determines the development trend of China. In any case, this book is absolutely worth reading. Regarding the author’s observations, one can refute his views or query his conclusions, but it is difficult to avoid paying attention to the questions he raises in the book.

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