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BOOK REVIEW

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Special Issue
China amidst Competing Dynamics in the Asia-Pacific: National Identity, Economic Integration and Political Governance

Special Issue Editors
Samuel C.Y. Ku Emile K.K. Yeoh Titus C. Chen
Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal

Notes for Contributors

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Special Issue

China amidst Competing Dynamics
in the Asia-Pacific

National Identity, Economic Integration and
Political Governance

Special Issue Editors

Samuel C.Y. Ku  Emile K.K. Yeoh  Titus C. Chen
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INTRODUCTION

Political Governance and Strategic Relations: Domestic-Foreign Policy Nexus and China’s Rise in the Global System

Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh*
University of Malaya

Abstract

Recent years have witnessed several momentous developments in the political economy of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) both on the domestic front and in her foreign relations. Deriving correct interpretation of such fast-paced developments and changes has pre-occupied much of the circles of China-watchers these days, with political scientists, economists, sociologists and international relations experts focusing their respective attentions on either the domestic transformation occurring within the PRC or on her foreign relations. While the volatile series of incidents involving a year of crackdowns on domestic civil societal movements, civil rights lawyers, labour activists and Hong Kong’s book publishers and distributors were unfolding dramatically, the year also witnessed the continued rise of China’s economic might culminating in the realisation of her initiative for the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) that started operation on
25th December 2015 and the continued progress of her “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) proposal after the creation of the State-owned Silk Road Fund on 29th December 2014. Such developments on China’s domestic and global fronts have to be properly placed in the overall context of China’s domestic-foreign policy nexus that has uniquely evolved during her recent decades of continuous, astounding economic tour de force amidst the stagnation of the modernisation and democratisation of her political structure and sociopolitical power configuration, and the rise of her influence in the global system.

Keywords: China, Chinese Communist Party, State, civil society, dissent, dissidents, weiquan, rights-defence lawyers, labour activism, liberal democracy, totalitarianism, authoritarianism, “One Belt, One Road”, “Maritime Silk Road”, “soft power”

JEL classification: D73, D74, F52, H12

1. Political Governance and Strategic Relations: China in the Asia-Pacific

The present volume, China amidst Competing Dynamics in the Asia-Pacific: National Identity, Economic Integration and Political Governance, represents a special issue of Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal (CCPS) that focuses on the interconnecting issues related to the competing ideational forces of regional integration and distinctive nationalism within the context of the political and socioeconomic development of mainland China specifically, as well as in comparison with Taiwan. As Professor Samuel C.Y. Ku, director of the Institute of China and Asia-Pacific Studies (ICAPS) at Taiwan’s National Sun Yat-
sen University (NSYSU) and convener of the 2015 Sizihwan International Conference on Asia-Pacific Studies, “Identity and Integration: Competing Dynamics in Asia-Pacific”\(^1\), remarks in the convening preamble to the conference, the competition between these two ideational forces “has manifested in the region’s political evolution, economic development, and strategic configuration” which on the one hand call for closer inter-state policy coordination and institutional cooperation, while on the other hand have the region witnessing “the popularization of countervailing demands for demarcation and distinction based upon national, racial, ethnic, and class identities”. The twelve articles featured in this special issue of \textit{CCPS}, with the exception of the two \textit{Special Features} and two \textit{Policy Comments}, represent new versions of selected papers among the many that were originally presented at the said conference, duly revised by incorporating critical peer feedback received at the conference and from other reviewers. This special issue begins with a \textit{Prologue} by Lowell Dittmer, “China, Southeast Asia, and the United States”, which is based on Professor Dittmer’s keynote address to the conference. In this prologue Dittmer traces Southeast Asia’s historical role as a meeting point between East and South Asia, the beginning of modernization since Western colonialism, Japanese occupation during the Second World War, and the post-WWII dominance of the United States of America in the region and rising influence of the People’s Republic of China which has experienced increasing strategic complications with the enhancing projection of the “ASEAN Way” leading to a “ménage à trios” configuration of the strategic triangle between the US, China and ASEAN.
1.1. China, Asia-Pacific Regional Economic Integration and Cross-Strait Relations

After Professor Dittmer’s prologue, this issue’s first section *China, Asia-Pacific Regional Economic Integration and Cross-Strait Relations* begins with YuJane Chen’s article, “Asia-Pacific Regional Economic Integration: Coopetition vs. Conflict”, that brings to the fore the struggle between securing economic sovereignty and national economic development, given the differential national economic interests and the needs of protecting domestic industries, in regional trade agreements as a key strategy to attract foreign direct investment and enhance national competitiveness in the global economy with special reference to the context of the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) vs. China-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiations. Her use of the portmanteau “coopetition” (or “coopertition”, a neologism whose origin can be traced back to the second decade of 1900s), in contrast to outright conflict, points to the plausible solution in the form of “cooperative competition” within the framework of regional economic integration, a positive form of competition over benefits produced by cooperation while economic sovereignty is being preserved.

While Chen’s paper looks at the practicalities surrounding especially issues concerning claimed threat to sovereign integrity or national security from regional economic integration arrangements related to TPP and RCEP, the other two articles in this section examine the controversies around the issue of regional economic integration from the perspectives of what can be said to be the most successful of such experiences of integration, the European Union, and the European theories on this issue, with another paper looking at the effect of the Crimean crisis on military balance across the Taiwan Strait.
Wolfgang Pape in his paper, “Economic Integration and National Identity in Northeast Asia: A European Perspective”, delves into the seeming contradictions of the “Asian paradox” of the primarily market-driven and bottom-up regional economic integration (“the warm embraces that businesspeople enjoy”) vs. the almost stalemate among political leaders (projected for public consumption either through the press photo of Shinzō Abe meeting Xi Jinping showing both with grim faces looking astray or the open talk in Tokyo complaining about the “Icy Lady” of Seoul) from the perspective of the EU experience.

Similarly from a European perspective is István Csaba Moldicz’s article, “Integration and Disintegration: European Theories and Experiences in the Light of China-Taiwan Relations”, which analyses the connection between political and economic integration in the cross-Strait relations. Taking a close look at the costs and benefits of a small economy and a small democracy and the saliency of security, in particular in the context of the determinants of the costs of the provision of public goods, Moldicz critically examines the recent Western theories of regional integration which show that economic integration does not benefit every partner equally, not only for the European experience, but which could also point to further diverging economic development paths for the two sides of the Taiwan Strait thus leading to weaker and weaker commitment to strengthen political cooperation across the Strait, although according to the neofunctionalist school economic integration would ultimately spill over into political integration. The analysis leads the author to conclude that economic globalisation does not lead Taiwan back to the One-China solution, and more provocatively, as diversity and competition have been the keys to European successes, “Taiwan’s independence would be beneficial for the Greater Chinese Area, not only for Taiwan, but even for China.” While tracing the emphasis on the saliency of security (the sequence of events starting from war making to
hold off competitors, through the acquisition of capital required to wage wars to providing protection) as provided by Charles Tilly in his 1985 thesis “War making and state making as organized crime” back to earlier approaches (e.g., Machiavelli, Bismarck) with “the fear of enemy” argument which inevitably carry era-specific limitations, Moldicz nevertheless affirms the logical validity of Tilly’s argument as protection is expanded beyond military security to other spheres (which Tilly himself referred to in his later work, Coercion, capital, and European states, AD 990-1990) that serves to legitimise state-making in today’s world. However, it would be difficult to ignore that the basis of the original argument – that fear is the most effective motive in the formation and unification of a nation – nevertheless stays salient in the context of the rise of Taiwanese nationalism in facing the overshadowing, overbearing and increasingly ominous behemoth across the Strait, and of the rise of Chinese nationalism on the Mainland (as analysed by Jungmin Seo in his paper in the next section of this special issue) in facing what is perceived to be a threatening containment tactic by the US with support from her European and East Asian allies of especially Japan and Taiwan. The interesting perspective provided by Charles Tilly’s thesis especially on the nature of a “racketeer State” will be revisited later in the Policy Comments in relation to the nature of the contemporary governance model of the Chinese Communist Party in the light of the tumultuous events that unfolded during the past one year from early 2015 to the first quarter of 2016 that characterised the latest phase of volatile State-civil societal relations in the People’s Republic of China (see also Section 2 to Section 7 of this introductory article).

Also focusing on cross-Strait relations is the last paper of this section, “Crimean Crisis and Military Balance in Asia” by Yongshu Li, which deals with a rarely noticed aspect of the Crimean Crisis – beyond the dynamics among the major players of the crisis, i.e. Ukraine, the EU,
the US and Russia – that the EU, Ukraine and Russia are also major players behind the rise of China in terms of the export of defense products and military hardware to China. Noting that Professor Lowell Dittmer’s classic analog of strategic triangles used for the Cold War context “when amity and enmity were relatively stable with the USSR-US confrontational structure” became less applicable in the post-Cold War, pre-Crimean Crisis era when “the relationship among the EU, China, Russia and Ukraine – or between most states – are dynamic and fluctuant”, Li argues that with China’s intervention in the Crimean Crisis as a pivot, the strategic triangles shift with the crisis which resulted in enmity between Ukraine and Russia, and between the EU and Russia, giving rise to China’s opportunity to act as a pivot in a “romantic triangle”, thus lead to military balancing between China and Japan in East Asia.

The four papers under the section China, Asia-Pacific Regional Economic Integration and Cross-Strait Relations thus bring to the fore the critical linkages between regional economic integration as a crucial component of a nation’s foreign policy agenda and a country’s concern for national security and sovereignty, a highly sensitive issue across the Taiwan Strait given the high level of distrust in cross-Strait relations between the governments of the two polities and the rising nationalisms among the people of the two states that continue to face each other down with a remarkable degree of distaste (e.g., as reflected in a United Daily News poll in September 2015 in which the Mainland Chinese government and people were rated as “bad” rather than “good” by approximately two-to-one margins of 58% to 28% and 51% to 28% respectively, as cited in Cal Clark and Alexander C. Tan’s paper in the next section) after such a long period of political separation from Japanese occupation of Taiwan through the Cold War era to the present.
1.2. Political Governance, Identity and Nationalism: China, Taiwan and the East Asian Experiences

Moving from the wider context of regional economic integration to focus specifically on the domestic sociopolitical environment are three articles under the special issue’s next section, Political Governance, Identity and Nationalism: China, Taiwan and the East Asian Experiences. The complexity of the subject matter involved here, as related particularly to cross-Strait relations, lies to a certain extent in the difference between a nation as a cultural and ethnic entity and a state as a political and geopolitical entity, a difference which can be further seen in terms of a community of people vis-à-vis territorial sovereignty, a biopolitical concept vis-à-vis a geopolitical institution. Among the various usages of the term “state” too - including a territorial concept linked to sovereignty (a body politic), one of the political units composing a federation under a sovereign government, and a supreme public power within a sovereign polity/political entity – a body politic could constitute a nation (a nation-state when nation and state coincide), but it could also be otherwise – the case of a truncated nation, leading to movements of revanchism (to regain lost territories) and irredentism (to acquire territory considered formerly part of the fatherland) as advocated by nationalist and pan-nationalist movements, involving identity politics, and cultural and political geography. While it is apparent that all the above-mentioned elements are pertinent in the relations between currently increasingly authoritarian one-party ruled mainland China and vibrantly democratic Taiwan, we can further question the essence of the nationalist claims on both sides of the Strait by taking into consideration Benedict Anderson’s thesis of an “imagined community”. In his 1983/1991 thesis, Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism, Anderson defines a nation as a
community socially constructed and ultimately *imagined* by the people who perceive themselves as part of that group and “regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible […] for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings” (Anderson, 1991: 6-7). The sovereignty of a nation-state is imagined, according to Anderson, because the concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm, giving rise to the national dreams of freedom whose gage and emblem were the sovereign state. Similarly, other historicist (in contrast to the primordialists) like Ernest Gellner (1983) and Eric Hobsbawm (1990) also posit that nations and nationalism are products of modernity and have been created as means to political and economic ends, and the nation, assuming the nineteenth-century conceptual entity of a nation-state, is the product of nationalism – but not vice versa – through the unification of various peoples into a common society or community.

Setting the context of this section is Jungmin Seo’s article “Nationalism, Nationalistic *Demos* and Democracy: East Asian Experiences” in which, using the experiences of nationalistic fever in Japan in the 1930s and South Korea in the 1980s to reflect on contemporary Chinese neo-nationalism, starting from the sensational boom of “Say No” publications in the mid-1990s through the world attention-grabbing series of nationalistic *demos*, i.e. demonstrations in support of nationalistic causes or in opposition to infringement on such claims, e.g. the massive street protests in 1999 and 2002 against the US, in 2005 against Japan, in 2008 against France and Carrefour from cyber-protest to product boycott, etc., he foresees that the surge of nationalistic sentiments from the bottom up in the Chinese society is set to pose a
threat to the domestic stability managed by the Chinese Communist Party which continues to monopolise political rule of China by brute force. Questioning the applicability of the Eurocentric perspectives of Benedict Anderson and Eric Hobsbawm which see the nationalist projects of nation-making invariably creating “a homogeneous – either real or fictive – population inspired by a strong sense of belonging to the national community” resulting in “the creation of national subjects who are willing to fight and die for the state that manipulates the symbolism of the nation”, Seo finds that while both the Japanese and Korean states just like their Western counterparts “were eager to produce a homogeneous and loyal population through massive state projects of nation-making”, his study of Japan of the 1930s and South Korea of the 1980s shows “a hidden face of nationalism – the more nationalized, the more rebellious – as the nationalized subjects claimed ownership of the state”. Believing that currently prevailing academic debates centred on the effectiveness of Chinese nationalism, including the expansion of patriotic education and popularisation of anti-Japanese war memories, deeply reflect Euro-centric experiences, in particular those of Nazism and Fascism, his study of the experiences of Japan and South Korea seems to suggest that the only outcome that can be predicted from the surge of nationalism as in today’s China “is the vitiated and weakened state capability to control the ideological realm of the society”. This interesting perspective on changing State capacity will be revisited later in the Policy Comments in a discussion on the “degenerative totalitarian” nature of the Chinese State and its connection with tendencies towards a mode of governance with strengthening features of Fascism (see also Section 2 to Section 7 of this introductory article).

Looking more closely at these issues of national identity and its connection with mode of political governance on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait respectively are the other two papers of this section, Cal
Clark and Alexander C. Tan’s “Identity and Integration as Conflicting Forces Stimulating the Sunflower Movement and the Kuomintang’s Loss in the 2014 Elections” and Alexey Alexandrovich Semenov’s “Development of Democratic Processes in the People’s Republic of China: Prospects of Transformation of the Political Regime”.

Clark and Tan find that while the clash between the need for economic integration with mainland China and a strengthening Taiwanese identity seems to have resulted in the preeminence of the later (even more evident now with the astounding DPP electoral landslide win in the 16th January 2016 elections when DPP’s Tsai Ing-wen was elected president), the mainland Chinese economy retains a major pull in Taiwan and hence the contradictory forces of integration and identity look set to continue to bedevil the island nation. After all, as István Csaba Moldicz highlighted earlier in his paper in the preceding section, the successful cooperation across the Taiwan Strait under the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) that has boosted trade and investment relations since 2011 between the two countries and relying on the rapid mainland Chinese economic growth have undeniably constituted one of the reasons why the island nation had been able to avoid falling into severe economic recession after the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-2009.

While Clark and Tan focus on the sociopolitical development on the Taiwan island, Alexey Alexandrovich Semenov looks at the difficult question concerning the political future of China and the possibility of its democratisation. Given that the Chinese leadership has proclaimed a war on “Western values”, in other words those features that characterise North Atlantic liberal democracies (including tolerance of dissent, a free press and the constitutional separation of powers), Semenov believes that the question of democratisation in China is fully in the hands of the ruling Communist Party. What is at stake, however, extends far beyond
China’s borders, in view of the high level of China’s involvement in the global processes and the East Asian giant’s enormous demographic potential.

Hence, the seven papers under the two sections above taken together provide a critical analysis of the consequential dynamics of the two competing strands of forces: the pushing force of regional integration, and the pulling force of national identity, which Professor Samuel Ku identified in the convening preamble to the 2015 Sizihwan International Conference on Asia-Pacific Studies, the competition between which has underlined the political evolution, economic development, and strategic configuration of the Asia-Pacific region, and more specifically as the focus of this special issue, mainland China and Taiwan.

In addition to the two sections above based on the 2015 Sizihwan International Conference on Asia-Pacific Studies, this special issue also contains two special featured research reports and two policy commentaries.

1.3. Special Featured Reports

The two special featured reports by Hara Fujio and Sun Jingxian take us back to that turbulent era of the early decades following the Communist Party’s conquest of mainland China, and an era during which Southeast Asia was embroiled in sociopolitical upheaval caused by the post-War decolonisation process and the rise of left-wing activism encouraged and supported by the socialist revolutionary movement in China’s civil war and later the newly established Communist Party ruling regime of mainland China under the fervent revolutionary leadership of Chairman Mao, and the Soviet government of Stalinist USSR.

Hara Fujio in his paper, “Literators of the Feng Xia”, studies the complex relationship between two factions of left-wing ethnic Chinese writers in Malaya (the China-oriented vs. the Malaya-oriented) during
the early post-War years. Hara’s research also provides valuable insights into how the rift between these two groups gradually widened and deepened, and how their activities were forced to come to an end through deportation by the colonial authorities – first the Malaya-oriented group regarded as a direct threat to the colonial authorities soon after the proclamation of Emergency in Malaya in 1948, and later the China-oriented faction too by 1950 after the eventual banning of the papers of the China Democratic League (CDL) among whose strong supporters was the well-known overseas Chinese leader and entrepreneur Tan Kah Kee.

In his research report “Population Change during China’s ‘Three Years of Hardship’ (1959-1961)”, Sun Jingxian takes a revisionist stance against the widely accepted view that around thirty million people died of starvation from 1959 to 1961 as a result of Mao Zedong’s disastrous “Great Leap Forward” industrialisation fiasco. Arguing that any research on the famine deaths should not and cannot be separated from the larger context and the discussion of anomalous population change both before and after the Great Leap Forward, Sun analyses the dramatic discrepancies in demographic statistics during those “Three Years of Hardship” and their causes based on the changing patterns of China’s household registration system to gain reliable knowledge of the country’s population changes during that period, and comes up with a revised famine death toll of about 3.66 million. Given the tragic significance of the “Great Leap Forward” in the contemporary history of the rule of the Chinese Communist Party, with the widely accepted death toll estimates ranging from 18 million to over 42 million (or a mid-estimate of around 30 million) which besides mainly deaths from starvation also include millions who were beaten or tortured to death and million others who committed suicide, Sun’s revisionist findings are sure to attract critiques and provoke debates. In the spirit of academic
objectivity, such critiques and debates would of course be warmly welcomed, for as the author emphasises in his paper: “Debating central and related issues would be an excellent way of promoting sound further research.”

1.4. Policy Commentaries

The collection of research articles in this special issue ends with two policy commentaries. Ching Chang in his commentary “The Legal Basis of the People’s Republic of China’s East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone” explores various key legal issues surrounding mainland China’s definition of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) the country proclaimed on 23rd November 2013. Scrutinising three legal decrees adopted by mainland China in the government statement for establishing the East China Sea ADIZ and the subsequent Defense Ministry announcement of aircraft identification rules, Chang finds a failure in the construction of a legal causation relationship between the related legal codes and the establishment of the ADIZ which has led to failure to satisfy the requirements of rule of law generally exercised by the major powers in the international community. While the first policy commentary by Ching Chang focuses on the very specific piece of policy item of the PRC’s proclamation of the East China Sea ADIZ in 2013, the second policy commentary by Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh, “The Writing on the Wall: National and Global Implications of the Ruling Chinese Communist Party’s Domestic and Foreign Policies”, picks up where the subsequent sections of this introductory article leave off and attempts to interpret the PRC’s government policy development with respect to the State’s relations with the civil society since the leadership transition from Hu-Wen to Xi-Li administration by scrutinising a year of unprecedented crackdowns on civil society by the Xi Jinping administration in 2015. To be read in

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conjunction with the subsequent sections of this introductory article, Yeoh’s policy commentary, by focusing on the series of events unfolding through 2015 from the arrests of the “Feminist Five” in March, followed by the infamous crackdown on civil rights lawyers that began on 5th July and lasted till August, to the mysterious disappearance of the five owners and staff members of Hong Kong’s Mighty Current publishing company and Causeway Bay bookshop who were only to reemerge in mainland China under the custody of the Chinese authorities, to the unprecedented December crackdown on labour activists, explores the current nature of the governing regime of the Chinese Communist Party, the applicability of Charles Tilly’s concept of a “racketeer State” in this context, the domestic implications of the global reach of China’s economic might and soft power in this regard, and whether China is currently treading a solitary and dangerous path from a “degenerative totalitarian” mode of governance (Hsu, 2003) towards a uniquely repressive capitalist polity essentially Fascist in nature.


While providing a critical analysis of the consequential dynamics of the two competing forces of regional integration and national identity the competition between which has underlined the political evolution, economic development, and strategic configuration of, more specifically as the focus of this special issue, mainland China and Taiwan, as well as cross-Strait relations, it is undeniable that these issues very much depend on the political and socioeconomic development of the demographically, economically and militarily gigantic player, the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Sections 2 to 7 of this introductory article thus aim to
provide an analysis of the latest sociopolitical milieu of the PRC as a backdrop against which the events, issues and problems addressed by the articles in this special issue take place, in terms of both the country’s domestic State-societal relations, her global politico-economic power projection as well as how her international power tour de force is impacting upon her domestic political governance.

2. From Hu-Wen to Xi-Li Administration: Surprising Disillusionment or Teleological Inevitability?

In their cynical take of the teleological hopes invested in the presumed apparent continuous transition of the People’s Republic of China from authoritarianism to liberal democracy just like what went through with her East Asian neighbouring polities, especially South Korea and Taiwan, Dirlik and Prazniak (2012) ask three questions: “First is the relationship to the legacies of the revolution of the Party and the people at large, including many dissidents, which is hardly the one-dimensional relationship it is often assumed to be. Second is the relationship of questions of repression and dissent in the PRC to its structural context within global capitalism [...] finally, is there a case to be made that the PRC is better off exploring socialist alternatives in economy, society and politics than emulating models whose future is very much in question, in which case critique should be directed at holding the Party to its promise of socialism rather than its failures to live up to the examples of those who themselves are in retreat from democracy?”

Dirlik and Prazniak’s first two questions can be viewed in an integrated context, for State governance and civil societal response in today’s China are intrinsically inseparable while opponents of the continuing political monopoly of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)⁴ have increasingly based their challenge upon the mounting
socioeconomic injustice under CCP rule in the post-Mao era, in facing the “increasing legitimacy” of the Party’s authoritarian grip following the last more than three decades’ miraculous economic success of the “China model”. This has resulted in a complex situation wherein while the PRC “presently suffers from severe economic and social inequality that may be sustained only by political repression”:

It is frequently overlooked, however, that economic and social inequality are products of the very development policies for which the PRC is widely admired. The ironic consequence is that criticism directed at the PRC for its democratic deficit is more than compensated for by pressures to keep up a pattern and pace of development that gives priority to its functioning within the global system over the economic and political welfare of the population. Indeed, the “China Model” has more than a few admirers who look to it with envy against the “inefficiencies” thrown up by popular pursuit of justice in democratic societies.

(Dirlik and Prazniak, 2012: 287)

Seen in this context, the teleological inevitability implicit in the democracy activists’ claim sounds equally hollow in view of the CCP’s continuing upholding of its now ragtag socialist flag in justifying its “moral obligation” to perpetuate its political monopoly, for as Dirlik and Prazniak argue:

Deepening inequality is a pervasive phenomenon of global neoliberalism, of which the PRC is an integral part. Around the globe the predicament of democracy has set off a dialectic of protest and repression that has further thrown its future into jeopardy in any but a formal sense. Within a global context in which democracy is at risk
and human rights in shambles, what does it mean for the PRC to be moving toward a more democratic regime?

(ibid.)

2.1. Perennial Hope for a Benevolent Autocrat

In an interview by Voice of America just prior to 2014’s June Fourth anniversary, veteran Tiananmen student leader Wang Dan 王丹, who holds both a Master’s degree in East Asian history (2001) and a Ph.D. (2008) from Harvard University, was asked the hypothetical question of what he would tell or wish to tell President Xi Jinping 習近平’s daughter Xi Mingze 習明澤 who was studying at Harvard if he happened to meet the latter. After expressing his lack of personal interest in Xi Mingze, Wang Dan said that, nevertheless, since her father was Xi Jinping, he would hope that she would talk properly to her father about the importance of democracy to the feeling of honour and pride of every Chinese. If Xi Jinping considered himself a Chinese, he should hope that China would be more democratic, and as the daughter of Xi Jinping and also feeling the honour of being a Chinese, added Wang Dan, Xi Mingze should persuade her father not to continue obstructing the tide of history. This would be the only way to enable every Chinese, including Xi Mingze herself, to have the true honour and pride of being a Chinese.5

Counting on a benevolent strongman (China’s millennia-long notion of a mingjun 明君, i.e. “enlightened ruler”) might sound ridiculous in other parts of this modern world, but ironically at least a Chinese Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev who is strong enough to push for real political reforms might just come in handy. Such hope for a closet Gorbachev who could be persuaded to eventually come out to do what is right when the time is ripe (or when the older and more conservative members of the politburo have retired) is real. Without economic crisis, without military defeat, any discretionary decision to move away from
the current one-party authoritarianism towards multi-party competitive liberal democracy could well be coming from a strongman’s personal political will. Nevertheless, contrary to all hopes and dreams of the democracy movement, such initiatives for political reforms, if not bottom-up, would also most likely not be top-down because the objective urgency for such changes simply does not exist at the moment in this rising superpower whose economic (and military) power advancement continues to be the object of both envy and apprehension of the world. In a country full of unprecedented hope of prosperity under a ruling Party that is ruthlessly protective of its absolute, unassailable political monopoly, yet executively efficient and currently even showing good political will in bringing corruption down to a tolerable level, why should the people at large risk chaos and bloodshed in fighting for a liberal democratic dream that has been seen to turn sour in Russia, Thailand, the Philippines, the Arab world, and even India? Why would the masses still not be contented with this, as Aldous Huxley calls it in his 1946 foreword to *Brave new world* (1932), “welfare-tyranny of Utopia” – a totalitarianism “called into existence by the social chaos […] and developing, under the need for efficiency and stability”? “You pays your money and takes your choice”, shrugs Huxley, metaphorically.6

After all, there are “enormous pressures in all human societies to go along”, as the late Roger Joseph Ebert, American historian, journalist, screenwriter and author and the first film critic to win the Pulitzer Prize for Criticism, ruminates, “Many figures involved in the recent [late 2008] Wall Street meltdown have used the excuse, ‘I was only doing my job. I didn’t know what was going on.’ President Bush led us into war on mistaken premises, and now says he was betrayed by faulty intelligence. U.S. military personnel became torturers because they were ordered to. Detroit says it was only giving us the cars we wanted. The Soviet Union functioned for years because people went along. China still does […]

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Most people, most of the time, all over the world, choose to go along. We vote with the tribe.”

2.2. “Withinputs” and External Efficacy

With intense repression beginning to target dissidents such as rights-defence lawyer Xu Zhiyong 許志永, founder of the Chinese New Citizens’ Movement (Zhongguo Xin Gongmin Yundong 中国新公民运动) and other human rights lawyers, even early in Xi Jinping’s presidency in 2013 (President Xi assumed office on 15th November 2012, taking over from Hu Jintao 胡锦涛) the liberals in the country have already expressed their disappointment with him and no longer expected that he was going to initiate significant political reforms, mainly due to the circumstances he waded into which his Maoist experience did not prepare him to deal with otherwise. With the intention “to exploit the combat of corruption and serious economic reforms to enhance the Party regime’s legitimacy and his own popularity, he needs to tackle the resistance of strong vested interests and therefore he has to strengthen his own personal control”, notes Professor Joseph Yu-shek Cheng 鄭宇碩 of the City University of Hong Kong (香港城市大學), making Xi want to follow the example of Vladimir Putin and not that of Mikhail Gorbachev, as his critics believe (Cheng, 2014: 339).

Neoinstitutionalist theorists proclaim that government institutions or structures tend to take on lives of their own and shape the behaviour and attitudes of the people within them, especially those who benefit from them. Whimsical optimists, who earlier bet on the long-awaited emergence of leaders free from traditional CCP totalitarian/authoritarian mindset or being closet democrats, now disillusioned with Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang 李克强, may take comfort in such neoinstitutionalist pessimism. This is not something that can be simplistically explained away by applying English historian and politician John Emerich Edward
Dalberg-Acton (Lord Acton)’s dictum: “Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Great men are almost always bad men.” Modern governments work more like systems with a lot more occurring than simply the processing of outside demands – late Professor David Easton’s “withinputs” construct laying emphasis on pressures from various parts of government. This can be portrayed by shifting the box depicting the political system or conversion process of government decision-makers at the centre of Figure 1 to the left end as the direct recipient of inputs in the form of society’s demands and supports via the feedback loop. In this case, government decisions and actions generated from the box will lead to outputs and then through the conditioning of the social, economic and political environment produce results which give rise to inputs, now positioned at the right end of the diagram, in the form of society’s demands and supports (if we disregard the possible apathy), for the government decision-makers via the feedback loop.

However, while in the case of a one-party authoritarian state like PRC the “black box” of the government conversion process has to remain opaque or completely impenetrable, it does not mean that such government is only talking to itself and completely short-circuiting the feedback loop from the citizens as depicted in Easton’s theory. Economic success and expanding national wealth have enabled the authoritarian one-party State to be seen responsive to the citizens’ economic aspirations – in Easton’s terms, citizens’ demands, at least on the economic side, are recognised by the government decision-makers and processed, through the black box of conversion process into authoritative decisions and actions (“outputs”, in Easton’s terms). While civil societal groups’ assertion of pressures are frowned upon and met with stern government crackdowns, which are increasingly draconian under the Xi Jinping administration, be they upon non-governmental organisation (NGO) leaders, civil rights lawyers or labour activists,
Figure 1 David Easton’s Application of Systems Theory to Political Science

Environment → The Political System → Outputs

Inputs: Demands → Support → Decisions and actions

Environment

Source: Easton (1965: 32)

the CCP State has at the same time been observed to be keen in responding to the society’s grievances, not least reflected in the Xi administration’s remarkably bold action against corruption, leading to the observation that this authoritarian State sometimes looks as if higher in external efficacy than that of some vibrant liberal democracies.

2.3. “Seven Dangerous Western Values”

An admirer of Mao, Xi Jinping has upped the ante on his credential as an exemplar leader of a totalitarian regime by shortly after taking over power having his government issuing directives dictating the “correct” pro-CCP ideology that has to be unquestioningly followed by party members, university lecturers, students, researchers and journalists, and
setting limits to discussions among university teachers and in the official media, thus turning “topics including universal values, freedom of the media, civil society, civil rights, independence of the judiciary, the Party’s historical mistakes and the power elite bourgeois class” into taboos, and severely attacking “historical nihilism” which refers to “the denials and criticisms of the Party’s established positions on various historical questions, especially the attacks on Mao and Mao Zedong Thought” (Cheng, 2014: 338). Referred to here are seven dangerous Western values warned of in a confidential internal document known as “Document No. 9” first published in July 2012: 1) constitutional democracy, 2) universal values of human rights, 3) civil society, 4) pro-market neo-liberalism, 5) media independence, 6) historical nihilism, i.e. criticisms of past errors, and 7) questioning the “Reform and Opening” policy, which represent the Xi administration’s tightening of thought control by including new topics that were previously not considered off-limits.

In this repressive atmosphere, civil rights activists and their family members were targeted “for harassment, arbitrary detention, legally baseless imprisonment, torture, and denial of access to adequate medical treatment” which, in a most well-known case, tragically led to the death in March 2014 of lawyer and grassroots human rights activist Cao Shunli 曹顺利 who while in detention was denied access to adequate health care even though she was seriously ill until it was too late when she was finally transferred from detention to a hospital. On the cyber front, influential weibo 微博 (China’s Internet weblog) bloggers were warned of writing about politics or making statements contradicting official narratives, or risked arrest or even imprisonment under a new law enacted in September 2013 against “defamatory” posts.
2.4. “New Five Black Types” and the Intensification of Repression

In an eye-catching article “Zhongguo zhenzheng de tiaozhan zai nali 中国真正的挑战在哪裡” [Where lie China’s real challenges?] by Yuan Peng 袁鹏, director of the Institute of American Studies at the Academy of Contemporary International Relations (中國現代國際關係研究院美國所), published on 31st July 2012 in the overseas edition of the Renmin Ribao 人民日報 (People’s Daily), rights-defending lawyers (weiquan lüshi 維權律師), dissidents, recusant underground religious groups (supposed to refer mainly to the unregistered, illegal Catholic and Protestant churches outside the government-sanctioned official/ “patriotic” churches), disadvantaged groups and leaders of the netizens are grouped as the five types of people acting as the channels through which the United States is infiltrating China’s grassroots to bring about change from bottom up.\(^\text{11}\)

Besides the timing of the appearance of the article – just prior to CCP’s 18th National Congress – the accusative warning brought back memory of Mao’s “five black types” (hei wu lei 黑五類, i.e. landlords, wealthy peasants, anti-revolutionaries, bad elements and rightists) during the Cultural Revolution and hence the article’s five categories are referred to by some readers as the “new five black types”. The accusation is ominous, and placing civil rights lawyers at the top of the list could be a warning that State repression would be intensified upon those in the legal profession who dare to defend in court those dissidents that the State is going after or to take up civil rights cases against the routine State persecution in the name of weiwen 維穩 (maintaining stability) and hexie 和諧 (“harmony” – the Party-State’s euphemism for censorship and muzzling of dissent). On the other hand, grouping together the different strands of dissent as targets to suppress also reflects a certain degree of concern over the potential threat posed to the
one-party State by a better coalescence of these different strands of dissent to form a common front in the pursuit of some transplanted “velvet” or “jasmine” revolution.

2.5. The Bigger Picture

Indeed, miraculous economic performance and urban modernisation accompanied by uncontrolled widening socioeconomic inequalities and the lack of rule of law (and often “lawless” local governments especially in the cases of the suppression of local civil rights activists and demolition of residential houses to make way for lucrative property development) have characterised the past more than three decades of Chinese development during the market-reform era. The problem is often blamed on Deng Xiaoping 鄧小平’s “Let some people get rich first” (讓一部分人先富起來) directive and the rugged capitalist approach to economic reform. However, as argued by Dirlik and Prazniak (2012), the issue at hand is bigger than just the misconduct of the local cadres or the nature of the political system:

[...] the most widespread causes of discontent – forceful expropriation of agricultural land, widespread dislocation of the population, severe exploitation of labour, social and spatial inequalities, corruption from the top to the bottom of the political structure, urban and rural pollution – are all entangled in the development policies that the PRC has pursued since the 1980s in its quest of “wealth and power” within the context of a neo-liberal global capitalism [...] The conversion of land into capital, the creation of a floating labour force available for this process, and the sale of cheap labour power to fuel an export-oriented economy are all aspects of capital accumulation within a globalized capitalist economy. If anything distinguishes the PRC, it is the presence of a sprawling organizational structure put in place by
the revolution that has guaranteed the efficient performance of these processes, with coercion whenever necessary.

(Dirlik and Prazniak, 2012: 295)

Besides, begging the question as to the glory of China’s success in the past decade is the apparent failure in establishing the rule of law under the Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao 胡锦濤－溫家寶 administration. The factors at work here could in fact be similar to the reasons why North Korea is so resistant to economic reform (Kim, 2012), for establishing a comprehensive framework of the rule of law could eventually harm the self-declared legitimacy of one-Party rule, jeopardise the wenwen efforts, and destabilise the sociopolitical status quo that the CCP State’s single-mindedness in pursuing greater economic prosperity, sometimes dubbed “GDPism”, has so far succeeded to maintain. An example, besides “evil laws” and hostile institutional arrangements, is “the naked violence of the State Security Division of the police, political police specialised in the suppression of political enemies of the Party[, who] are given extra-legal powers to keep their targets under round-the-clock surveillance, and even engage in kidnapping and physical assault on their targets, some of whom include rights defense lawyers” (Feng, Hawes and Gu, 2012: 331):

Many rights defence lawyers have become victims of these “evil laws” and hostile institutional arrangements. More often than not, the cases represented by rights defence lawyers are those sensitive cases avoided by ordinary lawyers and it is almost impossible for the rights defence lawyers and their clients to win the cases of this nature. Worse still, many defence lawyers representing those sensitive cases have been turned into defendants themselves by the state procurators on the charges [of] fabricating evidence, leaking state secrets or inciting
subversion of state power [...] And in the most recent government pre-emptive strike on Middle Eastern-style protests in connection with an online call to gather in public places – the so-called Jasmine Spring of 2011 – rights lawyers have again become major targets of intimidation and abuse.

(ibid.)

Zhang Wei 张煒, a senior research fellow at University of Nottingham’s China Policy Institute, in an interview by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) in 2012, rejected the popular claim that the Hu-Wen administration was responsible for the past decade of China’s unprecedented economic growth which he attributed instead to the economic reforms arduously engineered by earlier leaders in the 1980s and 1990s whose cumulative benefits were being reaped later by the Hu-Wen administration. On the contrary, the Hu-Wen administration were characterised in the past decade by its lack of any substantial reforms in economic or political institutions, as well as by the most draconian State control of society including the worst repression on civil rights activists and press freedom since the 1980s, which as Dirlik and Prazniak observe, combined to contribute to the complication of the overall problem of repression and dissent in the PRC:

Despite state pretensions to legality, the “crimes” for which intellectuals such as Ai Weiwei, Chen Guangcheng and Liu Xiaobo have been harassed, condemned, incarcerated and tortured (sometimes to death, as in the recent case of Li Wangyang) do not go beyond testing the limits of restrictive laws and even greater restrictiveness in their application. Restrictions on speech supposedly guaranteed by the PRC’s own constitution are routine practice. Unemployed peasant workers are employed by the authorities to provide round-the-clock
surveillance of victims whose only crime is to transgress against what
the authorities deem the limits of speech or to pursue justice in the
courts. The Party does not hesitate to resort to thuggery in order to
enforce arbitrary restrictions. It is little wonder that the internal
security budget of the PRC is larger than its defense budget.

(Dirlik and Prazniak, 2012: 288)

Far from being comparable with earlier leaders like Deng Xiaoping or
even Jiang Zemin 江泽民 and Zhu Rongji 朱镕基 in terms of reform
efforts, according to Zhang Wei, the Hu-Wen administration are directly
responsible for the acute social contradictions resulted especially from
spiraling income and wealth disparities.12 This would not come as a
surprise, as Dirlik and Prazniak remind us “that most of the criticism[s]
directed against the PRC for its ‘socialist’ failures overlooks the
fundamental national interest that guides the Communist regime’s
domestic and foreign policies, including the repressive exploitation of its
own population in the name of development and security.” (ibid.: 293,
italics added)

2.6. “Rule of Law” = “Rule of the Party”?

It would not be from a balanced perspective if all these aberrations and
inhuman consequences of GDPism are blamed on State-business
collusion and corruption, and the local governments’ weiwen overdrive.
After all, many cash-trapped and debt-ridden local governments might
have no choice but to heavily rely on developmental projects for their
revenues13 in this vast polity said to be the world’s most economically
decentralised country14 where the centre expects relative self-sufficiency
of the local economy whether at the provincial level or the county level
and the local governments are expected to be fully responsible for the
launching and coordination of local reforms, for local economic
development, and for legislation and law enforcement within their respective jurisdictions. Putting such context together with the country’s acute interlocal and interregional economic disparity, it will not be surprising to see inhuman forced demolitions becoming the rule of the day to make way for lucrative property development, or even manufacturing and mining ventures with little regard for human lives, labour rights and environmental consequences. Under such circumstances, these State actions of course unavoidably need to be coercive, leading to protests and resistance from the affected masses, which in turn lead to more repression in the name of weiwen including kidnappings, beatings, lock-ups and even murders, in the harsh environment of a legal system hostile and harmful not only to the rights defense movements but also the rights defense lawyers:

There are notorious “evil laws” against lawyers on the books, in particular against those perceived to be rights defence lawyers. In the Criminal Procedure Law, there are discriminatory provisions imposing onerous limitations on lawyers in meeting with their clients, accessing evidence, and investigating facts. The Criminal Law includes broad and vague provisions about “state secrets” that have been cited to prevent lawyers from investigating and obtaining a whole range of evidence. Most notorious is Article 306 of the Criminal Law with regards to “fabricating evidence”, which makes lawyers’ position disturbingly precarious and has been arbitrarily used to charge hundreds of lawyers in general and convict many high profile rights defence lawyers in particular.

(Feng, Hawes and Gu, 2012: 330)

While the Fourth Plenary Session of the 18th Party Congress held in October 2014 will probably go down in the history of the PRC as the
first time for a Party session to centre on strengthening the rule of law – according to the official Xinhua News Agency, “to speed up the construction of governance by law from the top level and by improving the system to promote social justice of the country”\textsuperscript{15}, the Global Times (寰球時報, a daily Chinese tabloid under the auspices of the Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily)) reminded its readers “that the rule of law should only be advanced by the rule of the Party and there are CPC fundamentals that should not be overridden”\textsuperscript{16}, or to put it more bluntly, that the Communist Party of China, like the Sons of Heaven in the Chinese imperial dynasties, is above the rule of law.

The labour activism blog \textit{Chuang} 鬥, in its analysis of the 3rd December 2015 crackdown on worker’s groups\textsuperscript{17}, somehow sees this development as still an encouraging sign:

[…] in the way the law is being used in this crackdown, we see an attempt to set a \textit{legal} precedent for repression and \textit{enhance} a certain rule of law, rather than an unlawful abuse of state power, such as the conventional beating or disappearing of activists without legal procedures […] We thus regard it as significant and necessary to explain why the state has now bothered to conduct extensive investigations into these activists in order to build legal cases against them. The reasons behind this may include the activists’ refusal to stop their workers-support activities after being beaten up, or the state’s desire to create a highly visible precedent, sending out a loud and clear message that certain forms of labor activism are illegal – or may run the risk of being treated as such. In any case, it is important to mark the difference between these legal charges and the mere hiring of thugs.
Panyu Dagongzu Service Center (番禺打工族服務部) staffer Zeng Feiyang 曾飛洋, a former corporate lawyer-turned grassroots labour organiser – who was among the seven workers-activists detained in the unprecedented December 2015 crackdown in Guangdong Province on some of China’s most effective independent labour organisations known as worker centres – has already earlier been, following his assistance in coordinating a major strike at a Guangdong shoe factory in late 2014, attacked by unidentified assailants in addition to his arrest and being threatened by police. Another activist among those arrested, Peng Jiayong 彭家勇 of the Panyu-based Laborer Mutual Aid Group (勞動者互助小組), was earlier assaulted by eight unidentified men and severely injured in April 2014.19

The Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions’ online petition, signed by numerous human-rights groups and European and Asian labour organisations, warns that while the Chinese government “purports to advance the ‘rule of law’ within its borders and promotes the idea of a civilised and peaceful rise internationally […] , local governments abuse their power, using violence and arrests to repress and intimidate labour organisations, preventing Chinese workers from pursuing fundamental labour rights.”20 While such crackdown and harassments can be blamed on the local government-business-underworld collusion, it is difficult to believe that these clampdowns are not having tacit endorsement or even planned from the higher level of government, which serves to expose the hypocrisy of CCP government’s “socialist rule of law with Chinese characteristics” pledge at the party’s 2014 annual plenum that ended on 23rd October, the CCP Central Committee promised to be implemented by 2020.

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2.7. Assault on Independent Unionisation

With labour unrest in China’s industrialising south spreading like wildfire lately – the Hong Kong 香港-based watchdog group China Labour Bulletin (中國勞工通訊, founded in 1994 by labour activist and post-1989 Beijing massacre exile Han Dongfang 韓東方) reported labour protest incidents in Guangdong spiking from 23 in July to 56 in November 201521 – the independent labour activists’ attempt at independent unionisation of such “work centres” has become such a thorn in the CCP government’s side while the Party is struggling to maintain its tight Fascist Francoesque corporatist control22 over labour through the management-aligned official union system. The latter, in the form of the government-run union apparatus, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), typically serves to neutralise disputes on management’s behalf and in cases of worker uprising, such as the massive Yue Yuen 裕元 shoe factory strikes in 2014, acts to co-opt workers’ industrial action to help the authorities to quash the workers’ protests. As Hong Kong-based labour scholar Anita Chan succinctly put it, “the [official union] doesn’t do anything” to promote workers’ interests23, but that is exactly a major, indispensable part of the Fascist corporatist agenda.

It is in this environment that the “work centres” serve to actively help workers to bypass the official trade union entirely and organise strikes and protests themselves in pursuit of better pay and conditions and to get redress over unpaid wages, factory closures, mergers and relocations especially when the new phenomenon of “precarisation” besetting the working class spreads as the predicament of the “proletariat” now declines further into that of the “precariats” (Standing, 2011). In China these victims of “precarity” are particularly exemplified by the million of mingong 民工 (formerly known as nongmingong 農民
– the rural-to-urban migrant labour who are increasingly habituated, as Guy Standing points out in his 2011 book, The precariat: The new dangerous class, to expecting and living as urban factory workers who were unstable and unregulated, at times being exploited by capital if they found employment, at times being excluded completely by capital if they did not. In other words, the “China Model” miracle of rapid development has been built upon what a critic called “low human rights advantage”24 and on exploitation of workers in the name of socialism:

Despite the ideological and organizational particularities of the PRC that are products of its revolutionary history, the accumulation of capital over the last three decades have been marked by class formations and relationships characteristic of the “primitive accumulation” of capital elsewhere. The distinction of the regime, derivative of its claims to socialism, is almost total control of resources, including labour, which under this “workers’ state” is not allowed to represent itself because it is already represented by the “socialist” regime.

(Dirlik and Prazniak, 2012: 296)

And this exploitation, like that described towards the end of George Orwell’s political satire Animal farm (1945), is conducted with the complicity of global capital:

Domestic accumulation has been achieved through the conversion of land into capital, in the process releasing huge amounts of cheap and controlled labour-power that then was put to use in the construction of cities, infrastructure projects, and industries. This labouring population also provided the workers and large numbers of women in export production financed by foreign and domestic capital that would
make China into the “factory of the world”, and a major depository of
global capital.

(Dirlik and Prazniak, 2012: 296)

Hence, the present crackdown simply reveals the dilemma of CCP’s
goal of holding on to its political monopoly by relying on an obedient
workforce to support its over-riding priority of high growth and
semblance of prosperity in order to continue sustaining its performance-
based legitimacy. Crackdown on the “worker centres” thus becomes
necessary.

2.8. From “Feminist Five” to “Guangdong Six”: A New Modus
Operandi?

The December crackdown on labour activists was the culmination of a
year of the CCP regime’s war on China’s civil society kicked off with
the arrests of the “Feminist Five” (women’s rights activists Zheng
Churan 鄭楚然, Wei Tingting 韋婷婷, Li Tingting 李婷婷, Wu
Rongrong 吳蘿蘿, and Wang Man 王曼) in March 2015 in
Beijing 北京, Guangzhou 廣州, Hangzhou 杭州 and Yunnan 雲南.
While the five were later released, a number of anti-discrimination
organisations related to Yirenping 益仁平, the anti-discrimination
organisation in which some of the Feminist Five had been involved,
were investigated in May and June and some leaders were detained
while Yirenping itself was declared illegal by the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs in April. Many other NGOs were also harassed and asked to
cancel their registrations. Also in May and June cases of the dissidents
Jia Lingmin 賈靈敏 and Tang Jingling 唐荆陵 consecutively went to
trial and another dissident Wu Gan 吳淦 and some petitioners from
Shandong were detained. These were followed by the infamous
crackdown on civil rights lawyers that began on 5th July and lasted till
August. There was a hiatus from August to October 2015, the months that saw the 3rd September military parade in Beijing to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the end of the Pacific war (i.e. the Japanese invasion) and CCP leaders’ state visits to US and Europe. Then the relative calm was broken by the unprecedented crackdown on labour activists with the arrest of the “Guangdong Six”\(^{25}\) in December.

As a critic describes:

It is as if someone is cleaning out their house and takes a momentary break to visit some friends. He puts down whatever he is doing and closes the door (human rights lawyers were not allowed to leave the country during this time), and leaves the house. After fulfilling his social obligations, he returns home and with one hand, sets his automated machine to the “clean” function, and with the other hand, throws out the pre-packed garbage.\(^{26}\)

And in what looks like a throwback to the times of the imperial dynasties:

The authorities treat the country simply as their home, diminishing any distinction between governance of a country, and ownership of a home [...] Such a regime disposes of anything or anybody that displeases or contradicts it. The terrifying reality is that such a regime appears limitless, given that it gets rid of anything that threatens its stability and security.

Civil rights organizations, independent research institutes, anti-discrimination organizations, human rights lawyers and grassroots activists have been swept away. Now, it is time for the labor organizations to be attacked. Soon enough, the government will have its clean slate.\(^{27}\)
Ever since the cases related to Hong Kong’s “Umbrella Movement” (the November 2014 trial of Xie Wenfei 謝文飛 and Wang Mo 王默, supporters of the Hong Kong “Umbrella Movement” who were arrested with several others on charges of “inciting subversion of state power”), it has been observed that the authorities seem to have changed their *modus operandi* from a “stabilisation” (維穩模式) strategy whereby the local authorities decided their own course of action, to one of “national security” (國安模式) whereby the central government began to centralise coordination of the whole country’s security measures.²⁸

2.9. Leninist Fascist Corporatism

With the continuing economic downturn expectedly increasing the likelihood of worker struggles, workers’ self-organised collective bargaining outside the control of the CCP-sanctioned official union is obviously deemed dangerous to CCP’s well-planned Francoesque Fascist “vertical trade unionism”. The concept of “vertical trade union” was a creation of Francoism in 1940 inspired by the ideas of José Antonio Primo de Rivera according to whom class struggle would be ended by grouping together workers and company owners based on corporative principles, thus creating the sole legal trade union which was under government control, while other unions were forbidden and repressed along with political parties outside the ruling regime of the Fascist Franquist state. It is not difficult to discern a parallel in today’s Leninist Fascist corporatist politico-economic structure maintained by the post-Mao CCP regime in China under the euphemism “market socialism with Chinese characteristics”.

The Chinese working class movement blog *Chuang* in late December 2015 published an analysis of the 3rd December crackdown.²⁹ Firstly, *Chuang* notes the unprecedented nature of the crackdown in the
number of workers’ organisations and individuals targeted at the same time – five worker-support organisations being raided on 3rd December 2015 and the following days, and at least 40 of their staff, affiliated workers and family members taken in for questioning – and in the severity of criminal charges brought against half a dozen of them who later remained in custody that “could result in lengthy prison sentences, setting a legal precedent for more intense repression in the future”. Chuang sees the arrests as the latest in a series of suppressions of workers’ groups and more broadly civil societal movement in general, exemplified by the crackdown on the New Citizens’ Movement, that has intensified since the 2012 CCP leadership transition, and this unprecedented repression on worker-support organisations represents “part of a dual strategy also attempting to integrate some of those oppositional forces, and to channel popular discontent into institutions it can control, such as the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) and affiliated ‘social work’ centers”.

2.10. Socioeconomic Determinants

Chuang highlights these worker-support organisations’ increasing focus on “political” issues – rather than targeting just individual private employers for wage demands, they are increasingly targeting also the State in struggles regarding social insurance and the outsourcing arrangements of local state services such as sanitation – that the government finds more threatening than merely economic matters as an explanation for the intensification of repression. However, Chuang further points out that the crucial determining factors were actually the slowing of economic growth in China (as well as globally) and industrial relocation away from the Pearl River Delta, a region that witnessed growing worker militancy with the number of recorded strikes doubling from over 1,000 in year 2014 to over 2,000 in year 2015, according to
the Hong Kong-based China Labour Bulletin, and those in Guangdong doubling just within five months between July and November of 2015 mainly “in the manufacturing sector with workers demanding payment of wages in arrears etc. after factory closures, mergers and relocations”. These occurred with the new economic realities that saw the country experiencing growth of merely 6.9 per cent for the full year of 2015, just below the government’s target of 7 per cent, which represented the weakest performance since 1990 when foreign investment shrivelled after the 1989 deadly crackdown in Beijing.\(^{30}\) The Chinese economy grew just at 6.8 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2015 – the lowest quarterly expansion since the global financial crisis in 2009.\(^{31}\)

Placed in a broader context, Chuang notes the similarities between this increasing repression in China and developments elsewhere recently:

More directly comparable to China’s crackdown on labor activists is the recent charging of South Korea’s union federation leader with “subversion.” This was in response to protests against state reforms of the labor law, and against the rewriting of history schoolbooks attempting to whitewash Korea’s history of state repression and popular resistance. Meanwhile, in response to the Euro-crisis and struggles in Greece, the EU has imposed a technocratic redefinition of “democracy” itself. And in the historical heartland of liberal democracy, the UK is preparing a new set of laws dismantling traditional rights of workers to strike and operate through unions. As in China, these governments’ responses have occurred in the context of tightening economic conditions, making it difficult for them to simply buy consent from the protesters.
Also, the problem is in fact more general than just an urban phenomenon. In terms of the participants’ profiles, while at the beginning the people involved in the “mass incidents” which are proliferating in an exploding proportion were mainly xiagang 下岗 workers and peasants (reflecting land loss and corruption issues) but later on the list of participants expanded to include, besides xiagang workers and peasants who lost their lands, also workers, urban residents, getihu 個體戶 (private individual enterprise owners), teachers, students and a small number of ex-servicemen and cadres, etc. (Hu, Hu, He and Guo, 2009: 143), thus reflecting expanding and deepening popular interest conflicts and contradictions.

The changing and expanding class structure is not only a society-wide phenomenon but also occurring within the particular social class itself, thus making the grievances of the class-within-class even more acute. Such is the inevitable consequence of a lopsided development which while having created an urban middle class evident of developmental success and managed successfully to feed the country’s huge population, with “the second largest economy in the world, the PRC nevertheless ranks among the world’s poorest countries in terms of per capita GDP” and has most of the wealth being “concentrated in the hands of the top 20 per cent of the population, but especially the top one per cent [while the] rural population which is still the majority languishes as agriculture is commercialised, with increasing participation from agribusiness” (Dirlik and Prazniak, 2012: 297). Regarding the last point, John Donaldson and Forrest Zhang give an incisive classification of China’s farmers today into five categories based on their role as direct producers and their class relations with the agribusinesses – “commercial farmers” who work independently on allocated family land; “contract farmers” who work on allocated family land to fulfill company contracts, whose harvests are sold to the
contracting companies, and while being dominated by the companies manage to retain some flexibility; “semi-proletarian farmers with Chinese characteristics”, mainly hired villagers who work on collective land rented to companies as company employees, whose harvests belong to the company, and while being dominated by the companies manage to enjoy a degree of entitlement; “semi-proletarian farm workers”, mainly hired migrant labourers who work on company land as company employees, whose harvests belong to the companies, and while being dominated by the companies do have family land at home as a fall-back option; and “proletarian farm workers”, mainly hired landless labourers who work on company land as company employees, whose harvests belong to the companies, and who, unlike the other four categories, suffer from complete domination by the companies (Donaldson and Zhang, 2015: 57, Table 1). On the other hand, on the urban front,

[…] the population is being crammed into “megacities” beset with problems of pollution, traffic, and the yet unpredictable toll on the population of life under such circumstances. The working population is still subject to abuse at the hands of domestic and foreign corporations. Workers fight back, needless to say, and the second generation of peasant-workers are less amenable to exploitation and prejudice than their parents. Much of the repressive apparatus of the state is directed to keeping under control, with violence if necessary, protests against inequality, exploitation, unjust plunder of public resources, rights to land in particular, and environmental pollution. State terrorism against these protests includes incarceration, torture and outright murder of their leaders, with similar treatment meted out to intellectuals and lawyers who throw in their lot with popular protests.

(Dirlik and Prazniak, 2012: 297)
With the ruling one-party state facing such mounting social challenges, to believe that extra-legal repression, which Chuang admits being such a common practice in China since time immemorial, will now be a matter of the past would be highly misguided probably for the simple reason that it provides such convenience for the ruling regime – witness the recent case of the disappearance of the Causeway Bay Five.

3. “Causeway Bay Five”: The Curious Case of Disappearing Publishers and Book Distributors

On 13th November 2015, Thailand’s military junta government put China’s exiled dissident cartoonist Jiang Yefei 姜野飛, dissident and human rights activist Dong Guangping 董廣平 and Gui Minhai 桂民海, a Hong Kong publisher of books critical of the Chinese government, on a plane chartered by the Chinese government and deported them to China. For the vast Hong Kong people who are seeing the daily erosion of civil liberties and political freedoms after the ”Handover” to the “motherland” in 1997, the Thai military junta government’s complicity with the Chinese authorities in kidnapping Gui Minhai to mainland China is particularly ominous. When Gui Minhai, the China-born Swedish national and co-owner of the Mighty Current publishing company ( 巨流出版社 ) and shareholder of the Causeway Bay Books ( 銅鑼灣書店, owned by Mighty Current since 2014), known for selling books critical of the Chinese government including those published by Mighty Current, failed to return from a holiday in Thailand’s beach resort town of Pattaya in October 2015, he was the fourth person linked to the company who had disappeared in that same month. The other three disappeared in southern China were Mighty Current’s general manager and shareholder Lui Por呂波 (who logged in for the last time onto the Causeway Bay Books’ computer on 14th October before his disappearance – some sources later reported his being taken away in
Shenzhen, on 15th October), Mighty Current’s sales manager Cheung Chi- ping 张志平 (who went missing in Dongguan) and Causeway Bay Books’ manager Lam Wing-kei 林榮基 (founder of the bookstore in 1994 who sold the bookstore to Mighty Current in 2014, who was last seen in Hong Kong on 23rd October before his disappearance; his wife filed a missing persons report with the Hong Kong police on 5th November, but some sources later reported his arrest in Shenzhen on 24th October). Then on 1st January 2016, Choi Ka-ping 蔡嘉蘋 (who is one of the three shareholders of Mighty Current), the wife of the Causeway Bay Books’ major shareholder Paul Lee (or Lee Bo 李波), claimed that her husband had gone missing. Paul Lee, who holds British and Hong Kong dual nationality, was reported last seen in Hong Kong at 5 p.m. on 30th December 2015 at the bookstore’s warehouse which he is in charge of. Although Lee Bo is not the most important among the five from Mighty Current/Causeway Bay who mysteriously disappeared, his case has managed to turn the disappearances into a cause célèbre because he definitely did in fact go missing in Hong Kong (see Figure 2) which raised the dreaded spectre of the CCP regime having finally crossed the line drawn by the “one country, two systems” agreement and made cross-border arrests of Hong Kong-based dissidents.

3.1. State Gangsterism and White Terror

There has been a recent precedent, though. Another Hong Kong-based publisher, Sichuan-born Yiu Man-tin 姚文田, chief editor of Hong Kong’s Morning Bell Press (晨钟出版社) that frequently publishes books banned by China, who was about to release a book about President Xi Jinping, was reportedly “lured” to Shenzhen in October 2013, detained and sentenced in May 2014 to 10 years’ imprisonment for smuggling by a Chinese court.
Figure 2 Mighty Current and Causeway Bay Disappearances

(1) 14th October 2015 – Mighty Current publishing company’s general manager Lui Por logged in for the last time onto the Causeway Bay Books’ computer before his disappearance (and some sources later reported him being arrested in Shenzhen, Guangdong Province, China, on 15th October).

(2) 15th or 22nd October 2015 – Mighty Current publishing company’s business manager Cheung Chi-ping went missing in Dongguan, Guangdong Province, China.

(3) 17th October 2015 – Gui Minhai, co-owner of the Mighty Current publishing company and shareholder of the Causeway Bay Books, went missing while vacationing in Pattaya, Thailand.

(4) 23rd October 2015 – Causeway Bay Books’ manager Lam Wing-kei was last seen in Hong Kong before his disappearance and his wife filed a missing persons report with the Hong Kong police on 5th November (but some sources later reported he being arrested in Shenzhen on 24th October).

(5) 30th December 2015 – Causeway Bay Books’ shareholder Paul Lee (Lee Bo) went missing in Hong Kong.
Facing expressions of concern from the United States and United Kingdom over the suspected Chinese kidnapping of the Hong Kong publishers and book distributors, Beijing remained intransigent, stating that “all Hong Kong affairs belong to China’s internal matters that not any foreign countries have a right to intervene” which in a way looks like admitting that the disappearance of the Hong Kong publishers and booksellers was the work of its agents, marking the regress of the regime from what some term “degenerative totalitarianism”\textsuperscript{36} to a form of quasi-Fascist racketeer governance\textsuperscript{37}.

This was further confirmed by the Chinese government media \textit{Global Times} which published an article by its commentator Shan Renping 翟仁平 in the early hours of 4th January 2016 accusing enemies of China of trying to exploit the issue to vilify China as violating the “one country, two systems” agreement. However, it is most important to note that the article calls for a reflection of what the Causeway Bay Books has been doing which consists of almost solely publishing and selling political books related to mainland China many of which being tabloid-style publications containing maliciously made-up contents amounting to severe defamation. The article continues its vitriolic attack by accusing the Causeway Bay Books (which has one third of the market share of such “banned books” in Hong Kong) of thriving on creating chaos in mainland Chinese society by supplying “banned books” to mainland China, taking advantage of the increasing number of mainland citizens entering Hong Kong after the 1997 “Handover” who have the opportunity to buy the “banned books” and bring them back to the mainland. By essentially intervening in mainland affairs, damaging the great interest of mainland China in maintaining stability and harmony, the article condemns, it seems like the Causeway Bay Books is deliberately creating a grey area between Hong Kong and mainland China to profit through confrontational politics.
3.2. The Making of White Terror

The mystery of the disappearing publishers and book distributors afflicting Mighty Current and Causeway Bay has started to have a chilling effect, in the form of “White Terror”, upon other booksellers in Hong Kong. Hong Kong’s *Apple Daily* (蘋果日報) reported that the PageOne bookstore (葉壹堂) at Hong Kong Airport had begun to stop selling books banned by the CCP regime, and in fact not only its airport outlet but all PageOne bookstores in Hong Kong had stopped selling such books. In fact, with increasing pressure on every stage of production of these “banned books”, from author to publisher to distributor including increasing costs and rentals, maintaining their market has been facing a lot of difficulties especially since 2015, and the disappearance of the Causeway Bay owners and staff could just act as the last straw that broke the camel’s back. Admittedly, many of these “banned books”, including juicy political gossip books and exposés on Chinese leaders, are full of tabloid-style sensationalism with doubtful credibility, but there is an even larger proportion of books in bookshops like Causeway Bay which are serious political, historical and social studies on the PRC and these are also books banned by China. However, 2015, even other than the White Terror instilled by the five disappearances, has not been a kind year for distributors of such books. With China strengthening her custom checks on banned books, previously good sales of such books to information-hungry mainland tourists have dropped drastically as many such tourists no longer dare to buy those books and bring them back to the mainland. Greenfield Bookstore (田園書屋), the major distributor of such books, under rental pressure, was forced to shut down one of its two warehouses on the last day of 2015.

Following Lui Por’s “release on bail” and return to Hong Kong in the later part of March 2016\(^{38}\), Paul Lee also returned to Hong Kong on 24th March. Interviewed by the Hong Kong media, Lee said that over

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the three months when he was in China ("not being kidnapped", as he reiterated, "but back to the Mainland to assist investigation"), he was deeply impressed by the "great prosperity and strength of the Fatherland" and felt "proud to be a Zhongguoren 中国人 (i.e. a Chinese national)". He also promised that he would "no longer engage in the publication and distribution of rumour-mongering books" in the future and urged anyone who was still doing so to stop doing that.39

As Nicholas Bequelin, Amnesty International's East Asia regional director, put it, the once free-wheeling Hong Kong is today being gradually asphyxiated. According to the Reporters Sans Frontières’ latest World Press Freedom Index released in February 2016 (to be officially published on 20th April), Hong Kong’s press freedom has dropped by a drastic 52 places during the past 13 years, from number 18 in 2002 to today’s number 70 among 180 countries and regions.40

By 5th February 2016, with Beijing’s finally confirming three more of the disappeared Mighty Current/Causeway Bay’s owners and staff – Lui Por, Cheung Chi-ping and Lam Wing-kei – in addition to Gui Minhai were in fact in its custody41, this latest action by the CCP regime while rather unprecedented would represent a further political strangling after a series of replacement of newspaper editors and columnists and exerting of pressure on publishing houses after Beijing was angered by the Occupy Central campaign a.k.a. Umbrella Movement that broke out in September 2014. As six thousand people took to the streets of Hong Kong on 10th January 2015 demanding to know the whereabouts of the five missing people and over 500 publishers, writers, booksellers and members of the public signed an online petition pledging to “not fear the white terror and uphold the principle of publication freedom”, Bao Pu 鲍鲁, who in 2009 published the posthumous secret memoirs of Zhao Ziyang 赵紫阳, told Reuters ominously, “Nobody is safe in Hong Kong now.”42 Neither are the dissidents safe outside Hong Kong as the

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tentacles of the White Terror reach far and wide. In Thailand where Gui Minhai was snatched, Chinese dissidents who were in exile told reporters in February that they were in fear of returning to where they were staying lest they should meet the same fate as that of at least four Chinese dissidents there who recently either disappeared (presumably snatched off the streets by Chinese agents) or were arrested “… only to resurface back in China in the custody of the government”. China has indeed been going global not only in her trade and investments but also in her pursuit of critics with the complicity of foreign governments tantalised by lucrative trade and investment relations with China.

Also as part of the ominous development of encroachment on freedom of expression and spreading of White Terror in Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Journalists Association claimed that reporters faced an “unprecedented” number of assaults during 2014’s pro-democracy rallies, an increasingly worrying pattern since the triad-style savage knife attack on Kevin Lau Chun-to 劉進圖, the replaced editor-in-chief of Ming Pao 明報, earlier in the year.

3.3. “The Confession of the Accused”

In a development chillingly reminiscent of the Moscow Trials of the Stalin era (the Zinoviev-Kamenev, Pyatakov-Radek and Bukharin-Rykov public show trials between 1936 and 1938), in mid-January 2016 Gui Minhai was paraded on China state television CCTV weeping and saying that he had returned to China to surrender to police 11 years after fleeing a fatal drink driving incident and urging Stockholm not to intervene, adding that: “Although I now hold the Swedish citizenship, deep down I still think of myself as a Chinese. My roots are in China.”

In March 1938, in the trial of the 21 who were alleged to belong to the so-called "Bloc of Rightists and Trotskyites" led by Nikolai Bukharin (Никола́й Буха́рин), Bukharin in his last plea cryptically spoke of the
Hegelian “unhappy consciousness” and the threat of Fascism (ostensibly the degeneration into something akin to a kulak praetorian fascism, in Bukharin’s exact words), adding, as cryptically, that “the confession of accused is not essential. The confession of the accused is a medieval principle of jurisprudence.”46 In response to Gui Minhai’s paraded “confession”, Nicholas Bequelin, Amnesty International’s East Asia regional director, tweeted, “A very elaborate script, and a skillful mix of truths, half-truths and outright lies.”47 Get ready for more: there has even been an earlier report that the Hong Kong deputy to the National People’s Congress talked on 5th January 2016 of receiving information from a friend that the Causeway Bay five were in fact arrested while visiting prostitutes in the mainland48, while by mid-February Hong Kong media were reporting an exclusive coverage by BowenPress (博聞社) that according to latest sources in the PRC, Lee Bo could be jailed for up to 10 years over blackmailing charges49. If these rumours were true, later development shows that these tactics were probably dropped as the accusations were simply too unsubstantiated and unconvincing.

On 29th February, Lui Por, Cheung Chi-ping and Lam Wing-kei finally appeared in clips shown on Phoenix Satellite Television confessing their “role in assisting others committing crimes” of smuggling illicit books into China and expressing personal remorse.50 While Gui Minhai confessed that he had “explored ways to circumvent official inspections in China” in his television interview on 28th February, Cheung Chi-ping, Lui Por and Lam Wing-kei blamed their company’s illicit book trade on Gui in their television interviews.51 Lee Bo also appeared on Phoenix on the same day insisting that he had not been abducted by mainland authorities but instead had gone to the mainland of his own accord. “Many have sensationalised my British citizenship and have complicated the situation,” said Lee Bo, “so I have decided to give up my British citizenship.”52
4. The Assault on Rights-defence (Weiquan) Lawyers

While the uncanny disappearance of dissident Hong Kong publishers and book distributors continued to attract the world’s attention at the beginning of the new year, January 2016 also saw further development in the regime’s unprecedented nationwide sweep of civil rights lawyers, during which hundreds of lawyers were detained, which began on 9th July 2015. Dozens of rights-defense lawyers and their associates later remained detained and some 38 lawyers and activists associated with the Beijing Fengrui law firm (北京锋锐律师事务所), which has been handling many weiquan (rights-defending) cases that the government deemed sensitive (including several high-profile clients, such as the ethnic Uyghur dissident scholar Ilham Tohti), have since remained under “residential surveillance”, many of them incommunicado and in unknown locations, according to the New York-based Human Rights Watch (HRW).

On 8th January 2016 two lawyers Zhou Shifeng 周世锋 and Wang Quanzhang 王全璋 and a legal assistant Li Shuyun 李姝云 were formally arrested on the charge of state subversion or inciting state subversion.53 In China such formal arrest would usually lead to a trial and conviction by the country’s ruling Communist Party-controlled courts. On the same day, Beijing rights-defense lawyer Xie Yanyi 谢燕益, who was detained on 12th July 2015, was also formally arrested in Tianjin 天津, and another Fengrui law firm lawyer Xie Yang 谢阳 was arrested in Changsha 长沙, both also on the charge of “incitement to subvert state power” (顛覆國家政權罪) which could lead to imprisonment of 10 years or above or life imprisonment. Also on the same day, several other people from separate firms, including Zhao Wei 赵威, the 24-year-old female legal assistant to detained rights-defense lawyer Li Heping 李和平 at Globe-Law law firm (高文律师事务所) in
Beijing, were formally arrested for state subversion or inciting state subversion, while Fengrui rights-defense attorney Liu Xiaoyuan 劉曉原 said one of the firm’s lawyers, Huang Liqun 黃力群, its financial officer Wang Fang 王芳, and intern Xie Yuandong 謝遠東 had been released on “bail” although they have remained incommunicado, and he was presuming that any of the 38 lawyers and activists associated with the Beijing Fengrui law firm, many of whom were put under “residential surveillance” incommunicado and in unknown locations since the crackdown that began on 9th July 2015, who had not yet been released were being formally arrested. In the following week, another rights-defense lawyer of Fengrui law firm, Wang Yu 王宇 – who is China’s most prominent woman human rights lawyer who had defended online free speech advocate Wu Gan, prominent rights activist Li Tingting, and Cao Shunli, the activist who died in detention after being denied timely medical treatment – having been taken into custody in July 2015 and accused in the following month of inciting subversion and “causing a disturbance”, was formally arrested on the same charge of subverting the state.54

On 29th January 2016, in Guangdong Province rights-defence lawyer Tang Jingling, who had offered legal assistance to the family of Li Wangyang 李旺陽 55 who died in extremely suspicious circumstances in 2012, was sentenced to five years of imprisonment under the charge of “inciting subversion of state power” for initiating civil disobedience movement, and editing, printing and distributing foreign books of social activism and related flyers. His two other fellow weiquan activists, Yuan Xinting 袁新亭 and Wang Qingying 王清營, who were arrested with him in 2014, were sentenced to three and a half years and two and a half years respectively. Tang Jingling, who has been in the frontline of China’s weiquan and democracy movements, previously had his lawyer license revoked in 2005 for defending justice for villagers in Panyu,
Guangzhou, and was detained for half a year during the CCP’s “war on jasmine” in 201156 (which pre-emptively detained many democracy advocates, bloggers and other “would-be troublemakers” including the prominent artist provocateur Ai Weiwei 艾未未)57 in response to the Internet call for a Chinese “Jasmine Revolution” following the Tunisian “Jasmine Revolution” of that year.

These sentences, like those handed out to prominent rights-defence lawyer Pu Zhiqiang 浦志强 on 22nd December 2015 (suspended 3-year jail for “inciting ethnic hatred” and “picking quarrels” in social media posts) and civil rights lawyer and activist Xu Zhiyong, one of the founders of the NGO Open Constitution Initiative (Gongmeng 公盟) which was shut down by the authorities in July 2009 and main founder and icon of the New Citizens’ Movement (four years in prison for “gathering crowds to disrupt public order”), are considerably lighter in comparison with the eleven-year sentence handed out to Liu Xiaobo 劉曉波 58, human rights activist and main figure behind Charter 08 (Lingba Xianzhang 零八憲章)59, in December 2009 for “inciting subversion of state power” (his wife, Liu Xia 劉霞, a poet and photographer, was placed under house arrest since Liu Xiaobo was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in October 2010). They are also relatively light compared to the seven-year sentence handed out to prominent dissident journalist Gao Yu 高瑜 (who had been repeatedly jailed previously, sometimes as long) in April 2015 for leaking state secrets to a foreign news organisation (later in December 2015 reduced to five years and “released on medical parole” according to Chinese state media). They seem nothing in comparison with the life sentence handed out to Central Nationalities University economist Ilham Tohti, a well-known scholar on Uyghur-Han Chinese relations and vocal advocate for the implementation of regional autonomy laws in China, in September 2014 for “separatism”, and 19-years prison sentence given to rights activist
Zhang Haitao 張海濤 in January 2016 by Xinjiang’s Urumqi Intermediate Court for “inciting subversion of state power” (15 years, with evidence consisting of 69 posts made to WeChat, and 205 posts made to Twitter including posts he retweeted) and “probing and illegally supplying intelligence abroad” (為境外刺探、非法提供情報罪) (5 years) with accusations including publishing online articles attacking socialism, assisting the work of foreign media, and “rumormongering”, and 14-year prison sentence handed out to another Xinjiang-based activist Zhao Haitong 趙海通 a year earlier simply for attending rights-defending activities in Guangzhou 广州 and Hefei 合肥 with other activists. 60 This shows that the latest spate of imprisonments of civil rights activists and lawyers, as part of the intense legal campaign against civil rights organisations and independent (thus illegal) unions in the form of worker centres since Xi Jinping took over as China’s president, is at the moment meant more to send a warning to grassroots dissidents as well as the lawyers assisting dissidents, before their rights-defending activities (which are still conducted within the accepted CCP’s one-party rule framework – i.e. still in the form of “protesting to the government”, asking the CCP government to zuozhu 做主 (i.e. “do justice”) – and hence not yet directly challenging the political monopoly of the CCP) escalating into system-threatening proportions (in the form of “protesting against the government”, questioning the legitimacy of CCP’s one-party rule). The surprisingly harsh sentences for Zhang Haitao and Zhao Haitong have to do with the fact that they live in China’s restive region of Xinjiang where dissent, whether from Uyghurs or Han Chinese, often meets with particularly harsh retribution.
5. Repression via the Mob: Chou Tzu-yu Incident and “Authoritarian Patriotism”

Some cybercritics have called Gui Minhai’s TV “confession” a replica of the “Chou Tzu-yu video apology” two days earlier. The 16-year-old Chou Tzu-yu 周子瑜 (stage name “Tzuyu”), a Taiwanese member of the multi-national K-pop girl group Twice, was pulled off from her endorsement with Chinese smartphone vendor Huawei 华为, following the currently common nationalistic outburst of China’s netizens because of her introducing herself as a Taiwanese and waving the flag of the Republic of China (ROC) when she and her band mates appeared on a Korean variety show in November 2015 and subsequently accused, actually illogically, by the Taiwanese-born but China-based singer and self-declared anti-Taiwan independence warrior Huang An 黃安 of being a Taiwan independence supporter. Twice was cut off from Chinese television and JYP Entertainment, which formed Twice, was forced to suspend all of Chou Tzu-yu’s activities in China. With JYP facing huge pressure from the Chinese market boycott, it released a video on 15th January 2016 in which a pallid Tzu-yu, looking disoriented, scared and without makeup, took a deep bow and apologised and stressed that there was only one China and she was Zhongguoren (i.e. a Chinese national).

5.1. “Authoritarian Patriotism”

The two televised “confessions”/apologies are indeed somewhat dissimilar in nature, one being State-orchestrated, the other seemingly mass-jingoistic netizens-driven – though there is indeed a theory proposed in anti-CCP The Epoch Times (Dajiyuan 大紀元, linked to the persecuted physio-spiritual Falungong 法輪功 movement) that attributes the Chou Tzu-yu incident to Jiang Zemin-Xi Jinping factional struggle within the CCP based on the personalities and organisations involved
and the delicate timing of various stages of the incident that coincided with the Taiwanese general elections that ended with the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, 民主進步黨) for the first time ever winning control of both the presidency and the Legislative Yuan (Li-fa Yüan 立法院)⁶¹.

Nevertheless, the Orwellian ability of a quasi-Fascist racketeer State⁶² in degrading and destroying basic human dignity is plainly manifest in both cases, one directly through the coercive instrument of monopolised violence or threat of violence, the other through the masses – epitomised by the fenqing 憤青 (literally “angry youth”) – who, understanding that too much is at stake in challenging a ruthless but so-far “benevolent” dictator, find meaning in life by directing their “unhappy consciousness” (for which notably Hegel does suggest liberation via subservience⁶³) outward via sporadic nationalistic outbursts (whether towards the traditional nemesis Japan, rival superpower America, or anybody who dares to articulate or insinuate the truth that Taiwan (ROC) is an independent, sovereign country not a part of the PRC). This is not too different from how so many Germans decades ago so heartily supported the Nazis and Third Reich of Adolf Hitler – a ruthless but “feel-good dictator” who, while being dangerous to challenge, did restore to them the feeling of self-importance and bring back not only lost glory and national pride but also long-awaited economic improvement and security⁶⁴, and instill a higher feeling of external efficacy, like what Italians said about the effect of Benito Mussolini’s Fascist reign on improving Italian trains’ punctuality or what Mussolini did convince many of them about: “Mussolini may have done many brutal and tyrannical things; he may have destroyed human freedom in Italy; he may have murdered and tortured citizens whose only crime was to oppose Mussolini; but ‘one had to admit’ one thing about the Dictator: he ‘made the trains run on time.’”⁶⁵
This is what citizenship education scholar Professor Joel Westheimer refers to as the social psychology of authoritarian patriotism (as opposed to democratic patriotism) which depends on a deliberate and complicit populace full of fiercely nationalistic and jingoistic sentiments (Westheimer, 2006: 610).

That “dissent is patriotic” (see Table 1) as a principle of democratic patriotism in Westheimer’s formulation, as opposed to authoritarian patriotism’s demanding allegiance to the government’s cause and therefore opposing dissent, harkens back to the quotation “dissent is the highest form of patriotism”. This is often attributed to Thomas Jefferson, though no evidence has been found according to Anna Berkes in her Thomas Jefferson Encyclopedia entry of “Dissent is the highest form of patriotism (Quotation)” that found the earliest usage of the phrase, which was used repeatedly during the Vietnam-War era, in a 1961 publication, The use of force in international affairs: “If what your country is doing seems to you practically and morally wrong, is dissent the highest form of patriotism?”

5.2. Recurring Mass Paroxysms and Capture-Bonding: Existential Hobson’s Choice?

In the recurring nationalistic outbursts and mass paroxysms of rage of China’s netizens and people on the streets, whether against Japan (or Carrefour in 2008), or attacking Chinese actress Zhao Wei 趙薇 with human waste in 2001 following her photo shoot for a fashion magazine wearing a dress featuring the Japanese “rising sun” military flag, we witness the twisted psychology of a subservient populace making the existential Hobson’s choice of “resigning [their] will, right of choice, and need to understand to the authority” with “its emotional base [being] gratitude for having been liberated from the burden of democratic responsibility”. In the process of directing their suppressed
Table 1 The Politics of Patriotism (Joel Westheimer, 2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Authoritarian Patriotism</th>
<th>Democratic Patriotism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ideology</strong></td>
<td>Belief that one’s country is inherently superior to others.</td>
<td>Belief that a nation’s ideals are worthy of admiration and respect.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Primary allegiance to land, birthright, legal citizenship, and government’s cause.</td>
<td>Primary allegiance to set of principles that underlie democracy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nonquestioning loyalty.</td>
<td>Questioning, critical, deliberative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Follow leaders reflexively, support them unconditionally.</td>
<td>Care for the people of society based on particular principles (e.g., liberty, justice).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Blind to shortcomings and social discord within nation.</td>
<td>Outspoken in condemnation of shortcomings, especially within nation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conformist; dissent seen as dangerous and destabilising.</td>
<td>Respectful, even encouraging, of dissent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Slogans</strong></td>
<td>My country, right or wrong.</td>
<td>Dissent is patriotic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>America: love it or leave it.</td>
<td>You have the right to NOT remain silent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Historical Example</strong></td>
<td>McCarthy Era House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) proceedings, which reinforced the idea that dissenting views are anti-American and unpatriotic.</td>
<td>The fiercely patriotic testimony of Paul Robeson, Pete Seeger, and others before HUAC, admonishing the committee for straying from American principles of democracy and justice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Contemporary Example</strong></td>
<td>Equating opposition to the war in Iraq with “hatred” of America or support for terrorism.</td>
<td>Reinforcing American principles of equality, justice, tolerance, and civil liberties, especially during national times of crisis.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

helplessness-induced anger outward in public shows of patriotism, they openly or tacitly act to justify the authority of their authoritarian overlord, replacing, as political scientist Douglas Lummis argues, the love that brings a people together with the misguided love of institutions that dominate them in this manifestation of “authoritarian patriotism”.

With the Xi Jinping administration unleashing its “extraordinary assault on basic human rights and their defenders with a ferocity unseen in recent years”, such would be a safe and rational approach for the masses who want to avoid trouble and yet “feel great”. In this sense the social psychology of “authoritarian patriotism” is that of a people long held hostage by a ruthless racketeer government who end up, with no more rational option, expressing empathy and sympathy and developing in themselves positive feelings towards the Party that continues to hold them hostage, to the point of not only being apologists on behalf of but also vehemently defending and even identifying with their authoritarian ruler. In psychological terms this is called the Stockholm syndrome or capture-bonding in which by choosing the “safe” path and staying away from dissent the subservient populace is also mistaking any lack of abuse by the ruling Party for an act of kindness. As Adolf Hitler said, “The great masses of people … will more easily fall victims to a big lie than to a small one.”

5.3. “Doublespeak” and the “Nomenklatura Conspiracy”

As Raymond Sleeper pointed out in 1987 referring to the Soviet Union and the “nomenklatura conspiracy”, we can discern the same deception being employed today by the CCP regime to maximise the maintenance of this capture-bonding, a continuation of the use of Marxist-Leninist concepts developed in Soviet/Maoist times that represent subversions of well-accepted Western liberal democratic ideas, mainly through the
use of double-meaning language that serves to justify CCP’s authoritarianism, e.g., admitting that human rights, freedom and democracy are universal values but giving them a different meaning in the “unique” Chinese context – in short, so-and-sos “with Chinese characteristics”, inevitably because of “different national contexts” (guoqing butong 國情不同). Sleeper referred to then head of the US negotiating team in Geneva on nuclear weapons Ambassador Max Kampelman’s 4th January 1985 address to the Standing Committee on Law and National Security of the American Bar Association where he made a significant point on the USSR leaders’ facility in using language differently:

They have the ability to use language […] in a way which is designed to confuse people like ourselves and undermine our will. This they do professionally and effectively. They take a noble word like democracy and adopt it as their own – as you know, they frequently call their systems ‘people’s democracies.’ This is a total corruption of the term […] The Communists are able to use these differences [in meaning of words] to promote their own appeal, which […] is essentially a humanitarian appeal […] in their propaganda they identify themselves and ally themselves with efforts to achieve humanitarian goals such as ‘freedom’ or ‘justice.’

(Quoted in Sleeper, 1987, p. 203)

In other words, the “different use” of words Kampelman referred to is basically “an instrument of subversion, of disinformation – an instrument of deception” (ibid.).

These concepts that are in fact subversions of well-accepted Western liberal ideas born out of hundreds of years of the struggle of civil society against autocratic monarchy and over the Painean
revolutions French and American, and based on fundamental ideas first
developed during the Renaissance, used in Marxist totalitarian states or
post-Marxist authoritarian states today as “active measures”, i.e. acts of
“disinformation” and “deception” intentionally rooted in double-
meaning language or “doublespeak”, is closely related to George
Orwell’s concept of “doublethink” in his dystopian novel Nineteen
eighty-four; one of the book’s twin central conceptual inventions (with
“Newspeak”). The use of such “different meaning” tactic has its roots at
the time when Lenin was planning to overthrow the Tsarist government
at the turn of last century, as Professor Raymond Sleeper plainly lay out:

When Lenin began to organize his revolutionary conspiracy, he found
that the main ideas of communism were already or could be expressed
in terms of Western ideas so cleverly that the average citizen of the
West [as well as that of the Russian empire, later USSR] would not
see the trick – the inherent deception of communist ideas. To the
contrary, the average citizen understood genuine democracy and
economic freedom to mean what they had always meant, the right to
vote, the right to own property, the right to travel, the right to work
where he pleased – in short, freedom.

(Sleeper, 1987: 191)

Maintaining its Marxist-Maoist tradition, today’s CCP is redefining
concepts like democracy and human rights under the warped framework
of “(market) socialism with Chinese characteristics”. In this process the
Party is following this early Leninist subversion of Western liberal ideas
in the wide use of double-meaning concepts – one meaning being the
accepted Western liberal concept (the “universal values” to which
today’s CCP is paying lip service) and “the other meaning being the
opposite or subverted meaning that was the true Marxist-Leninist

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meaning [which] also served the very useful purpose of not immediately alarming the established government, which Lenin had to deceive, confuse, and destroy in order to capture political power in Russia” (ibid.). No longer talking much about Communism, Marxism or even Maoism, the CCP regime of “People’s” Republic of China has remained the faithful follower of this power of double meaning – redefining such terms like “human rights”, “democracy” and “freedom” in its own way, and justifying such deception by referring to “China’s different context, different condition” (guoqing butong).

In this atmosphere criticisms against the Party or mode of government in this one-party state are considered subversive. The critic can be charged with “incitement to subvert state power” which can lead to more than 10 years’ jail or life imprisonment, as authoritarian patriotism asks for unquestioning loyalty and absolute allegiance to the government’s cause and therefore is intolerant towards dissent and any challenge against the Party’s monopoly over public discourse.72

6. Domestic Repression Goes Global: Racketeer State and Its Global Reach

Further to his postulation of a racketeer government (a concept that will be discussed in the special issue’s policy commentary article later, “The Writing on the Wall: National and Global Implications of the Ruling Chinese Communist Party’s Domestic and Foreign Policies” in the context of China’s authoritarian governing structure), Charles Tilly notes that “the relative balance among war making, protection, extraction, and state making significantly affected the organization of the states that emerged from the four activities.” (Tilly, 183-184) Tilly depicts the relationship diagrammatically as shown in Figure 3 here.
Figure 3 Relationship between War Making, Protection, Extraction and State Making (Tilly, 1985)


“To the extent that war making went on with relatively little extraction, protection, and state making […] military forces ended up playing a larger and more autonomous part in national politics [e.g., Spain]”, says Tilly, “To the extent that protection […] prevailed over war
making, extraction, and state making [e.g., Venice or Holland], oligarchies of the protected classes tended to dominate subsequent national politics.” (Tilly, 1985: 184) And the Papal States illustrate the other extreme when state making predominated relatively, giving rise to the disproportionate elaboration of policing and surveillance (*ibid.*) Moving from the Civil War period through Mao’s “perpetual revolution” years to today’s post-revolutionary, politically more stable yet no less repressive era, the CCP regime’s rule can be seen to have evolved from the first to the latter two forms of imbalances following Tilly’s explication of the development of racketeer governments.

On how racketeer governments acquire authority, Charles Tilly says, “Back to Machiavelli and Hobbes, nevertheless, political observers have recognized that, whatever else they do, governments organize and, wherever possible, monopolize violence […] governments stand out from other organizations by their tendency to monopolize the concentrated means of violence.” (Tilly, 1985: 171) Mao Zedong understood this best when he said, “Every Communist must grasp the truth, ‘Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.’” This represents the true heritage from millennia of Chinese dynasties, and it was an aberration from this imperial tradition when Zhao Ziyang acted on his principle he reiterated in his secret memoir: “I told myself that no matter what, I refused to become the General Secretary who mobilized the military to crack down on students.” The twentieth-century history of the Communist conquest of China, from “Chinese Soviet” to the “People’s Republic” of China, would not have transpired as it did if not for the havoc the Japanese invasion wrecked upon the Republic of China under Chiang Kai-shek, and it would be futile to try to figure out whether the continued development of the Republic of China on the mainland would follow Tilly’s depiction of the European historical experience from the “state’s monopoly of large-scale violence [finally]
turning from theory to reality” by the later eighteenth century to “massive pacification and monopolization of the means of coercion” in the long run to “the coincidence of war making, state making, and capital accumulation” (Tilly, 1985: 174-175, 177), though Tilly did note the advantage in Chinese experience vis-à-vis the European: “Before quite recently, no European government approached the completeness of articulation from top to bottom achieved by imperial China. Even the Roman Empire did not come close.” (ibid.: 174)

What has become increasingly clear is that after the three-decade long Maoist idealistic ultra-autarchic socialist economic policies, the late-reform era PRC now looks like perching on the edge of resuming its missed process of contemporary imperialist state making (with possible limited war making) and capital accumulation as depicted by Tilly. Indeed, while the uncontrolled widening socioeconomic inequalities and the lack of rule of law (and often “lawless” local governments) accompanying the miraculous economic performance and urban modernisation that have characterised over three decades of Chinese development during the market-reform era are often blamed on Deng Xiaoping’s “Let some people get rich first” directive and the rugged capitalist approach to economic reform, the issue at hand is bigger than just the misconduct of the local cadres or the nature of the political system, as Dirlik and Prazniak argue, but the need now to fuel an export-oriented economy through various aspects of capital accumulation within a globalised capitalist economy:

[...] the most widespread causes of discontent – forceful expropriation of agricultural land, widespread dislocation of the population, severe exploitation of labour, social and spatial inequalities, corruption from the top to the bottom of the political structure, urban and rural pollution – are all entangled in the development policies that the PRC
has pursued since the 1980s in its quest of “wealth and power” within the context of a neo-liberal global capitalism […] The conversion of land into capital, the creation of a floating labour force available for this process, and the sale of cheap labour power to fuel an export-oriented economy are all aspects of capital accumulation within a globalized capitalist economy. If anything distinguishes the PRC, it is the presence of a sprawling organizational structure put in place by the revolution that has guaranteed the efficient performance of these processes, with coercion whenever necessary.

(Dirlik and Prazniak, 2012: 295)

Contrary to the “receptive to the governed” argument often referred to, a governing regime’s legitimacy according to Arthur Stinchcombe depends rather little on abstract principle or assent of the governed for the “person over whom power is exercised is not usually as important as other power-holders” (Stinchcombe, 1968: 150, italics in the original) the probability of whose confirmation of the decisions of a given authority constitutes the latter’s legitimacy. These other authorities, says Tilly (1985), “are much more likely to confirm the decisions of a challenged authority that controls substantial force; not only fear of retaliation, but also desire to maintain a stable environment recommend that general rule [which] underscores the importance of the authority’s monopoly of force” (Tilly, 1985: 171-172). Lynn White in her four-country study of money-power nexus observes that: “By no means are state agents the only powerholders with whom business owners (as well as regional gangsters and mob-affiliated political canvassers) make liaisons. They also link up with each other. The coherent state, even if it behaves as a single actor, is just one of the interlocutors for other networks in either a fair or coercive ‘civil’ polity.” (White, 2009: 37) In a wider context, it is in this way that these “other powerholders”, be they
societal pressure groups, professionals, or academics and the intelligentsia, “have been co-opted into the decision-making process, rewarded with perks and privileges, and are no longer available as a source of inspiration [for the dissident activists …]”, having retreated “from ‘politically engaged and intellectually oppositional topics’ to inquiries reconcilable with the prevailing order and designed to legitimate the hegemonic order” (Benton, 2010: 321-322)\textsuperscript{78}. Similar co-optation extends beyond China’s borders with the global reach of her “soft power” backed by her economic strength and market size, and the lucrative trade and investment opportunities she could offer the world – as discussed earlier in the preceding sections and will be picked up again in Section 7 of the policy commentary article later, “The Writing on the Wall: National and Global Implications of the Ruling Chinese Communist Party’s Domestic and Foreign Policies” – and there are

[…] even displays of willingness to complicity with the regime’s pursuit of global hegemony, most notoriously through the so-called Confucius Institutes. Not only governments and business but even educational institutions supposedly dedicated to critical inquiry are anxious to court a regime which is by common acknowledgment suspicious of free inquiry beyond its control. Rarely is this contradiction questioned. Business is less than eager to jeopardize its chances in the “China market” in the name of human or political rights. There are suggestions of envy in praises of a “China model” that has “successfully” combined neoliberal economic policies with authoritarian politics and social policy.

(Dirlik and Prazniak, 2012: 290)
7. National and Global: Nexus between Domestic Repression and International “Soft Power”

Today China’s global investment is truly impressive, as can be seen in the *China Global Investment Tracker* map in Figure 4, created by the American Enterprise Institute and The Heritage Foundation (“the only publicly available, comprehensive dataset of large Chinese investments and contracts worldwide (excluding bonds)”\(^79\)).

**Figure 4** China’s Worldwide Investments and Contracts (*China Global Investment Tracker*, created by the American Enterprise Institute and The Heritage Foundation)

N.B.: Circle size represents total business.


*Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal* 2(1) • 2016
The tracker map, as of April 2016, shows China’s worldwide contracted investment from 2005 to the first half of 2014 – “over 1250 attempted transactions – failed and successful – valued at more than $100 million in all industries, including energy, mining, real estate, and transportation.” As the Tracker reflects, “If there’s a Chinese business person in your neighborhood talking about buying a local company or plot of land, you’re not alone.”

Geographically, as shown in Figure 4 above and Figure 5 below, Latin America is among the furthest reaches of China’s global economic tentacles. Even here, one can sense the astounding rise of China. According to the Inter-American Dialogue’s latest report on Chinese finance to Latin America and the Caribbean in 2015:

- 2015 was the second highest year on record for Chinese state-to-state finance in Latin America, with loans to the region topping $29 billion. Much of this finance was announced during Premier Li Keqiang’s 2015 trip to Latin America.
- In 2015, Chinese finance to Latin America surpassed World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank lending to the region combined.
- China continues to be an important source of finance for those countries in LAC (e.g., Venezuela and Ecuador) with weaker access to global capital markets.
- Venezuela has received $65 billion since 2007, or approximately 52 percent of total Chinese policy bank finance in the region. Another 34 percent of Chinese finance to Latin America went to Argentina, Brazil, and Ecuador.
- Chinese banks continue to focus on LAC’s extractive and infrastructure sectors. From 2005 to the present, Chinese policy banks financed $40.3 billion in infrastructure projects (e.g., highway and
facility contraction), as well as many energy projects with infrastructure components. Energy loans, including China’s oil-backed lending to Venezuela through the China-Venezuela Joint Fund, accounted for $70.2 billion of overall Chinese finance in LAC since 2005.

- In addition to China’s many bilateral loans to LAC, Beijing also recently established approximately $35 billion in region-wide funds for infrastructure and other projects. It is unclear whether these funds are a means for restructuring existing bilateral capital or an entirely new source of finance.

(“Chinese Finance to LAC in 2015” (summary), Myers, Gallagher and Yuan, 10th February 2016)\textsuperscript{81}

Indeed, a CCP reborn since Deng Xiaoping’s audacious reform initiative, transformed in nature into a curious chimeric hybrid some scholars refer to as CCCMMMP (Chinese Communist Confucian Marxist Maoist Mercantilist Party)\textsuperscript{82} or CCCMMMP (Chinese Communist Confucian Marxist Maoist Mercantilist Plutocratic Party), in combination with the ambitious activities of Chinese companies, is remaking the country quickly into history’s most extensive global commercial-military empire\textsuperscript{83}, according to Steve LeVine, adjunct professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University and the global digital business news publication Quartz’s Washington correspondent (see Figure 5 below).
Figure 5 The Dragon’s Global Reach

Key (For further details please refer to Note 84)84
(1) “Silk Road Economic Belt”: An overland network of roads, rail and energy pipelines that will begin in Xi’an 西安 in central China and extend as far as Belgium.
(2) “Maritime Silk Road” initiative: A “21st-century Maritime Silk Road” will connect the South China Sea, and the Indian and South Pacific oceans. The “Maritime Silk Road” will enter Europe, and ships from China will also make port in Lisbon, Portugal, and Duisburg, Germany.
(3) A high-speed rail network will start in Kunming 昆明, the capital of China’s Yunnan Province, and connect into Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia, Burma, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore.
(4) A 3,300-mile high-speed railroad that will start in Acu, near Rio de Janeiro, cross the Amazon rainforest and the Andes Mountains, and terminate on the Peruvian coast. In addition, there was also an advanced proposal by a Chinese billionaire to build a 170-mile-long canal through Nicaragua.
(5) China has agreed with the African Union to help build railroads, roads, and airports that will link all 54 African countries, and has also envisioned modern ports in Dar es Salaam (Tanzanian capital), Maputo (Mozambican capital), Libreville (in Gabon), Tema (in Ghana) and Dakar (Senegalese capital).

(6) Besides the planned high-speed rail network into Malaysia and Singapore and through Laos, China is also planning a canal across Thailand’s Isthmus of Kra, a deep-water container port and industrial park in Malaysia’s Kuantan, an expansion of Maldives’ Male airport, as well multi-million-dollar projects in the Pacific island states.

(7) Multi-billion-dollar infrastructure projects in Pakistan, including the financing of a deep Arabian Sea port at Gwadar and a 1,125-mile-long super-highway, high-speed railway and oil-pipeline route back to Kashgar in China’s Xinjiang.

(8) A 4,000-km “Power of Siberia” gas pipeline and a 4,300-mile high-speed railway from Beijing to Moscow.

Source: Maps 1-9 in “Do as Rome does: China is building the most extensive global commercial-military empire in history” (by Steve LeVine), Quartz, 9th June 2015.

7.1. Soft Power Spurious and Nefarious

In the latest ranking (2015/2016) of countries by soft power according to the British magazine Monocle, it seems that China, ranked 21st, would still have some way to go to compete with the liberal democracies that are above her, including South Korea (see Table 2). According to this latest investigation by Monocle on soft power based on government standard, diplomatic facilities, cultural exports, educational capability, business environment, etc., topping the list in 2015/2016 is Germany, followed by the United States, United Kingdom, Japan, France, Australia, Sweden, Switzerland, Denmark and Canada among the top ten.
Table 2 *Monocle* Soft Power Survey 2015/2016

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<td>1</td>
<td>Germany</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>Japan</td>
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<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
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<td>Singapore</td>
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<td>Turkey</td>
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That the recent claim of China’s increasing “soft power” is much overhyped was also reflected in, for instance, the comments of Professor Qiao Mu 喬木 of the Beijing Foreign Studies University (北京國語大學) in 2013 on that year’s Country Ratings Poll of 25 countries and the European Union conducted by GlobeScan, an international polling firm, and the Programme on International Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland for the BBC’s World Service which shows global views of China’s influence having deteriorated sharply to reach their lowest level since the poll began in 2005, with positive views falling eight points to 42 per cent and negative views rising eight points to 39 per cent. Perceptions of China are seen plunging markedly not only within the EU, expectedly worst in Japan (with only 5 per cent holding positive views against 64 per cent holding negative views), but also in China’s regional neighbours which are not her traditional enemies, e.g., Australia (swinging around dramatically from the previous survey’s 61 per cent positive and 29 per cent negative to this latest survey’s 36 per cent positive and 55 per cent negative).86 Admitting that “the rating had put China in an ‘embarrassing’ position, compared to the nation’s rising economic power and the national image it sought to project”, sighed Professor Qiao Mu, “It seems China is getting rich fast but its influence ranking is dropping dramatically […] China is drawing more attention globally, for its increasing foreign aid and participation in international affairs, but now it turns out that the values and the political system China holds are not accepted by the world.”87

The reservations above notwithstanding, if we consider such impressive outreach of China’s economic power as depicted in Figure 4 and Figure 5 as the main driver of its “soft power”, it should still be noted not only that such influence makes the global economy a friendly place for Chinese commerce, but the much touted Chinese “soft power” derived therefrom has been put to excellent use to extract complicity
from foreign governments in assisting the PRC’s domestic oppression on political freedom and civil liberties to reach beyond the country’s borders. Despite the euphoric accolades enthusiastically heaped upon China’s supposedly rising “soft power”, the only clear nature revealed regarding this Chinese “soft power” so far has either been spurious or iniquitous. Spurious in giving the impression that traditional Chinese culture is supposed to spread across the globe by the strong China, not least through the so-called “Confucius Institutes” – a monstrosity of propagandic misnomer and misinformation; iniquitous, both in terms of extending domestic oppression on political freedom and civil liberties, muzzling of free speech and free media and trampling on human rights across her borders, and exporting her Fascist corporatist model\(^8\) to the despotic regimes and neo-authoritarian rulers of flawed democracies in the developing world which now find alliance or potential alliance with this biggest dictatorship on the planet a balancing safeguard against Western sanctions over their trampling on human rights and helping them keep their heads above water.\(^9\) On the other hand, extending domestic repression across China’s borders is an obvious and inevitable policy shift in line with, as mentioned earlier, the apparent change in *modus operandi* by the Xi Jinping administration from a “weiwen” (maintaining stability) strategy to one of “national security”, the latter also in taking advantage of the current global War on Terrorism.

With the national security law adopted on 1st July 2015, with its obligation to “defend the people’s fundamental interests”, today’s CCP regime, seemingly no longer contented with exporting its system of censorship and information control through the carrot and stick approach with foreign governments, corporations and academia which has proven to be surprisingly successful, has resorted to using “national security” as grounds for extending its repression beyond China’s borders with pursuit of dissidents who have gone into exile and by calling upon friendly
countries, especially China’s ASEAN neighbours, to repatriate those who fled the regime. Just a month prior to Jiang Yefei, Dong Guangping and Gui Minhai’s repatriation by the Thai government, as we have mentioned earlier, another ASEAN member country, Myanmar/Burma, arrested Bao Zhuoxuan 包卓軒, the son of human rights lawyer Wang Yu and activist Bao Longjun 包龍軍 who were already being held incommunicado in China, and sent him back to China’s Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, where he was then placed under house arrest.

7.2. A Disrupted and Stalled Democratic Transition

Admittedly for many developing countries a system of liberal democracy that is coming too soon, or worse, imposed upon them too soon can bring chaos. Amy Chua in *World on fire* (2003) points out how in cases like Rwanda and Burundi the “one person one vote” democracy by empowering abruptly the majority Hutus brought about genocide of the Tutsis. Also, abject poverty and lack of education opportunity for the majority of the masses always make democratic transition a failure. People in abjectly poor countries care more about food than pursuing democracy and civil liberties or political freedom. In 2004 the United Nations conducted a survey in Latin America about people’s preference for democracy; the majority of those surveyed said they preferred a dictator who put food on the table to democratically elected leaders who failed to do so. Liberal democracy in Europe took hundreds of years to develop and mature, through struggle between parliament and monarch and between the bourgeois merchant class and the hereditary aristocracy, through civil wars, moving stage by stage from the initial “whig democracy” to truly multiparty competition and universal suffrage that finally include (the newly emancipated and educated) women, ethnic minorities and lower social classes. As the late Jeane J. Kirkpatrick,
American political scientist and President Ronald Reagan’s ambassador to the United Nations, emphasized in her most well-known article “Dictatorships and double standards” published in the monthly American magazine *Commentary* in November 1979, in “the relatively few places where they exist, democratic governments have come into being slowly, after extended prior experience with more limited forms of participation during which leaders have reluctantly grown accustomed to tolerating dissent and opposition, opponents have accepted the notion that they may defeat but not destroy incumbents, and people have become aware of government’s effects on their lives and of their own possible effects on government.” And such an arduous process takes a lot of time and calls for much patience:

Decades, if not centuries, are normally required for people to acquire the necessary disciplines and habits. In Britain, the road from the Magna Carta to the Act of Settlement, to the great Reform Bills of 1832, 1867, and 1885, took seven centuries to traverse. American history gives no better grounds for believing that democracy comes easily, quickly, or for the asking. A war of independence, an unsuccessful constitution, a civil war, a long process of gradual enfranchisement marked our progress toward constitutional democratic government. The French path was still more difficult. Terror, dictatorship, monarchy, instability, and incompetence followed on the revolution that was to usher in a millennium of brotherhood. Only in the 20th century did the democratic principle finally gain wide acceptance in France and not until after World War II were the principles of order and democracy, popular sovereignty and authority, finally reconciled in institutions strong enough to contain conflicting currents of public opinion. 92
Today many nations in the developing world may have the
democratic structure, but may not have gone through a democratic
process that Europe has. But today’s world is also vastly different from
Europe one or two centuries ago. Modern communication, the Internet
and related electronic social media, air transport, and universal
compulsory education should serve to shorten the democratic process if
entrenched authoritarian regimes are not bending on blocking the
inevitable. In this great transition China is now playing an influential
negative role. Its rising power is acting to keep most of the despotic
regimes across the world afloat. There have been a hundred years of
democracy in the making since the Hsin-hai 辛亥 (Xinhai) republican
revolution (1911) – a hundred years are not a short time for democratic
process – and yet the process was first blocked by the Japanese invasion
and then by the Civil War and the totalitarian Chinese Communist Party
rule since 1949. This barrier to democratic transition is now projected
outward to the world by the sheer economic might of PRC after the
astonishing success of more than three decades of economic (solely
economic) reform – the soft power of glittering Chinese
authoritarianism. The success of such externally projected influence
feeds in a backward loop the Party’s control in the country through other
world powers’ cooperation or seeking cooperation in international affairs
and crisis management (Arthur Stinchcombe’s “other power-holders”
that legitimise the authoritarian regime), through the new “tributary
system” between the despotic and authoritarian regimes in the
developing world (another group of Stinchcombe’s “other power-
holders”) and this largest dictatorship on the planet which helps to keep
their heads above water, and through the mesmerising national glory to
impress its own hapless citizens.
7.3. Influencing Perceptions

PRC’s advance in influencing world and domestic perceptions of the CCP regime takes a complex mix of strategies. Renowned political scientist the late Sterling Professor emeritus of political science at Yale University Robert Alan Dahl used six main “influence terms” to explain the varieties of power: *rational persuasion; manipulative persuasion; inducement; power; coercion; physical force* (Dahl and Stinebrickner, 2002; Stinebrickner, 2015; Dahl, 1999). CCP’s foreign and domestic policies lay everything out as if all are done with nice *rational persuasion*, telling the truth and explaining why the world should support China’s peaceful rise which will always contribute to a win-win conclusion, and why her citizens should support the only party – an “advanced, selfless and united ruling group”\textsuperscript{93} – that has always been since 1949 and will always be in power.

In actuality, a tactic a notch lower, *manipulative persuasion*, is the tool the CCP regime employs to convince other world powers, the West, the world bodies, and the international financial, educational, and other institutions to forfeit their ethical, moral, and political principles, to turn a blind eye to her human-rights abuses, in order to reap the potential benefits promised in exchange for cooperation. For the developing world leaders who are struggling with poverty, political insecurity, and with their own political glass houses to guard, a still lower means, *inducement*, is that which is applied to secure their support and cooperation, via rewards in terms of aids and investments and trade, or punishments in the form of withdrawing or withholding these opportunities. For the overseas Chinese community leaders and business class, the same means of bribery or vote-buying is employed to secure their support, allegiance and loyalty.
7.4. “Fact-Value Fusion” in Social Contract

As common for authoritarian regimes, inducement is useful but not enough for domestic control in China. Diplomatic niceties are not required when dealing with her own citizens. The next three categories ordered by increasing brutality are applicable here: power, with threats of job dismissal (as experienced today by a great many disobedient academics at universities in mainland China, Hong Kong and Macau 澳門, as well as media editors and reporters) and imprisonment (as meted out to myriads of human rights, civil rights activists, labour unionists, civil rights lawyers, and civil societal group organisers), and coercion, denying the citizens all political choices other than supporting CCP’s rule, backed by physical force with threat of bodily harm – as experienced by victims of the 1989 Beijing massacre and today’s countless dissidents (including among others social activists and civil rights lawyers) harassed and beaten, put under round-the-clock surveillance or tortured in jail (detainees, including those incarcerated since 1989, often broken and driven to insanity by the long imprisonment, or ending up losing their lives like Li Wangyang and Cao Shunli). The fate of these persecuted or murdered dissidents serves to convince the wider citizenry that it is wise to stay away from un-CCP-sanctioned sociopolitical activities, support CCP’s version of history and social analysis and accept CCP-imposed public amnesia on 1989 and veil of ignorance over the present political oppression of those who dare to speak out. “Fear can keep a man out of danger, but courage only can support him in it”\textsuperscript{94}, goes an old saw, and that the Chinese citizens today and foreigners who have a business stake or livelihood to maintain in China have chosen fear over courage testifies amply to the success of the CCP regime in enforcing their following its unique “social contract” for them: “… China is the one major country in the world for which
censorship is not merely or even principally, a matter of suppressing undesired messages”, and there are “no facts that exist independently of their significance in the social contract”, as a China-based foreign media entrepreneur ruminates. Instead, Beijing has created a “fact-value fusion”, he says, comparing this CCP-PRC Incorporated to the Western corporations that he is familiar with:

Thus, residence in China is not unlike working at a strongly cultured company, e.g., a Disney or Starbucks. Residents agree to support the “brand values” defined for China by the CCP. They are rewarded for doing so, penalized for abstaining from the general effort and punished severely for actively taking a contrary stance […] the mingling of positive official messages, suppression of alternative narratives and amplification of approved reactions make it almost impossible to understand what the average Chinese person might “really” think.

Fear can keep a man out of danger, as the epigram quoted earlier says, and those who dare to actively engage in dissenting activities would have only personal courage to accompany them as they languish in jail, or are harassed and beaten, or are put under round-the-clock surveillance and house arrest while the masses whose grievances they are fighting to redress stay clear and cower in fear, knowing “that local security and Party officials exercise broad latitude in enforcing the center’s line [and understanding] that pressures to maintain the correct line from the center [euphemistically, aligned with the “feelings of the people”] and specific interests of local officials [create] a broad zone of potential risk to steer clear of.”
7.5. Degenerative Maybe, Totalitarianism Lives

While the transition from Maoist terror (which claimed the largest number of victims, estimated up to 40 million, mostly by starvation, among 20th-century totalitarian regimes – compared to Hitler’s 11 million, and 6 to 9 million under Stalin) reflects moving away from absolute totalitarian practices to more subtle authoritarian exploits practiced in most pseudo-democracies from Russia to Singapore (for instance, replacing forced enthusiastic participation and mobilisation in support of the elite leadership with tolerated political passivity and obedience), interestingly in the unique case of China, the late Carl Joachim Friedrich and late Zbigniew Kazimierz Brzeziński’s all six features of totalitarian states (Friedrich and Brzeziński, 1956) seem still have not lost their applicability. The new “(market) socialism with Chinese characteristics” has replaced the old straitjacket Maoism as the all-encompassing ideology. There is still only a single party, the CCP, legally allowed, unchallenged, to rule the country though it is no longer led by one man with a cult of personality (like Mao, or the consecutive Kims in North Korea) but by collective leadership in the CCP central politburo. There is still a monopoly of communications by extreme censorship and with swift punishment of occasionally wayward editors and reporters, and monopoly of weapons ensuring swift State violence against any resistance threatening CCP’s rule including military action against ethnoregional insubordination towards Beijing’s internal colonisation. While the discredited central-command economic system has been thrown into the ash heap of history as in all other parts of the formerly Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist (Communist) world except North Korea and replaced with the free market, a CCP-tightly-controlled economy is still imperative as high economic growth has manifested itself to be the top priority in legitimising the Party’s continued monopoly of political power together with outward projection of
economic might taking precedence over local priorities (e.g., workers’ welfare, social equality) because of the rising nationalistic support for CCP that international clout can generate. Finally, *organised terror* remains an effective tool to subdue the country’s citizens, though as William Dobson notes in *The dictator’s learning curve* (2012), instead of mass killings and swift executions, the Party today prefers legal conviction and incarceration through the application of blanket laws like “subversion of State power” and “picking quarrels” (a nebulously defined “pocket crime” charge into which “anything can be stuffed”98), house arrests, extralegal beatings and other forms of harassment or more subtle forms of control and intimidation like threats to family members, loss of jobs and internal exile to remote areas, which as a whole form what can be described as the government’s “holistic censorship regime”99.

The authorities’ legal tools are surveillance, arrest and imprisonment. But often the “legal” apparatus is deployed as a form of intimidation rather than law enforcement. This is because indiscretions against the ruling ideology are offenses against the CCP, not the civil authorities; civil law applies only imperfectly. So offenses against the “feelings of the Chinese people” are met with house arrest, incognito detention, assault by unidentified authorities and physical intimidation.100

The “midnight knock on the door” during Soviet times that cowed the population throughout the Communist world, while still occurring occasionally like in the case of the disappearance of the Causeway Bay Five, in these days could usually come in broad daylight in the new PRC with official legal summons backed up by blanket public offense charges in the realms of “subversion of State power”, “sedition” or “disturbing social peace”, and a kangaroo court, just like in many other developing countries including members of China’s neighbour ASEAN.
8. Postscript

This April 2016 issue of CCPS is slightly longer than a usual issue for, as a special thematic issue, more leeway in terms of length has been given to the papers, in particular the Special Features and Policy Comments, as well as the introductory article, paying heed to Aldous Huxley’s concern that sometimes brevity might not do justice to all the facts of a complex situation\textsuperscript{101}.

Before ending this introduction, we would like to thank all the contributing authors of the articles in the various sections of this special issue and the anonymous reviewers of these articles for their invaluable efforts in making the publication of this 2016 CCPS special issue of China amidst Competing Dynamics in the Asia-Pacific: National Identity, Economic Integration and Political Governance possible. For the seven articles in the first two sections of this issue following the introduction and the prologue which represent new versions of the earlier papers presented at the 2015 Sizihwan International Conference on Asia-Pacific Studies, “Identity and Integration: Competing Dynamics in Asia-Pacific”, duly revised by incorporating critical peer feedback received at the conference and from other reviewers, we would also like to thank these conference presenters who have taken great effort to revise their papers for inclusion in this special issue, as well as the discussants, conference participants and other reviewers who have given invaluable assistance in providing critical comments on the earlier versions of these papers. We are also grateful to our proof-readers for their crucial assistance in checking the final galley proofs and CRCs, and to Miss Wu Chien-yi 吳千宜 for the journal’s website construction and maintenance. The responsibility for any errors and inadequacies that remain is of course fully mine.
Notes

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security (edited focus issue, IJCS, 2014, 195 pp. + x), China: Developmental model, State-civil societal interplay and foreign relations (edited monograph, 745 pp. + xxi, ICS, 2013). His latest research projects include the Malaysian Ministry of Higher Education/University of Malaya High-Impact Research (HIR) Grant project “The China Model: Implications of the contemporary rise of China” (2013-2016, principal investigator) at the Department of Administrative Studies and Politics, Faculty of Economics and Administration, University of Malaya, and Suntory Foundation/University of Tokyo international research grant project “Beyond ‘China threat theory’: Dialogue with China experts on the rise of China” (2014-2015, Malaysian component). <Website: http://emileyeo5.wix.com/emileyeo; email: yeohkk@um.edu.my, emileyeo@gmail.com>

1. The 2015 Sizihwan (西子灣) International Conference on Asia-Pacific Studies, “Identity and Integration: Competing Dynamics in Asia-Pacific”, held at the National Sun Yat-sen University in Taiwan (台灣國立中山大學), on 12-14 November 2015, jointly organized by the Institute of China and Asia-Pacific Studies of the National Sun Yat-sen University and the Department of Political Science of the University of the Philippines Diliman.


4. Or officially the “Communist Party of China” (CPC, 中國共產黨).

5. “其實說實話，我對她本人沒有什麼興趣。但是，因為她的父親是習近平，那我就希望她能好好地跟她父親談一下。中國好，中國壞，中國是否會民主，這涉及我們每一個中國人的光榮和驕傲。習近平假如


12. ODN, 31st August 2012. (東方日報 /Oriental Daily News/ODN is a Malaysian daily in Chinese, with China news sources mainly from the Hong Kong and Taiwan media.)

13. ODN, 12th October 2012.

14. Although the scope of China’s economic decentralisation goes far beyond decentralisation in public finance, but even measured solely by the latter, China has been said to be the world’s most economically decentralised country (Xu, 2008: 187-188) given that China’s local public spending has
since the mid- and late 1980s been steady at about 70 per cent of her total national public spending, whereas in federal countries such as the US, Germany and Russia, the proportions of local public spending in total national public spending are only respectively 46 per cent, 40 per cent and 38 per cent. From the angle of central-local economic relations, China is also one of the most, or to some, even the most economically decentralised countries in the world, with most parts of resources controlled by the local governments, including the allocation of land, energy and financial resources (ibid.: 187). In fact, one of the characteristics of China’s economic decentralisation is the relative self-sufficiency of the local economy whether at the provincial level or the county level. The local governments are fully responsible for the launching and coordination of local reform, for local economic development, and for the legislation and law enforcement within their respective jurisdictions. Such a characteristic not only marks China’s economic institution apart from a central planning economic system, but also makes her local governments more powerful in competences than the local governments in most federal countries in the world. (ibid.: 188)


18. Provincial-level administrative units in the People’s Republic of China refer to the country’s 31 sheng 省 (i.e. provinces of Anhui 安徽, Fujian 福建, Gansu 甘肅, Guangdong 廣東, Guizhou 貴州, Hainan 海南, Hebei
Introduction


22. The concept of “Fascism” will be discussed further later in this special issue’s policy commentary article “The Writing on the Wall: National and Global Implications of the Ruling Chinese Communist Party’s Domestic and Foreign Policies” in the context of China’s authoritarian governing structure.


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25. According to Chuang, “Regarding the number of criminal detainees, Tang Huangxin appears to have avoided criminal charges by collaborating with the police, so he is no longer counted among the detained “labor heroes” (勞工俠) supported by mainland solidarity efforts – hence the change from ‘the Guangdong Seven’ to ‘the Guangdong Six’.” (“The Guangdong Six and the rule of law (of value): Preliminary theses on the December 3 crackdown”, Chuang, 28th December 2015. <http://chuangcn.org/2015/12/theses-on-dec-3/>)


32. The term “xiagang” refers to redundant workers mainly at State enterprises, without directly describing them as “unemployed”. Still officially attached to their work units or enterprises, the *xiagang* workers continue to receive basic minimum subsidies for their living and medical expenses, and are encouraged to change job, probably through State-run job and re-employment centres, or go into small businesses. In line with State enterprise reforms, the number of *xiagang* workers has been on the rise: 4 million in 1995, 8 million in 1996, 12 million in 1997, 16 million in 1998, 20 million in 1999, though dropping to 11 million in 2001. (Zhou, 2006: 289)


35. “4 Hong Kong book publishers critical of China’s Communist regime go missing” (by Jigmey Bhutia), *International Business Times*, 10th

“Hong Kong publisher Yiu Man-tin, working on Xi Jinping book, held on mainland China – Editor of Morning Bell Press was working with author of book about Xi Jinping when lured to Shenzhen and detained three months ago” (by Angela Meng), South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), 21st January 2014, updated 8th May 2014 <http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1409973/hk-publisher-yao-wentian-working-xi-jinping-book-held-mainland>.

36. While having lost the original totalitarian regime’s ideology, power of political mobilisation and monopoly over the economy, a “degenerative totalitarian polity” (t’ui-hua chi-ch’üan cheng-t’i 退化極權政體) still not only continues with but tenaciously maintains the absolute monopoly of the “Party” over political power and State machinery and control over media of propaganda and social organisations (Hsu, 2003: 168).

37. Charles Tilly’s concept of a “racketeer State” and the concept of “Fascism” will be discussed further later in this special issue’s policy commentary article “The Writing on the Wall: National and Global Implications of the Ruling Chinese Communist Party’s Domestic and Foreign Policies” in the context of China’s authoritarian governing structure.

38. ODN, 20th March 2016.

39. ODN, 26th March 2016 (in printed edition only; the report did not appear on-line).

40. ODN, 24th March 2016.

41. ODN, 5th February 2016.

42. “Thousands protest in HK over missing publishers; booksellers worried” (by Donny Kwok and Kalum Chen), Reuters, 10th January 2016. <http://
www.reuters.com/article/us-hongkong-publisher-bookshops-idUSBRE8016O02A20160110?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews>


45. “Missing Hong Kong bookseller paraded on China state television” (by Agence France-Presse), Mail Online (Daily Mail, UK), 17th January 2016. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-3403798/Missing-Hong-Kong-bookseller-paraded-China-state-television.html>


47. “Missing Hong Kong bookseller paraded on China state television” (by Agence France-Presse), Mail Online (Daily Mail, UK), 17th January 2016. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-3403798/Missing-Hong-Kong-bookseller-paraded-China-state-television.html>


49. “Blackmail charge for bookseller” (by Calum MacLeod), The Times (UK), 18th February 2016 <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/uk/article4693158.ece>; ODN, 17th February 2016.
51. “‘Missing’ Hong Kong bookseller Lee Bo says he will give up British citizenship” (by Agence France-Presse), *The Guardian* (UK), 29th February 2016. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/29/missing-british-bookseller-appears-on-television>
52. “‘Missing’ Hong Kong bookseller Lee Bo says he will give up British citizenship” (by Agence France-Presse), *The Guardian* (UK), 29th February 2016. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/29/missing-british-bookseller-appears-on-television>
55. A glass factory worker who was first arrested in 1983 for organizing the Mutual Aid Association of Shaoyang Workers (邵陽市工人互助會) under the influence of the Beijing Spring (Xidan 西單 Democracy Wall) and Poland’s Solidarność, and who during the tumultuous months of 1989 organized and chaired the independent workers’ union of Shaoyang city (邵陽市工自聯) and led workers’ demonstrations in support of the students’ protests in Beijing, Li Wangyang was arrested on 9th June 1989 immediately after the Beijing massacre and jailed for 13 years for “anti-revolutionary propaganda and instigation” and released on 8th June 2000 blind and deaf and in extremely poor health, after enduring long years of beating and torture in jail. He was soon jailed again in 2001 for 10 years for “subverting government institution” and under continued surveillance upon release in May 2011. “There’s no looking back even if they chop off my head,” said a blind and frail Li Wangyang, broken in body by 23 years...
of life spent almost entirely in jail and under repeated beating and torture, in an impassioned, heart-rending video-recorded interview broadcast in Hong Kong on 2nd June 2012 (http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=IK47hlQ.tcGQ), before his highly suspicious "suicide" in a tightly guarded Beijing hospital ward on 6th June, two days after that year’s 23rd anniversary of the June Fourth massacre.


58. Leading intellectual dissident activist from the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations and hunger strikes to Charter 08 – for which he was sentenced to 11 years of imprisonment – Liu Xiaobo was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize on 8th October 2010 but was unable to receive it as he was serving his 11-year sentence. He received his Ph.D. from the Beijing Normal University in 1988 with his thesis “Shenmei yu ren de ziyou 審美與人的自由” [aesthetics and human freedom].

59. Charter 08 was published at the 60th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopting name and style from the anti-Soviet Charter 77 issued by dissidents in Czechoslovakia in 1977 which became an informal civic initiative in Communist Czechoslovakia till 1992, a few years after accomplishing its goal of overthrowing Communist Party dictatorship in the 1989 Velvet Revolution.

activist-zhang-haitao/.


62. Charles Tilly’s concept of a “racketeer State” and the concept of “Fascism” will be discussed further later in this special issue’s policy commentary article “The Writing on the Wall: National and Global Implications of the Ruling Chinese Communist Party’s Domestic and Foreign Policies” in the context of China’s authoritarian governing structure.


70. Charles Tilly’s concept of a “racketeer State” will be discussed further later in this special issue’s policy commentary article “The Writing on the Wall: National and Global Implications of the Ruling Chinese Communist Party’s Domestic and Foreign Policies” in the context of China’s authoritarian governing structure.


75. See Bo (2010: 117).


77. On China, Thailand, Taiwan and the Philippines.


84. Explications quoted from Steve LeVine’s Quartz report, 9th June 2015:

(1) “Silk Road Economic Belt”: An overland network of roads, rail and energy pipelines will begin in Xi’an in central China and head west as far as Belgium. To take the network into the heart of Europe, Beijing has agreed to finance a 250-mile bullet train, costing up to US$3 billion, from Belgrade to Budapest. Separately, an 8,011-mile cargo railroad from the Chinese city of Yiwu to Madrid, which Beijing has already initiated, is taking away business from far more time-consuming truck shipping. Compared with 36 days of maritime transport (from Shanghai, Taipei, Hong Kong, Macau through the ports of Singapore and Colombo, onward via the Gulf of Aden and Cairo to Lisbon and Duisburg), goods transported by the envisioned Chongqing-Xinjiang-Europe International Railway
(through the Silk Road Economic Belt – a more direct route version from Chongqing and Xi’an through Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, Poland on to Duisburg) would take just 16 days.

(2) “Maritime Silk Road” initiative: At sea, a companion 21st-century Maritime Silk Road would connect the South China Sea, and the Indian and South Pacific oceans. China would begin to protect its own sea lanes as well. On 26th May 2015 it disclosed a strategy for expanding its navy into a fleet that not only hugs its own shores, but can wander the open ocean. The Maritime Silk Road will enter Europe through a US$260 million Chinese-funded upgrade of the Greek port of Piraeus. From there, rail service will continue into the Balkans. Ships from China will also make port in Lisbon, Portugal, and Duisburg, Germany.

(3) On land, Beijing also has in mind a high-speed rail network. It will start in Kunming, the capital of Yunnan province, and connect with Laos and on into Cambodia, Malaysia, Burma, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.

(4) In 2015 President Xi Jinping pledged US$250 billion in investment in South America over the next 10 years. The centerpiece is a US$10 billion, 3,300-mile, high-speed railroad that would start in Acu, near Rio de Janeiro, crossing the Amazon rainforest and the Andes Mountains, and terminate on the Peruvian coast. On top of that, there’s an advanced proposal by Chinese billionaire Wang Jing to build a 170-mile-long, US$50 billion canal through Nicaragua.

(5) In January 2015, China agreed with the African Union to help build railroads, roads, and airports to link all 54 African countries. These plans are already under way, including a US$13 billion, 875-mile-long coastal railroad in Nigeria; a US$3.8 billion, 500-mile-long railroad connecting the Kenyan cities of Nairobi and Mombasa; a US$4 billion, 460-mile railway linking the Ethiopian cities of Addis Ababa and Djibouti; and a US$5.6 billion, 850-mile network of rail lines in Chad. Then there are China’s maritime ambitions. These envision modern ports in the Tanzanian capital,
Dar es Salaam; the Mozambican capital, Maputo; Libreville, Gabon; the Ghanaian city of Tema; and the Senegalese capital, Dakar. All these land and marine projects align with existing Chinese natural-resource investments on the continent. For example, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) has large oil projects in Chad and Mozambique, and Chinese manufacturers are fast setting up Ethiopian factories that rely on cheap local labor.

(6) In addition to its planned high-speed rail network into Malaysia and Singapore, China’s reach into Southeast Asia also includes a planned high-speed railroad through Laos. In addition, China is planning a canal across the Isthmus of Kra in Thailand, a deep-water container port and industrial park in Kuantan, Malaysia, and a US$511-million expansion of Male airport in the Maldives. Further into the Pacific, Chinese projects include: a US$158 million hydroelectric plant and several sports complexes in Fiji, including the 4,000-seat Vodafone stadium in Suva; a US$100 million hospital in Apia, Samoa, a US$40 million terminal and upgraded runway at Faleolo Airport, and a US$140 million wharf at Vaiusu; a US$12 million government building in Tonga to be called St. George Palace, and two small Chinese turboprop aircraft for domestic routes aboard Real Tonga airlines; two turboprops for Air Vanuatu and US$60 million to build a Port Vila campus of the University of the South Pacific and a Parliament House for Vanuatu. The amounts of Chinese aid in the South Pacific are: US$52.16 million for Timor-Leste, US$440.30 million for Papua New Guinea, US$28.25 million for Federated States of Micronesia, US$225.57 million for Vanuatu, US$338.24 million for Fiji, US$158.50 million for Tonga, US$207.99 million for Samoa, US$0.70 million for Niue, and US$48.60 million for Cook Islands.

(7) In addition to the main route of the “Silk Road Economic Belt”, Beijing is lavishing US$42 billion in infrastructure projects on Pakistan, including the financing of a deep Arabian Sea port at Gwadar, and a 1,125-mile-long
super-highway, high-speed railway and oil-pipeline route to the Chinese city of Kashgar. Sending goods through Pakistan will help China avoid the Malacca Strait through which much of Beijing’s oil and other natural resources passes and which US could theoretically blockade.

(8) The 4,000 km “Power of Siberia” gas pipeline, a US$400 billion Gazprom-CNPC gas deal, will ship 38 billion cubic metres of Russian gas to China a year for 30 years, starting from 2018. This is the larger one of the two natural-gas pipelines, which form the centerpiece of Russia’s pivot towards China announced in 2013, through which a fifth of China’s gas imports would flow. In addition, China is to build a US$242 billion, 4,300-mile high-speed railway from Beijing to Moscow, a two-day trip compared with the current six-day Trans-Mongolian Express.


86. “China’s image takes a battering as majority of nations brand it a ‘negative influence’” (by Laura Zhou), South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), 24th May 2013. <http://www.scmp.com/print/news/china/article/1244498/chinatakesbatteringpollperceptions25nationsandeu> GlobeScan’s 2014 Country Ratings Poll further confirmed this: “The UK is the country whose perceived influence in the world has most improved from 2005 to the present […] Conversely, China’s perceived influence has worsened the most over the same decade”, though views of China “have stabilised in 2014 after the sudden deterioration that occurred in 2013.” (“BBC World Service Poll” (2014 Country Rating Poll BBC GlobeScan), Embargo 23:01 GMT 3 June 2014 <http://www.globescan.com/images/images/pressreleases/bbc2014_country_ratings/2014_country_rating_poll_bbc_globescan.pdf>)

87. “China’s image takes a battering as majority of nations brand it a ‘negative influence’” (by Laura Zhou), South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), 24th May 2013 <http://www.scmp.com/print/news/china/article/1244498/
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As Juan Pablo Cardenal and Heriberto Araújo summarise in the report of their field survey in over 25 countries across the globe on China’s expanding influence among the developing countries that for the overriding political and economic interest of the Party-State, whenever China sees an opportunity, she invariably “chooses to act as an accomplice in these excesses rather than acting as a guardian of the law”, and following from that, it is “not just the fact that China has become the great champion and favourite business partner of the world’s most repressive regimes (Burma, North Korea, Iran, Sudan, Cuba), or that its state-owned companies often enjoy carte blanche in their dealings as a result of the dizzying effect of the all-powerful Chinese state. What is just as important is the infiltration and acceptance of Chinese standards and values – which are highly ambiguous when it comes to good business practices or labour, social or environmental issues – throughout Beijing’s sphere of influence” (Cardenal and Araújo, 2011, tr. 2013, 2014: 262).


Ibid.


進步、無私與團結的執政集團，according to teaching material “China Model National Conditions Teaching Manual” of the Moral and National
Education (MNE, 德育及國民教育) school curriculum proposal which
the Hong Kong Professional Teachers’ Union has accused as being a brain-
washing political action.


95. Mr X, whose identity was concealed by the *Far Eastern Economic Review*
which published his article “China’s holistic censorship regime” in Vol.
171, No. 4, of the journal (May 2008, pp. 21-23) “because of the certainty
that publishing this essay under his name would lead to the loss of his
livelihood” (editorial footnote, p. 21).


171, No. 4, May 2008, p. 22.

98. “‘Picking quarrels and provoking troubles’ – The crime sweeping China”
www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-05-12/picking-quarrels-and-
provoking-troubles-the-crime-sweeping-china>

99. “[…] in the more ambiguous spectrum that exists between democracy and
authoritarianism. Most strive to win their people’s support by making them
content, but failing that, they are happy to keep their critics off balance
through fear and selective forms of intimidation.” (Dobson, 2012, ppb
2013: 6)

171, No. 4, May 2008, p. 22.

101. “The soul of wit may become the very body of untruth. However elegant
and memorable, brevity can never, in the nature of things, do justice to all
the facts of a complex situation. On such a theme one can be brief only by
omission and simplification. Omission and simplification help us to
understand – but help us, in many cases, to understand the wrong thing; for
our comprehension may be only of the abbreviator’s neatly formulated notions, not of the vast, ramifying reality from which these notions have been so arbitrarily abstracted.” (From: Aldous Huxley’s “Foreword” to his *Brave new world revisited.* Chatto & Windus Ltd, London, 1959, republished by Grafton Books, London, 1983, p. 7.)

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Prologue
China, Southeast Asia, and the United States

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Abstract

Southeast Asia has historically been a meeting point between East Asia and South Asia before Western colonialism opened the region to the West and to the winds of global modernization. Since Japan’s coercive decolonization during the Second World War, the dominant outside influences have come from the United States and from the People’s Republic of China. The post-Cold War era began with a withdrawal of both China’s and US power projection from Southeast Asia, facilitating the configuration of a triangular ménage à trios, with ASEAN expanding to include all of Southeast Asia and introducing a number of extended forums intended to socialize the rest of East Asia into the ASEAN way. The “rise of China” occurred within this friendly context, though beginning around 2010 its strategic implications began to appear more problematic with the mounting dispute over the issue of the South China Sea.

Keywords: China, ASEAN, United States, post-Cold War era, strategic triangle

JEL classification: F15, F51, F52, F55
1. Introduction

Southeast Asia has historically been a cultural and economic meeting point between South Asia and East Asia. It is geographically divided into maritime Southeast Asia (the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, East Timor, Papua New Guinea and Indonesia) and mainland Southeast Asia, also known as Indochina (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar/Burma, Singapore and Thailand). In terms of religious impact, the region owes South Asia the influence of Theravada Buddhism, Hinduism and Islam; from Northeast Asia derives Mahayana Buddhism and Confucianism; from the West, Christianity. Influential modern idea systems include democratic liberalism, capitalism and communism. Linguistically, economically and ethno-culturally it is perhaps the most diverse region on earth, ranging from Singapore, a highly developed city-state with a per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) approaching that of Japan or the United States (US), to largely agrarian developmental dictatorships like Cambodia or Laos. All but two of the sovereign states of the region (East Timor and Papua New Guinea) are members of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a 10-nation intergovernmental organization (IGO) established in 1967 (and they are both candidates). With a combined gross domestic product of US$2.4 trillion in 2013 and a combined population of 625 million, Southeast Asia now has the third largest GDP in Asia after China and Japan and the 7th largest in the world. The GDP of ASEAN is projected to grow by more than 5 per cent per annum over the next five years, while intra-ASEAN trade is expected to exceed US$1 trillion.

While Southeast Asia was previously intersected by the political and cultural influences of India and China, the influence of the former was largely broken during the colonial era, when both South and Southeast Asia fell under the sway of Western imperialism. Since post-World War II decolonization, the predominant outside influences on the region have
come from the north (China) and the east (the US). Of course other great powers have also been influential: Japan, after militarily overrunning the region during World War II, has limited its post-war presence to diplomatic and commercial engagement, particularly after the 1985 Plaza accord revaluation of Japanese currency made it an attractive investment opportunity. Russia’s (then Soviet Union’s) influence during the Cold War on the other hand was mostly strategic, with a submarine-launched ballistic missile fleet in the Sea of Okhotsk (based in Vladivostok) and mutual defense alliances with China, North Korea and Vietnam. After gaining independence in 1947 India was a leader (with China, Indonesia, and Burma) of the nonaligned movement in such forums as the Bandung Conference, but tended to neglect Southeast Asia during much of the Cold War. Beginning in 1991 the Rao government sought to revive interest with a “Look East” policy; in 1996 India was included in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), signed ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in 2003 and was included in the East Asian Summit (EAS) in 2005.

In view of the dominant outside influence of China and the US, international politics in Southeast Asia takes place in three arenas: the intra-regional or intra-ASEAN arena, Sino-ASEAN relations, and ASEAN-US relations. Hence the organization of this article will consist of three parts. The first part will outline the political identities of the three principals: ASEAN, China, and the US. The second presents and justifies the triangular format that will be used to analyze the interaction between ASEAN, China, and the US. The third part reviews each of the three patterns of interaction in turn. A synthetic conclusion follows.
2. Political Identities

A national identity consists of a limited set of collective narratives, values, assumptions and transcendant symbols. It is important in the development of a nation-state (or indeed any collective actor) because it provides a raison d'être for that entity’s existence – why it came to be, what purposes it serves for its members, what it hopes to accomplish, and how it fits into a world comprised of other such units. Without a larger collective personality to identify with citizens would not be motivated to pay taxes, obey laws not in their personal interest, or risk their lives in the armed forces. Of course there is also perpetual conflict over the content of national identity as different constituencies project different material and ideal interests into it, but once it takes coherent form it can be used (or sometimes misused) to build consensus and sanction deviants as “un-American”, “un-Chinese” and so forth. It can also in some cases define a foreign policy orientation by dint of the assumption of a “mission” to proselytize one’s identity to others, or to assume defensively that one’s identity is secure among other similar identities.

To begin with the most challenging and controversial case, Southeast Asia is the heir of an ancient literate civilization in which vast empires long contended for dominance. The region succumbed to imperialist domination (with the lonely exception of Thailand) in the 19th century but this was not a unifying experience as each European power carved out its own colony: the Dutch in Indonesia, the British in Burma and Malaysia, Spain then the US in the Philippines, the French in Indochina, the Germans in Papua New Guinea. The Japanese invasion “freed” these colonies from Western imperialism only to impose one of their own, but the 1945 Japanese defeat did not end hostilities. The return of European imperialism was violently but successfully resisted, followed by ethnic and ideological insurgencies and other conflicts (e.g.,
the 1962-1966 Konfrontasi between Indonesia and the newly created
Malaysia). The creation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) in 1967, initially consisting of the five leading nations, then
including Brunei, and after the Cold War extending to the four northern-
tier autocracies (Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Burma), was to some
extent an emulation of the European Union but less ambitious. Never
explicitly aiming at a fully integrated superstate, ASEAN aspired to
facilitate economic growth, social progress, regional peace and stability
and mutual defense among its members. ASEAN is an anarchic regime
based on consensual democracy, sometimes derided as a “talk shop” that
has many meetings but gets nothing done. Yet ASEAN has also aspired
to act as a collective identity by socializing its members and associates
to adhere voluntarily to a set of norms. These norms are set forth in the
treaties, declarations and agreements in ASEAN, starting with those
outlined in the 1967 Bangkok Declaration and elaborated in subsequent
declarations and agreements. This so-called “Asean Way” was defined
by Malaysian academician Noordin Sopiee as the “Principle of seeking
agreement and harmony, the principle of sensitivity, politeness,
nonconfrontation and agreeability, the principle of quiet, private and
elitist diplomacy versus public washing of dirty linen, and the principle
of being non-Cartesian, non-legalistic”. This spirit suffuses all ASEAN
statements of diplomatic principles, such as the 2002 Treaty of Alliance
and Cooperation (TAC): (1) respect for sovereignty and territorial
integrity; (2) non-interference in internal affairs; (3) settlement of
disputes by peaceful means; and (4) renunciation of threat or use of
force. And the transformation has been quite impressive: since 1967 no
interstate wars have been fought in Southeast Asia, a respectable rate of
growth has been achieved and economic cooperation has increased,
symbolized most recently by the establishment of a Southeast Asian
Economic Community (SEAEC) with common tariffs.
The American national identity is of course rooted in Western Judeo-Christian political traditions but has grown more heterogeneous, like Southeast Asia a “melting pot” of diverse ethno-cultural and religious elements. It is tenuously held together in a collective identity based on: (1) the American dream of boundless opportunity and freedom; (2) free markets and pluralist politics, regulated by a legal framework based on a central constitution; (3) the myth of American exceptionalism, a “city on a hill” destined for exemplary global leadership. This regulatory framework is constantly contested by individualism and by a Faustian spirit, which propelled American civilization westward into the frontier, subduing the Indians and pushing aside the Mexicans in the south and the British in the north, and thence beyond into the Pacific. Though fascinated by the exotic character of the Orient the principal attraction was mercantile: American shippers joined the opium trade as “free riders” taking advantage of the “unequal treaties” imposed by the European victors. A late-comer to imperialism, the Americans nonetheless acquired colonies in Guam and the Philippines after the 1898 Spanish-American War. After World War II the US initially supported the decolonization process, only to backtrack after the 1950 invasion of South Korea to become the main cheerleader and bankroller of Western anticomunist resistance. But while the US has had a growing economic engagement in the region – ASEAN is the leading Asian recipient of US foreign direct investment (FDI), more than China, India, South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong combined, and America’s 4th largest export market has a total two-way trade in goods and services of US$260 million (as of 2015) – its political interest has been episodic and ephemeral.

China’s national identity is also exceptionalist, but based on collectivist values (e.g., a superior civilization). It bears the impact of two formative factors: an ancient imperial tradition, and a great
communist revolution. Since the revolution the national identity has swung spasmodically between these influences with the interesting qualification that the oscillations are relatively sweeping, so that PRC identity tends to be relatively homogeneous at any given time but heterogeneous over time. Since the advent of reform and opening at the 11th Plenum of the 11th Congress in December 1978, and particularly after the 1989 Tiananmen 天安門 Incident, the leadership has sought to moderate these oscillations and impose a stable synthesis. Although the impact of the communist ideological system on China’s economic identity has declined amid the eclectically pragmatic drive for rapid GDP growth, it is still visible in the basically Leninist political structure and in the teleological drive for a socialist utopia morally superior to democratic capitalism. China is geophysically adjacent to Southeast Asia, sharing borders with Vietnam, Laos, and Burma/Myanmar, and its relations with its neighbors have all involved border disputes (most now resolved) and a certain ethno-cultural affinity. China has historically been invaded or threatened from the west, the north, and most recently the east, it has never been invaded from the south, while contrariwise it has often represented a security threat to its southern neighbors. China invaded and occupied Vietnam for nearly a thousand years, launched four wars with Burma during the 18th century, and in the post-WWII period rendered logistic support to communist insurgencies in Burma, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia. On the other hand, most Southeast Asian states were respectful tributaries of imperial China and vast waves of Chinese migrated to the region in the aftermath of the seven voyages of 15th century Ming Dynasty Admiral Zheng He 鄭和, many of whom still render residual loyalty (including cash remittances) to the homeland. China has historically been viewed as more advanced and hence a source of enlightenment to its neighbors, an image that China’s post-Mao economic miracle has helped to revive. In sum,
China’s political identity vis-à-vis Southeast Asia is that of a culturally superior neighbor, entitled to respect and (hopefully) obedience.

3. A Strategic Triangle?

A strategic triangle may be said to be operational if three conditions obtain: (1) all three participants are sovereign (i.e., free to decide their own national interests and foreign policy preferences), rational actors (i.e., ideology, religion, etc. does not limit linkage options); (2) each actor takes into account the third actor in managing its relationship with the second; and (3) each actor is deemed essential to the game in the sense that its defection from one side to the other would affect the strategic balance. If we assume that relations among actors may be classified as either “positive” or “negative” (a simplification, but sometimes a necessary one), there are only four possible configurations of the triangle. These are the unit veto, consisting of negative relationships among all three actors; the “marriage”, consisting of a positive relationship between two partners against a third “pariah”; a “romantic triangle”, consisting of positive relationships between one “pivot” and two “wing” actors, who have better relations with the pivot than they have with each other; and finally the ménage à trois, consisting of positive relationships among all three actors. The individual actor’s logical objective in this triangle is to have as many positive and as few negative relationships as possible. The implications are that first, each actor will prefer to have positive relations with both other actors; second, failing that, each will prefer to have positive relations with at least one other actor; and third, that in any event each actor will try to avoid incurring negative relations with both other actors. This implies a fairly clear rank order, with the pivot position in a romantic triangle being the optimal choice, followed by an actor in a ménage à trois,
followed by wing player in a marriage, followed by any actor in a veto triangle, with the position of pariah in a stable marriage being the least preferred option. Thus the dynamics of change from one triangular configuration to another might thus be conceived to ensue from competition for the limited number of favorable positions, so that as actors maneuver the configuration shifts shape. But changes in configuration might also be viewed as a response to growth in the capabilities or ambitions of one or another actor and the consequent need to adapt to the redistribution of threats.

Can the relationship between ASEAN, China, and the US be conceived as a strategic triangle? The second and third conditions clearly obtain: each actor takes into account the third in its relation to the second (e.g., ASEAN takes into account the interests of China in dealing with the US, and vice versa), and each actor is essential in the sense that a defection would imply a critical shift in the balance of power. The relationship however runs into difficulty with the first condition. China and the US are clearly sovereign actors, but ASEAN is a not a unitary actor but a collection of smaller actors concerting together to attain greater influence in a region otherwise dominated by great powers (e.g., China, Japan, India). When ASEAN can cobble together an internal consensus it can make binding decisions like any sovereign actor, as it did for example in the formation of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) in 1992-2015, eliminating all internal formal tariff barriers, or when it forced Burma/Myanmar to adopt democratic elections. But without consensus it cannot, as it is sometimes difficult to define what the “ASEAN Way” is in a specific case. But is this a difference in kind or a difference in degree? Sovereign actors also face this dilemma in the sense that there may be divisions among domestic participants in the foreign policy making process, resulting in ambiguous policies or even protracted policy paralysis. It is important to note that ASEAN does try

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to synthesize a consensus to act as a sovereign, because it is subject to many of the same problems and conscious that as a unit it has more international influence than it would as an assortment of small countries. In terms of intra-ASEAN relations the bloc functions as a consortium with many meetings to flesh out consensual positions; in its relations to the US, Japan, China, India and Europe it functions as a unitary actor. ASEAN can thus be considered an *aspirational sovereign* in the triangle, which shares many interests and threats and hence can often (but not always) muster a concerted response to them.

Having set forth the analytical framework, let us now outline a rough periodization. Stage I was the period of the Cold War, from 1950-1980; stage II the post-Cold War period, from 1980-2010; and stage III, the “rise of China” period, from 2010 to the present. We next examine each period more closely to determine the basis for the triangular configuration at that time, how it came into being and why it eventually changed.

1. The Cold War period constituted a “marriage” between the US and Southeast Asia against the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as a “pariah”. The basis of the antagonism was the communist revolution that was successfully concluded in China in 1949, which constituted a major shift in the world balance of power and created a “domino effect” for continuing revolution throughout the world that communist elites in Moscow and Beijing eagerly endorsed with both organizational and material support. This was viewed with great (in retrospect, exaggerated) trepidation in both the US and in the fragile new nations of Southeast Asia. As in China, favorable conditions for communist revolution were originally created by the Japanese invasion and creation of a short-lived “Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere”, which turned out to be even more rapacious than Western imperialism. Communist insurgencies
began in Southeast Asia (sc., Burma, Malaya, Vietnam, the Dutch East Indies, the Philippines) against Japanese occupation forces, often in united front coalitions with US and European (erstwhile colonial) forces. When Japanese occupation forces departed in 1945, resistance continued against returning Western colonial authorities. The Chinese communist revolution followed roughly the same pattern, combining class struggle at the grassroots with nationalist mobilization against the Japanese invaders, and as the largest and among the first to establish an independent new regime after Japan’s defeat, aspired to leadership of “national liberation movements” in the developing “colonies and semi-colonies” that became known as the Third World. Even before victory the Comintern “advised the other Communist parties in the colonial world to study the experience of the Chinese Communist Party”. The assertion of the leading role of the communist revolution became a vehicle for the consolidation of Mao Zedong 毛澤東’s Thought as a winning formula for launching peasant insurgencies in developing countries (and for his personal ascendancy in the Chinese Communist Party as well). Mao was said to have created a revolutionary “theory” applicable not only to the special characteristics of China, but to other new nations in similar circumstances. The crowning public assertion of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s unique leadership role was made by Liu Shaoqi 劉少奇 in his Report to the Party’s 7th Party Congress in 1945, in which he referred to Mao Zedong or his thought no less than 105 times: “the Thought of Mao Zedong … will … make great and useful contributions to the cause of the emancipation of the peoples of all countries, and of the peoples of the East in particular.” In the revised Party Constitution (which Liu also drafted), Mao’s Thought was put on the same footing with Marxism as a “guiding principle for all the works of the Party”. After the “Liberation” of China was proclaimed in October 1949 Stalin delegated Mao to lead similar revolutionary movements
throughout the Third World, where conditions were deemed analogous to those in China. These efforts were greeted by indigenous supporters of revolution in all the new nations of Southeast Asia. Only Japan, South Korea and Taiwan were proof against this revolutionary appeal by virtue of being occupied by American forces in the closing phases of World War II.

After “Liberation”, the CCP leadership made international revolution with a particular focus on the Third World the centerpiece of Chinese foreign policy, employing the full resources of the state including extremely generous foreign aid (proportionate to China’s GDP) in this endeavor. The Chinese model of peasant war surrounding the cities was successfully implemented in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, the former constituents of French Indochina, and unsuccessfully applied in the Philippines, Burma, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, and Malaysia. The resulting conflicts defined the contours of the Asian Cold War cleavage for more than three decades; it also created two mutually exclusive economic blocs in which the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), formed in 1949 as a communist counterpart to the Marshall Plan and the European Economic Union, faced an informal arrangement in which developing Asian nations were given privileged access to American consumer markets in return for their support for the US anticommmunist coalition. The conflict was deeply divisive and protracted. In triangular terms this was a Southeast Asian-US “marriage” against a “pariah” of communist forces (the PRC, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam).

A simplified bottom-line verdict would be that the pariah “lost” and the US-Southeast Asian “marriage” ultimately “won” the Southeast Asian Cold War (as one would expect from the relative size and strength of the two coalitions): indeed, even in cases of communist victory the outcome was not necessarily helpful in terms of Chinese foreign policy.
(e.g., vide Vietnam, with which the PRC had a fierce border war only four years after revolutionary victory). Critical to this victory were not only the superior power and resources of the US as anticommunist coalition leader but failures of coordination within the communist coalition. Ironically, although the communist ideological appeal transcended nationalism to focus on internationally shared class interests, repressed nationalism split the communist camp between its leading powers so deeply that there was armed conflict among communists. At the end of the Cold War the repudiation of Marxism-Leninism in the former Soviet Union and its revision in the PRC finally crippled the already weakened trans-national revolutionary argument. Circumstances in Southeast Asia were also less favorable: communist revolution succeeded in the Chinese case not only because of its superior military strategy of “people’s war” but because at critical junctures revolutionary forces were able to form united fronts with “bourgeois nationalist” forces, but in Southeast Asia this proved more difficult. In Burma, the Philippines and Malaysia, the revolutionary appeal was limited to ethnic minorities, only in Indonesia could a combination of grassroots class struggle and elite united front be achieved (and there only until the alleged “coup” attempt in 1965).

Although the post-Mao leadership in 1979 opted to repudiate the unsuccessful, even counterproductive “export of revolution”, the experience was not bereft of positive consequences. First, the threat of revolution seems to have inspired land reform, education and labor reform in noncommunist neighbors in order to coopt communist appeals. Second, it coined an image of China as the champion of the poor and oppressed and a tribunal of the interests of developing countries that has proved surprisingly resilient, despite the evolution of a far more hierarchical distribution of wealth, power, and other values in China in the course of its economic development. This image of China having a
unique moral mission in the world has arguably endured in China as well, even as the content of that mission has evolved. Third, China’s generous aid to other developing nations in the course of promoting international class struggle established few proletarian dictatorships but it did prove useful in generating the 1971 majority vote in the United Nations General Assembly to evict Taiwan from the China chair in the UN and install the PRC on the Security Council.

2. The Cold War ended earlier in Asia than in Europe, thanks largely to Sino-American détente. The post-Cold War period, from around 1980 to 2010, was a ménage à trois, in triangular terms, in which the US, the PRC, and the ASEAN countries enjoyed mutually cordial interrelations. This new configuration did not suddenly appear ex nihilo; the seeds to the transformation were planted by the 1972 Nixon visit to China, the “week that changed the world”. But the repercussions were not instantaneous. It initiated a Sino-American détente that was narrowly limited at the outset to the strategic necessity of thwarting the perceived rise of a Soviet Union that was deemed a threat to both countries, but most acutely to the PRC. In terms of this “great strategic triangle” (between great powers the US, China, and the USSR) the US tacitly agreed to protect China from a Soviet preemptive nuclear attack while at the same time maintaining détente (and strategic arms limitation talks) with the USSR, this engendered a “romantic triangle” with the US at the pivot position balancing two antagonistic “wings”. Although this was strategically necessary for China, the Maoist leadership was wary of US manipulation and determined to limit détente to the strategic dimension. Thus although the two countries opened trade missions in each other’s capitals and limited trade began (including nonlethal security technology) China’s ideological crusade against Soviet “socialist imperialism” – a threat which had grown to eclipse anti-capitalism –
continued and even intensified, now with US support. Thus in 1974 Deng Xiaoping 鄧小平 outlined Mao’s “three worlds theory” in a speech to the UN General Assembly, in which the world was seen divided into a First World of maleficent “hegemons” (the US and the USSR), a Second World of medium powers that might tilt either way, and an entitled Third World of developing countries led by the PRC.

The impact on Southeast Asia, a geographically accessible piece of the Third World, was ambiguous. “Proxy wars” continued through the 1970s and well into the 1980s, in which the PRC and the USSR sought to undermine each other’s clients and defend their own. China’s rhetorical support (e.g., radio broadcasts) for guerrilla insurgencies in Burma, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines continued uncontested by the USSR through the 1980s, but in former French Indochina Hanoi came to distrust Chinese patronage after the Nixon visit and drifted increasingly to the Soviet camp. Chinese strategic advice to Hanoi had been to continue the guerrilla insurgency indefinitely but Vietnam, now with predominantly Soviet logistic and advisory assistance, disregarded Chinese counsel and shifted to a more conventional military offensive for its crowning victory over the south in 1975. When China’s genocidal client Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia precipitated border conflict with Vietnam and the latter countered by invading Cambodia and overthrowing the Khmer Rouge regime in 1979, China made the evacuation of Vietnamese forces from that country one of three “fundamental obstacles” to reconciliation with the USSR in its 1982-1989 “normalization” negotiations with Moscow (in other words Moscow was expected to force its “proxy,” Vietnam, to leave Cambodia before full Sino-Soviet normalization could take place).

Yet the overall trend during this period was in the direction of greater peace and prosperity. It was to be sure an ironic détente, based more on supervening outside priorities than on any explicit
understanding among the powers. Under pressure of domestic anti-war sentiment, in 1969 President Richard Nixon announced the “Nixon doctrine”, urging US allies to rely on their own self-defense efforts and less on US protection. Although Vietnamization, the most prominent exemplar of this doctrine, failed with the collapse of the Saigon republic in 1975, the US did reduce its military commitment to East Asia and urge its allies to defend themselves (with the help of rising US weapons sales). Former “proxies”, no longer urgently needing security protection from the great powers, began to withdraw from their strategic umbrellas. The US was pushed out of its bases in Clark Air Force Base (1991) and Subic Bay Naval Base (1992) in the Philippines, while the Soviet Navy was evicted from Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam in 2002. Meanwhile Sino-Soviet normalization talks created the necessary Soviet diplomatic pressure to facilitate Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia, ultimately resulting in the emergence of a pro-PRC neo-Khmer regime under Hun Sen. FDI from Japan, Taiwan and the West flooded into Southeast Asia after Tiananmen and the 1990s were boom years for the “small dragons”. There may have been some sense of abandonment about this withdrawal of the powers from Southeast Asia but the overall feeling was one of relief.

Southeast Asia, for the first time in decades disencumbered of external security threats and now under more coherent leadership, proceeded in the next two decades to implement a bold new East Asian architecture based on “ASEAN centrality”. They selected an elite of wise men (“Eminent Persons Group”) to formulate an ambitious “Vision 2020” and proceeded to act to integrate the rest of East Asia peacefully to ASEAN norms. Beyond the original five members, Brunei Darussalam became the sixth member in January 1984, barely a week after becoming independent. Vietnam became the 7th member in 1995; Laos and Myanmar joined in 1997 and Cambodia in 1999; PNG and

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Timor-Leste are candidate members seeking accession. This will include all 12 Southeast Asian nations in the organization. But the ASEAN vision has been to go beyond Southeast Asia to restructure all of East Asia around the ASEAN way. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was established in 1994; ASEAN plus 3 (APT, meaning China, Japan and Korea) was established in 1997 and institutionalized to form an FTA in 2010; the ASEAN Charter came into force in 2008, as well as the East Asian Summit (EAS), including the “plus 3” plus Australia, New Zealand and India (adding Russia and the US in 2011). The ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) was established in December 2015, which will eliminate all internal duties and create a common market. Going beyond Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), ASEAN also undertakes to delve into sensitive security issues as well in expanded meetings of defense and foreign ministers and by approving a nonbinding 2002 “Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea”. All these attempts to broaden the compass of ASEAN are based on the “ASEAN Way”, however, meaning many meetings and discussions but no decisions except by unanimous consent and little executive power to enforce decisions. This has entailed the ability of a determined dissident to stymie majority consensus, as in the protracted failure to negotiate a follow-up legally binding code of conduct for the South China Sea.

3. The period from 2010 to the present can be characterized as a romantic triangle, with ASEAN in a passive pivot position. Although ASEAN continued its outreach, this metamorphosis was set in train by the “rise of China”. During the 10-year term of the leadership of Hu Jintao 胡锦涛 and Wen Jiabao 溫家寶, China achieved the highest sustained growth rate in its recorded history, averaging 10.4 percent nominal GDP growth per annum and 10.1 percent per capita growth.
This achievement was particularly impressive in the global context: the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 2008 had a devastating effect on the US, on Europe, on financially linked developed economies. But in China, although trade dived deep into negative territory in 2009, in late 2009 China launched a 4 trillion yuan (US$640 billion) stimulus package, largely in the form of loans from the banking sector to state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The short-term impact was to offset falling exports with domestic infrastructure investment, and it spared China from any single year of recession throughout the crisis period, with an understandable bracing effect on public opinion – China surpassed Japan in aggregate GDP in 2010 and the US (calculated in PPP) in 2014, convened the ballyhooed 2008 Beijing Olympics, Shanghai Expo, etc. – China had arrived, much faster than anticipated; the century of humiliation was forby. Of course it is also true that the Hu-Wen decade saw little political or economic reform, leading Wen to issue his famous March 2007 warning that the economy was “unbalanced, unstable, uncoordinated, and unsustainable”. But the ascendance of Xi Jinping in 2012 inspired Chinese confidence that these problems too could be quickly overcome.

The upshot for Southeast Asia of China’s rise was two trends, one welcome, the other less so. The first was an increase in Sino-Southeast Asian trade and economic intercourse. China first became economically interested in Southeast Asia around the time of the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-1998, to which it responded with loans of US$4 billion to Thailand and Indonesia and by refraining from devaluing its currency, to the relief of these stricken export economies. General discontent with the terms of International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans aroused interest in regional financial solutions, which China encouraged, and in 1997 ASEAN plus three talks were initiated, out of which grew the China-ASEAN free trade agreement. CAFTA came into effect in 2010 as the

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most populous FTA in the world and third largest in GDP, encompassing some two billion customers. China displaced Japan as ASEAN’s leading trade partner in 2009, with two-way trade surpassing US$366 billion by 2014, according to ASEAN trade figures. The United States was fourth in 2015 behind the European Union and Japan, and Southeast Asia was America’s fourth-largest export market. Chinese investment in the region followed the trade surge, suddenly making China the region’s second largest FDI source (American companies poured US$32.3 billion into Southeast Asia from 2012 to 2014, according to ASEAN data, followed by US$21.3 billion from China). Chinese FDI, mostly by SOEs, tends to be focused on infrastructure (e.g., high-speed rail) and mining. Although Chinese FDI runs second (to the US) it has been growing more rapidly. To wit: in 2014 China unveiled a gigantic infrastructure building scheme called “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR). This initiative is composed of two primary projects: the “Silk Road Economic Belt” and “21st-Century Maritime Silk Road”, a network of road, rail and port routes that will connect China to Central Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. The Silk Belt includes the BCIM (Bangladesh, China, India, Myanmar) economic corridor from Yunnan through Myanmar to Dhaka to Kolkata, as well as plans for a Khunjerab Railway from Kashgar in Xinjiang through Kashmir to the Gwadar port China is constructing in Pakistan. Also included is a high-speed rail line from Xi’an to Moscow and on through Belarus to Duisburg, Germany. The 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road will start from Fujian and link littoral countries in Southeast Asia to the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean Sea through the Indian Ocean. The chain of infrastructure projects is projected to create the world’s largest economic corridor, covering a population of 4.4 billion with an economic output of US$21 trillion. To fund this vast project Beijing provides several financial instruments. The China Development Bank (CDB) will receive US$32
billion, the Export Import Bank of China (EXIM) will take on US$30 billion, and the Chinese government will also pump additional capital into the Agricultural Development Bank of China (ADBC), altogether totaling some US$62 billion. To underwrite the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is a US$46 billion fund. Funding will also be provided via two new multilateral banking projects, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), to which China has committed at least US$50 billion toward a projected total of US$100 billion, and the BRICS bank or New Development Bank (NDB), which also aims for a US$100 billion currency reserve pool. The total funding China has put on offer in this visionary project approaches US$1 trillion, on financial terms yet to be negotiated. While the latter is limited to the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), others were invited to join AIIB and, after a year’s hesitation, some 57 founding members jumped in, including 12 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members. Though these new institutions replicate the functions of the IMF and World Bank, the crucial difference is that they are controlled by Beijing.

The second facet of China’s rise is China’s more “assertive” attempts to claim exclusive ownership of over 80 percent of the South China Sea. The legal basis of this sweeping claim is: (1) the claim that these were Chinese waters “since ancient times”, as demonstrated by the discovery of potshards and diary or logbook mentions of the islets by earlier travelers (none of whom ever laid claim to the islands on behalf of previous Chinese dynasties), (2) a maritime map with a (then 11-dash, now 9) or “cow’s tongue” line sketched on it by the Chinese Nationalist regime in 1947, which apparently derived from a similar map drawn by Imperial Japan after conquering the surrounding territories from European colonial powers.¹ China claims to have inherited it from the defeated Nationalists, who still claim it in Taiwan, but neither made

¹ Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal 2(1) ♦ 2016
energetic attempts to enforce this claim until recently. Though the map overlaps the 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of four littoral states as well as maritime areas previously considered high seas, China has attempted to drive away other claimants and enforce exclusive sovereignty.

There are at least three reasons for China’s more energetic recent enforcement efforts. First, in 1968 rich subsurface hydrocarbon deposits were discovered by the UN Commission for East Asia and the Pacific (UNSCAP) – the exact size of these deposits is still controversial, but China takes the most optimistic view – and other littoral states have since begun to exploit these deposits, often in joint ventures with major international oil companies. China, having convinced itself of the validity of its claims, has expressed outrage at this infringement of sovereignty. Second, from a strategic perspective, at least since the rise of Admiral Liu Huaqing 劉華清 China has evinced an interest in establishing sovereign control over its “near seas”, including the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and the Yellow Sea, then breaking through the “island chains” to the high seas and becoming a world naval power. The South China Sea became particularly important after the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy established a major naval base on Hainan Island, which it seeks to protect from enemy surveillance. Third, since the Tiananmen crackdown in 1989, there have been double-digit increases in the military budget every year but one, giving China the largest budget in Asia and the second largest in the world. Now, with the second largest defense budget in Asia and an impressively modernized and powerful navy and air force, Beijing boasts the capability to enforce its “A2/AD” (anti access/area denial) capabilities and has proceeded to do so, proceeding however cautiously (“salami-slicing”) in order to avoid provoking the superpower which alone has the capability to block its ambitions. Chinese maritime vessels, technically not naval warships
but belonging to the coast guard and fisheries police and three other maritime agencies, began detaining fishing vessels, confiscating fish, cutting cables, setting up oil drilling rigs and in effect annexing small islets in areas of disputed sovereignty by patrolling them and blocking other vessels from trespassing on China’s “sovereign territory”. China’s claims were further reinforced in 2015 by the “reclamation” of many of these tiny islets, dredging land from the surrounding ocean floor to greatly expand their size, after which harbors, air strips, and most recently anti-aircraft missile systems were added.

The dominant Chinese foreign policy discourse since the late 1990s had been that of “peaceful development” and “harmonious world”, hoping thereby to disarm the network of bilateral alliances with the US left over from the Cold War, which Beijing deemed to be based on an anachronistic “China threat” narrative and hence no longer relevant. But in the late 2000s a more militant narrative began to surface publicly that was more consistent with the tougher enforcement behavior Beijing had adopted since 2010. First, there was a rising emphasis on “core interests”, which could not in principle be compromised, one of which was the defense of sovereignty over China’s various territorial claims but particularly Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang (and, it was implied, the South China Sea). Second, after a long period of identification with the internationally oppressed developing countries China’s leaders around 2012 began asserting that China was a “great power”, with “great power relations” with other great powers, which included mutual respect for respective core interests. The implication was that different rules applied to relations with other great powers than to asymmetric relations with “small countries”. Third, the hallmark of Xi Jinping’s rise was the invocation of the “great rejuvenation” and the “China dream”. Although this rhetoric presumed a rising prosperity that would lift all boats, the subject and chief beneficiary of the China Dream was of course China.
Underlying this change in behavior and rhetoric was the implicit awareness that China had indeed become a “major power”, that the American “superpower” was now in terminal decline, and that this shift in the balance of power warranted respectful acceptance.

The response of the other two wings of the triangle to Beijing’s attempt to expand its sphere of influence was indeed respectful (in the sense that China’s attempts to enforce its claims were not met with greater or equal force), although no one actually agreed with the 9-dash line except Taiwan (who distanced itself from China’s attempts to enforce it). In Southeast Asia, Vietnam and the Philippines were vociferous in their objections, and Manila, after failing to generate support for a Code of Conduct at ASEAN in 2011, took its claims to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Court of Arbitration in 2012. Vietnam, having lost naval battles with China in 1974 and 1988, tried to find a balance between resistance and negotiation. China’s position was for shelving sovereignty issues and engaging in bilateral joint development, but those who tried to negotiate were told that joint development was premised on concession of sovereignty. Those states whose EEZs were interdicted sought to mobilize joint resistance by ASEAN because Beijing’s joint venture terms were unattractive and they were too weak to contest them bilaterally. But other ASEAN countries, e.g. Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, had no maritime territorial claims and enjoyed expanding economic relations with the PRC. More importantly, the integration of China into such expanded forums as the ARF and ADMM plus gave Beijing a voice in the question of whether to constrain Beijing, which it used skillfully. Thus Southeast Asia proved unable to concert a united resistance to China’s incremental advances.

The US, on the other hand, reacted with unusual sharpness. The US position on the question of sovereignty had hitherto been consistently
neutral. The US had no maritime territorial claims and avoided involvement. When China defeated Vietnam in 1988 and then effectively occupied the Paracels, the US said little and did nothing; when China stealthily occupied and then fortified Mischief Reef in 1995, well within the EEZ of US’s ally the Philippines, the US objected verbally but did nothing. But in 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton at a meeting of the ARF in Hanoi asserted that the US had a “national interest” in the defense of “freedom of navigation” in the South China Sea and urged disputants to reach a peaceful multilateral settlement. The following year President Barack Obama announced a “pivot” (later “rebalancing”) of US forces designed to strengthen the US military and economic commitment to the western Pacific. This rebalance included beefing up US forces in Singapore and establishing new defense facilities in northern Australia; economically, the focus was on crafting a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), to which China was not invited. The US strengthened its bilateral alliances with Japan, the Philippines, Thailand and Australia, and made port visits, weapons sales, and naval exercises with front-line states. All of this clearly indicated one-sided support for the anti-China position, a departure from customary neutrality, and Beijing was understandably annoyed. Beijing’s rhetoric became even more antagonistic to US “interference” than to Southeast Asian resistance.

Thus the triangular configuration shifted from a ménage to a romantic triangle, in which ASEAN had better relations with both the US and the PRC than the latter had with each other. This was somewhat paradoxical in that the US has no territorial claims in the dispute, even the complaint of constraint on “freedom of navigation” met Chinese insistence that they had no intention of interfering with commercial shipping. From the American perspective, Sino-US polarization arose from the Chinese determination to push the American navy out of the
South China Sea, an area it had hitherto dominated. This evoked fears of “power transition” and a shift in the global power balance. From a Chinese perspective the focus on the US was because the US alone had the military power to block Chinese ambitions. ASEAN thus paradoxically became “pivot” balancing between two polarized wings even though ASEAN has a major stake in the game. Southeast Asia benefits both from Beijing’s economic largesse and from American security protection; it could not afford loss of protection nor was it willing to forgo Chinese economic inducements. Both were useful, while the outbreak of war between these two giants would be an unmitigated disaster in which ASEAN lost both. Thus for ASEAN as a whole, the need for balance and harmony (the “ASEAN way”) outweighed its interest in defending maritime sovereignty claims. That said, in the long run exclusion from local high seas will severely cripple developmental prospects for these trade-dependent economies; Vietnam for example derives some 25 percent of GDP from offshore commodity exploitation.

4. Conclusions

Southeast Asia has always been a meeting point. Historically it was a meeting point between East Asia and South Asia, absorbing Hinduism, Theravada Buddhism and Islam from the south and Confucianism and Mahayana Buddhism from the north. Western colonialism opened the region to the West and to the winds of global modernization. Since Japan’s coercive decolonization during WWII the dominant outside influences have come from the US and from the PRC. The US, as the strongest world power to emerge unscathed from the war, represented an odd mix of democratic liberalism and the defense of lingering Western imperialist interests, while China sought to divest itself of its tributary traditions and represent the forces of world revolution (with Chinese
characteristics). Both tended to ignore the force of indigenous nationalism, which shaped events in unexpected ways.

While the Chinese revolutionary project was a vastly ambitious one aimed at transforming the entire Third World but Southeast Asia in particular for reasons of geographic proximity and historic influence, and it significantly impacted postwar developments in Indonesia, Burma, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam, in the long run it however succeeded only in Vietnam. And it was here that Chinese interests clashed most directly with US interests, as the US stumbled into a defense of a holdover neocolonial regime. ASEAN came into being in 1967 independently but with Western support, in part in reaction to the perceived communist threat. This confrontation with China over former French Indochina was ultimately resolved in a bilateral compromise in which both tacitly agreed to withdraw, a solution that was however sabotaged by Vietnamese nationalism. This outcome not only created enduring friction for the Socialist Republic of Vietnam with both China and the US but split Southeast Asia between south and north, a cleavage that was not resolved until the end of the Cold War.

The post-Cold War era began with a withdrawal of both PRC and US power projection from the region, facilitating the configuration of a triangular ménage à trois. ASEAN took advantage of the power vacuum to expand vigorously, resolving the breach with the northern-tier states to include all of Southeast Asia and introducing a number of extended forums intended to socialize the rest of East Asia into the ASEAN way. On the basis of “ASEAN centrality”, the ARF, CAFTA, EAS and other forums were instituted to engage Japan, Korea and China and ultimately Russia, the US, India, and Australia-New Zealand as well. The “rise of China” as a geopolitical juggernaut occurred within this friendly context, as China joined ARF in 1990 and helped innovate the APT and CAFTA
at the end of the decade. Beijing’s generous assistance to stricken Southeast Asian economies during the Asian Financial Crisis helped to dispel lingering mistrust of the communist giant and economic intercourse took off, benefitting both parties.

But beginning around 2010 the strategic implications of the rise of China began to appear more problematic. The crux of the problem is of course China’s mounting determination to turn the South China Sea into a Chinese lake, converting tiny subsurface islets into naval and air bases commanding their own EEZs. China has not yet attempted to take over land features already occupied by other Southeast Asian claimants, but it has attempted to settle previously unoccupied islets and grasp fishing and petroleum bounties. Yet the incorporation of China into various ASEAN forums has afforded Beijing the political wherewithal to prevent a majority from forming that could question its claims or oblige it to negotiate a more acceptable compromise. China has utilized an active diplomacy and economic statecraft to prevent any such majority from forming, including One Belt, One Road and other such mega-investment projects. This has for the time being succeeded in blocking any Code of Conduct or multilateral sanctions and thrown ASEAN Centrality into serious question. ASEAN emerges as a passive pivot between an ambitiously expansionist China and an alarmed US, which sees the geopolitical balance in Asia shifting to its enduring disadvantage.

Notes

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1. Personal communication from Wang Gungwu 王赓武 (who saw the Japanese map).
China, Asia-Pacific Regional Economic Integration and Cross-Strait Relations
Asia-Pacific Regional Economic Integration: 
Coopetition vs. Conflict

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Abstract
In the era of economic globalization, promoting regional trade agreements or regional cooperation has become a plausible strategy to attract foreign direct investment and to promote national competitiveness at a global level. Nonetheless, facing the differential national economic interests and the needs of protection of domestic industries, as well as the diverse levels of economic liberalization domestically, the involvement of FTA negotiation in every country is universally in the situation of struggling between securing economic sovereignty and national economic development. Countries in the Asia-Pacific region are in the same situation. This article analyzes how countries balance between securing economic sovereignty and promoting national economic development when they are involved in TPP and RCEP negotiations. By confirming the appropriate linkage between each participating countries’ decision for balancing between domestic economic sovereignty and further integrating into regional economic cooperation institutions the validity of the proposition for this research project can be verified.
Keywords: regional economic integration, TPP, RCEP, Asia-Pacific region, FTA

JEL classification: F13, F15, F52, O24

1. Introduction

In the era of economic globalization, promoting regional trade agreements or regional cooperation has become a plausible strategy to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) and to promote national competitiveness at the global level. Nonetheless, facing the differential national economic interests and the needs for protection of domestic industries, as well as the diverse levels of economic liberalization domestically, countries that are involved in the negotiation of free trade agreement (FTA) are universally in the situation of struggling between securing economic sovereignty and national economic development.

Countries in the Asia-Pacific region are no exception in facing the same dilemma because they need to figure out to what extent they should be involved in the regional economic integration while fulfilling their specific national interests. Since the 1990s, the Asia-Pacific regional economic integration is accelerating, although the progress of the economic integration in the region is in a creeping speed in contrast to that of the European Union (EU) and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). So far there are two FTAs, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), under negotiation. The TPP and RCEP are the most significant FTAs in the region working for liberalizing trade and investment. Because the United States of America (USA) joins the TPP negotiation, and China participates in the RCEP negotiation, the undergoing high-standard free trade agreements in the region have been labelled as the
US-led TPP and the China-led RCEP respectively.

The former FTA involves 12 Pacific Rim countries, while the later covers a total of 16 members including 10 members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) plus China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and India. There are seven countries involved in both FTA negotiations, including Australia, Brunei, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Vietnam (Table 1).

**Table 1** List of Countries Involved in TPP and RCEP Negotiation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RCEP members</th>
<th>Joining both TPP and RCEP negotiation</th>
<th>TPP members</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td>Canada</td>
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<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
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<td>Cambodia</td>
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<td>Laos</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
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<td>Myanmar (Burma)</td>
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<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Japan</td>
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<td>South Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
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Source: Edited by the author.
As reported in the media, the TPP negotiation has been completed in October 2015 (Becker and Nara, 2015; Corbett, 2015). In contrast, the RCEP has been under negotiation for more than two years and is expected to complete by the end of this year. Nevertheless, according to the Joint Media Statement of Ministerial Meeting of RCEP, the negotiation is still at a relatively early stage. It is confirmed that it is impossible to finalize the RCEP agreement in 2015.¹ The forward progress is obscured because of the difficulties in reaching consensus for market access for goods.

Both TPP and RCEP are significant FTAs in the region in terms of the large number of participating economies and population involved. Besides, in terms of the economic diversity and scale, countries involved in negotiation including developed and developing economies. Disregarding individual country’s domestic political situation, it is for sure that countries at different levels of economic development must have different economic concerns and interests driving them to be involved in regional economic negotiation. Although reasons for involvement in economic cooperation negotiations are different among partner countries, it is definitely that every individual partner country has its own rational and self-selected purposes with respect to national interests, strategic intention, economic concerns, etc., when they decide to enter into negotiations. Therefore, with different interests between developed and developing economies, the TPP and RCEP negotiations become more complex. Furthermore, the fact of overlapping participants of RCEP and TPP suggest that members of the two FTAs are eager to form trade bloc so as to liberalize trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region. They barely dare to be absent from the negotiation in order to avoid being marginalized from regional economic cooperation. Yet, just like every form of economic mechanism, the essential for
success of TPP and RCEP negotiations depends on the willingness and readiness of participants to realize commitments to all parties.

This paper aims to analyze how countries balance economic sovereignty on the one hand, while working for promoting national economic development on the other when they are involving themselves in TPP and RCEP negotiations. This research adopted a micro-macro research model by defining all the negotiations and documentations of TPP and RCEP as the crux of micro-analysis so as to conclude the consensus established by these policy documents from various sources.

Subsequently, the final progress of the negotiation of the multilateral agreement can be treated as the objective for macro-analysis. Hence by confirming the appropriate linkage between each participating countries’ decision for balancing between securing domestic economic sovereignty and intention of further integrating into regional economic cooperation institutions, the validity of the proposition for this research project can be verified. All the essentials concluded by this study may serve as the reference elements for long-term strategic assessment.

2. Current Progress of Asia-Pacific Regional Economic Integration

In the past, countries worked generally through the World Trade Organization (WTO) for economic negotiation at the global level. However, in most recent years bilateral negotiations of free trade agreement between countries or multilateral regional economic negotiations are prevailing gradually as reactions to the stalemate of the Doha Round trade negotiation conducted under the WTO.

Like countries in most regions worldwide, in the Asia-Pacific region there are also many countries participating in economic cooperation agenda for pursuing greater market access and facilitating better global value chains. In Asia, many governments have been very enthusiastically
signing up many types of trade deals. South Korea, for example, has already had more than 15 FTAs in force and with more under negotiation. Such agreements can be possibly helpful in spurring economic growth of nations as well as some international businesses or covered industries.

According to WTO statistics, regional trade agreements (RTAs) have increasingly been widespread worldwide since 1990s. Up to 7th April 2015, the GATT/WTO has received some 612 RTAs notifications. More than 400 have been put into effect. Amidst those effective FTAs, more than 58% of FTAs are in force in most recent years. It indicates that establishing free trade agreements are increasingly popular between nations.

Meanwhile, according to the information released by the Bureau of Foreign Trade, ROC (BOFT), countries worldwide keep on actively pursuing establishment of FTAs with trading partners within region or cross-region. In the document edited by the BOFT, a list of 16 Asian countries, including the ROC in Taiwan, all have already signed several bilateral or multinational FTAs; many FTAs have been put into effect. Besides, the document also displayed the underway negotiating FTAs and possible new FTAs that are under research.

In the same information released by the BOFT, it is shown that the numerous FTAs signed by countries are overlapping and intertwining. Without a universal free trade area as North America or Europe does, Asian countries have signed many bilateral and multinational FTAs already. In many cases, when a country is involved in several different negotiation groups, negotiating terms settle with various counterparts would be varied accordingly. The intricately intertwined situation has normally been call as the “Spaghetti bowl effect”.

In most recent years, the TPP together with RCEP are the focus of regional economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. Given that the
US pushes the negotiation of the TPP, while China is only involved in the talks of RCEP, the two focuses of FTA negotiation have been labeled as the US-led TPP and the China-led RCEP. Many argue that the Asian economic integration could possibly spill over into the trade arena and become a competition between China and the US (Hamanaka, 2014: 12-13; Chao, 2014).

2.1. **Brief Review of TPP**

TPP is a multinational trade agreement that is currently under negotiation among 12 Pacific Rim countries. It adheres to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) by having open accession clauses to allow all APEC economies or countries to join the negotiation (Hsu, 2015). Currently, TPP, stretching from Japan to Chile, covers 40% of the world economy. The origin of the TPP was built on a free trade agreement called Pacific-4 (P4) between New Zealand, Chile, Singapore and Brunei. The P4 came into effect in 2006. In 2008 the USA decided to join the P4 negotiation and enlarged the scale of the FTA to become TPP. Afterward, more parties joined the TPP negotiation, including Australia, Peru, and Vietnam.

TPP negotiators have worked for the elimination of trade barriers as well as establishment of common framework and mechanism of dispute settlement since February 2008. As a report illustrated, the TPP agreement is a comprehensive agreement covering 30 chapter documents and dealing with almost everything from agricultural tariffs to intellectual property (IP) as well as from environmental conservation to financial service. As for the cross-cutting issues, it includes regulator coherence, state-owned enterprises, competitiveness and global supply chain, and small- and medium-size enterprises (Fergusson, 2015: 42-46).

Like most of the FTAs’ claim, TPP seeks to eliminate tariffs and nontariff barriers to trade in goods, services, and to establish rules on a
wide range of issues including intellectual property rights, foreign direct investment, and other trade-related issues. It also covers many non-trade issues ranging from food safety, Internet freedom, copyright, trademarks, patents, and intellectual property. It was said that the negotiation chapters of TPP adopted the strictest standard, especially in the IP chapter. By so doing, the TPP can meet the primary aim of securing liberalization in the fields of market access for good and services, rules, and the cross-cutting issues (Bush, 2013).

After more than seven years’ efforts, negotiators of the 12 TPP countries have announced that they had reached a deal on 5th October 2015 (Calmes, 2015). Given that the parties of the TPP contributed more than 40% of global gross domestic product (GDP) and one third of world trade, as well as 24% of the world’s trade in services, it was said to be the most significant trade negotiations globally (Bush and Meltzer, 2014; Baykitch et al., 2015).

The TPP agreement is at least significant in three aspects: firstly, the size of trade flows and population covered; secondly, the scope and scale of liberalization in reducing barriers in goods, services, and agricultural trade, as well as on a wide range of topics; thirdly, the flexibility to be expanded in trade and investment disciplines (Fergusson, 2015: 54). Furthermore, the most noteworthy feature of the TPP negotiation in the market access agenda is non-discriminatory treatment. As for the rules, it is about a broadly defined new, leading edge of policy innovation of trade rules covering manufactured products and services. Furthermore, the TPP is said to seek a higher standard to protect trade-related intellectual property rights than that of the WTO standard. Besides, as claimed, once the TPP negotiation is completed, all participants should be treated equally with non-discrimination, transparency, and international standards.
It is for sure that the TPP agreement has strategic policy implications for not only the USA as well as the other 11 participants but also for those non-involving negotiating countries with respect to trade policy. It is for sure that the TPP would end many tariffs that participating countries have placed on. Once the TPP is put into effect, it will be the world’s largest trade pact to date. Unavoidably, the TPP will likely affect a wide range of sectors and regions of economies which are being involved or non-involving in the negotiation process for the foreseeable future.

2.2 Brief Review of RCEP

RCEP is a proposed mega-regional trade deals. The FTA is a negotiation among 10 ASEAN countries and six existing FTA partners of ASEAN, including China (November 2002), Japan (December 2008), South Korea (June 2007), Australia and New Zealand (January 2010), and India (January 2010). The RCEP was proposed in the 19th ASEAN Summit in November 2011 and formally started negotiation in November 2012. The aim of RCEP is for broadening and deepening ASEAN’s engagement with its FTA Partners.

The RCEP was greatly stimulated by the TPP. In large part, RCEP is an alternative to the TPP. To some extent, the RCEP standard is relative easier to achieve that is suitable for the developing countries to join. Although the RCEP is less ambitious than the TPP in the aspect of liberalization standard, it is a strategy aiming at maintaining regional economic growth by ensuring the openness and competitiveness of markets for participating countries. Meanwhile, the RCEP works for strengthening ASEAN centrality in regional economic integration so as to resist the US-led TPP (Jin, 2013).

Therefore, the RCEP is globally important because it contains the largest economies in the world – China, India and Japan. In total, the
population of the 16 RCEP participating economies is more than 3 billion, accounting for almost half of the world’s population. The economic performance of the RCEP participating countries is strong amidst slow global economy. In total, the output of RCEP countries accounted for US$22.7 trillion in 2014, which was about 29.3% of world GDP. In the same year, those countries attracted about 29.8% of FDI inflow, amounted to US$366.3 billion. They are also strong in the field of trade. Total trade of RCEP economics accounts for 28.4% of global trade, amounting to US$10.8 trillion. Once RCEP is ratified, it would integrate the entire Asian region into the largest economic bloc in the world.

The combination of the negotiators including some small and less-developed economies of Southeast Asia, some advanced economies of Northeast Asia (Japan and South Korea), and the world’s economic giant (China), is an important feature of RCEP. It is expected that each individual country’s aim and purpose of joining FTA talks are definitely varied. Taking 10 members of ASEAN alone, there are outstanding differences in cultures, ethnicities, histories, experiences, ideologies, political systems, territorial definitions and even perceived national interests. The 10 countries represent 10 differences of identity as well as ideological divides, economic disparities, competing interests, mutual suspicions and territorial disputes.

Actually, a group of countries with different levels of economic development working together on a negotiating table for the aim of liberalizing trade-related issues is a mission full of challenges. It could possibly lead to two diverse ways – either a mess or an inclusive mechanism for regional economic integration in the Asia-Pacific region. Basically, with the economic diversity and scale of economy, as well as the difference of national interests between developed and developing economies, and the complex and numerous integration mechanisms...
being introduced in the RCEP negotiation, it is supposed to be more
difficult to reach conclusion. Yet, the RCEP is still expected to allow all
parties with different levels of economic development to maximize the
opportunities for further cooperation through deeper and broader
economic engagements.

There are four ASEAN nations, including Singapore, Brunei,
Malaysia, and Vietnam, together also with Japan, which have been
involved in the TPP negotiation. Such a situation has raised much
attention with regard to the potential coopetition and conflict among
negotiators in the region. Besides, while the TPP negotiation has reached
conclusion at the end of 2015, it was less likely that the RCEP
negotiation could reach conclusion before the end of 2015 as in the
original negotiation schedule, although the RCEP has already held
several rounds of negotiation.

3. The Overlapping Participants of TPP and RCEP

The RCEP is standing greatly against the TPP. Currently, both the RCEP
and the TPP are in the negotiation phase, although TPP is announced to
be finalized. It needs a further observation to check what compromises
are reached on participating members and levels of liberalization.

Both TPP and RCEP are large networks of FTAs among members
with the same ultimate objective of economic integration in a greater
scope. Both negotiations work to generalize the bilateral and smaller
regional agreements into more coherent region-wide arrangements.
While the utmost aim of both TPP and RCEP is to establish a universal
Asian free trade area, to some extent, the TPP and RCEP are
opportunities to liberalize trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific
region. And therefore, the two multinational FTAs are possible pathways
to reach free trade area of the Asia-Pacific region. If RCEP together with
TPP has been ratified by the participating countries, both will influence the regional trade architecture of the Asia-Pacific massively.

However, TPP is mainly composed of developed countries with comparative advantages that work together to liberalize trade in services and economic systems. In contrast, RCEP is mainly assembling some East Asian emerging economies with competitive edges in manufacturing and export-oriented industries but with little readiness to be more open in economy.

In 2008, the US started to push for TPP, outlining a high-level and comprehensive economic partnership. Of course, the move has been regarded as an important step of the US in its “returning to Asia” strategy. It also has been regarded as a rebalancing strategy of the US towards Asia (Fergusson, McMinimy and Williams, 2015). Participation in TPP negotiation quickly expanded within a few years from 9 to 12 countries. With that, the TPP is seen as a US-led negotiation. Furthermore, because the US participates in TPP and not in RCEP, while China is in RCEP but not in TPP, thus RCEP is regarded as China-dominated negotiation. Although the two FTA negotiations are led by two rival power states respectively, there are seven countries involved in both FTA negotiations. Therefore, the TPP and RCEP have been viewed as two trading blocs in the Asia-Pacific region that conduct strategic competition between the US and China. Given that, some argued that the Asian economic integration could possibly spill over into the trade arena to become a political competition between the two powers (Chao, 2014). Nevertheless, it is also possible that the two FTAs can integrate together for the sake of overall regional economic integration in the future.
4. Trade-Off between Economic Sovereignty and National Economic Security

It is a universal question that why a country would like to trade-off part of its economic sovereignty for better opportunity of national economic development. Countries being involved or intending to get involved in the TPP and RCEP negotiations is an example that countries do encounter such a dilemma.

The TPP is a comprehensive and advanced trade agreement that covers many economic issues. Negotiators of TPP are mostly high- or high-middle income countries working together for pursuing a more wide-ranging and broader liberalization agreement in trade and many other issues. In contrast, RCEP is a negotiation between ASEAN and six existing FTA partners. Some of the participating ASEAN countries are not ready to be more open in their trade terms. Comparing the two FTA negotiations, it is really hard to tell whether the negotiation of the TPP or that of the RCEP would be easier to reach conclusion. It depends on many micro and macro factors that affect participating countries’ decision-making.

The basic function of states throughout history has been to provide security for their citizens by eliminating threats. Despite the fact that sources of threats are various, the major source of threat to national security generally originates from the interaction among states when states perceive their national interests as vulnerable. Governments hence develop suitable and feasible security policies in order to protect and defend vital national values against existing and potential adversaries. Although military power might be the most direct strength used to defend the security of state, states cannot be truly secure without prosperity. History has illustrated that the rise and fall of power states are demonstrably caused not only by military conflict, but also by the consequence of economic factors (Kennedy, 1988).
States must seek both security and prosperity in the international environment. States usually have to rely on the world economy to provide the matériel and money for defence. In the most simple and direct way, economic potential supports the establishment of a military might and thus strengthens national security (Friedberg, 1991). National security is improved and protected by secure economic power. Similarly, national economic power will be amplified and secured by national security. Utilisation of economic measures to achieve national interests in the face of threat can thus constitute a feasible means for national security ends.

Therefore national economic performance is a crucial factor for economic security as well as national security. It is the reason why states are always paying much concern and attention on the issue of economic cooperation, no matter the issue is relevant or irrelevant to the country. In a globalized world, no country can live isolated. Thus, countries will worry about being marginalized if they miss any multinational negotiation. On the other hand, when they are in the game, they also worry about the dominance of decision or even sovereignty that they need to give up or be denuded of.

Countries, either advanced economies or less-developed economies, would need to review all aspects before they decide whether to be involved in FTA negotiations or not. Likewise, those countries that are being involved in TPP and RCEP negotiations are all in a long griled process to produce decisions. The interweaving economic and political situation of the countries in the Asia-Pacific region may provide some micro and macro factors to explore the possible cooperation vs. conflict in the issue of the Asia-Pacific regional economic integration.
5. Coopetition vs. Conflict: Regional Economic Integration

Regional integration agreements are common activities in today’s globalized world. It is for sure that every individual country should have its own reasons and purposes to agree to remove trade barriers on a reciprocal basis. Those divergent reasons may include the concern of transnational epidemic, pollution and crime, which is in the category of the non-conventional threat. For those negative phenomena needed to be tackled by transnational collective efforts, states may form certain mechanism to facilitate such joint tasks. Nevertheless, there are also containing economic factors to persuade governments and enterprises to promote economic integration. For instance, to alleviate the market competition originated from reducing price malignantly, states may establish regional economic integration mechanism to regulate the market. By so doing, states within the same region may effectively contain the destructive competitions often occurred in the community of the developing states. To control the epidemic eruption possibly undermining agricultural production or diary industry, states in the same region mat take joint measures since no virus causing the epidemic will be halted by the artificial national boundaries.

Other similar situations also occur whilst some nations becomes the pollution source and affecting other neighbouring states. Collective efforts will be put into force through the regional economic integration mechanism since these events may hurt the economic activities eventually. Likewise, transnational crimes can also be eliminated or at least, well-contained by regional economic integration since the financial transaction will be relatively transparent through such an integration process. All the organized transnational criminal activities will be accompanied with money laundering actions. To defeat the transnational crimes, financial transparency is an essential element achievable through regional economic integration.
It is also plausible that a collective approach may allow all the participants to secure their market leverage. For instance, setting a standard for certain merchandise is the most frequently appeared consequence through an economic integration process. States within the same region sharing similar manufacturing goods or natural products may form an alliance to set the rules, standards or agenda for the global market. All these leverages can only be acquired and secured through an economic integration process; otherwise, all the collective efforts will be inevitably consumed by regional competition and no consensus will be achieved at all.

Those arbitration mechanism for coordinating disputes and difference in interests can only be established through the economic process. To establish an economic integration mechanism that serves all participants' interests is literally a process of give-and-take. States all need to surrender some of their privileges in exchange for collective actions or positions. To achieve any consensus cannot be merely based on any unilateral aspiration. States should have their own interest calculation table to decide whether they should be included or excluded from these offers of regional economic integration.

Further, to form a trading bloc is the present modus operandi of the commercial and trade practices in the global community. Within any trading bloc, all participating states may enjoy the treatment of free trade thus securing the competitiveness over those contenders outside the trading bloc. It is an indisputable fact that no state in the world can isolate itself from the international commercial linkages nowadays. The basis for any trading bloc is again the regional economic integration process.

On the other hand, a likely reason for states to resist regional economic integration is the concern for political incorporation or even sovereignty annexation possibly introduced by the economic practice of
assimilation. As a matter of fact, this is a generally perceived myth in both the academic community and the political circle. The most significant example ever occurred in recent years is the process of German reunification (Rotter and Deveson, 2011: 37). Particularly, the currency union between the two German states before the formal reunification was activated was interpreted as paving the foundation for further political integration.

Nevertheless, to define economic integration as the prior situation for subsequent political incorporation is not a general rule at all. Adopting the German reunification as an example to prove the causation relationship between economic integration and political incorporation does have a logical flaw. It is the misperception of a single exception to be a general modus operandi. It is very easy to find certain counter-examples such as that the Euro itself has not caused any further political integration so far. Many nations within the Caribbean region share the same currency but still preserve their own sovereign identity. Most importantly, we should not put an equal sign between the currency union and economic integration. The content of economic integration is far more sophisticated than a pure currency union. Moreover, the currency union for the German case was indeed an exception. Most of the people knew well that the German reunification was an inevitable fate for the two German states then. East Germany was in its final stage facing the countdown at the moment. It was not the question of what would happen but a matter of when the reunification would come true. The currency union of the two German states was not a stimulus that triggered any political reunification process but only a step to facilitate the political reunification process that had already been decided. It is therefore incorrect to adopt the German reunification process as an example to establish any causation relationship between economic integration, or currency union, if we insist, and political incorporation happened later.
after. There are other counter-examples such as that many free trade blocs and common currency mechanisms have already successfully rebuked the myth.

The true reluctance of resisting regional economic integration is again originated and driven by substantial interests. Especially, those who may suffer from the regional integration process are the natural opponents to the integration concept and process. For instance, farmers and workers in the dairy industry who enjoy privileges from the national subsidy that provides a secure competition environment will not be happy to see the challenges from imported merchandise. For all free trade agreements and regional economic integration processes, the most considerable resistance is always from the farming sector. It is quite understandable to see that domestic politics may affect the progress of the negotiation process for regional economic integration. Likewise, some other sectors lacking in competitiveness may also oppose to the regional integration process. This is why the regional economic integration process is never a fully rational practice but full of political bargain within the negotiation procedures.

Unfortunately, as already mentioned above, the myth of losing national identity, particularly the sovereign identity, was generally adopted by the politicians to resist regional economic integration though counter-examples do exist and they surely know that the facts may tell otherwise. Nonetheless, losing the sovereign rights would always be an excuse sensational enough to terminate adversaries’ argument. This may be the reason why such a groundless myth can be so popular. In certain states, the political sectionalism will be strong enough to blockade the internal review of the regional economic integration process. Also, some stakeholders who enjoy the leverages of internal subsidy may support the efforts to negate the regional economic integration negotiation or even the initiative of studying the terms of these integration
mechanisms.

On the other hand, those who keep a solid conviction that economic integration may eventually undermine the sovereign integrity or national security are not totally incorrect. The economic linkages do affect the national security calculation and possibly have an effect on national sovereignty. For instance, as the EU member states suffered from the national debt crisis, it may meanwhile damage the Euro’s credit to some extent. As the Greek government faces the bankruptcy crisis and threatens to withdraw from the common currency system, it may become a universal burden for all the EU member states that have adopted the Euro as bank note. Nonetheless, to exclude any specific political entity from the economic or commercial connection may not be an assurance for national security since the global market impact caused by any state, even without direct interaction, may still cause an effect on the domestic market.

It is necessary for us to face the reality that a global village is not an imagination anymore. With or without the direct economic, financial, trade or commercial linkages may only decide the level of the impact as any economic turmoil actually occurs in other states. The matter is the size of the economic entity, not the intensity of our engagement with the specific entity. For any impact on the global market, the shock wave will inevitably reach us eventually, regardless of whether the direct connections exist or not. Whether economic security can be well assured by quarantine or separation is indeed questionable. Economic interaction is essentially a dynamic process. No one should expect it to remain at a static status. There is therefore no need to fear economic linkage or any kind of economic integration as long as appropriate measures can be adopted to cope with all the challenges accordingly. To block all the efforts of promoting economic integration is fundamentally unrealistic. Being over-optimistic on economic integration because of negligence on
the risks contained by the transnational threats possibly originated from economic integration is also undesirable.

Regardless of the actual achievement of the negotiation, in facing the gap between national interests and the need of securing domestic industries, countries that participate in regional economic negotiation need to give up part of economic sovereignty or at least the freedom of the right to make decision alone with respect to economic issues in order to trade off the development of national economic security. Such trading off in terms of overall national well-being is a necessary sacrifice.

5.1. Micro-Perspective Review

In total there are 12 participating countries joining the TPP negotiation, while there are 16 members involved in RCEP talks. Each participating state of TPP or RCEP has its own interest calculation table to decide whether they should be included or excluded from the regional economic integration. No unilateral aspiration can achieve consensus. Therefore each individual negotiator’s domestic situation can affect the future progress of the TPP and RCEP negotiations.

Given that the ASEAN member states are with strongly divergent income and productivity levels, the national interests of the less-developed ones should be different vis-à-vis the rich ones. Besides, the readiness for opening market access must be diverse as well. Although ASEAN as an organization has long established a consensus mechanism under the principle of the “ASEAN way” to deal with affairs, each individual country still can maintain their respective idea and opinion.

It is for sure that the 10 members of ASEAN have reached a consensus under the principle of the “ASEAN way” to work collectively for the goal of achieving the RCEP agreement. However, in the past few years since the beginning of the RCEP negotiation, some individual ASEAN countries have their respective specific opinions toward one or
some partners because of their respective national interests. Table 2 contains each individual ASEAN member country’s opinion toward the RCEP and TPP negotiations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ASEAN member country</th>
<th>Attitude toward RCEP</th>
<th>Attitude toward TPP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Indonesia            | • A major player in ASEAN.  
|                      | • Seldom takes initiatives for FTA negotiation.  
|                      | • Not very active in forming trade deals with its partners in the region.  
|                      | • Considers China as its competitor in the labor-intensive industries, such as textile, toys, etc. | • Pays attention to the process and the possible results of the negotiation.  
|                      |                                   | • TPP is not in its interests. |
| Singapore            | Welcomes the negotiation.        | Joined TPP negotiation. |
| Malaysia             | No opposition.                  | Joined TPP negotiation in July 2010 mainly because there was no hope to finalize the United States-Malaysia FTA whose negotiations were launched in 2006 (Hamanaka, 2014: 7). |
| Thailand             | Welcomes the negotiation.       | Thailand has ever expressed intention to join TPP, but that does not necessarily mean its willingness to join independently. |
Table 2 (Cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ASEAN member country</th>
<th>Attitude toward RCEP</th>
<th>Attitude toward TPP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Philippines          | • Welcomes the negotiation.  
                       | • Struggles with China for South China Sea issue. | Not necessarily shows a willingness to join TPP independently. |
| Vietnam              | • Positive and welcomes the negotiation.  
                       | • Struggles with China for South China Sea issue. | Joined TPP negotiation. |
| Cambodia             | Follows the ASEAN proposal. | Due to domestic economic situation is less qualified to join the negotiation. |
| Laos                 | Follows the ASEAN proposal. | Due to domestic economic situation is less qualified to join the negotiation. |
| Brunei               | Welcomes the negotiation. | • Joined TPP negotiation.  
                       | • Promotes relations with US to confront China’s territorial ambition. |
| Myanmar (Burma)      | • Follows the ASEAN proposal.  
                       | • Does not trust China because of some historical experience in dealing with jade and precious stones business with China. | Due to economic situation is less qualified to join the negotiation. |

Source: Edited by the author after interviewing some scholars and experts in the field.
From Table 2, it is clear that the all 10 members of ASEAN agree to negotiate RCEP, but some of them keep a mistrustful mentality toward outside counterparts, especially China. Furthermore, for those relatively poor economies, such as Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, they do not have too many choices but have to follow the ASEAN collective proposal to be involved in the RCEP negotiation. Given that some participating countries whose economic growth is lagging behind, such as Indonesia, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, it is less likely for all ASEAN member states to meet the identical high standard of TPP negotiation. They would less likely approve the TPP’s method of approach. Besides, historically, Indonesia is not generally in favor of preferential trade liberalization (Damuri, 2014). Indonesia shows little interest in trade deals, including the TPP.

Table 3 illustrates the attitude of the RCEP participating countries except the ASEAN countries. India has border dispute with China. The country’s stance towards liberalization has varied widely depending on the economic situation. India’s economy is expected to benefit from the RCEP by strengthening its trade ties with Australia, China, Japan and South Korea (Chatterjee and Singh, 2015). However, negative sentiments about liberalization and openness seem to be prevalent in India (Basu, 2015).

Currently, generally speaking, China’s involvement in RCEP negotiation is changing from a supporter to the leader of the regional trade negotiation (Kwie, 2006: 117). Besides, as for the TPP negotiation, because of the accumulated confidence resulting from increasing economic strength, China believes that it can handle the higher standard of FTA, such as the TPP. China has transformed its role in regional economic integration from “patient observer” to “active player” (Kwie, 2006: 117). It has also expressed its positive attitude to the successful
Table 3 Attitude of the Six RCEP Participating Countries toward TPP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Attitude toward RCEP</th>
<th>Attitude toward TPP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>• Strongly endorsed RCEP.</td>
<td>Attitude toward TPP is changing from resistance to more welcoming (He and Yang, 2015).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Takes a lead for RCEP negotiation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Welcomes the negotiation.</td>
<td>Joined TPP negotiation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Welcomes the negotiation.</td>
<td>Joined TPP negotiation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>• Welcomes the negotiation.</td>
<td>• Is much concerned about the TPP because it is not part of it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Maintains certain level of reluctance because of struggle with China, such as boarder dispute.</td>
<td>• Currently, cannot afford to conduct large-scale free trade adjustment to meet the criteria of TPP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>At the very beginning was indifferent toward RCEP negotiation.</td>
<td>Joined TPP negotiation but the popular opinion is split on the issue of TPP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>Welcomes the negotiation.</td>
<td>Actively expressed its intention of joining TPP negotiation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Edited by the author.

negotiation of TPP by saying that it is happy to see that the TPP members can reach a consensus.9

Japan’s attitude toward the RCEP talks is indifference from the very beginning. Japanese politicians and media seldom talked about the issue of RCEP. Meanwhile, it is seldom to find disagreement or opposition
against RCEP in Japan. In contrast, the Japanese popular opinion is split on the issue of TPP with very intertwined and confused arguments. Some opinion even said that the TPP might “throw Japanese society into turmoil” (Jin, 2013). So, basically, the ASEAN-majority RCEP is assumed to take a more Asian approach of gradual liberalization, which may be seen as safer by the Japanese society.

5.2. From the Macro-Perspective

In large part, taking the foundation of ASEAN + 1 FTA networks the RCEP works for strengthening ASEAN centrality in regional economic integration to resist the US-led TPP. ASEAN is worried that some of the ASEAN member countries joining the TPP would weaken the ties in the area. The concern has been further amplified because of the effort of the US in pushing the TPP negotiation. ASEAN is worried that TPP might take away the leadership of Asian economic integration and marginalize the association. Therefore, with the support of China, ASEAN took the lead to start the negotiation of RCEP at the beginning. Integrating the five existing ASEAN +1 FTAs, ASEAN together with China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand works for the RCEP negotiations. Gradually, China has replaced ASEAN to lead the negotiation and the TPP negotiation and RCEP negotiation have kept pace with each other in their progress (Chang, 2014). Nevertheless, some ASEAN member countries are worrying about the increasing sphere of influence of China over ASEAN resulting from the China-led RCEP negotiation.10

Countries involved in either TPP or RCEP are alike; they are not only driven by economic concerns but also work for international strategic deployment. Thus, there are some struggles or disputes between the Asian participating countries of RCEP and TPP. Firstly, Indonesia worries about China’s growing strength. Furthermore, Indonesia feels
that the ASEAN-China FTA has led to the deterioration in the competitiveness of Indonesia’s industries. Secondly, the China-Japan-South Korea FTA negotiation is in a situation of stalemate. The three countries are still concerned too much about their respective interests, therefore the three-party FTA has no sign to reach conclusion anytime soon.11

Thirdly, because of the South China Sea dispute, Vietnam and the Philippines are unenthusiastic in the RCEP negotiation. The South China Sea issue has stirred up the hostile sentiment among stakeholders. Fourthly, according to statistics, trade between China and ASEAN as a whole accounted for only 10.7% share of China’s total trade in 2013 (Salidjanova and Koch-Weser, 2015: 3). Although China was the largest individual trading partner of ASEAN, trade with China accounted for only 14% share of ASEAN trade (Salidjanova and Koch-Weser, 2015: 4). The trade activity between ASEAN and China is far less than expectation. Such situation has further raised anxiety for the capacity of the RCEP. Meanwhile, it has increased the concern about the future implementation of the TPP.

Overall, countries in the Asia-Pacific region are in the same situation. National economic development and national security are the core interests of every government. The willingness to cooperate on trade issues, in larger aspect, is for national economic development on the one hand and for avoiding being marginalized in the regional trade bloc on the other. With that, TPP and RCEP partner countries struggle in a balance between providing protection for investors and maintaining governments’ ability to regulate the public interests. On the one hand, participants expect to receive preferential and unprecedented access to the Asia-Pacific region; on the other hand, they need to conduct some economic adjustments so as to fit into the framework of negotiation. Of course, more issues are needed to be concerned with, such as
environmental standards may be modified or undercut so as to improve competitiveness or to eliminate the image of protectionism. There are always many challenging issues needed to be handled.

6. Conclusion

For the decisions of embracing regional or global economic integration or alternatively, preserving the national identity in economic dimension, there is no perfect answer since there is no way to have a comprehensive solution. On the other hand, neither a conclusive solution can be available since the economic issues are circumstantial by nature. Also, there is no permanent answer for this challenge or dilemma, either. The economic situation is fundamentally dynamic and progressive. We should never expect any panacea for the economic challenges. Preserving the national economic identity may not imply to exclude all external factors completely since it is impossible to be purely isolate in the modern society. To embrace regional or global economic integration does not mean that all the protective measures will be inevitably abolished thus making the whole nation become totally defenseless in the economic frontline.

The Asia-Pacific community has the most outstanding economic dynamics in the past several decades. Nations within the region may already have transited through various transformation stages. Nonetheless, as mentioned before, the future economic environment is still full of dynamics. Measures and policies should be adopted accordingly. We should always remember that no answer can be a perfect one but being with no answer will definitely be a wrong one.
Notes

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5. Jagdish Bhagwati first used the term in his 1995 paper “U.S. trade policy: The infatuation with free trade agreements”.


7. Please refer to: ASEAN, “ASEAN and FTA partners launch the world's biggest regional free trade deal” <http://www.asean.org/news/asean-secre

10. The author’s interview with an Indonesian scholar when he visited Wenzao Ursuline University of Languages as a visiting scholar in October 2015.
11. The author’s interview with a Singaporean scholar at an international conference in Shandong University in October 2015.

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Economic Integration and National Identity in Northeast Asia: A European Perspective

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Abstract

The “Asian Paradox” in the Northeast of the continent appears to be particularly evident if seen through European eyes. While one of the tightest networks of intra-regional trade binds the economies of China, Taiwan, Korea and Japan, their political leaders hardly ever connect with each other in substantive exchanges. Cold images of frozen faces and of an “icy lady” seem to contrast with the warm embraces that businessmen enjoy after successful deals over borders. However, is this the view only in the eyes of the European beholder, who is used to the myriad of regular institutionalised meetings at all political and bureaucratic levels of the EU? Northeast Asia comprises two of the three biggest national economies in the world and on the basis of its interdependence flourishes economically – with the exception of Japan – with GDP growth-rates above OECD average. At the same time, in view of unresolved historical legacies their leading politicians still feel forced to keep frozen faces because of voters’ gazes of self-instilled nationalisms back home. Homogeneous cultures of Confucianism and shame rather than guilt, notably on the islands and the peninsula,
maintain a very high level of national identity, in spite of a growing awareness of economic interdependence and globalisation that even conservative schoolbooks and dominant mainstream media cannot refute anymore. Nevertheless, fledgeling attempts to facilitate the flow of goods and services across national borders through bilateral and plurilateral free trade agreements seem to advance, albeit only slowly. China, Japan and South Korea have managed to institutionalise at the level of rotating ambassadors at the tri-lateral secretariat in Seoul some forms of cooperation. “Hot-lines” of emergency communications have been installed at the highest level to fend off sudden misunderstandings related to still looming territorial disputes. This paper will explore the above issues with concrete evidence and examples, notwithstanding the author’s perspective as an observer from Europe.

**Keywords**: integration in Europe and East Asia, past without “nation”, stakeholders in global governance, national limitations, identity levels, omnilateral cooperation

**JEL classification**: F15, F51, F52, H56

1. Introduction

“Divide and rule”, as a maxim, has served rulers and negotiators since ancient times. Its counteract, namely solidarity, has served people by grouping together in formations of pluri- to multi- and omnilateral organisations ranging from tiny trade unions in small enterprises to continental economic institutions of a multitude of nations and more.

In the less individualistic societies of East Asia, the divisive maxim seems to be particularly common and effective, as practised in that region notably by the superpowers the United States of America (USA)
and China time and again. The European Union (EU) – itself often object of such tactics\(^1\) – however, due to its very own historic precedence of regional integration can hardly follow this divisive method against other third countries. In principle, the EU rather furthers cooperation between countries wherever such coming together promotes peace and prosperity, notably through ASEM, the regular Asia-Europe Meetings. In ASEM, vis-à-vis a united EU bloc, the Asians in spite of differences amongst themselves often feel obliged to find a common denominator if not consensus amongst themselves.

Nevertheless, Europe with its focus on institution-building from the outset continues to maintain mental reserves in regard of intra-regional cooperation in the “Far East”, as Euro-centrics have long labelled the region politically incorrectly and often in ignorance. However, economic integration actually is being practised in Asia already to a higher degree\(^2\) than most observers in the West recognise. There even exists plenty of energy in the East to overcome – rather than to deepen – divisive territorial disputes. In addition, the common basis in Confucian culture with holism and its less strict separation of private from public realms more naturally further harmony and unity than the often-artificial individualism and analytic approach in the West.\(^3\)

2. Western Colonisation and Its Aftermath Imposing Borders

It was in earlier times that European colonial powers worked against thriving economic exchanges within Asia\(^4\) by dividing up much of the continent and its islands into separate colonies by drawing border-lines irrespective of local natural and cultural identities. Notably, the British and Dutch first theorised and then imposed their evolving concepts of “international” law on a mainly maritime region where the notion of “nation” with clear set borders traditionally hardly existed. Asia had
been spared most of the wars of religions and then nations that devastated Europe time and again. The Pacific Rim was a region of polyglot networks untroubled by formal borders, where kingdoms and fiefs were all connected. Only the battles between empires from the other side of the world, namely Europe, and their theoretical thinkers like John Selden ("Mare Clausum") and Hugo Grotius ("Mare Liberum") could impose new ideas of boundaries that continue to disturb the warm waters of the South China Sea today.\(^5\)

### 3. Asian Hesitance in Integration

Now, more recent intra-regional historic burdens seem to loom large against integration amongst countries in East Asia.

Already in the past, often enough there have been struggles for hegemony, notably between China and Japan,\(^6\) but the notions of nation-state and sovereignty of the Westphalian System played a crucial role only since its Western imposition. In spite of much of Japan’s learning and culture coming from the continent over millennia, including notably pottery and the Japanese Emperor’s lineage from Korea, its self-imposed experience of “Sakoku” (鎖国) isolation and resulting dogma of “Nihonjinron” (日本人論) have build up an extraordinarily strong sense of identity on the islands of Nippon. A highly centralized education system only further enforces the Japanese people’s feeling of homogeneity even today.

Although China since the 1980s has seen the opening of Meiji Japan partly as a model for its own *ouverture* to the world, both countries hardly ever have enjoyed a mutual relationship with each other free from any tensions. While Western colonialists threatened China into opening the country’s ports, Japanese troops invaded other parts of the “Middle Kingdom”. At the same time as the Chinese Communists were internally

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fighting and then expelling their nationalist rivals to previously
Japanese-occupied Taiwan, the Chinese altogether externally faced the
threat of a deeper invasion by the Japanese. Nippon’s Western-inspired
colonial rule over Manchuria and the practices by its military during
WWII are engrained in the memory of not only the older generations of
Chinese (but much less so in Taiwan). Schools and many of the media
on the continent manage to maintain them in the Chinese mind. The
Communist leaders have hardly ever publicly acknowledged Japan’s
official aid since WWII, which the island country wants to be seen as
repairations for – albeit not always clearly acknowledged – past
misdeeds. China in public frequently still plays the history card of
Japanese war crimes, unfortunately made easy by occasional visits of
Japanese nationalist leaders to the Yasukuni Shrine (靖国神社) in
Tokyo, where they are worshipping Nippon’s militarism. Even NGOs
and academics of both countries yet cannot agree with each other for
example to objectively compile the historical facts of the massacre by
the Japanese in Nanjing in 1937. Ongoing territorial disputes, such as
over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands (尖閣諸島/釣魚台列島), perpetuate
bilateral tensions with China as well as with Taiwan. Such tensions pop
up every once in a while with nationalists on all sides symbolically
pouring oil into the heated debate, oil that is amongst other resources
expected to be found in big bubbles under the bottom of the territory in
contention.

Likewise, with the Koreans Japan could not yet settle issues over an
islet called Dokdo 독도/獨島 by the Koreans and Takeshima 竹島 by
the Japanese near the peninsula’s coast surrounded by natural gas
deposits and rich fishing grounds for the tuna-fish that the Japanese
relish so much for their Sushi. Ironically, Korean officials invite foreign
guests to a restaurant chain called Dokdo in Seoul to enjoy “Maguro-
Sushi” together. (NB: Also with Russia, namely over the Kuril Islands,
Japan retains territorial disputes for that matter.) Occasionally these unsolved issues make headlines, thus disturbing Japan’s relations with its neighbours until this very day. Of course, often emotions dominate the scene over the rocks of Dokdo/Takeshima when politicians are visiting.\textsuperscript{10} Especially emotionally engrained on the peninsula are scars from memories of Korean “comfort women” who were forced into work as sex slaves by Japanese soldiers and still fight for compensation. Even the official agreement between Japan and Korea in December 2015 including a donation of 1 billion yen for compensation seems to have opened up old wounds\textsuperscript{11}.

Feelings of loss of face and the Asian sensitivities from a culture of shame do not facilitate the solution of these problems either, but they rather aggravate the enduring political impact. This basically East Asian attitude has to be distinguished from the Christian concept of guilt that comparatively easily can be paid off by a “letter of indulgence” or for instance through ostentatious genuflection, as demonstrated in the year 1970 by the German Chancellor Willy Brandt in Warsaw. However, the majority of Germans did not support this “Warsaw Genuflection”. According to a survey by a German news magazine of the time, 48% of West German citizens regarded it as “excessive”, and only 41% said it was “appropriate”. Although the lack of support by the contemporary voters might indicate otherwise, even the conservative Chancellor Helmut Kohl repeated such a gesture of indulgence when he held hands with French President François Mitterrand in 1984 on a cemetery in Verdun. Similar demonstrations of remorse and indulgence are still unimaginable between the leaders of Japan and China, for instance in Nanking 南京, even seven decades after the Second World War.

Notwithstanding the more transparent Western culture of guilt in the Christian understanding, post-WWII Germany and France still faced plenty of difficulties in settling territorial issues over the state of
Saarland, as did Germany with Poland to resolve the problems of the long-disputed Oder-Neisse Line. The solutions to these border issues in Europe came through self-determination and international treaties, and not through any “superstructure” as claimed by a Japanese academic\textsuperscript{12}.

In 2003, a common Franco-German history schoolbook for use in both countries equally was compiled for the first time in order to promote a “shared vision” of history. This task so far – as anywhere else in the world – very much had been left to subjective interpretations as national histories.\textsuperscript{13} These divergent narratives of national histories are among the most influential builders of identities at national level. Indoctrinated at formative age from elementary up to high school the young recipients of such history lessons hardly become aware of any alternative source of information in order to find the factual truth of the past.\textsuperscript{14} This is notably the case in the most homogeneous island culture of Japan with its highly centralized education system. It is also the case in the traditionally hierarchal societies of China and Korea that are yet scarcely internationally exposed to outside information sources. Frequently, foreign reports and studies are compiled in languages that are not accessible to most people in China, Japan and Korea. Of course, only a multitude of different sources can provide an approximation of the historical truth of events.\textsuperscript{15}

Nevertheless, there are continuing efforts being made amongst East Asian scholars and NGOs, even occasionally including officials from national ministries, to establish common denominators for history books\textsuperscript{16} in order to find agreement on the description of certain still controversial events of the contentious past.
4. “East Asia’s Paradox”

Apart from different interpretations of history, there exist other contexts that provoke the description as Asian Paradox. It was South Korean President Park Geun-hye 박근혜/朴槿惠, who in her speech to a joint session of the USA Congress in 2013 proclaimed an “Asia’s paradox” as the disconnect between growing economic interdependence on the one hand, and backward political, security cooperation on the other. Here, one should draw, however, a line of distinction between on the one hand ASEAN that actually is actively talking and cooperating amongst its members, and on the other hand the three bigger economies up north, China, Japan and Korea.

This dualism of high level of economic, but only low level of political interaction is most evident among the northern trilateral relationships. Trade is flowing in huge volumes and keeps further growing in this triangle. However, there is a “Perilous Paradox” as the highest level of government leaders, China’s President Xi Jinping 習近平, Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzō Abe 安倍晋三 and South Korea’s President Park, even hardly talk to each other. Nationalism back home seems to be victorious over guanxi / mianzi (關係 / 面子) of personal relations amongst politicians abroad, notably between Japan and China as well as between Japan and Korea. In Tokyo there is open talk complaining of the “Icy Lady” of Seoul, and a rare press photo of Abe meeting Xi shows both with grim faces looking astray. As detailed above, because of “differences” over historical issues the politicians’ culture of shame and face (建前 v. 本音 in typical Japanese) scarcely allows them to draw a final line, even after words of remorse and deeds of compensation.

This situation at the political level paradoxically contrasts starkly but does not stop the further increasing exchange of goods and services as well as the trust manifested through huge mutual foreign direct
investment (FDI) between the three neighbours. Although the low level of institutional and regulatory cooperation in view of political mistrust keeps up unnecessary barriers (notably non-tariff barriers/NTBs) to trade and FDI in East Asia, the trade interpenetration in the region almost equals that of the common market of the EU. This market-driven integration hence can be considered as very much “trust-based” with its major part in intra-firm trade of semi-finished products and FDI. The still large differences in economic development add another driver for further growth in terms of David Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantages promoting trade. However, unlike in Europe, the function of trade in the concept of Joseph Schumpeter’s, notably imports in order to stimulate positive competition on the domestic market, yet has to convince most economic leaders in Asia. In this context it also has to be mentioned that the crucial Western term “competition” has only a short history in Asia and still rather translates as rivalry (競争). While in Western cultures the understanding of this central term in market economics of “competition” or “concurrence” inherently emphasises the “togetherness” (com/-con-) of such efforts, the more collective thinking in the East originally translated the term into much more of a negative “rivalry” of opposing forces.19 In order to overcome these rivalries,20 agreements have to be found with the other side, rather than through unilateral liberalisation.

Hence, after some initial reluctance South Korea also joined the bandwagon of East Asian bilateral deals under the pressure of its big businesses of “chaebol” (財閥) rather than pursuing market opening with the more difficult potential “omnibus”21 of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). As in other fields, at first following Japan and than speedily overtaking it, the peninsula has implemented bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) with the three biggest markets in the world, namely the EU, the USA and China. For Japan such FTAs still remain on the
negotiation table, with the EU bilaterally and with the USA plurilaterally through the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). As far as integration in East Asia is concerned the island country has yet to establish a free trade agreement with its neighbours China and Korea.

However, Beijing, Seoul and Tokyo started first negotiations of a trilateral agreement on trade and investment with handshakes on 26 March 2013 in Seoul that would cover 20 percent of the global GDP and could form the basis for an East Asia Community. A Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat in Seoul already serves as the inner soul of it.

Of course, there are other official groupings amongst states in Asia apart from the trilaterally “CJK” of China, Japan and Korea. Most matured in terms of integration and with a long history going back to the 1960s is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) of the now ten “nations” in the opposite corner of the Eurasian continent seen from Europe. In spite of its distance and climatic divergence from Europe, its process of economic integration traces plenty of common features with that of the EU. Its endeavors to have achieved an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) by the end of the year 2015 only confirm such commonalities. Nevertheless, one just has to read the just ten pages of the Charter of ASEAN and compare it to the more than one hundred thousand pages of legal texts of treaties, regulations and directives of the so-called “acquis communautaire” of the EU to grasp the basic difference between the two processes of integration at the extreme ends of the Eurasian continent. On the one hand, a fundamentally legalistic institution-building with supra-national pooling of sovereignty for peace in Europe, and on the other hand a rather pragmatic and brief declaration of principles for almost exclusively economic cooperation with the remaining emphasis on non-interference in ASEAN. “Nomen est omen”, ASEAN already in its name is carrying a major message when it includes the term “Nations”, which the EU hardly uses anymore. The
EU rather prefers as more appropriate to call its members only “states”. While – strange enough in eyes of the European beholder – in ASEAN under post-colonialism there is still a claim of “nation-building” going on, in the EU even legally the nations are more and more losing competences. Downstream autonomy is flowing towards subnational regions (cf. for instance Scotland, Catalunya, Flanders, Bavaria etc. in Europe, but also East-Timor, Mindanao, Okinawa etc. in Asia) under more devolution, federalism and subsidiarity. At the same time, this closer proximity of democratic decision-making increases the identification with and ownership of the process by the people, the final sovereign in democracies. It likewise improves the opportunities for more participation in it and strengthens the recent development of a “monitoring democracy”.25

5. Upstream with Globalisation

At the same time, there seems to be a loss of identification with the territorial polity of the nation through the rapid further globalisation of the economies. Since this phenomenon exerts a huge influence on the process of integration as well as identity of the people in East Asia, it is worth discussing it in more detail here. This upstream move towards the global level likewise in terms of other societal movements follows the “death of distance” through digitalisation, as communication technologies advance and cause an enormous increase in cross-border activities. With the nation-state lacking such competences, obviously it has become necessary to set legitimate and globally enforceable rules for these activities beyond national limits omnilaterally. Specifically, this very same cross-border information technology calls into question the legitimacy of the concentration of competences at national level only within those territorial borders. This is notably the case in Europe with

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the strengthening of the EU governance, but it has also impacted Asia and in particular ASEAN, where the once shunned idea of institutionalisation is becoming less of a taboo in the debate now, and not only in academic circles.

With the “Rise and Fall of Nations”, history has moved beyond the understanding of the almost absolute sovereignty of the nation-state that emanated in Europe from wars of religions and the resulting Peace of Westphalia of 1648, i.e. now almost four hundred years ago. This Westphalian System has become an increasingly dysfunctional legal fiction, as notably demonstrated in the operation of the United Nations (UN).

Nowadays, various global societal developments have significantly chipped authority away from such nation-states as the core polity of governance in the direction towards wider regional, continental and even global decision-making. Just think of the economic interdependence through trade and finance, transnational terrorism, cyberspace with the Internet, traffic on the high seas, global common goods like the environment etc. Increasingly conscious of these wide-ranging developments, more and more people identify their life-style with these issues and realise that global problems call for global solutions beyond borders, which individual nations cannot achieve anymore on their own, not in Asia, Europe or elsewhere.

For instance, the man-made radioactive clouds from the nuclear melt-down in Chernobyl in 1986 flying high over national borders as well as the contaminated shipwrecks from Fukushima 福島 crossing the Pacific Ocean and still landing in America clearly demonstrate the failure and incapacity of the individual nation-states at the origin of these ordeals. Nevertheless, they claim “national sovereignty” to decide over such common global goods of the environment like air, water and energy that evidently can affect the health of all humanity. The
aggravating problems of man and nature in our Anthropocene period and the damage they cause to our habitat are demonstrated by numerous obvious cases that render any purely national solutions impossible. Obviously, these do not concern mere national issues, and nations cannot solve them on their own in the existing multilateral system that is based on purely (and highly unequal) national representation, such as the UN. Rather, all stakeholders of all continents have to identify themselves with these issues and learn from each other\textsuperscript{31} to cede and collect scientific competences upstream beyond the nation, i.e. omnilaterally.\textsuperscript{32}

Another sphere where most people in Asia and Europe go beyond national borders every day and develop new identities relates to the Internet and cyberspace.\textsuperscript{33} This global medium for communication and information exchange between computers and their human operators – and increasingly less human-controlled with the “Internet of Things” – is based on the latest technology for cyberspace of the 21st century. Yet at the heart of cyber-governance lies a fundamental disagreement over the relevance and significance of national sovereignty that originated with the above-mentioned Peace of Westphalia in the Old Europe of the 17th century. That concept of national sovereignty was only imposed on Asia and the rest of the world by the colonising forces of Europe and their accordingly so-called “international law” subsequently and has as such no ideological roots in Asia.\textsuperscript{34} That is why there is still this (mis-) understanding of “nation-building”, notably in Indonesia, instead of calling it correctly capacity-building.

While surfing the expanding World Wide Web, we scarcely are aware of the existence of national borders. However, once we encounter problems related to the protection of privacy\textsuperscript{35} or hitches in e-commerce, we realise that not only issues of cybercrime\textsuperscript{36} and access to knowledge and services\textsuperscript{37} are at stake here globally. Rather controversially, the governance of the Internet remains in the hands of the USA-based
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). Since 1998, the Internet has clearly outgrown its humble beginnings as the “virtual village”. It has more than three billion users today and they will soon rush to link up with tens of billions of devices on the “Internet of Things”. This burgeoning interdependence brings along new and complex vulnerabilities that single national governments cannot control, and reports of “cyber wars” hardly match traditional definitions of conflicts between countries. Rather, other actors are to be identified, which include groups of terrorists and organised crime. They pose huge problems to cyber security. Such common enemies of safe communication across borders can crystallise the incremental global cooperation of concerned stakeholders. That is why participants in the recent Conference on Cyberspace 2015 in the Netherlands called it a “multi-stakeholder” event, as it appropriately included some 2,000 representatives of not only different governance levels, but also of NGOs, multinationals and academics. It was China and Russia that sought to overcome the “Conspiracy of North-Atlanticism”, and they have proposed a treaty for broader UN oversight of the Internet for information security, while the USA still plans to strengthen ICANN by authorising it to also supervise the Internet’s “address book”. Europe, on the other hand, pushes its 2001 Convention on Cybercrime, which involves Interpol and Europol in tackling the related problems that occur across borders.

Just like cyberspace expanding outside of any national competence, the high seas also are largely unregulated. Sixty percent of the Earth’s surface is deep oceans. However, our still nation-centric laws only cover the oceans’ very edges. For instance, very day 40,000-odd industrial-sized fishing boats are hauling kilometre-long dragnets through the oceans, and overfishing particularly halibut and cod has by now become reality. What is even more disturbing is that they dump back about a
quarter of their bait as “by-catch”. This unwanted by-catch, amounting to tens of millions of tonnes a year, cannot be landed because those fishes legally are too small, include unauthorised species or were caught in the wrong season. Even if certain authorities, like the EU, aim to legislate on the by-catch, how can those rules be enforced on the high seas faraway from any national policing without omni-lateral monitoring that involves the fishing industries and other stakeholders?

Similarly difficult to tackle by national rules and the police are other frequent misconducts on the high seas committed by the fleets of more than four million cargo vessels and 100,000 large merchant ships that haul about 90 percent of the world’s transported goods. Thousands of seafarers, migrants and fishermen are murdered offshore under suspicious circumstances annually. Yet the culprits are rarely held accountable, as no one is required to report violent crimes committed in international waters. In addition to dumping oil and sludge into the oceans and emitting more air pollutants than all the world’s cars combined, more than 2,300 seafarers have been violently stranded by their employers over the last decade. According to the UN International Maritime Organisation, the country whose flag the ship flies is obliged to investigate any allegations. The existing flagging system, which allows ships to buy the right to fly the flag of any nation as long as they promise to heed the given country’s laws, actually provides good cover for the unscrupulous. When crimes occur, no single agency within the – mainly small or even land-locked – cheaper flagging countries or any specific multilateral organisation typically holds a sufficient stake in matters on the high seas to seriously pursue them.

More accessible to most of us are the activities of the financial system that spans the globe likewise beyond national competence. In particular, international currency trading urgently needs global rules and policing. Notably, during recent years scandals have occurred that
concern us all beyond any claims of national sovereignty. Money is often transferred across borders in digital form and no single nation can control, let alone tax, this flow. Driven by speculation for windfall profits, it gets transferred around the world in unimaginable quantities of more than five trillion dollars in a single day and in this way escapes all national rules, while it frequently results in plutocrats’ tools of corruption. Some call it the “perfect market”; others consider it a way to create crony capitalists. Globally, there seems to be no regulation, only speculation. Not before the “Forex scandal” of 2013 was there any debate, because it was outside the public political sphere, which our illusion of sovereignty still naively sees purely within national borders. Some governments try to control those banks nationally. However, most would rather protect them through subsidies, even more so in the aftermath of the major financial crises that have occurred since the first bank panic back in 1791 in the USA. The money collected from taxpayers to support the world’s banks in 2011-2012 amounted to $630 billion, more than the GDP of a mid-sized industrialised country like Sweden.\(^1\) This led, for instance, the EU and some countries to call on the banks to pay back at least some of that money through a financial transaction tax. But international taxes make sense only if applied equally omnibus, by and for all on this globe. Otherwise, the rich always can find tax havens beyond national borders that will welcome evaders.

These enormous funds would find better distribution as investment in less developed regions to bridge the gap between rich and poor, within and beyond the nation-states.\(^2\) Among others, Thomas Picketty highlighted in his global bestseller\(^3\) the growing inequality gap that is also aggravated by the neo-liberal global markets that operate out of bounds and without rules. The jurisdiction within most developed countries forbids unabashed competition in a “winner-takes-it-all” fashion, which would naturally lead to the emergence of monopolies and
destruction of markets. Thus, national law intervenes to enable newcomers to enter and revive the market. However, with the *laissez-faire* of neo-liberal globalisation, many multinationals have grown into unchecked dominant players worldwide.\textsuperscript{44} Profiteering out of the reach of national rules, they often avoid adequate taxation and remain unbridled by the principles of fair competition. The advances of multinationals have reached such an extent that only omnilateral rules of competition for all beyond national borders could achieve sustainable globalisation. This relationship in terms of official trade across borders is partly ruled by the WTO, but without covering issues of competition, since the USA in 1947 blocked the inclusion of such competition rules in the original General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).\textsuperscript{45}

The high level of economic interdependence through the selective approach and the fragmentation of production by these multinational companies also significantly impacts domestic employment, a politically highly sensitive issue in most countries currently. However, the interdependence of the millions of jobs involved and their protection hardly find any recognition by the multilateral system, not even by the International Labour Organisation (ILO). Established in 1919, the ILO became the UN’s first specialised agency in 1946. Its legitimacy is broader than that of most UN bodies, because it reaches beyond nations in its governing structure and directly gives workers and employers an equal voice with governments in its deliberations of international labour standards and policies. Accordingly, it is innovative and could almost be called “omnilateral” in its limited field of specialised competence, because as a tripartite organisation it involves most of the stakeholders on issues concerning labour. However, as most bodies in a multilateral system, the ILO itself has no means to enforce its decisions, which can be appealed only to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The ICJ, on its part, lacks compulsory jurisdiction, with the exception concerning
only about 67 countries,\textsuperscript{46} thus it can hardly be called omnilateral.

Obviously, the above-mentioned global issues show the limitation of national governance anywhere in the world, be it in Europe or in East Asia. They also show the need of not only multilateral cooperation between those limited national institutions, but rather the need of omnilateral solutions, namely omnibus, by all and for all stakeholders involved.

6. Identity Lost in Globalisation?

However, the globalisation of daily life does not necessarily entail a loss of identity of the individual citizen in a “melting pot” of “world cultures”. Not only is “Americanisation” or “Westernisation” in Asia and elsewhere increasingly regarded as a loss of valuable regional and local particularities that enrich the social diversity necessary for a creative community, just like healthy life needs bio-diversity. But a countermovement under the slogan of “Glocalisation” has gained track, originally since the 1990s in marketing in various sectors from McDonald’s food to Sony’s electronics and more generally with global business adapting its products to local demands. Even in agriculture there are plenty of cases where new produce from far away adapts to local circumstances and acquires a new identity. For instance the “kiwi” fruit, originally a Chinese gooseberry brought in the early 20th century to New Zealand, since the end of that century – lacking intellectual property protection – is being grown and commercialised under this very name on most continents now.

The rapid and comprehensive globalisation of the last decades penetrating most aspects of our daily life, of course, has greatly affected the identification of the people. This is particularly the case in the urban agglomerations that are growing faster than the rural hinterland and are
clearly more exposed to these trends. In addition, new means of communication from the spreading Internet to more and more crossbroader tourism should expect us to find more identity beyond the nation-state. However, the political decision-makers at national level fight a self-interested battle with their backs against the national walls of their own construction in order to maintain their de facto limited power in continentally integrating Europe as well as in economically highly linked-up Asia. Notably since we saw the economic crisis of 2008 in the USA rolling eastward over not yet sufficiently converging Europe and then hardly decoupling Asia, national politicians have managed to rekindle reductive, narrow-minded and short-sighted nationalism. Such nationalism covers up their incapacity to handle the highly interdependent economies that already have outgrown their national control. That is one reason why in spite of far-reaching globalization the level of people identifying themselves beyond national borders, for instance as “Asians”, is still low, although the notion of nation was alien to Asians in their historic tradition before the colonisation by Europeans. Now naturally, linguistic differences greatly reduce the number of people that are identifying themselves as Asian.\textsuperscript{47} It seems to defy a trend from sub-national (local, provincial, state) identity towards sub-global regional (economic communities like EU, ASEAN) etc. identity that needs a “Common Public Sphere” (cf. the term “Öffentlichkeit” by the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas).\textsuperscript{48} Such public sphere technically has evolved from the experience of the Greek “Agora” and medieval village square now digitally to the Internet’s cyber-space and thereby beyond any national borders. However, in view of the linguistic limitations and various nationally imposed censorships the technically possible full exploration of a global public sphere by all people is still illusory. The intellectual “ownership” of such wider public sphere through methods of free contributions like on Wikipedia and other ways
of “sharing” would hugely widen circles of identification independent from territorial borders.

The EU has already granted Erasmus scholarships to more than two million students who subsequently have studied in another member state. Also many other integrating EU projects from the cohesion funds to the common currency, the Euro (€), already have generated a high level of identity beyond the nation-state in Europe. Numbers show that – often against expectations – in situations of crises the identification with the EU is clearly strengthening. For the first time since this question was first asked decades ago, at least half of the population of every member state now feel that they are citizens of the EU.49

In Europe, a high level of identity with the EU goes along with high expectations in governance by the EU rather than in the competences of national governments. Thus, 38% of Europeans see the highest priority of the EU in the task to guarantee peace among its member states, which the Committee of the Nobel Foundation recognised in 2012 by granting its Peace Prize to the EU for achieving this primary goal of peace since its beginning. Indicative for the incompetence of single countries confronting these issues are also the other main expectations of EU citizens towards the Union. They concern mainly the environment (cf. e.g. trans-border problems encountered from the nuclear melt-down in Chernobyl), health and consumer protection (cf. problems from “BSE to GMO”), and the fight against cross-border crime and trafficking (in particular international terrorism).

Since identity needs “otherness” on the outside to distinguish and literally define oneself in any group, a global identity must be an illusion (defining against “Man in the Moon”?). “Global citizens” would also need loyalty to a common authority like a UN police that enforces common rules. In view of the yet limited role of Europol and the EU’s dependence on member states’ remaining monopoly of police forces, EU
citizenship and hence identification is still confined to their cooperation.

Obviously, a clear distinction from the others externally greatly helps to establish one’s own identity. Nationalist politicians exploit this fact time and again by pointing out differences, overly painting them in black and white, especially in hot and in cold wars (cf. G.W. Bush’s “We and Them, the Evil Empires”). In East Asia a certain form of nationalism has found expression in the past twenty years in the best-selling books of “no-saying”, but it now increasingly takes more vociferously to the Internet where web-fora can hardly be restrained by authorities and notably young people let off chauvinist steam against “the others” abroad.

Likewise, it was easier to integrate Western Europe during the Cold War as long as the countries in the East could easily be defamed en bloc as a threat by hardly recognising any divergences within the Warsaw Pact until 1989.

This issue of identity and distinction from other people(s) continues to play a major role, notably internally in Taiwan during election campaigns and in politics in general. However, for China, Japan and Korea, it is difficult to find data for the identification of people with a transnational group, i.e. Asia. In 2007, respondents for Asiabarometer in these three countries asked for their identity with any transnational group declared themselves “Yes, as Asian” in very unequal percentages. Unfortunately, the Asiabarometer website has not been updated since 2007, but in the meantime continuing unsolved territorial disputes and nationalist politicians exploiting them with the mass media could have further brought down these numbers of identity as Asian, particularly in still rising China, but also in rather sinking Japan.

In Europe, since WWII institutions – originally meant to render peace permanent – were built as the basis for integration and identification in a rather legalistic way, top-down in Roman law
tradition. East Asia’s much more market-driven integration by economic agents, notably big business initially, hence seems to be more fragile in terms of fluctuation with economic cycles. The EU – often even beyond its treaties – frequently strengthens its economic governance de facto in crisis situations (cf. de Gaulle’s “chaise vide” as well as the recent developments of stronger economic governance in Bruxelles after the experience of the “PIGS”\textsuperscript{53}). In East Asia, it is not exactly the opposite as one might expect from the almost complete absence of any regional legal framework. But the multilateral system of the UN, WTO, International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, ILO etc. seems to suffice to provide the necessary fundamental provision to continue trade and investment in the region even in crisis situations. Nevertheless, one has to note that the region is not entirely without institutions for identification either. Just to list up the main other organisations and their date of establishment one has to mention: Council for Asia Pacific Security Cooperation (CSCAP, 1993), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF, 1994), ASEAN +3 (1997), East Asia Vision Group (EAVG, 2000), East Asia Study Group (EASG, 2001), East Asia Forum (EAF, 2002), East Asia Congress (2003), East Asia Summit (EAS, 2005).

Of course, apart from economic integration in the ASEAN region, most central and politically crucial for East Asia is the Trilateral of China-Japan-South Korea. It presently demonstrates a typical case for the Asian Paradox, which sees heads of government hardly talking to each other while business continues almost undisturbed. Since already 2011 a permanent “Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat (TCS)” in Seoul, headed currently by a Japanese ambassador, maintains the continuity of dialogue at the level of director generals and occasionally (officially at annual intervals) of ministers of foreign affairs. It started in 1999 with the First Trilateral Summit of China, Japan and Korea and so far peaked in 2008 with a “Joint Statement for Tripartite Partnership”. The basic
five guiding principles on paper consist of “openness, transparency, mutual trust, common interest and respect for diverse cultures to facilitate regional peace, co-prosperity and sustainable development”. These are claims that could as well be written by Eurocrats in Bruxelles, but amongst CJK their translation into practice are not at any time soon put to a challenging majority vote like the immigration allocation in September 2015 in the EU. Thus, the 2010 “Trilateral Cooperation VISION 2020” looks convincing in theory, but doubts remain whether the projects will ever see the day. Actually, the lack of activity at the top of CJK can be regarded as a chance for Taipei, since it manages to maintain official talks with Beijing as well as with Tokyo, the two protagonists in the region. If Taipei manages also to talk accordingly with Seoul, it could build up a chance to mediate and promote President Ma Ying-jeou 馬英九’s “Code of Conduct” quadri-laterally. The changes with the elections in January 2016, of course, have put off these chances for the near future.

Another project that could exert a huge impact towards identification in the region has been discussed under the abbreviation of ACU, i.e. Asian Currency in reference to the former naming of the Euro (€) as ECU. However, this reference – in spite of the Euro’s continuing stability – now seems to shed a negative shadow on plans for common currencies, and anyway in East Asia high-level cooperation remains at low gauge, likewise on monetary affairs. In 2003, there was still talk of a Road Map towards ACU when the former high official of the Japanese Finance Ministry, E. Sakakibara, gave his bestseller the courageous title “Asian cooperation and the end of Pax Americana” and the co-authors Shin and Wang went a step further with their book Monetary integration ahead of trade integration in East Asia?. Then in 2005 R. Pomfret generated even more expectations by predicting “… in Asia monetary integration could triple trade.” Most courageous seems to be X. Zhou,
who was quoted in 2009 as saying that “China suggests an end to the dollar era”.

In line with the present discussion around the ACU having come down to more restricted audiences mainly in the academia, the recent Chinese initiatives from AIIB to BRICS Bank and OBOR Funds have refocused interest in the Chinese Renminbi 人民币 and its potential dominance in spite of its slight devaluation against the Dollar since mid-2015.

7. Conclusion
In conclusion, through the eyes of a European beholder, the integration in East Asia is primarily market-driven and insofar bottom-up, in paradox with an almost stalemate amongst the political leaders in the region. Nevertheless, the identity of their people(s) with a wider circle than the old and fading Western notion of a nation, which anyway has hardly any roots in Asian tradition, yet lacks awareness of the economic interdependence and of the global public commons. In spite of their often-obvious incompetence to solve the imminent problems merely at the level of the nation-state, in particular nationalist politicians distract attention from these wider issues by blaming the others and submitting to shortsighted domestic lobbies of vested interests. The European observer, unfortunately, finds such narrow-minded leaders also back home, but seeks consolation in institutions that ideally ought to serve not only the strongest in the market, but omnilaterally the enlightened wider interest of mankind.
Notes

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1. For the EU’s experience of “divide and rule” cf. that by East Asian governments, e.g., Japan’s attempt to divide France (“Poitier Case”) from the EC on the problem of imports of tape-recorders in early 1980s leading to the European Commission achieving greater solidarity in negotiation with Nippon. Consider also more recently Japan’s approach to negotiating FTAs with individual member countries of ASEAN instead of dealing with the Association as one group. The latter was done by China and Korea and initially tried by the EU.
2. Cf. the story of “fragmented value chains” where a smartphone crosses a hundred times borders in East Asia as a semi-finished product, before it lands in a retail shop in the West.


4. Beyond the euro-centric acceptance of Asia as being “everything east of Europe”, now increasingly authors recognise the Asia-Europe Meeting’s (ASEM) membership as the defining moment of belonging to either Asia or Europe (see Dinh Thi Hion Luong, “Regional powers and the building of an East Asian Community”, Asia-Pacific Conference, Keio University, Tokyo, 8th December 2005, p. 2).


7. This for Japan is particularly delicate, because on this issue common to China and Taiwan (respectively dealt with mainly by Japan’s Foreign Ministry or METI) it cannot follow Nippon’s traditional policy of *divide et impera* based on experience in its own group-oriented culture. Rather, Japan confronts both sides of the Taiwan Strait as if they were almost in the same boat.

8. Dinh Thi Hion Luong (“Regional powers and the building of an East Asian Community”, Asia-Pacific Conference, Keio University, Tokyo, 8.12.2005, p. 8) mentions rising nationalism in the region as an important challenge to building an East Asian Community. From her Vietnamese viewpoint, she
criticises Japan for “not being sincere with its wrongdoing in the past” and China for its “irredentist claims to disputed territories”.


12. For instance a Japanese professor hardly convincingly “envied Europe” for such a claimed “superstructure” in order to also solve such conflicts in East Asia; see Hitoshi Tanaka in his presentation on “East Asia – Conflict or cooperation” at the EU-Asia Centre, Bruxelles, 11th September 2012.

13. In order to overcome such nationalist distortions of European history notably for future generations, the project originated from the 2003 “Franco-German Youth Parliament”, which brought together half a thousand youngsters from French and German secondary schools. Published with the title *Histoire / Geschichte* since 2006, more than one hundred thousand copies of the book have been bought. Due to this “success history”, not only has Germany considered a similar project bilaterally in cooperation with the Czech Republic and also with Poland, but likewise the couple of the Slovak Republic and Hungary are discussing the possibility of publishing a common history schoolbook. For further details see Wolfgang Pape, *Oshu ni okeru furansu to doitsu no kankei* [German-French relations within Europe], in: Noriko Yasue (ed.), *EU to furansu* [EU and France], Horitsu Bunka Sha, Kyoto, 2012, pp. 171-191.

14. The undersigned himself underwent a similarly biased educational experience in the 1960s in Germany only to be unilaterally (not necessarily
objectively either) contradicted during one year at high school in the USA.

15. For instance, the highly appraised study by Oxford historian Rana Mitter (China’s war with Japan, 1937-1945: The struggle for survival, Allen Lane, London, 2013, 458 pp.) obviously is based on almost exclusively English and Chinese language sources, thus by and large lacking essential information that exists only in Japanese.

16. The content of history books raises not only issues with Japan, but also with others, for instance with China; see “Dispute over teaching Chinese history shakes Hong Kong”, International Herald Tribune, 4th September 2012.


18. The undersigned himself heard this complaint from an advisor to Prime Minister Abe in February 2015 in the “Sori-Kantei” (總理官邸, Prime Minister’s Official Residence) itself.


20. Interestingly, Professor Shujiro Urata of Waseda University and Stanford (announced as “one of the most distinguished Japanese experts on trade issues”) also spoke of “rivalry” between Japan and China as well as Japan and Korea in his presentation on “Japan’s strategy in Asia” on 9th July 2012 at Madariaga in Bruxelles.

21. In its literal Latin meaning of “for and by all”, cf. definition of “omnilateralism” by the undersigned in Wikipedia; further details on his blog http://omnilateralism.blogspot.be/
22. The text of TPP was “paraphed” by the negotiators in December 2015, but officially still has to signed and then ratified by the partners.

23. As reported by NHK World Services Radio (in Japanese) on 26th March 2013 in the evening Tokyo time.


26. An “Eastphalian international order” as perceived by D.P. Fidler, S.W. Kim and S.Ganguly (“Eastphalia rising? Asian influence and the fate of human security”, World Policy Journal, Vol. 26, No. 2, 2009, p.53) is a misperception that places non-intervention and sovereignty at the centre of a so-called international order, since these principles lack any historic evolution in the region and they run counter to recent tendencies of interdependence in globalisation.

27. See Joseph E. Schwartzberg, Transforming the United Nations system: Designs for a workable world, United Nations University Press, Tokyo, 2013, p. 5; also in this context the issue of refugees between nations is noteworthy as most recently again encountered in Europe as well as in Asia; see article “Strangers in strange lands” in The Economist, London, 12.9.2015 (“European nation-states have been coping with acute refugee flows at least since the Protestant exoduses of the Thirty Years’ War – that is, for as long as there have been European nation-states.”)

28. The lasting complications imposed by European colonialists onto foreign peoples by drawing so-called national borders were exposed most recently in India and Bangladesh. They finally straightened their lines by eliminating more than 160 en- and exclaves which involved some 50,000 people of both sides and eventually grant them full rights as citizens (cf. BBC World Service, London, 2.8.2015).
29. How the people, inclusively with non-state actors, should govern notably transnational goods and the public commons collectively in a more democratic fashion is increasingly raised in the debate of better global governance; cf. conference by University of Leuven, Belgium, on 22-23 February 2016.

30. Thus, also China has an ongoing incentive to work with the West to address a growing array of common global concerns, from pandemics to climate change to terrorism (see Michael D. Swaine, “The real challenge in the Pacific – A response to “How to deter China”, Foreign Affairs, New York, Vol. 94, No. 3, May/June 2015, p. 146).

31. It was not by accident that the Worldwatch Institute gave China relatively good marks on its environment policies already at the end of the last century in spite of high industrial growth and yet worsening pollution. At that time, however, few people had imagined that by 2015 China is increasing the generation of electricity from renewable sources faster than any other country, with now a third of the world’s total installed capacity generated from wind and on top with the world’s biggest solar industry. A recent study of the University of East Anglia in the United Kingdom confirmed that “China emits less CO2 than thought” (see headline in Financial Times, 20th August 2015) and pointed out a 14% reduction of China’s emissions in 2013.

32. Common issues of science greatly create solidarity as can be perceived throughout history; see Mark Mazower, Governing the world: The history of an idea, Allen Lane, London, 2012, Chapter 4, “Science the Unifier”, pp. 94-115.

33. Apart from cyberspace, the outer space increasingly faces problems of insufficient rules, because the plurilateral Treaty of the Outer Space (signed since 1967 by only 53 states) is holding national governments responsible, while now non-state actors ranging from billionaires to space tourists board rockets to add to the clutter of 17,000 objects already
circling the Earth (see Dave Baiocchi and William Welser IV, “The democratization of space: New actors need new rules”, Foreign Affairs, New York, Vol. 94, No. 3, May/June 2015, p. 98, p. 100, p. 102). Similarly overburdened is the International Civil Aviation Organisation, which is tasked with issuing clear rules for the virally growing number of drones. Only a few countries have adopted regulations for drones to date, and those rules are highly divergent. However, beyond the highly controversial issue of the military’s extra-territorial use of drones, their growing global market of €1.5 billion by 2025 will lead to huge numbers of commercial drones posing problems across and outside national borders (see Gretchen West, “Drone on: The sky’s the limit – if the FAA will get out of the way”, Foreign Affairs, New York, Vol. 94, No. 3, May/June 2015, p. 95). See also The New York Times of 1st August 2015 reporting of huge programmes by Facebook to bring the Internet to remote parts of the world by lifting hundreds of drones into the sky for a network of laser beams of immense amounts of data.

34. See at note 5

35. While the USA’s NSA surveillance of political leaders in other countries has been making headlines, the real issue of economic importance is the industrial espionage related to it.

36. Cybercrime alone costs the USA 0.64%, China 0.63% and the EU 0.41% of their GDP; see McAfee-CSIS Report on the Global Cost of Cybercrime, 2014.

37. For instance, a notable case of global legal services on the Internet is evolving de facto with cyberjustice and its alternative online dispute resolution platforms that blur the borders of national jurisdictions by the pluralism of laws applicable without any state involvement; see Global Law Week, discussions on Cyberjustice, Bruxelles, Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB), 18th May 2015.
41. The Economist, 12th April 2014.
44. One important reason for this unchecked situation is that the so-called Singapore issues of competition rules etc. did not make it onto the WTO’s agenda.
46. In WTO terminology, now even with the participation of 67 countries a group is called “plurilateral”, such as recently TISA, the trade in services agreement. Strictu sensu, after the one-sided “unilateralism” of George W. Bush without any other, we know of “bilateral” agreements with one partner like in most free trade agreements (FTAs) and “plurilateral” agreements amongst two or more parties. In order to indicate the many nations involved, notably in the UN system, the term “multilateral” is used, while “omnilateral” comprises all stakeholders involved globally.
47. The so-called Asiabarometer <http://www.asiabarometer.org> (modelled on the EU’s Eurobarometer) has tried to survey identities in parts of Asia by asking “Do you identify with any transnational group?” They received replies as follows: “Yes, as Asian”:
   - 71% in South Korea
   - 42% in Japan
   - 6% in China (least among youngsters!)


49. Thus, 74% of respondents in EU in 2009 felt they were European, which was an increase of 3% over 2008 when the economic crises started. Similarly, those who then did not feel European had decreased to 25%. Now, in 27 of the current 28 member states of the EU, majorities of respondents feel that they are citizens of the EU (up from 25 states in autumn 2014). More than eighty percent of respondents feel that they are citizens of the EU in Luxembourg (88% for the total “yes”, including 61% of answers “yes, definitely”), Malta (84%), Finland (81%) and Germany (81%). But fewer do so in the new member states of Bulgaria and Cyprus (50% in both countries).

50. It started in 1991 with the book by Akio Morita and Shintaro Ishihara The Japan that can say no, was then followed up in 1995 by an anti-West publication by Ishihara with former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia under the title The voice of Asia and in 1996 echoed by a group of Chinese nationalists in their book China can say no as well as its later version called China can still say no.

52. See details of the Asiabarometer (http://www.asiabarometer.org) in note 47. It gives only limited access to the undersigned in the EU.
53. “PIGS” stands for Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain, thus listing the four southern member states of the EU that have suffered most in the crisis since 2008.
54. See his quotation in The Economist, 26th March 2009.

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Integration and Disintegration: European Theories and Experiences in the Light of China-Taiwan Relations

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Abstract
This paper attempts to look at the connection between political and economic integration in the cross-Strait relations, while also referring in many cases to the European experience and theories of the European integration. One of the main conclusions of the paper is that economic globalisation does not lead to political integration of the two polities. Modern theories of labour division and their conclusions on the distribution of economic gains underline that a peaceful free trade environment without major political conflicts endorses the formation of smaller political entities and this environment basically contributes to healthy competition among these countries and to diversity of political and economic regimes.

Keywords: political economy, economic integration, political integration, Taiwan, China, international relations

JEL classification: F15, F52, H41, H56
1. Introduction

Why do we have different nations and countries? What are the dominant forces behind the formation of a new country? Is economic or political integration more decisive in this respect? These questions are basic in political economics. For a very long time, it seemed to be evident that economic integration was the prevailing, leading force behind the integration process.\(^1\) However, the European experience demonstrates that no clear answers can be given, since the right answer can be more dependent on the external environment than on the internal forces of the integration. Political integration and commitment to identity can be more relevant in “bad times” being characterized by wars and protectionism; however, “good times” – peace and free trade – reinforce the salience of economic integration, highlighting the economic benefits of the process.

The paper aims to investigate the connection between political and economic integration, in particular in connection with small economies and countries. The reason why small countries require special attention relates to the costs of running a small country. Some analysts suggest that democratization and thereby formation of smaller polities where policies are closer to the public are facilitated by increasing economic integration. According to this approach, secessions are easier in times of growing economic interconnectedness. To put it in other words, the level of economic integration determines the possible number of countries/nations. The more successful the integration of world economy is, the more likely it is to form a new entity (country) since the costs of “maintaining” small countries or economies become lower. As Alesina-Spolare put it: “The equilibrium number of countries is increasing with the amount of international economic integration.” (Alesina and Spolaore, 1997: 1028)

Emphasis of the paper is put on the connection between political and economic integration in the cross-Strait relations.
• What are the circumstances under which economic integration between political entities can support political integration? More importantly, what are the circumstances that impede the formation of a self-reinforcing circle between economic and political integration.
  ○ In this regard, theories and experiences of European integration and assumptions of the classic and neoclassic economics are to be referred to.

• Are there other mechanisms in functioning? Can mechanisms be distinguished which lead to divergence rather than to convergence between the Republic of China (Taiwan) and People’s Republic of China (Mainland China)?
  ○ In this case, the endogenous growth theory and theories regarding the break-up or formation of nations, the European experiences, and the new trade theory are to be referred to.

2. Costs and Benefits of a Small Economy and a Small Democracy

2.1. The Costs of Security

The traditional concept which emphasizes the salience of security is provided by Charles Tilly (Tilly, 1985: 170). He contends that a clear connection between war making and state making can be found. Tilly outlines a sequence of events starting from war making, required to hold off competitors, through acquisition of capital (necessary to wage wars) to providing protection. He clearly points out the connection between protection and state making which requires the monopoly of power. However, his arguments have their strong limitations in a world of growing economic interdependence and globalisation. In the 21st century it would be an oversimplification to reduce the state’s role to military protection, but the logic of this argument can be applied and it can be developed further in the following way: the modern state not only
provides military security and protection but many other kinds of protection, services (the rule of law, education, health system, infrastructure, separation of powers through a system of balances and checks, in other words democracy) which legitimate state making and the existence of the state.

Tilly’s attempt to classify the activities of states seem to be outdated especially looking at the European Union (EU), but it can be adapted easily when analysing the Ukrainian conflict or looking at the break-up of Yugoslavia where war and state even today seem to be the integrated parts of the same process. Anyway, the approach to find correlation between the cost of activities (war making, state making, protection, and acquisition of capital) and the organisational surplus to be found in the state can also be utilised in our analysis.

Tilly’s original approach emphasized the connection between the making of wars and the formation of states; however, this approach is not a novelty. This perspective can be traced to Machiavelli, Bismarck’s “iron and blood” speech or to the Roman historians. This approach utilizes “the fear of enemy” argument which points out that fear is the most effective motive in the formation and unification of a nation. In the 21st century, however, it is more than obvious that protection of citizens is not the only service provided by the state and therefore an academic analysis must include references to the economic aspects as well. Even Tilly refers in his later work to other factors as well. In his Coercion, capital, and European states, AD 990-1990,2 he also incorporates the effects of economic globalisation (Tilly, 2000: 5-6).

2.2. The Costs of Public Goods

The costs of public goods depend on the following factors: (a) size, (b) nature of political institutions, (c) openness of economy and (d) distribution of economic gains.

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(a) *Size.* From the economic perspective one of the most comprehensive literature reviews is provided by Spolaore (Spolaore, 2009). He starts his line of reasoning with the importance of size contending that larger nations spend less on their government and public goods per capita, whereas the coordination costs tend to rise in larger states due to increasing heterogeneity. He argues that it is less costly to provide public services to a population of a large country because of the homogeneity of preferences which can be secured easier (economies of scale). But on the other hand, there is also the assumption that the larger the country becomes the more heterogeneity of preferences can be found, along with increasing heterogeneity costs. Thus there must be equilibrium between the cost and benefits with regard to the size of the nation/country. Based on this formal logic it can be concluded: “When economies of scale become more prominent compared to heterogeneity costs, larger political systems are likely to emerge. In contrast, a drop in the benefits from size or an increase in heterogeneity costs will bring about political disintegration.” (Spolaore, 2009: 4)

(b) *Nature of political institutions.* But what are the public goods besides security? Public goods or services of advanced, modern states include a well-functioning legal and justice system, enforcement of human rights and rights of minorities, the provision of public health services, high-quality education, good infrastructure and protection against catastrophes. The provision of these services is dependent on political institutions. When analysing the East-Asian region, access to all of them is only provided in democratic, open societies (South Korea, Taiwan), access to some of them (public health, infrastructure, education, protection against natural disasters) is provided even in non-democratic but economically open societies (China). Only a few of them can be accessed in totalitarian states.
with closed economies (North Korea). Therefore it can be argued that trade-off between costs and benefits of the country size depends on the nature of the political institutions (democratic or non-democratic). But how is a rationale to be provided for this? One may reasonably argue that in authoritarian regimes preferences of the public are much less important than in democracies, where governments want to be re-elected and try to pursue policies which are more or less in line with the main preferences of the public. That is the reason why the heterogeneity costs become more important in democratic societies.

(c) **Openness of economy.** The trade-off between benefits and costs of country size depends on the “nature” of the political institutions as well. But it is clearly also a function of a country’s openness and integration into the world economy. That simple reason for this is that because of the structure of the global economy, the optimal size of the market today far exceeds the average size of national markets. Globalisation and economic integration have contributed to reduce the costs of the maintenance of a small economy. After the Second World War (WW2), but in particular from the 1990s, liberalisation of international trade and investments have brought about a world economic order in which small countries could prosper pursuing free trade policies. (The creation of the single market in Europe made an important contribution to this process. Needless to say that Taiwan is democratic and it has a very open economy and both features could contribute to reduce the cost of the small country size. Economic openness, including economic cooperation with Mainland China, has greatly helped reduce the economic costs and to increase political benefits.)

(d) **Distribution of economic gains.** Bolton *et al.* attempts to contrast the different models to explain the connections between political and
economic integration (Bolton et al., 1996: 697-705). They also remind us of the question who are the winners and the losers of unification or separation. In a system where the decision on sovereignty is taken through democratic procedures the majority of the population only votes for unification/separation if the benefits are clear (Bolton et al., 1996: 698). In the European Union, because of the remaining differences in income, wealth, government policies, and a huge variety of local advantages/disadvantages it is highly unlikely to find a common pool of the preferences of the European voters which could push countries forward towards unification. In the case of Taiwan the same can be stated and the median Taiwanese voters will only support unification if they clearly see the economic and political benefits.

2.3. An Overview of the Literature

According to Bolton et al., the general perspective to be found in the literature is that unification provides gains in terms of the provision of public services, but it reduces the ability of countries to provide the most optimal selection of public services and goods for their citizens. Bolton et al. undertakes a review of the literature with regard to the connection between political integration and economic integration. Table 1 illustrates their findings as well as their model.

There are two important conclusions which can be drawn based on these models:
1. There are clear economic gains of running a larger economy, but in larger economies, the political costs tend to rise.
2. Alesina-Spolaore contend that the economic gains depend on geography while Bolton et al. puts the emphasis on differences in income and wealth.
Table 1: Explanations of the Connection between Political and Economic Integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The nature of political institutions</td>
<td>Democratic political institutions</td>
<td>Democratic political institutions</td>
<td>Not democratic political institutions</td>
<td>Democratic political institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does political integration provide economic gains?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes, only economic gains are important</td>
<td>Yes, but economic gains depend on differences in geographical position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are there political costs involved?</td>
<td>Yes, the larger the nation the greater the political costs of unification</td>
<td>Yes, the political costs are in terms of greater inefficiency</td>
<td>No, political costs are not important</td>
<td>Yes, but economic gains depend on the differences in geographical position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sequencing of political costs and economic gains</td>
<td>At higher level of economic development, economic gains become smaller</td>
<td>At higher level of economic development, economic gains become greater</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author's own compilation based on Bolton et al. (1996: 700-702).
3. None of these explanations, however, refer to the distribution of the benefits. The unequal distribution of gains might lead to diverging economic processes blocking the political integration process. In economics a great part of the literature focuses on the long-term effects of economic integration and opinions are divided. (See Section 3.)

4. These models focus on the question of whether political integration can lead to economic benefits. The reverse of the question in the case of Taiwan is more important: can economic integration lead to political integration or unification between two political entities? From this perspective the theories of European integration are of importance. (See Section 5.)

3. New Theories of Economic Integration

There are different approaches among scholars with regard to the effects of integration. This debate is very clear when it comes to the assessment of the economic effects of international trade. The first scholar who pointed out the benefits of international trade was Adam Smith at the end of the 18th century. And this approach was not disputed until the WW2 which may not surprise us, because trade then occurred mainly between different countries and this trade was comprised of not homogenous products.⁴ (However, even in this period, there were policies and theories restricting free trade; Friedrich List and Alexander Hamilton attempted to provide a general theoretic support for this approach.)

That is why the theory of comparative advantages could explain international trade properly and it could provide a rationale to the possible effects of international trade. However, after WW2, protectionist practices began spreading, in particular in Latin America, and in the communist bloc. These countries attempted to build a broad
industrial base relying on import-substitution, on restraints of free trade and on forced capital accumulation. The latter practice was typical in Eastern European countries. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the economic transformation and opening up of East Asian and Eastern European countries, free trade became the mainstream approach again. Neoliberal trade policies spread across the world economy leading to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade. Along with the return of free trade policies international trade has undergone a deep transformation.

But the international trade of the 21st century cannot be explained anymore by the simple theory of comparative advantages, which mainly focuses on differences in resources, productivity and labour. There are new approaches which put an emphasis on other important considerations as well (economies of scale, economies of scope; the emergence of global supply chains, and the importance of state intervention, development policies etc.)

1. The new trade theory of Paul Krugman highlights the importance of economies of scale and that of the intra-industry trade which mainly takes place among advanced countries (Krugman, 2008: 335-348).
2. The new trade theory can be interpreted as a compilation of theories emerging after Krugman’s ground-breaking work which focused on monopolistic competition and increasing return to scale.
3. Economies of scope or efficiencies of product diversification can be utilized only when they are based on common and recurrent know-how and technology.
4. The Porter model stresses external or economies of agglomeration which can derive from skilled labour, top infrastructure, local advantages, firm rivalry and good governance etc. (Porter, 2008: 1-18).
5. The success of the four Asian tigers was based on a practice of state
intervention which became known as the theory of the developmental
state later. A general overview is provided by Shigehisa Kasahara
(Kasahara, 2013: 1-23). Even today, state intervention has been part
of the business life, distorting free trade and redistributing economic
gains among countries.

Sunanda Sen puts the major change in the free trade doctrine like
this: “In the meantime, the rigid framework of trade theory started being
questioned from different quarters. In a major departure from old trade
theories, attempts were made in the new trade theory (NTT) literature to
introduce the scale economies in production. A major point raised in
these modifications included the impact of increasing returns to scale on
the pattern as well as on the mutual benefits from international trade.”
(Sen, 2010: 6)

The theory of comparative advantages and its modifications suggest
an equal distribution of economic gains of international trade in the long
run. These new theories underline the case for unequal distribution of
economic gains, and as a result, these approaches do not take an
equilibrium process for granted. Another source of unequal distribution
of gains can be explained by monopolies, and protectionist trade policies
as well.

According to these theories, economic integration does not benefit
every partner equally. This is an important lesson in the European
perspective but also in the assessment of the economic integration
between Taiwan and China. If gains are not distributed equally leading
to diverging economic development paths in China and Taiwan, the
commitment to strengthen political cooperation may become weaker and
weaker. (See Figure 1 and Figure 2.)
**Figure 1** Difference between GDP per capita of Taiwan and China (current prices, in US dollars), 1980-2014

![Graph showing the difference between GDP per capita of Taiwan and China (1980-2014)](image)

Source: Author’s own compilation, based on IMF database.

**Figure 2** Difference between GDP per capita of Taiwan and China (PPP, in US dollars), 1980-2014

![Graph showing the difference between GDP per capita of Taiwan and China (1980-2014)](image)

Source: Author’s own compilation, based on IMF database.
So the question is not only whether economic integration is beneficial to every partner, but how the benefits are distributed geographically and in time. This paper contends that the Bolton/Roland model (1995) ought to be supplemented by the aspect of how the local and temporal distribution of economic gains can affect the political integration process. The model could be summarized as in Table 2.

The model assumes that political integration definitely leads to clear economic gains, but their scale and distribution depend on differences in income and wealth, which determine the local competitiveness. Local advantages and policies pursued by governments influence competitiveness as well. And obviously, openness to international trade and investments can transform the structure of the economy leading to improving or worsening competitiveness. These explanations stress why more wealthy regions might benefit much more from economic integration and cooperation under certain circumstances and as a logical consequence, why economic integration does not necessarily induce political integration. In the cross-Strait relations, research must include the analysis of economic convergence and/or divergence between the two countries.

4. The European Experience and the Theories of European Integration

The most fundamental European experience is the dichotomy of integration and fragmentation processes which has brought about a mixture of diversity and integrity in Europe.5 This continent is a more or less coherent region in political, economic and cultural terms, but it has never been under the control and governance of a centralized political power.6 As a consequence of fragmentation, wars had characterized the history of Europe throughout the centuries, but the internal political and economic competition had led to great accomplishments in technology,
Table 2 How Does Political Integration Affect Economic Gains?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The nature of political institutions</th>
<th>Democratic political institutions</th>
<th>Non-democratic political institutions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Does political integration provide economic gains?</td>
<td>Yes, but their extent depends on the following aspects: 1. differences in income and wealth 2. local advantages 3. government policies (developmental policies, trade policy etc.) 4. openness to world trade, investments</td>
<td>Yes, but their extent depends on the following aspects: 1. differences in income and wealth 2. local advantages 3. government policies (developmental policies, trade policy etc.) 4. openness to world trade, investments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does political integration provide other gains?</td>
<td>Strengthening and weakening of national identity</td>
<td>Strengthening and weakening of national identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are there political costs involved?</td>
<td>The larger the nation the greater the political costs of the unification (due the greater inefficiency)</td>
<td>No, political costs are not important (no voters)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporal sequencing of political costs and economic gains</td>
<td>In a world of free trade policies, at higher level of economic development, economic gains become smaller</td>
<td>In a world of free trade policies, at higher level of economic development, economic gains become smaller</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In a world of protectionism, at higher level of economic development, economic gains become larger</td>
<td>In a world of protectionism, at higher level of economic development, economic gains become larger</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own compilation.
economy and politics. This internal competition was one of the reasons why European countries were able to be part of the development of new technologies, solutions, ideas, etc. As European countries remained one of the core regions of economic development, they were all part of an economic division of labour in which resources, ideas, skilled labour and capital were allowed to flow between the countries freely. Additional components of the success were the consequent implementation of the rule of law, accountability of the elected governments and the formation of inclusive societies. After WW2 Western European countries – not least because of the deepening Cold War – reshaped their democracies, established a new kind of capitalism and laid down the foundations for successful future regional integration, the European Union.

During the Cold War, international trade between the two political blocs can be characterised as protectionist and the Soviet Union included there were only 25 countries in Europe, today there are 40 countries. Free trade practices were typical for the Western European countries of the EEC (European Economic Community), while restrictions of trade and not convertible domestic currencies dampened the trade among the socialist countries. (Although the COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) played an important part in the development of regional trade, the lack of convertible currencies confined these countries to barter trade.)

In these decades Western European cooperation was supposed to be evolving into a full-scale European state. But after the collapse of the communist bloc the pressures leading to the European state disappeared. The forces of globalisation remained in place and pushed forward the economic cooperation of these countries but without creating a single political entity in Europe (the United States of Europe). Only a few pundits recognised the change in the nature of the integration. These changes explain why the establishment of the European Monetary Union
and the introduction of the euro did not lead to a full-fledged monetary and fiscal union among the Eurozone countries, not to speak of those remaining outside the Eurozone. The other important element to bear in mind is the big bang enlargement of 2004 which enhanced the already deep fragmentation of the EU and led to a more diverse Europe and undermined the prospects of a Single European state.

The European environment is obviously very different from the East-Asian one where different regional economic integrations are still in an embryonic condition. It is also evident that Asian development will not necessarily follow the European path, but it is important to underline that the EU has served as an institutional framework, which has supported peace among these countries. With the creation of the single market and the introduction of euro the EU has created a level playing field for economic cooperation as well. Referring to the concepts mentioned earlier, it is apparent that the EU has made a contribution to the “good times” (peace and free trade) which lessen the costs of the maintenance of smaller countries and nations, thereby the EU at the end of the Cold War created an environment in which economic integration supports political integration. The EU itself is far from being a state, despite the pooled sovereignty elements it has in different fields of cooperation – common agricultural policy, single market, common currency etc.

When it comes to the implementation of integration concepts which basically rely on European experiences, there are three main theories of European integration to be mentioned: neo-functionalism, federalism and inter-governmentalism. Neo-functionalism places emphasis on automatic spill-over effects which were generated by the economic integration and led to further integration of other areas. This theory was only able to explain the integration processes of the 1960s accurately.8 In 2015, it is needless to say that neo-functionalism is not sufficient to
explain the changes taking place in Europe. In many cases inter-governmentalism and neo-functionalism are described as two very different and divergent theories of European integration. But they can also be interpreted as theories which are only capable of explaining either the dynamic or the static side of European integration. Without a shadow of a doubt, inter-governmentalism was more accurate in explaining the processes and the political climate of the 1990s when major reforms could take place as a result of agreements made between European governments (Maastricht Treaty, Nice Treaty, Lisbon Treaty, etc.). But the theory failed to clarify and highlight the economic benefits and the final goal of European integration. Although federalism is able to provide a definite answer regarding the goal of integration – the “United States of Europa – USE” – it fails to find a feasible way of achieving it.

The end of the Cold War and deepening and speeding up the global economic interconnectedness are the drivers of change in Europe, and these drivers deeply affect the integration process of the European countries, in particular of the EU-members. The next question which the paper looks at is how the same drivers have changed the dynamic of the China-Taiwan relations.

5. Lessons for Taiwan

Why are there nations and countries? How do countries and nations form and break up? What are the centrifugal and centripetal forces in play? Is it true that economic integration leads to political integration or is there no automatic correlation at all? Does economic integration bring about the convergence or divergence of societies?

Theoretically, these could be the most fundamental questions to be raised when looking into the integration process of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. Basically, there are three traditional schools of thought.
offering answers to how economic and political integration across the Taiwan Strait are connected (Chao, 2003: 280).

1. The *cultural integration* theory stresses the salience of language, the relevance of culture, and the importance of shared customs and traditions. This school basically states that the unification of two countries is a process which logically follows from the dominance of cultural forces. The view which puts an emphasis on culture has a long tradition in the political sciences. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Samuel Huntington contended that the majority of political conflicts would emerge due to the cultural junctures, while political and economic causes would be less important in the future (Huntington, 1997: 20). Culture and language are inevitably important elements of national identity; however, there are arguments to the contrary as well:

- A handful of European examples vividly demonstrate that different national identities can evolve in a very short period of time from which it follows that they are not necessarily linked to culture and language, which are more constant variables. Austria, Scotland, Ireland, Switzerland – these countries have each shared a common language with another nation. Needless to say that there are some Eastern European countries too, where different national identities can hardly be explained by the trifle linguistic, cultural or religious differences that exist between specific ethnicities.

- The term *culture* also includes the political culture of any given society. In this respect, after the transition in the early 1990s, Taiwan has developed democratic institutions and a democratic political culture as well. So today, Taiwan and Mainland China have entirely different cultures; moreover, it can be argued that the two countries can be found at the opposite ends of the same spectrum. Chao puts it like this: “From Taipei’s perspective, the contrast is culturally
reinforced by the more participant political culture emerging in Taiwan, as opposed to the subject political culture that is still dominant in the PRC.” (Chao, 2003: 291)

2. Another line of reasoning highlights that being a rising economic and political power, Mainland China would weaken smaller Asian nations and countries of the Asian-Pacific region and would make them more and more dependent on its mercy. This political integration argument assumes that the inevitable rise of China will continue in terms of politics, economy, and even military potential. No doubt, the key issue is the economic development of Mainland China. There are 3 basic dilemmas arising in this context.

• The first dilemma is whether the rise is indeed inevitable. According to Cs. Moldicz: “The so-called middle income country trap poses long-term threats to the Chinese economy unless the capacity of the Chinese political elite to continue political and economic reforms improves. (Aging population, eroding competitiveness due to increasing labour wages, growing social tensions, weak rule of law, political tensions caused by surging inequality within the society, etc. present threats to the Chinese economy in the long term.)” (Moldicz, 2015: 17)

• Even though the answer was yes, another question still remains: Is it certain that this economic rise or solid economic strength will lead to unification or maybe there are elements which will slow down or stop the rise of Mainland China. Earlier examples can be pointed out where the rise of a political power did not impede secession. (See Russia-Ukraine, Germany-Austria, Czech Republic-Slovakia examples.)

• The third dilemma is that economic theories do not support the concept of political integration/unification stemming from an increased level of economic integration due to the increasingly
unequal distribution of economic gains among the economic partners.

3. The third school of thought stresses *the relationship between economic and political integration*. The argument, initially formulated by Ernst Haas (1961), points out that economic integration (customs union) creates new political and economic pressures (spill-overs) for further economic integration. According to the neofunctionalist school, economic integration would ultimately spill over into political integration. In the case of the Taiwan Strait, it is more than obvious that the spill-over mechanisms, which are able to describe the European integration process of the 1960s, do not work. It is partly because of the lack of customs union between Taiwan and Mainland China, but also because the historic framework is very different. After World War II tensions between the two countries were attributed to the principle of indivisibility of sovereignty. Under these circumstances, the delegation of sovereignty, which is an inherent element of the European integration process, is hardly conceivable even today. Haas defines spill-over as: “... policies made pursuant to an initial task and grant of power can be made really only if the task itself is expanded, as reflected in compromises among the states interested in the task.” (Haas, 1961: 368) Can these compromises be realistically achieved by the two states involved?

None of the above-mentioned theories can offer proper explanations as to how the mechanism of economic cooperation between the two countries will affect the political integration in the long run. None of them can reliably predict how this process affects the unification/independence question and each of them is loaded with oversimplifications. But what are the realities then which influence this process?
5.1. Taiwan-China Relations

First, there is a growing economic cooperation or integration between the two countries, in particular in trade and investment. Since 2011, the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) between the People’s Republic China (Mainland China) and the Republic of China (Taiwan) has boosted trade and investment relations. This successful cooperation has been one of the reasons why Taiwan, relying on the rapid Chinese economic growth, could avoid falling into severe economic recession after the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-2009.

Secondly, despite growing cooperation, the two economies have complementary structures, which enable them to reap some of the benefits of economic cooperation. But this builds on the mobility of capital and the mobility of goods much more than on the mobility of labour and services. So it is far from being a full-fledged economic integration similar to the one in the case of the EU.

Thirdly, the end of the Cold War theoretically reduced the risk of military conflicts between Taiwan and Mainland China, but the political and economic rise of China and the US policy which aims to contain China in the Asia-Pacific region have led to mounting tension in the region. (See the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis or the territorial disputes in the South China Sea.)

Fourthly, neither the lower level of conflicts brings about unification automatically. It only offers a peaceful way of settling controversial issues between the two parties. Moreover, according to mainstream analyses, peaceful times do not favour unification; to put it more generally, they do not lead to the formation of larger countries. It is argued that the reason for this lies in increasing economic integration, which makes the “maintenance” of smaller economies and countries cheaper.
5.2. The Domestic Environment

When it comes to Taiwanese approaches to independence/unification it is important to stress that compared to Mainland China, Taiwan is a very homogenous political entity despite the cultural and linguistic diversity of the island. The country is an economically more equal society where democracy secures the diverse public services/goods provided by the state. Therefore Taiwanese governments are theoretically able to pursue policies which are close to the preferences of the voters, while liberalization in world trade and investments flows reduces the costs of running its relatively small economy. These factors clearly give a boost to those who oppose any kind of future unification process.

Let us take a view of the different factors of independence/unification from a Taiwanese perspective.

1. The size of the economy. For the time being, Taiwan’s economy has the size of the Belgian economy (490 billion USD in 2014). Moreover, adding the performance of Taiwanese firms in China, “Chiawan” generates around 700 billion USD, which equals the size of the Turkish economy or that of South Korea (Lee-Makiyama and Messerlin, 2014: 3).

2. The size of the government. As mentioned earlier, according to the literature, the greater the size of the government compared to the population, the more costly it is to build a standing army. At this point, Tilly refers to Brandenburg-Prussia. This aspect is certainly relevant for Taiwan, because its army is relatively strong compared to the size of its population; however, the assistance of the United States has contributed effectively to counterbalance Mainland China which could reduce the costs of the strong army.

3. Homogeneity. According to the theories, the more fragmented the country is the easier it is to conquer the political entity. Democracies usually do not have difficulties to maintain coherence in terms of
socioeconomic homogeneity. The term socioeconomic homogeneity can be measured by the Gini indicator and other indicators which cover application of the rule of law, extent of social security and social protection etc. Taiwan has achieved a high socioeconomic homogeneity, in particular if taking into account how small the Taiwanese state is.

4. Resources. The smaller the scale and scope of the resources to tap and the more closed the economy is, the more costly it is to maintain state activities. In the case of Taiwan, it is obvious that its open economy can offset the negative effect of the scarcity of natural resources (land), and the scarcity of energy (oil, gas, coal etc.). It is no surprise that Taiwanese economic policy aims at maintaining the economic openness of the country. This can be backed up by statistics as well; according to the Index of Economic Freedom, Taiwan’s economy is the 14th freest economy in the world.

5. The protection provided by the state to its citizens. The greater the extent and range of protection provided by the state to its citizens, the more costly it is to maintain the system. According to the Index of Economic Freedom, the Taiwanese government spending reached only 20.7% of the GDP in 2014. The size of the Taiwanese government is very limited, especially if one considers the development of the economy. (Advanced economies usually have a much higher level of government spending; however, Taiwan fits well into the group of fast-growing, East Asian countries – Singapore, China, the Philippines, Indonesia – especially where the state is small.)
6. Conclusions

To sum it up, Taiwan today possesses all economic, political and cultural characteristics needed to be a full-fledged independent country. This is no surprise, as the country has been independent since after WW2; however, this full independence belonged to a political entity which did not focus on Taiwanese, but on Chinese identity. Taiwan lost its United Nations seat in 1971 and the diplomatic recognition of Mainland China by most of the countries (One-China Policy) was a backlash for Taiwan. The change could be interpreted as a shift into worse conditions, hence room for political and economic manoeuvre has been constrained; however, it also provided an opportunity to form and crystallize its own political and cultural identity – the Taiwanese identity – necessary to form a political entity.

As it can be concluded from this article, economic globalisation does not lead Taiwan back to the One-China state solution, as many fear (or hope). Moreover, economic globalisation and deeper economic cooperation with China does not support economic convergence between the economies, but more analysis based on statistics are required to back up this theoretical approach.

The paper also referred in many cases to the European experience and theories of the European integration. These references underlined that a peaceful free trade environment without major political conflicts endorses the formation of smaller political entities and this environment basically contributes to healthy competition among these countries and to the diversity of political and economic regimes which are democratic and capitalist at the same time.

In the very long run, diversity and competition have been the keys to European successes. Taking these arguments into account, it could be argued that Taiwan’s independence would be beneficial for the Greater Chinese Area, not only for Taiwan, but even for China.
Notes

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1. Prussia faced a similar question in the 19th century. Having established a customs union with the German states, the country took it for granted that economic integration would subsequently lead to political union. However, when tensions between the Habsburg Empire and Prussia erupted, some of the former allies joined the other camp. (Desmond, 2014: 13-14)

2. First edition in 1990, but published several times afterwards.

3. Needless to say that nation does not necessarily coincide with country.

4. Colonized countries exported natural resources, agricultural products to advanced countries whose export consisted of industrial goods.

5. There are types of concepts which focus on the diversities of the EU. The “two- or multi-speed Europe” is used to refer to the fact that some of the member states are delayed in the integration process while other countries cooperate at an earlier point in time. The concept is often referred as a temporal one. In the concepts of “Europe of concentric circles” or “core Europe”, emphasis is placed on the creation of a federal union with only a few members. In this approach differences are not temporal and the spatial nature of the integration is underlined because only core countries are in a position to make decisions concerning the political union. The conceptualization “Europe à la carte” is a theoretical approach in which the sectoral differentiation is put in the limelight. Another version of these is
the concept of “differentiated integration”, which describes the European Union in a more complex way. Sectoral, temporal, and spatial aspects are not sufficient to describe the diversity of the EU. There are of course other suggestions of completion of this concept too. Transcending Alexander Stubb’s three way classification (temporal-spatial-sectoral), Holzinger and Schimmelfennig suggest that this concept should ”be distinguished along six dimensions: (1) permanent v. temporary differentiation; (2) territorial v. purely functional differentiation; (3) differentiation across nation states v. multi-level differentiation; (4) differentiation takes place within the EU treaties v. outside the EU treaties; (5) decision-making at EU level v. at regime level; (6) only for member states v. also for non-member states/areas outside the EU territory.” (Holzinger and Schimmelfennig 2012: 294)

6. There have been several attempts to centralize Europe, but neither the Roman Empire nor the Soviet Union was able to extend its power to the entire continent.

7. Outstanding historian Niall Ferguson in his book Civilization: The West and the rest writes of this puzzle of the history: “For some reason, beginning in the late fifteenth century, the little states of Western Europe with their bastardized linguistic borrowings from Latin (and a little Greek), their religion derived from the teachings of a Jew from Nazareth and their intellectual debts to Oriental mathematics, astronomy and technology produced a civilization capable of not only conquering the great Oriental empires and subjugating Africa, the Americas and Australasia, but also converting peoples all over the world to the Western way of life – a conversion achieved ultimately more by the word than by the sword.” (Ferguson, 2011: 18)

8. Sandholtz and Sweet claimed: “By the early 1990s neofunctionalism was virtually extinct. In the common narrative, De Gaulle’s empty chair, the Luxembourg compromise, and the failure of ambitious integration plans in
the early 1970s refuted the Neo-functionalist expectation that integration would be a relatively steady process, in which market integration and the building of policy-making competence at the EU level would go hand-in-hand.” (Sandholtz and Sweet, 2010: 3)

9. Gehring puts it the following way: “A closer look at the existing divide reveals that it is made up of two interrelated aspects. At the theoretical level a static and state-centered theory is juxtaposed with a dynamic theory emphasizing the role of supranational and non-state actors.” (Gehring, 1996: 226)

References


Crimean Crisis and Military Balance in Asia

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Abstract
As the Crimean Crisis goes on, many analysis have been focusing on the dynamics among parties of Ukraine, the EU, the US and Russia. Very few noticed another important strategic impact the Crisis may cause: the Chinese military rebalancing in East Asia. China has been increasingly confident in assuming both political and military power in the East Asian region. The confidence resulted in the South China Sea disputes with ASEAN countries, “Anti-Secession Law” against Taiwan, and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Dispute with Japan. Behind such confidence of China, the EU has consistently been exporting defence products to China since the end of the Cold War; Ukraine, although sometimes reluctantly, has also been backing China along the process of building up a stronger navy as well as other defense industry construction; Russia has traditionally been supplying China with a wide range of military hardware. It can be noticed that the Crimean Crisis involved three out of four countries and region that have been behind China’s rise. How will the Crimean Crisis influence China’s rebalance in East Asia then? The answers stay opaque. This paper will attempt to answer the questions.
Keywords: China, Japan, Ukraine, the EU, Russia, arms trade, regional rebalancing

JEL classification: F51, F52, F59, H56

1. The Rise of China and the Logic behind It

This paper focuses on tackling the following questions: how China has been rising in Asia, what contributed to the rise of China, and how the Crimean Crisis may cause rebalancing in Asia.

China has been importing defence products from Israel, Russia, the European Union (EU) and Ukraine; three out of the above four are currently closely entangled in the Crimean Crisis, which is the reason why the Crimean Crisis’ impacts on China should be noted. In this paper it is argued that Ukraine’s support to China’s military rise was significant but unnoticed; the EU’s impact has been somehow visible especially since the 2003 EU’s attempt to lift the arms embargo on China; as a chain effect, Russia may strengthen its tie with China to balance the impact from its western side. As the Crimean Crisis goes on, it may be beneficial to the EU, Ukraine and Russia to strengthen their cooperation with China; by then the military balance in Asia will be tipped to the favorable position for China.

When did China have the clear will to rise? By the end of the 1990s especially after the Taiwan Strait Crisis, when China felt its sovereignty was at stake, China has demonstrated a clear will for rise in the region. It was considered necessary to rival against Japan for the past war and Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, Taiwan for its will for independence, ASEAN for their claim for South China Sea. As countermeasures, some scholar suggested fostering multilateralism in the region to reduce the US’ burden to balance China. Nevertheless multilateralism worked poorly in
the political environment of East Asia, as China viewed multilateralism with great suspicion, for it does little to solve China’s problems and it might compromise China’s deterrence to rivals. To rise alone and enhance its overall power of deterrence was considered a more feasible strategy by the Chinese leadership.

In the early 1990s, China was considered a rising power, but containing it was not an urgent matter. Discussions have been on how to construct balance in Asia to either contain China or at least slow down the rise of China. By the time Japan was still ahead of China in terms of economy and many other figures, therefore some discussion was on whether China should be considered as a challenge to Asia instead of Japan, and whether Japan alone was enough to keep China at bay. For many scholars, China has been identified as a problem partially because of its history but majorly because it was trying to challenge the regional order and even the international order at the time. Examples are that China was trying to change the World Trade Organization (WTO) mechanism at the time rather than complying with it; China was claiming for the sovereignty of South China Sea; China was trying to manipulate Japan over Japan’s attitude towards Taiwan, etc. Actually, although there was no clear articulation for military rise, as soon as the Cold War ended, China was sensing great crisis for its legitimacy and survival, therefore tried to foster its military power by cooperation with Ukraine and the EU. This will be discussed in later sections.

As to the political and security environment in Asia for effective countermeasures to the rise of China, difficulties were identified, though with some limits. The fragmentation of East Asian countries prevented any effective containment policy; there has been a lack of effective regional institutions, unlike the EU in Europe. The interdependence between some countries and China also has rendered many countries reluctant to go against China; Thailand has been very reluctant to
contain China but Vietnam and the Philippine have been very active on this matter. The unforeseeable depth of entanglement was also stopping international power to get involved; the United States (US) has only limited commitment to Taiwan, and the EU has refused to give specific comment and position on the security environment in Asia. As a matter of fact, the EU has been boosting China for its military rise, though very little literature was dedicated to such EU policy.

How could China be balanced? As shown in the Figure 1, in the 1990s it has been recognized that, given the size and the sophistication of the political system of China, China cannot be simply engaged or contained with one policy. A combined policy of engagement and containment was offered – in other word, to hedge the rise of China. Another factor, the US influence, was also repeatedly introduced to balance China in the region. To keep the US in Asia was argued to be an effective containment of China, though the willingness of the US was in doubt:

American power is the linchpin that holds Japan in place. By so doing, it delays the full transition to an independent Asian sub-system and allows time for forces that can mitigate the effects of multipolarity to gain in strength. U.S. pique over unresolved economic issues with Japan, a domestic desire for even deeper defense cuts, and the more obvious immediacy of post-Communist crises in eastern Europe could combine to cause the United States to pull back more sharply from Asia than it is currently doing. The fact that such a course of action would be mistaken and dangerous affords no guarantee that it will not be followed.

(Friedberg, 1994: 32)
**Figure 1** China in Comparison with Other Major Countries and Regions in Asia

Note: All figures are for 1994, except exports (1993). ASEAN figures do not include Indonesia; China figures include Hong Kong.

Entering 2000s, the academic trend of discussion on China shifted to how to cope with the reality of a rising China: should balancing still be an option, or the rise of China is unstoppable and bandwagoning should be considered. The reality was that countries were bandwagoning China economically and balancing China politically; the question was that how long this situation could continue and what was the solution for the future. Some scholars start to argue that weak China was the reason why Asia was unstable and a strong China plays a positive role in every way in stabilizing Asia. Some others supported constructive engagement of China and cooperation with China’s neighbours for multilateral containment of China. For this strategy, regionalism and multilateralism were argued to be the key, though the actors were still limited to Asian countries.

Throughout previous studies, several pieces of key information can be distilled: China’s rise was not considered a great problem until the second half of 1990s; to contain or to hedge China’s rise, collective efforts of China’s neighbours were lacking; the US presence is key to keep China at bay. These arguments are nothing but true, however they missed half of the picture at the time: China planned the rise both economically and militarily since the end of the Cold War; the Crisis in the second half of 1990s was nothing but a manifesto of China’s attempt at military rise; more external actors should be introduced to keep China’s ambition at bay. The evidence for such argument is that after the Cold War China had begun some major cooperation in the military field with Ukraine on one hand, and resumed military and economic cooperation with the EU on the other. Previous studies ignored China’s effort in the first half of 1990s. Moreover, to either contain or slow down the rise of China, efforts of Asian countries as well as the US were key but not enough. To put many other players into the multilateral structure in Asia was important, especially the EU and Ukraine. Previous studies
treated the rise of China as if China gained no external help and made the rise alone.

As argued so far, it is of great importance to scrutinize how the EU and Ukraine contributed to the rise of China. In the following section, this topic will be discussed.

2. The Current Boosters for China: the EU and Ukraine

Currently China is still importing arms and dual-use product from the EU and Ukraine. Although the EU, along with the US, Japan, and many other countries from the Capitalist bloc of the Cold War, have arms embargo on China, it is critical to understand that the EU’s arms embargo on China is political, non-legally-binding and unspecified. Such features lead to two outcomes: one is that EU member states can interpret the arms embargo by their own understanding and the other is that they can export arms as long as they can justify the arms sales by their interpretations of the embargo. As to Ukraine, the Communist bloc of the Cold War never have such embargoes, but it only started exporting arms to China since the end of the Cold War. In the post-Cold War era, pressure from the US and Russia casts most influence on Ukraine’s decision on arms sales to China. This section will look into the data of arms sales to China and demonstrate how the EU and Ukraine have been contributing to the military rise of China.

The EU and the United States installed their arms embargo on China in 1989; the first question is how the embargoes changed the arms transfer to China. From 1950 to 1989, eight countries had exported arms to China, which included Albania, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom (UK), the United States, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Among these countries, the USSR was responsible for the absolute majority of exports from 1950 to 1968,
which laid the foundation of the USSR-based Chinese military system. The Sino-USSR split at the end of the 1960s led to a decrease of arms export from the USSR to China, which totally ended in 1969 until 1990; meanwhile, there has been evidenced an increase of arms export from the West to China since 1966, from France, Germany, Italy, and the UK. By 1988, arms export from EU regions to China occupied 83% of the total arms export to China; the remaining 17% was the United States. In 1989 and 1990, which were the year of arms embargo installation and the year after, the arms exports to China did not even make a decrease: EU member states increased arms export.

For a more visually direct view, Table 1 may shed some light on how the arms embargo changed the arms transfer to China. As can be acquired from the table, the arms export from EU member states to China did not stop, but even increased after the embargo. The embargo has been merely symbolic, and it was barely effective at controlling arms transfer from EU member states to China.

It can also be observed that Ukraine started exporting arms to China as soon as the Cold War ended. The next set is the military expenditures of related countries. As we can see from the table, until 2013, most of the arms exporters to China suffered from shrinkage of military expenditure, or at most maintained their expenditure at a fixed level. The shrinking budgets have impacted the governmental purchase of the local military industries, and the chain effect would be that the military industries have to look for alternatively available buyers for their products in order to survive. China is the only country that made an almost seven-fold enlargement of its military budget; it will be difficult for EU military industries to restrain their desire to export arms and relevant technologies to China.\textsuperscript{13}
Table 1  Arms Transfer to China from 1988 to 1992 (Unit: million US dollars)

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<td>215</td>
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### Table 2 Military Expenditure of China and Exporters of Arms to China (Unit: million US dollars)

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Note: N/A – not available.

### Table 3 Arms Transfer to China from 2007 to 2013 (Unit: million US dollars)

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<th>2012</th>
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<td></td>
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Table 3 shows the arms sales to China in recent years. EU member states basically maintained their arms exports to China, however as to Russia, it is clear that China tried to reduce its arms imports from Russia. The reduction of imports from Russia was because China started developing arms domestically. Another interesting figure is that Ukraine’s arms export to China almost equalled Russia’s in 2012; it is an indicator for the increasingly close cooperation between Ukraine and China. China currently needs maritime hardware and technologies for its grand navy strategy, for which products are supplied by Ukraine. China also needs state-of-the-art coordinating hardware and software; many sources indicated that China has been building up and showed interest in purchasing the capabilities of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) which is the EU’s strength and what Russia is unwilling to offer.¹⁴

As a conclusion to this section, China has been purchasing arms (especially C4ISR) that major EU arms exporters are willing to export. As to maritime hardware, China has been purchasing related products from Ukraine. The Crimean Crisis may also pace up Ukrainian sales to China. These issues will be discussed separately in the following sections.

3. The EU’s Arms Embargo on China

China has long been planning to lift the EU’s arms embargo on China and thusly enhance its military power. The first traceable clue was that, China brought lifting to France in April 1997, right before the “France-China Joint Declaration for A Global Partnership” in May, by the Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman Guofang Shen saying the embargo was an “incorrect attitude” and China hoped that “the European Union will lift all its unreasonable criticisms of the Chinese Government.”¹⁵
French Defence Minister Millon agreed with Shen that “there is no question of going back on the decision about the arms trade.” The Defence Minister suggested that France would like to revisit the issue at the EU level.

The Chinese Government’s claim was a gesture of pressing France and the EU to loosen their arms control on China, as well as China’s will for arms imports from the EU. It is said so because recalling the US-China confrontation over the Taiwan presidential election that caused the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1996, China had to back down with its outdated and small military vis-à-vis the United States’ cutting-edge aircraft carrier groups. Having the capability to expel the US influence from the Chinese shore has become the priority for the Chinese navy since then.

The connection between China’s realization of its military power gap with the United States, and China’s will to fix the gap by importing military technology from the EU as well as the other countries, can probably be possibly be shown by Table 4.

The total arms imports of China started to soar after the temporary low in 1998. From the table it is clear that France and Germany maintained their usual scale of arms exports to China, and France had been the leading arms exporter in Europe; Switzerland and the UK started to export arms to China in 1997; other countries such as Russia and Ukraine also increased arms export to China, in contrast to the total embargo of the United States. Significantly, the UK became willing to loosen the arms embargo on China in 1997.

Aside from the European exporters of arms to China, it does not necessarily mean that the rest of member states enjoyed the restrictions of the arms embargo. For example, in the case of the Netherlands; the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Van Merlo, criticized China internationally but pragmatically reserved the rights of arms
Table 4 Increase in China’s Arms Imports (Unit: million US dollars)

<table>
<thead>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>1160</td>
<td>652</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>1514</td>
<td>1795</td>
<td>3006</td>
<td>8878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>261</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>134</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>649</td>
<td>1345</td>
<td>807</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>1795</td>
<td>2089</td>
<td>3337</td>
<td>10785</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


exports for the Dutch domestically. During the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) session in 1997, on behalf of his country’s Presidency of the EU, Merlo argued that dropping criticism on China is “not compatible with the universality of human rights” and the EU would be guilty of double standards. However, domestically, he stated to the Lower House of the Netherlands Parliament as follows:

“All the Government wishes to say here is that it has tried to ensure that all EU Member States interpret the arms embargo on China uniformly. When this proved impossible – a number of Member States do not interpret the embargo comprehensively – the Netherlands reserved the right to adopt an ad hoc approach with regard to certain military goods, in line with other EU countries.”

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It could be seen that arms exports was still optional for the Netherlands. Later an MEP (Member of the European Parliament) touched on the issue. On 10 July, the MEP Johanna Maij-Weggen submitted a written question to the Commission, elaborating the above attitude of the Netherlands, and enquired the member states’ “compliance with the arms embargo on China”. She questioned on three issues: the national differences of interpretations on the embargo, the measure securing uniform interpretation, and the approach of the EU to the embargo at the time. On 4 September, Sir Leon Brittan on behalf of the Commission replied that a decision was made within the “European political cooperation” framework, the “implementation fall in the first instance to member states”, and the information at the Commission was “confidential”. In other words, the EU had no clear definition of the embargo, no control of it, or publishable information.

Nonetheless, as to the arms embargo per se, despite China’s criticism in 1997, the embargo had been widely discussed, though not as an issue of priority within the EU until 2002. Regarding defence, most of the attention was paid to the official adoption of the EU’s Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, and consequent discussions, which involved an annual review of the Code. The Code was first created in European Council meetings in 1991 and 1992; after the intensive lobbying of human rights non-governmental organisations (NGOs), it was officially adopted in 1998. The annual report on the use of the Code started in 1999.

In 2003, the EU tried to lift the arms embargo against China. The EU member states, even Sweden and some other countries critical of the human rights status of China, agreed to lift the embargo to improve EU-China relations. The lifting gathered great momentum, though it was suspended for the US pressure in 2005. Although it did not succeed, it showed the EU’s intention and readiness to face the pressure to the EU’s
compromise on key grounds such as human rights. There was no noticeable change in China’s human rights record, which possibly meant that the EU just wanted to sweep the human rights issue under the carpet. Besides, there was hardly a successful record of the long-existing arms embargo in history. Austin (2005) argues that the main weakness has been the availability of alternate suppliers and the unwillingness of states to observe sanctions rigorously.\textsuperscript{26} Russia and Ukraine kept exporting arms to China, which greatly compromised the EU arms embargo into a symbolic gesture.

In general, during the 2000s, the EU and China had been moving toward an unparalleled honeymoon. In 1998 EU and China made the decision to develop a comprehensive partnership.\textsuperscript{27} Since then, the EU and China have noted “the increasing maturity and growing strategic nature of the partnership.”\textsuperscript{28} And some essential points of a strategic relationship are: “a commitment to promote stable political links and economic exchange; a mutual understanding not to interfere in domestic politics while working together on international issues; frequent official high-level visits.”\textsuperscript{29} Clearly, the EU is very unlikely to improve a strategic partnership with an embargo. Both strengthening and keeping the embargo are hindering a strategic relationship.

Economically, the EU has become China’s biggest trading partner and China has become the EU’s second largest trading partner since 2004. China is also becoming the biggest non-European trade partner to more and more European countries, such as Spain. Both the EU and China are endeavouring to preserve their market share in each other’s markets. China is an important raw material and labour-intensive product exporter to the EU and the EU has numerous technologies that China thirsts for. Moreover, the Chinese Government regularly signs billion-dollar contracts with European companies, which encourages the EU to improve relations with China.
A much freer transaction of arms could also bring both parties economic benefits. Although probably arms trade will not increase too much after the removal of the ban, many European countries wanted to sell arms to China. Clear evidence indicated that in 2008, some EU countries sabotaged the legislation of the EU’s Code of Conduct on Arms Export and prevented it from becoming a legally binding instrument. Even though the Code was legalized by the end of 2008, the essential rights of arms exports still lie in the hands of member states, as the Code only legalized the responsibilities of member states to report arms transfers, rather than punishment for rule breaking. The whole series of evidence indicates that there has always been a will within the EU to strengthen ties with China through arms transfer.

4. Ukraine’s Relation with China

The start of the military industry cooperation between China and Ukraine was from the end of the Cold War. At the time the collapse of the USSR Empire resulted in massive layoff, bankruptcy of factories and R&D institutions in the defence industry. Engineers, expertise and professors who still had jobs suffered from sharp reduction of income. Against this background, Chinese government initiated the “shuang yin 双引” [double introduction] project to attract former USSR expertise to work in or for China. The prime minister Li Peng at the time believed that the number and the level of expertise was so overwhelming that China could not foster anything similar, not even after 10 years. It was also for the purpose to attract those expertise, the State Department ordered the State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs to set up “youyi jiang 友谊奖” [Award of Friendship] to award those who work for China. From 1991 to 2002, the “shuang yin” project attracted more than 10,000 expertise and accomplished over 2,000 projects. The First
Secretary of the Chinese Embassy in Ukraine Li Qianru indicated that only in the year 2006, China has invited over 2000 Ukrainian professionals for over 150 projects.33

Not only China viewed Ukraine with significance; Ukraine also sees China as opportunities, especially economically. In 2013, Ukrainian economists observed that China could become a balancer between the EU and Russia:

In the context of Ukraine’s options, Beijing can be the ideal supplemental partner for Kyiv. With the signing of the AA between Ukraine and the EU, China will get new opportunities for development of the all-European market through the organization of joint ventures on the Ukrainian territory.

According to recent information from the Ministry of Revenue and Duties of Ukraine, Ukraine-China economic relations are on the rise. In particular, the share of export-import transactions with China makes up about 8% from the total amount of goods turnover of Ukraine and is on constant increase. Over the first eight months of 2013 the goods turnover between Ukraine and China has made up $7.3 billion (€5.4) which is 16.6% more by $1 billion than the similar period of 2012. Foreign trade between Ukraine and China grows at the expense of increase of both import (by 9.2%) and export (by 46.6%). Besides, recently Chinese State Corporation “Xinjiang Production and Construction” has leased nearly 3 million hectares of land for food cultivation for 49 years.

Thus, China starts playing a balance role for the relations with the EU and Russia in Ukraine’s foreign economic activities, and allows diversifying the Ukrainian presence at the international markets.

Profound development of relations with the EU, preservation of close cooperation with Russia and the CU countries, and also dynamic growth of trade and economic relations with China can become a new success formula for Ukraine in the XXI century.34
Besides economic and human resource connections with Ukraine, China has endeavoured to utilize the defence industry of Ukraine, as shown in Table 5.

As shown in the table, the defence cooperation between Ukraine and China covers many important areas, such as: diesel engines and gas turbine for tanks and ships, missiles and radars for fighters, and a variety of platforms.

It should be noticed that the defence deals goes closely in line with China’s modernization strategy for navy, which includes blue water navy development (Kuznetsoy, the Liaoning aircraft carrier) and near sea amphibious warfare (Zubr, the biggest hovercraft). Other than supplying China with equipments, Ukraine was also offering China to train Chinese pilots for aircraft carrier at Nitka, though the cooperation on the issue was never confirmed publicly.\(^{35}\) As a matter of fact, Chinese leadership values Ukraine’s support so much that in June 2011 Chinese president Jintao Hu visited Ukraine, signed $3.5 billion worth deals with Ukrainian president Viktor Fedorovych Yanukovich, as well as a strategic partnership to elevate overall cooperation including security.\(^{36}\) Interestingly, the first stop of the Chinese president was not Kiev but Simferopol, the capital of Crimea, two hours away from Feodosia, where the ships for China were made.\(^{37}\)

In December 2013, China even offered Ukraine nuclear umbrella in order to strengthen its tie with Ukraine:

China pledges unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the nuclear-free Ukraine and China further pledges to provide Ukraine nuclear security guarantee when Ukraine encounters an invasion involving nuclear weapons or Ukraine is under threat of a nuclear invasion.\(^{38}\)
Table 5 The Defence Product Orders by China

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Weapon ordered designation</th>
<th>Weapon description</th>
<th>Year of order/licence</th>
<th>Year(s) of deliveries</th>
<th>Number delivered/produced</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Fedko</td>
<td>Tanker</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>naval tanker/supply ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Zubr/Pomornik</td>
<td>ACV/landing craft</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>$315-319 m deal; incl 2 produced in China; Project-958 Bizon version; delivery probably by 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>DT-59</td>
<td>Gas turbine</td>
<td>(1992)</td>
<td>1996-1999</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>For 1 Type-052 (Luhu) and 1 Type-051B (Luhai)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Kuznetsov</td>
<td>Aircraft carrier</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Second-hand (production stopped 1992 with end of Soviet Union and unfinished ship sold 1998 in $20-30 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2S9 120mm Self-propelled gun</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1999)</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Probably Second-hand</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5 (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Weapon designation</th>
<th>Weapon description</th>
<th>Year of order/licence</th>
<th>Year(s) of deliveries</th>
<th>Number delivered/produced</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Kolchuga</td>
<td>Air search system</td>
<td>(2000)</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>DT-59</td>
<td>Gas turbine</td>
<td>(2001)</td>
<td>2004-2005</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>For 4 Luyang (Type-052B/C) destroyers produced in China; DA-80 version</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>6TD</td>
<td>Diesel engine</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>(25)</td>
<td>Probably for tank produced in China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250</td>
<td>AI-222</td>
<td>Turbofan</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$380m deal; for L-15 trainer/combat aircraft produced in China; AI-222-25F version</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The offer itself may be problematic as Ukraine is consistently struggling for survival between the EU and Russia; how much China could really commit to Ukraine with its nuclear weapons stays in question. But the signal is clear: China is seeking nothing but stronger ties with Ukraine.

Of course the relationship between China and Ukraine is not always smooth. After the Crimean Crisis, China has been playing on the fence, leaning to Russia mostly of the time. Sometimes China supports Ukraine for that national sovereignty: “China is deeply concerned about the
current situation in Ukraine; the relevant parties in Ukraine should resolve their internal disputes peacefully within the legal framework. The independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine are respected”; sometimes China also shows understanding to Russia, saying “biased mediation has polarized Ukraine and only made things worse in the country, the west should stop trying to exclude Russia from the political crisis they failed to mediate.”\(^{39}\)

The Ukrainian government was aware of the fact that China was not on its side unconditionally, and China had doubt over Ukraine’s past deals with China; therefore when the new Ukrainian government came into being it immediately reassured China that: “The Ukrainian government has made its promise clearly. It will adhere to the documents signed by each side and implement the existing cooperation projects, in the hope of pushing mutual cooperation to a higher level.”\(^{40}\) Nevertheless China became highly cautious already, for that supporting Ukraine also means supporting the “West” to confront Russia, China’s most valuable ally.

With such current given circumstance, the view of Ukrainian political scientist is somehow dimmer than their government. According to the author’s interview with Oleksandr Bogdanov, a professor of the National Academy of Security Service of Ukraine, he saw Ukraine distancing China in contrast to Japan.\(^{41}\) Although basically he believes that Ukraine-China relation and Ukraine-Japan relation are both in good shape, Ukraine sees China as a non-democratic country, therefore China will not support the democracy of Ukraine as much as Japan does. Especially with the recent development of the Crisis, China has been progressively critical on Ukraine not Russia. From Ukraine’s perspective, Ukraine may be able to contribute to China-Japan relation with its reconciliation experience with former enemies, even though Ukraine is still having difficulties with Russia. Regarding the arms
export from Ukraine to China, he believes that politically speaking Ukraine does not take pressure from Russia or the US into its decision-making on deals; but if there is to be economic pressure, Ukraine may alter its decisions. Regarding the current defense cooperation between Ukraine and China in the Crimean region, although Ukraine hopes China to continue cooperation with Ukraine not Russia, and join international effort to sanction Russia, Ukraine also knows that China is not going to do so.

The defense cooperation that Oleksandr referred to was that, as Russia annexed Crimea, where Feodosia Shiyard makes the Zubr hovercrafts, the Zubr delivery was suspended. In December 2014, China desperately wanted to get the Zubr deal done therefore China has been negotiating with Russia (upon Russian’s request) to pay the rest of the payment to the shipyard in Crimea, US$14 billion, not to Ukraine but to Russia. It is apparently unacceptable to Ukraine, and China may have to make a clear stance and pick a side between Ukraine and Russia for taking this action.42 According to the most recent update on the deal, Chinese media reported that China finished imports of Zubr from Crimea, without mentioning both Ukraine and Russia. How China reacts to the Crimean Crisis might be able to tilt the balance between the EU, Ukraine and Russia.

5. The Dynamics of Crimean Crisis and Military Rebalance in Asia

Given then continuing confrontational relations between the EU and Russia, Ukraine and Russia, how would the dynamics in Asia change in favor of China? The classic analog of strategic triangles shall be applied for explanation:
Three different systemic patterns of exchange relationships are conceivable: the “ménage a trois,” consisting of symmetrical amities among all three players; the “romantic triangle,” consisting of amity between one “pivot” player and two “wing” players, but enmity between each of the latter; and the “stable marriage,” consisting of amity between two of the players and enmity between each and the third.

(Dittmer, 1981: 489)\(^{43}\)

Noticeably this analog is not applicable for the situation before the Crimean Crisis. The analog was used to analyze the triangle during the Cold War, when amity and enmity were relatively stable with the USSR-US confrontational structure. Before the Crimean Crisis, in other words in the post-Cold War era, the relationship among the EU, China, Russia and Ukraine – or between most states – are dynamic and fluctuant. But as the Crimean Crisis broke out, relationships of amity and enmity emerged and got clear, therefore the analog can be applied.

Using the analog, it is argued that with the intervention of China in the Crimean Crisis as a pivot, the strategic triangles in the Crisis shift, and cause the military balance between China and Japan to rebalance.

The Crimean Crisis caused the enmity between Ukraine and Russia, and between the EU and Russia, where China can play a pivot as in romantic triangle.

One triangle is the Ukraine-China-Russia triangle. Right before the Crisis, China had a purely bilateral relationship with Ukraine: given the loan-for-grain agreement, the defence cooperation, or the nuclear umbrella. The relationship with Russia was similar: the Russian supply of defence products was stable but at an outdated level; the economic and energy cooperation were stagnant.\(^{44}\) The reason why is that
Ukrainian foreign policy could shift between amity and enmity towards Russia and the EU; China has been an important source of growth for Ukraine but Ukraine had many options. Russia also had stable economic ties with Ukraine and the EU; therefore it had no rush for arms sales to China for money. Looking at the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU, Ukraine kept shifting from the EU pressure and the Russian pressure, and the EU and Russia kept trying to draw Ukraine to their sides; it was a triangle among which China had no role to play with.

After the Crimean Crisis, the new Ukrainian government soon reassured China for its past pacts to ensure future incomes; Ukraine fought with Russia for the future payment of the Zubr. Russia signed huge pacts with China, including more than 30 cooperation projects in defence industry and energy sector, some of which marked the first large purchases from China in a decade. Mostly significantly, China got US$400 billion gas deal from Russia, replaced Germany to be the biggest energy partner for Russia.

As to the EU-China-Russia triangle, it is also changing. The EU and Russia never wished for an overall confrontation; however as the sanctions goes on, both parties are seeking additional help. The EU went for the NATO expansion, which just announced the biggest reinforcement since the Cold War. There will be six new small units in Eastern Europe; the rapid reaction force will be doubled. As to Russia, it will conduct the arms sales of cutting-edge technologies and equipment, which include building submarines in China. It bears great resemblance to 2005, when the EU was trying to lift its arms embargo on China and encroach upon Russia’s market share of Chinese defence market, Russia also responded with giving China the coproduction rights of advanced conventional submarines. The Crimean Crisis may trigger the Russian arms sales to China for economic help, and it will also

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trigger the EU arms cooperation with China, to replace Russian suppliers in order to strangle the Russian economy.

As a result, the Crimean Crisis has already helped China to gain huge energy deal and cutting-edge defence products from Russia and Ukraine. To counter the Chinese influence, the EU may have to offer a stronger tie with China, which may also result in arms deals. The Crimean Crisis provided China with great opportunity for playing a pivot in many strategic triangles.

Notes

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17. “Charles Millon, varnarmálaráðherra Frakklands, sem er í Kína til viðræða við kínversk yfirvöld, sagðist í gær vona að banni sem Evrópusambandið (ESB) hefur sett á vopnasölu til Kínverja verði aflétt.” [Charles Millon, the French Defence Minister, who is in China for talks with Chinese authorities, said yesterday that he hoped the European Union (EU) arms
embargo on China would be lifted.] – Óvist um áhrif á samskipti Kínverja við aðrar þjóðir [Uncertainty lies in the impact on relations between China and other nations], Erlendar fretter, 9th April 1997, mbl.is, http://mbl.is/greinasafn/grein/324630/, accessed 8th February 2015 / “Si la cause disparaît, je ne vois pas pourquoi l'embargo serait maintenu.” [As far as I see, I do not see why we still have the embargo.] – Millon, marchand de canons en Chine. La France proposera à l'UE de reprendre les ventes d'armes à Pekin [Millon as the arms merchant in China. France will propose to the EU to resume arms sales to Beijing], Amalric Jaques, 14th April 1997, liberation.fr, http://www.liberation.fr/monde/0101211981-millon-marchand-de-canhons-en-chine-la-france-proposera-a-l-ue-de-reprendre-les-ventes-d-armes-a-pekin, accessed 8th February 2015.  
21. Ibid.  


33. Ibid.

41. 30th July 2015.

47. NATO strengthens forces in eastern Europe against Russia risk. http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/02/05/uk-ukraine-crisis-nato-idUKKBN0L82KG20150205, accessed 9th February 2015.


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Political Governance, Identity and Nationalism: China, Taiwan and the East Asian Experiences
Nationalism, Nationalistic Demos and Democracy: East Asian Experiences

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Abstract
This research is an attempt to offer a new theoretical framework to understand the political dynamics of East Asian nationalism(s), a topic overlooked by both historians and political scientists. The political dynamics of nationalism shown in the two historical case studies investigated here, the bottom-up ultra-right-wing nationalism in 1930s Japan and the anti-state left-wing/anti-imperial nationalism in 1980s Korea, poses a strong anti-thesis against our commonsensical understanding of nationalism. From the Eurocentric perspectives, the nationalist projects of nation-making always create a homogeneous – either real or fictive – population that is willing to fight and die for the state. The historical case studies shown in this study, however, refute the monolithic interpretation of nationalism in the modern history. Assuming that the nation-making projects in Japan and Korea were very successful, the histories of 1930s Japan and 1980s Korea show a hidden face of nationalism – the more nationalized, the more rebellious – as the nationalized subjects claimed ownership of the state. The experiences of
nationalistic fever in Japan and Korea provide a prism to analyze contemporary Chinese neo-nationalism, which has become one of the most important research subjects in China. The experiences of Japan and Korea suggest that the only outcome we can predict from the surge of nationalism is the vitiated and weakened state capability to control the ideological realm of the society. Therefore, we can expect that the surge of nationalistic sentiments from the bottom up in Chinese societies pose a threat to the domestic stability managed by the Chinese Communist Party.

**Keywords:** Chinese nationalism, Japanese nationalism, Korean nationalism, democracy, popular nationalism

**JEL classification:** D72, D74, F52, Z18

1. Introduction

The rise of nationalism in the Chinese intellectual and public space has been one of the most heated issues for concerned East Asia scholars. Starting from the sensational boom of “Say No” publications in 1996 to the series of massive anti-American demonstrations in major Chinese cities following the 1999 bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, the 2002 collision of a US Navy EP-3 Spy plane with a Chinese fighter and the boost of nationalistic images through the Beijing Olympic Games in 2008, nationalistic fever in China is neither temporary public sentiment nor the result of outright government manipulation. China scholars agree that the 2005 Shanghai protest regarding the revisionist Japanese history textbook controversy has proven that social spaces for voluntary nationalism/patriotism are emerging through popular culture and the Internet, and the Beijing authority appears to be threatened by the uncontrollable nature of popular nationalism (Zhao, 2005; Gries,
2005; Liu, 2006; Ho, 2006; Yang and Zheng, 2012; Tang and Darr, 2012; Sinkkonen, 2013). This unending march of nationalistic fever in China has made both scholars and journalists across the globe dismayed and frustrated in their attempt to explain the political dynamics of these nationalistic discourses and events. This study provides a comparative historical perspective on the relationship between nationalism, nationalistic *demos*, and democracy in 20th century East Asia in order to contextualize the emergence of nationalism in Chinese society within a broader historical and regional perspective in the region.

2. The Problem Set: Entangled Nationalism and Democracy

The phenomena of contemporary Chinese nationalism have been discussed by a sizable number of Western and overseas Chinese scholars. Since the simple but powerful explanation of “the government manipulation hypothesis” first raised by Chris Christensen in 1996, which attributes the rise of Chinese nationalism to the Chinese Communist Party’s attempt to replace communist ideology with nationalism (Christensen, 1996; Metzger and Myers, 1998; Zhao, 1997, 1998), a majority of academic and journalistic accounts of Chinese nationalism predominantly regarded it as state discourses rather than popular discourses.¹ A persistent stereotypic image of Chinese polity – a fundamental dichotomy between the democratic/pro-Western populace and the despotic Chinese Party/state, or more succinctly “Big Bad China and the Good Chinese” (Wasserstrom, 2000) – has not been seriously challenged by this new tide of nationalism.

The Western inclination toward an image of the omnipotent Chinese Communist Party is, ironically, best criticized by Kang Liu, one of the authors of *Behind the Scene of Demonizing China*.² He contends that “it becomes clear that tales of China’s political repression and terror have
more to do with the political, ideological, and commercial objectives of
the Western media than with what is really happening in China today”3,
and calls for in-depth analyses of the tension between the mass
consumption of MTV, karaoke concerts, TV soap dramas and Kungfu
fictions versus the state’s desire for ideological control of society in
China (Liu, 1997). As he properly emphasizes, the realm of cultural
consumption in China has become a battleground where different forces
in Chinese society collide with each other. Hence, we have to be more
attentive to the newly conspicuous situation in China, that is, non-state
actors are aggressively participating in the production of political
discourses that used to be monopolized by the party-state (Kong, 2014).

Extrapolating from Kang Liu’s observation, I argue that Chinese
popular nationalistic discourses, especially those in non-state sectors, are
inherently subversive. During the Diaoyutai 釣魚台 (Senkaku 尖閣) dis
pute between Japan and China in 1996, the liberals in Hong Kong
aggressively challenged Beijing for not being nationalistic, or at least not
a good nationalist, with a strong enough anti-Japanese political stance
(Gries, 2004: 123). When Jiang Zemin 江澤民’s 1998 visit to Tokyo
became a fiasco due to his failure to receive a written or official apology
regarding the past Japanese aggression against China, a well-known
Chinese dissident Qin Yongmin 秦永敏 accused Jiang for rashly
accepting “the irrational demands of the Japanese, who agreed to offer
apologies to the Koreans but not to the Chinese” and considered his visit
to be “a national humiliation” (Hong Kong AFP, 26 November 1998;
FBIS CHI 98 330). As I have explored in another place (Seo, 2005a), the
dissident narratives in China since the 1989 Tiananmen Democratic
Movement have been rooted more in nationalism, developmentalism and
modernization than on the notion of democracy and popular sovereignty.

The nationalistic discourses should be regarded as subversive
precisely because the popular belief in the Chinese nation is genuine.
Many assume that the popularization of nationalism in Chinese society proves the Chinese Communist Party’s hegemonic status in the realm of ideology production and its effectiveness in the field of ideology. Nevertheless, even if the Chinese citizens truly believe in the nationalistic rhetoric of the government, ironically, they are not necessarily docile and subservient. As Slavoj Zizek argues, “the greatest catastrophe for the regime would have been for its own ideology to be taken seriously, and realized by its subjects” (Zizek, 2001: 92). Therefore, the success of the Chinese nationalism project comes from its ability to re-direct the political loyalty of the populace from clans, locality, class, ideology, and state/party toward the reified Chinese nation through which the Chinese party-state is able to derive political and historical legitimacy (Seo, 2005b). At this moment, the issue of popular sovereignty, which is the core of any idea of democracy, arises. If the Chinese Communist Party is representing the Chinese nation, who are the members of the nation and what rights are these members supposed to claim?

For Western scholarship and popular mind-sets, the symbolic relationship between democracy and nationalism is negative and dismal due to the turbulent history of the Holocaust and subsequent collective attempts of ethnic cleansing by national collectivities. Nationalism has been seen as a vicious ideology which is “an upwardly mobile, power-hungry and potentially dominating form of language game which pretends to be universal”, “attempting to stifle the plurality of non-national and sub-national language games within the established civil society and state in which it thrives”, and “arrogant, confidently portraying the Other as inferior rubbish, as a worthless zero” that “becomes ‘a continuation of totalitarianism by other means’” (Keane, 1998: 94-97), in conjunction with the increasingly popular post-modernist and constructivist perspectives of nationalism that see nation
as “invented” or “imagined”, and the images of nationalism in the contemporary Euro-American world as fixed, fake and dangerous.

A few scholars, however, have tried to defend nationalism by promoting liberal or civic nationalism, while suggesting that the “emphasis on the importance of particular circumstances for the construction of personal identity does not contradict the universalist view of human nature” (Tamir, 1993: 7). Hence, unlike fanatic and zealous nationalism prone to be totalizing and violent, civil nationalism embraces discriminated minorities and indigenous peoples. Furthermore, the supporters of multiculturalism, such as Charles Taylor and Will Kymlicka, support the increased autonomy of national groups in a society since they believe that nationality is an indispensable aspect of people’s identity and self-esteem. Nevertheless, civic nationalism might be a mere fantasy considering that virtually no state can write multiple histories or celebrate genuinely diverse holidays and festivals that are inherently cultural and religious. As Ernest Renan suggested more than a century ago, all nation-state projects of history writings and cultural activities involve the production of “willfully selective memories” and the forceful “forgetting”, through which the state ensures the unlimited political loyalty from its subjects (Renan, 1996). Simply speaking, “there is no such thing as a culturally neutral state” (Spinner-Haley and Theiss-Morse, 2003: 524). Hence, as long as national identity is endorsed as a legitimate political grouping in a given society, the national/ethnic conflicts or the public desire to discriminate or exterminate subaltern and minority groups are unavoidable, since any winning or dominating national and ethnic group would monopolize the state’s discursive functions.

Thus, it is relatively easy to conclude that nationalism, regardless of its variant and type, is inherently anti-liberal and, subsequently, against liberal democracy. Nevertheless, nationalism’s antagonism against
liberalism does not necessarily mean that it is anti-democratic. As Fareed Zakaria accurately noticed, the illiberal form of democracy is becoming a fashionable mode of democracy in the twenty-first century within and outside America (Zakaria, 2003). Michael Mann further argues that “murderous ethnic cleansing is a hazard of the age of democracy since amid multi-ethnicity the ideal of rule by the people began to entwine the *demos* with the dominant ethnos, generating organic conception of the nation and the state that encouraged the cleansing of minorities” (Mann, 2005: 3). It is noticeable that these two authors fundamentally challenge the commonsensical myth of the binary image of nationalism and democracy in the twentieth century but return to the original relationship between the *demos* and the nation in the early nineteenth century. At the dawn of Western democracy, the core element of the democratic ideal was the principle of popular sovereignty from which the government would derive political legitimacy, as did the French Republic after the Revolution. The problem was, however, how to discern “the players and the playing field” since “the criteria for deciding just who is a citizen and just where the borders are cannot be derived from any logic intrinsic to the democratic enterprise” (Nodia, 1994: 6). In that sense, successful democracy can emerge only where the problem of community is solved, mainly by effectively creating a nation – an alternative name for “We the People” (Hahm and Kim, 2015) – through nationalism. The newly formed nationalism might be anti-liberal by suppressing minorities residing in the new imagined communities; nevertheless, it definitely is democratic in the sense that it resists either pre-modern autocracies or modern bureaucratic state apparatus by asserting the notion of popular sovereignty.

The purpose of this study is to provide an analytical framework to understand contemporary Chinese popular nationalism by introducing two cases of popular nationalism in East Asia: 1930s Japan and 1980s
Korea. In both cases, popular nationalism was aroused after decades-long state nationalization projects. While popular nationalism produced radically different political outcomes in 1930s Japan (fascist state) and 1980s Korea (democratization), both cases show that bottom-up nationalism challenged and vitiated the nationalizers, that is to say, the state. It is commonsensical that the rise of Japanese militarism during the pre-war era destroyed the 1920s’ Taishō democracy (大正デモクラシー). As I argue in this paper, it was not necessarily the top-down oppression of the militarists that ended the Taishō democracy. Rather, the bottom-up nationalistic fever, that encouraged the Japanese Army and the fascist leaders, was responsible for the collapse of the Taishō democracy which contained much of liberal elements. The inability of the Japanese bureaucratic state to control the uproar of popular nationalism led the Army and fascist leaders to overthrow the semi-liberal democratic institution in the name of Japanese nation. In other words, the democratic nature of Japanese popular nationalism destroyed the semi-liberal democratic institution precisely because it was seen as “undemocratic”. The Korean experience in the 1980s shows a different story. The highly bureaucratized un-democratic state was seriously vitiated, if not overthrown, by popular nationalism led by students and intellectuals.

As I discuss further, during the democratic movement in 1987, the discourses of nationalism were predominant over the discourses of democracy. Korean society did not evolve into a deeper nationalistic entity, not necessarily because Korean nationalism was benign or peaceful but because the Korean state was not entirely taken over by democratizing forces. These two historical cases of the rise of popular nationalism – followed by those two states’ enormous efforts to nationalize their subjects – evolved into two radically different outcomes; one is the emergence of an ultra-right-wing fascist regime and

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the other a new democracy. Both, however, resulted in the same outcome – a weakened or vitiated state apparatus.

3. The Rise of the Fascist State in 1930s Japan

The semi-liberal Taishō democracy of Japan ended with the Manchurian Incident of 1931, followed by the Kwantung Army (Kantōgun 関東軍)’s complete control of Northeast China, and a series of assassinations of high-ranking Japanese political leaders including two prime ministers between 1930 and 1932. The formal parliamentary political system was taken over by militarists and ultra-right-wing leaders that created a fascist regime centered on the re-invigorated Emperor system. Japanese political history between 1931 and 1945 is not often discussed in Japan and the West, instead is the simple narrative that a small number of ultra-right-wing leaders dragged the whole nation into a series of wars and indoctrinated fascist ideas to the populace for fifteen years. The post-war research on this period has shared a tacit consensus that an overwhelming majority of Japanese intellectuals, soldiers, bureaucrats and civilians were willing to but could not resist the rulers who were well equipped with ideological, political and physical apparatus to suppress any dissenting voice (Maruyama, 1969; Ienaga, 1978).

Recent scholarship on the rise of the ultra-right-wing nationalist regime in 1930s Japan, however, suggests a strikingly different picture. Louise Young, for example, argues that a close look at the reaction of the mass media and publishing industry to the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident of 1931 reveals that images of presses and publishing houses being suppressed by government censors (publicizing with great reluctance the official story of Japan’s military actions in Manchuria) were heavily problematic and misleading. In fact, with little urging from
the government, the news media took the lead in promoting the war with imperial jingoism. Publishing and entertainment industries volunteered to cooperate with army propagandists, helping to mobilize the nation behind the military occupation of Northeast China (Young, 1999: 55-114). This spontaneity of the Japanese mass media is supported by Richard H. Mitchell’s extensive study of the pre-war Japanese censorship system. Though the Taishō democracy was prone to build up a complete surveillance state through a sophisticated censorship system, the Japanese bureaucratic state never accomplished total control of the ideological realm, leaving a large space for indirect and insinuating dissent opinions (Mitchell, 1983). This reality was quite opposite to conventional wisdoms. As Sandra Wilson recently suggested, the Japanese censors in the 1930s “had to spend more time curbing enthusiasm for the Manchurian venture than dissent from it” (Wilson, 2002: 31). The rise of the war fever inside of the Japanese society forced and threatened, rather than provoked by, the Japanese bureaucratic state, which was unprepared for the bottom-up nationalism. Japanese society was, therefore, more eager and passionate about the expansion of the empire than the state. The Japanese state took the lead of the war fanfare only after the outbreak of the costly Sino-Japanese War of 1937 to justify massive war mobilization.

The new studies on the society’s role in the radicalization of Japanese nationalism in the 1930s raises a fundamental question regarding the relationship among state, society, and the reified notion of nation. Existing studies on the emergence of the Japanese fascist regime were obsessed with the role of the state, in spite of the nation-wide and societal consensus of Japanese expansionist imperialism in the 1930s, while ignoring the issue of the nature of the Japanese society produced by the nationalization project beginning in the Meiji era (Meiji-jidai 明治時代). I do not suggest a simplistic political history that Japanese
society was the very source of the Japanese ultra-right-wing nationalism in the 1930s. Such an interpretation can easily fall into the cultural essentialism upheld by many Western Japanologists including Ruth Benedict⁴. Rather, I argue that the Japanese society which was able to promote ultra-nationalism was the product of the long interactions with the Japanese state. In other words, the state and society in Taishō 大正 and early Showa 昭和 Japan have negotiated and shaped each other.

It is rather clear that the Japanese state’s nationalization project since the turn of the century fundamentally changed the Japanese social fabric. The seminal study by K.B. Pyle shows that the transfer of political loyalties from the natural village and hamlet (buraku 部落) to the administrative towns and villages (chō-son 町村) until the end of the Meiji era (1918) enabled the Japanese state, through the localities’ positive identification with the nation-state, to “absorb new groups into the political community and to avoid disruptions that would destroy the social consensus upon which economic development depended” (Pyle, 1998: 16). The centralized political loyalty in Japanese society was further deepened by the government’s deliberate myth-production mechanism. The state orthodoxy centered on the emperor ideologically denied politics as the representations of societal groups or private interests, while reifying the emperor system as the source of public morality and ethics (Gluck, 1985).

What is noticeable in the technology of Japanese nationalism at the turn of the century is that the state orthodoxy of nationalism was rigid enough “to prevent effective opposition by equating dissent with disloyalty”, but, at the same time, vague enough “to adapt its injunctions to different needs, so that sacrifice in war and savings accounts in peace could both be justified in terms of the same national myths” (ibid.: 5). The co-existence of rigidity and vagueness of Japanese nationalism and the emperor system left the Japanese national subject confused regarding
one core question: if they had to be loyal to the nation, what categories of behavior were regarded as loyal, what were not?

The nationalization of the population did not necessarily produce a docile populace. From the beginning of the nationalization project during the mid-Meiji era, Japan witnessed the rise of a variety of anti-state nationalism in spite of the sheer fact that the state was the promoter of nationalism. Even with the exclusion of anti-Western and traditionalist nationalisms, such as the League of the Divine Wind (Shinpūren 神風連) in the 1870s, a number of patriotic and nationalistic societies, that often refuse to recognize the state’s authority as the representative of Japanese nation, emerged during the late nineteenth century (McVeigh, 2004). The best example of nationalistic challenge against the state is the Hibiya 亀戸 Riot of 1905 (Okamoto, 1982).

With the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War by the Portsmouth Treaty, thousands of protesters in Tokyo condemned the government for the failure to gain satisfactory booty including Japan’s complete control of Manchuria. For rioters, the Japanese bureaucratic state was betraying the nation and the emperor with a humiliating treaty. With the omnipresent “Banzai!” (ばんざい/万歳) for the emperor, the army and the navy indicated that the rioters were loyal and patriotic subjects exactly which the Japanese state intended to produce through its nationalization projects. Nevertheless, the rioters’ vehement symbolic and physical attacks on the government buildings and private residents of the high-ranking officials proved that the government already had lost its monopoly on the prerogative to determine what it meant by being a loyal subject. In that sense, the Hibiya Riot was the moment when the populace began to see that the state as a rational, contemporary, calculating and realistic bureaucratic entity was a being subordinate and inferior to the Japanese nation which in turn appeared to be emotional, eternal, romantic and moral.

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I interpret the rise of Japanese ultra-nationalism in the 1930s as an expanded and completed version of the Hibiya Riot of 1905. The socio-economic crisis of the late 1920s greatly helped the deep penetration of the Japan-centric, fundamentalist nationalist and right-wing groups into the low- and middle-class Japanese populace, from which most of the soldiers were recruited. Similar to the success of the Nazi organizations, a number of right-wing organizations, such as the Great Japan National Essence Association (Dai Nippon Kokusui-Kai 大日本國粹會), became popularized among youths (quickly obtaining hundreds of thousands of members) by promoting anti-democratic and anti-party politician slogans (McVeigh, 2004: 48). For them, the bureaucracy and party politics were seen as an unhealthy expression of “private” interests against the national interest. Similar to the Hibiya Rioters, the ultra-right-wing activists saw the state or ultimately the political itself as the enemy of the Japanese nation. Ironically, the ideological denial of politics had been actively promoted by the Japanese state itself by putting the monarch at the center of the emerging national myths during the late Meiji era (Gluck, 1985: 72).

Apparently, Japan in the 1930s was not the only place with the fever of “go-fast” imperialism and ultra-right-wing nationalism. The elements of extreme imperialism and nationalism historically existed in many places, including the United States, Britain and France during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century (MacKenzie, 1984; Slotkin, 1992; Schneider, 1982). Even at the age of “the end of history”, we still witness ultra-right-wing discourses throughout the globe and embedded within our daily lives. Hence, the existence of ultra-nationalism and the go-fast imperialism of the 1930s does not explain why Japan transformed itself into a fascist state. That is why the majority of Japanese historians have focused on the role of the state. Nevertheless, as I mentioned earlier, the Japanese state had nationalized its subjects,
but had not ultra-nationalized them. In other words, it aimed to create docile and disciplined national subjects, not radicalized and rebellious “idealists” who regarded the state as subordinate to an abstract Japanese nation and eventually took over the state and transformed it into a fascist state. In short, the emergence of the fascist state in mid-1930s Japan was not the intended consequence of the Meiji leaders’ nationalization program. The ironical relationship between state nationalism and the emergence of the fascist state, therefore, should be explained through the way the state and society interacted.

One possible answer might be the weakness of the counter-discourses to overcome the popularized Japanese nationalism. Tomoko Akami convincingly explains that Japanese society could not develop the concept of “negative liberty” that would have produced individualistic liberal citizens (Akami, 2005). The novelty of Akami’s interpretation lies in her emphasis on the two competing notions of liberty, “positive” and “negative”. As Berlin proclaimed long ago, the negative, not the positive, liberty is the core concept of liberalism that can fight against the state’s totalizing ideological and political projects (Berlin, 1969). The positive liberty for the full realization of the selfhood, unlike the negative liberty that means freedom from oppression, has a tendency to identify individuals with a collectivity. Hence, Akami contends that the internal logic of liberalism that prevailed in the age of mass democracy and empire, especially during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, was the source of the failure of the Taishō democracy. Though her study interestingly tries to explain why there was so little opposition against the emergence of a fascist state among the Japanese intellectuals, it instantly raises another question: why did fascist regimes become successfully established in very few countries, but not in every country with imperfect liberalism and imperialism?5

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While accepting Akami’s observation on the weakness of Japanese liberalism as a counter-discourse to fascism, my study tentatively argues that the emergence of the Japanese fascist state can be explained within the dynamics of nationalism, market-based mass culture, and imperfect authoritarianism during early twentieth-century Japan. As I mentioned earlier, the deep-nationalization of the Japanese society by the state reshaped the nature of the populace as early as 1905 – as the Hibiya Riot ironically proves it. The popular belief in the legitimacy of nation and the emperor system was sincere and genuine enough to challenge the bureaucratic state for betraying the glory of nation and the emperor. Studies of the Meiji and Taishō censorship, on the other hand, show that the Japanese state was not able to fully control the ideological sphere of the society. As much as the state failed to eliminate dissenting voices against the Japanese imperial expansion, it was also unable to control the popular imperial-jingoism and ultra-nationalism that emerged outside of the state’s ideological apparatus. In the process of the ultra-right ideologues’ take-over of the semi-authoritarian state, another factor – popular mass culture – was also deeply involved. This second factor is explored in detail below.

Japanese commercial media, especially newspapers, rapidly grew since the 1889 promulgation of the Meiji Constitution and virtually exploded through two wars, the Sino-Japanese War in 1894-5 and the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-5 (Huffman, 1997: 563). Newspapers actively exploited both anti-government and pro- imperialism sentiments at the same time to increase their circulations. Beyond being sensational reporters, newspapers often sponsored large social and political events to cultivate subscribers among the new urban middle-class. The Hibiya Rally, eventually developing into a massive riot, was also sponsored by a newspaper, which did not have clear anti-government agendum at the moment of preparation (ibid.: 301). Especially, the victory of the Russo-
Japanese war in 1905 fundamentally changed the public discourses of nationalism through a shifted focus from “national crisis” as a semi-colonial status of Japan in the international society to “national greatness” as a member of global imperialism (Wilson, 2005). Throughout the late Meiji era and the Taishō democracy period, the Japanese cultural industry became fully fledged with a fast-growing literate population produced by a nation-wide compulsory education system. In 1913, Japan already surpassed all Western imperial powers, except Germany, in terms of the number of published book titles – 27,000 new titles per year and 1,500 to 2,000 periodicals (Gluck, 1985: 12). By the late 1920s, commercialism had triumphed in the field of newspaper and publishing industry, while leaving little space for elite, politically dominated press and publishers (Huffman, 1997: 304).

When the Manchurian Incident occurred in 1931, the triangular dynamics of nationalism, commercial mass media and the imperfect censorship created a social war fanaticism. The Peace Preservation Law of 1925, which enabled the Home Ministry to censor and arrest dissenting political opinions, strictly controlled the information regarding what actually happened in Manchuria. Nevertheless, it could not prevent the rise of war fever promoted by the mass media that deliberately used the abundant slanted information to attract more readerships (Tomiko, 1973: 542). The Kwantung Army, which was well aware of the need of domestic popular support, did not, and was not able to, coerce the media to propagate the Army’s cause, but indirectly encouraged the war fever by providing a great deal of information and images on Manchuria when requested (Wilson, 2002: 68). The increased demand for information from Manchuria reinvigorated an almost-saturated Japanese media market in the 1920s. Market competition, in conjunction with the outbreak of war, “stimulated technological innovation in newspaper production as well as the diffusion of new
medium of communications, radio” (Young, 1999: 58). When the dissenting voice was suppressed by censorship, the media elites’ perspectives were delimited by the concept of positive liberty and patriotism, and the populace was fully nationalized; the full-fledged popular cultural industry followed a pre-determined path toward ultra-nationalism and imperial jingoism.

One of the most vivid examples of the role of the media during wartime Japan is the report of the 1937 Nanking 100-man killing contest. Many historians cite this bestial act of two Japanese lieutenants who started a “murder race” of killing 100 Chinese as fast as they could in Nanking as the most convincing evidence of the brutality of Japanese imperialism. Bob Wakabayashi’s meticulous examination of the factuality of the event, however, suggests that the history of a “murder race” was fabricated from the beginning (Wakabayashi, 2000). He instead argues that the history was initially exaggerated by Japanese journalists who were passionate enough to write a fake hero story and, later, uncritically accepted by left-wing liberal journalists as the evidence of the Japanese war guilt. Wakabayashi’s impressive study, I believe, provides a better understanding of the nature of Japanese mass media and society during the wartime than to the nature of the Nanking Massacre, which he originally intended to elucidate. Watabayashi’s study ironically shows how much the Japanese media was devoted to producing “propaganda-cum-entertainment” articles that could please the Japanese readers. In other words, the commodity-value of the “murder race” during the wartime exposed the very nature of Japanese journalism and, to some extent, Japanese media-consumption in general. If the Nanking 100-man killing contest did not happen, but was instead fabricated by journalists, it reveals that Japanese mass media and society were more aggressive and chauvinistic — to the level where a murder race is an entertainment and news commodity - than the army and the
state that might not commit the act. The murder-race report case shows the triangular dynamics among the mass cultural industry, the populace and the state (army). When the army induced the war-propaganda media into the battlefield, the mass media and the populace out-performed the army itself, imperfect censorship, the nationalized populace as well as media intellectuals and the harsh market competition in the Japanese cultural market can be attributed to this success.

4. Postcolonial Korean Nationalism and the Democratization

If the Japanese Showa state was overcome by, or dominated by, radical right-wing nationalism driven by the commercial fever of “go-fast” imperialism, the Korean state in 1987 was forced to compromise with the powerful left-wing nationalism, especially among college students. The emphasis on nationalistic discourses by student activists might surprise many English-speaking scholars, since a majority of the studies on Korean democratization in the 1980s focus on “civil society” (Kim Sunhyuk, 2000; Kim, 2003; Armstrong, 2002) or “labor movement” (Koo, 2001) to describe the nature of the movement and few have been attentive to the fundamentalistic nationalism embedded within the young Korean generation at that time. This paper reveals the nationalistic foundation of the Korean democracy movement first by analyzing the language of democracy movements from 1960s and 1980s and by interpreting the historiography of the Korean democracy movement established during and after the 1987 democratization⁶.

Unlike the English literature or academic analyses of the Korean student movements, the 1980s student activists refer to their own and precedent student movements as the “minjok, minju” (national, democratic) movement, instead of democratic movement. The attachment of the term “minjok” 민족/民族 (national) basically stems
from the understanding of the April 19th, 1960 Democratic Revolution, which resulted in the collapse of the authoritarian First Republic (1948-1960). The April 19th Movement was initially called as “minju” 민주 (democratic) movement until the 1980s. Indeed, the slogans and pamphlets during March and April of 1960 were solely focused on the denunciation of sham elections and government corruption.

The intentions of the student activists were neither coherent nor consistent. Stemming from spontaneous anger provoked by the revelation of a high school student’s brutal death in the hands of the police, the sole purpose of the movement was straightening out the result of the March 15th presidential election that allowed another term for Syngman Rhee (Yi Seungman 이승만/李承晚). Student activists quickly returned to their campuses as soon as the dictatorial president announced resignation followed by the call by mainstream politicians and the media for the students to demobilize themselves (Kim, 1988: 37). Mobilized students in general stayed on campus until the summer of 1960, while focusing on the issues of “campus democratization”, “national enlightenment movement” and “new life movement”.

Though there has been a consensus on the historical meaning of the April 19th Democratic Movement as an anti-dictatorial movement, the attachment of the term “minjok” 민족 in the naming of the movement reveals a sharp bifurcation in the April 19th historiography. State discourses until the 1980s explain that student activists became irresponsible and created grave chaos by starting a “romantic” and “utopian” unification movement and inducing hundreds of public protests over various socio-economic issues. The military coup of May 1961 was justified as a legitimate reaction to the social chaos occurring in the spring of 1961. Though Park Chung-hee 박정희/朴正熙 and his subordinates, the core of the military coup, denounced the “chaos” caused by the student protesters, they actively praised the April 19th Democratic Movement
for toppling corrupt politicians from power and claimed that the military coup was the inheritor of the April 19th Movement.

The official image of the April 19th movement, however, was challenged by students and young scholars in the 1980s. Instead of delimitating the scope of the movement into protests against the sham election, the new historiography began to focus on the so-called “chaotic period” in early 1961. The student activists who focused on the on-campus issues began to stage a few street protests as the February 8th Korea-U.S. Economic Agreement passed the parliament. Many students and progressive political forces saw the Agreement as giving up Korean economic sovereignty. Between February and April 1961, student activists began to re-activate the discourses of anti-colonial nationalism, such as: “Now is the era of national liberation and the complete abolishment of colonialism” and “right now, the only way to make a historic, progressive reform on this land is to unite anti-feudal, anti-foreign oppression and anti-comprador capital forces and to make a national revolution” (Seo, 1997: 27). Furthermore, student activists started a fresh unification movement, which consisted of a public suggestion for a “South-North Student Conference” (nambuk haksaeng hoedam) and “preparation committee for the national student association for national unification” (minjok tongil jeonguk haksaeng yeonmaeng gyeolseong junbi wiwonhoe) (ibid.).

While these “radical unification movements” were labeled as “chaotic” behaviors of overly romantic students by authoritarian state discourses in 1970s and 1980s, a new historiography emerged in the 1980s in accordance with the rise of “anti-state” nationalistic discourses7. According to the new historiography, April 19th was not a civil-democratic revolution that overthrew an autocratic regime, but “an incomplete people’s revolution for democracy and genuine national liberation and a proxy revolution executed not by people but by
students” (Pak, 1983). Since the new historiography began to perceive that the national contradiction (*minjok mosun* 민족모순/民族矛盾), the divided nation, is the ultimate source of the people’s suffering, it was natural that the people’s resistance against an autocrat (Syngman Rhee) was followed by a people’s movement for unification. In that sense, the unification movement in early 1961 was newly seen as an integral part or a second phase of the April 19th movement (Kim, 1991). For the 1980s intellectuals, the April 19th Revolution was, therefore, re-defined as part of the nationalistic resistances against the neo-colonial/neo-imperialistic world order.\(^8\)

I argue that the re-definition of the April 19th revolution has little to do with the new research or findings in history per se. Rather, it was triggered by the new historiography of modern Korean history, which saw post-liberated Korea as a semi-colonial/semi-feudal society managed by American imperialism that rapidly dominated the Korean college campuses. Many Korea scholars notice the Kwangju 광주/光州 Massacre of May 1980 to be the watershed for the new understanding of Korean modern history. Since the Korean Army was under the authority of the chief of the ROK-US Combined Forces Command, an American general, the massacre committed by the Korean Army in May 1980 was a trigger for a new image of America, an imperial and colonial power that supports a brutal military regime. Since the Kwangju Massacre, dissident social groups, especially student activists, began to promote a new strain of nationalism which is deeply rooted in a new historical consciousness that understand the status of the Republic of Korea (ROK) as a semi-colony of the American imperialism (Kim, Dong-Chun, 2000: 352)\(^9\). Unsurprisingly, the Kwangju Massacre was followed by a series of attacks on American icons in Korea: arson of the American Cultural Center in Busan 부산/釜山 (1982), the incineration of a Star-Spangled Banner (1982), and a sit-in protest in the American Cultural Center in

For 1980s Korean student activists, the United States became a sworn enemy responsible for the division of the nation, the longevity of dictatorship and military rule, and countless massacres from the notorious Cheju 제주 Massacre (1949) to the Kwangju Massacre (1980). Until the late 1980s, the majority of college campuses in Korea were dominated by a radical nationalist group, the “National Liberation” faction (NL), and the emergence of the NL-controlled nation-wide organization of student activists, Jeondaehyeop (the National Council of College Representatives). Though it is undeniable that the Kwangju Massacre was the historical momentum for the emergence of a new strain of Korean nationalism, which anchored on a strong anti-Americanism, I suggest that the rise of a new historiography preceded the massacre, and the new historical consciousness was created by deeper dynamics of the politics of nationalism.

Most of 386ers agree that the most important reading during their college life was Haebang jonhusa ui insik [Understanding History before and after the Liberation] (UHL), published just before the Kwangju Massacre, February 1980. The book may not be as revolutionary as many contemporary Korean conservatives argue. The contributors of the book include a few established scholars in major universities as well as a few dissident thinkers. They are nationalistic in terms of their concerns and themes but neither left-wing nor pro-North Korea. The enormous power of this book in the 1980s ideological spectrum, therefore, was not out of the revolutionary appeals of the writings themselves. Rather, its long-term impacts stemmed from the shifted focus in the readings of Korean modern history. The orthodox historiography that permeated into the official education system had little interest in the event of liberation in 1945 itself. The history between the March 1st Movement (1919) and the establishment of the
Republic of Korea, South Korea, (1948) was largely ignored or partially/sparsely dealt with by the government-sponsored writers.

While the primary purpose of history education was the promotion of the Korean state and nation as the ultimate target of political loyalty and the creation of the anti-communist population, the orthodox historiography had little or no capacity to deal with the complexity of the colonial and liberation histories that are filled up with the dense interconnection between left and right, deep ambiguity regarding the question of collaborators, and the harsh nature of the Realpolitik surrounding the process of the division in 1945. Public history education primarily treated the history around 1945 with uncomfortable silence and a rather unconvincing heroic story of how the right-wing defended against the left-wing in domestic and international struggles, while leaving the question of who struggled against Japanese imperialism and the national division.

The book UHL fundamentally challenged the official historiography simply by shifting the focus to the shadowy era of modern Korean history and revealed stunning stories of tragedy, such as: the existence of the autonomous government which was suppressed by the American occupying force; the purge of countless numbers of left-wing and middle-course “nationalists”; the elimination of the early efforts to punish “pro-Japanese collaborators” by the Syngman Rhee regime; and, most importantly, the presence of the socialist and communist struggles against Japanese imperialism.

Young Korean intellectuals, deeply and profoundly influenced by this new historiography, founded a new research area, nick-named “the study of the three years’ history after the liberation” (Haebang samnyonsa), while publishing and translating a number of books focused on the formerly silenced issues, such as the independent struggles in North China and Manchuria – including that of Kim Il-Sung – and the
cooperation between the left-wing and right-wing activists (Kim, 1982; Choi, 1985; Scalapino and Lee, 1986; Cumings, 1986; Kim and Kim, 1986; Lee, 1989; Suh, 1989). In short, the new historiography established a new political and historical subject: a nation that overcomes the ideological division of left and right. In that sense, the division was now seen as the ultimate source of pain and suffering for the nation\textsuperscript{14} while making the developmental discourses of “GNP”, “Industrialization” and “Modernization” as secondary keywords in writing history.

Since the censoring authorities initially rejected the manuscript of UHL in the summer of 1979, the book was actually written during the darkest period of Korean democracy, the Yushin /維新 regime (1972-1979). What is ironical is the fact that the Yushin period was the climax of the state-led Korean nationalism, represented by Saemaul (New Community) Movement, Bansanghoe (Neighborhood Association) and the fetishism of “Gross National Product” and “Export”.\textsuperscript{15} While the whole population was mobilized under “go-fast” developmental state projects, the state also enforced massive patriotic education projects, such as recitation of the “National Charter of Education”\textsuperscript{16} and the “Pledge to the National Flag”\textsuperscript{17}, as well as the implementation of “National Ethics” to all levels of education. The series of educational and social policies implemented in the 1970s were, in short, the condensed process of “national subject making”, while its methods and contents were similar to the Japanese nation-making projects from the late Meiji to the early Showa era (1890s – 1930s).

Thus, we can safely argue that a new nationalistic historiography represented by the publication of UHL was born amid the fervent state projects of nation-making and the nationalization of the grassroots. In other words, while the state tried to nationalize the society, the society was able to produce its own version of nationalism. The college students
in the 1980s who endlessly recited the rhetoric of statism and nationalism, such as the “National Charter of Education” and the “Pledge to the National Flag”, were easily convinced in the 1970s by the new nationalistic historiography that focuses on the suffering of the nation by division and so-called “neo-colonialism”. Hence, the Kwangju Massacre as a trigger for the popularization of anti-imperial/anti-colonial discourses is only one aspect; the emergence of a nationalistic young population is another. The former could construct a discourse of “victimized nation” in an efficient and powerful manner due to the conditions set by the later.

5. Conclusion

The political dynamics of nationalism shown in the two historical cases investigated here, the bottom-up ultra-right-wing nationalism in 1930s Japan and the anti-state left-wing/anti-imperial nationalism in 1980s Korea, pose a strong antithesis against our commonsensical understanding of nationalism. From the Eurocentric perspectives, the nationalist projects of nation-making always create a homogeneous – either real or fictive – population inspired by a strong sense of belonging to the national community (Anderson, 1991; Hobsbawm, 1990). The most important invention of the modern state might be the creation of national subjects who are willing to fight and die for the state that manipulates the symbolism of the nation. The historical case studies shown in this study, however, refute the monolithic interpretation of nationalism in the modern history. Like their Western counterparts, both the Japanese and Korean states were eager to produce a homogeneous and loyal population through massive state projects of nation-making. In some sense, the projects in these countries were much more successful than any other part of the world since these countries are still called, and
understood as, exceptionally homogeneous nation-states. Assuming the nation-making projects in Japan and Korea were very successful, the histories of 1930s Japan and 1980s Korea show a hidden face of nationalism – the more nationalized, the more rebellious – as the nationalized subjects claimed ownership of the state.

The experiences of nationalistic fever in Japan and Korea provide a prism to analyze contemporary Chinese neo-nationalism, which has become one of the most important research subjects in China scholarship (Zheng, 2008; Callahan, 2006; Gries, 2004; He, 2007; Zhao, 2004). It seems that most academic debates are centered on the effectiveness of Chinese nationalism, such as the expansion of patriotic education and popularization of war memories, given that effective nationalism means irrational, revisionist, populist, and dangerous Chinese domestic/foreign policies and an ineffective one is transient, ephemeral and superficial. I believe this binary image of Chinese nationalism deeply reflects Euro-centric experiences, especially those of Nazism and Fascism.

The primary function of radical nationalism shown in East Asian histories is not the creation of a certain type of regime. Rather, its political significance should be found in its capacity to destroy the status quo in both domestic and international fields. The experiences of Japan and Korea suggest that the only outcome we can predict from the surge of nationalism is the vitiated and weakened state capability to control the ideological realm of the society. Therefore, we can expect that the surge of nationalistic sentiments from the bottom up in the Chinese society poses a threat to the domestic stability managed by the Chinese Communist Party.

China scholars recently noticed that the CCP is well aware of this hidden face of popular nationalism. When Chinese authorities found the 2005 anti-Japanese protests in Shanghai, the largest instantaneous mass rally in Shanghai since the Cultural Revolution, uncontrollable, they
posted hundreds of uniformed and plainclothes police forces surrounding Tiananmen Square (Washington Post, April 16, 2005). With the second nationalistic fever occurring within the Chinese publication market, the first being signified by the massive consumption of “Say No” books in 1996 and 1997, nationalistic writers in China produced another syndrome of nationalistic fever, this time with the keyword of “Unhappy China”. While the nationalistic discourses of the 1990s were based on the deeply rooted sense of the “century of humiliation”, Chinese nationalistic writers in the 2000s are demanding both the Chinese government and international community to recognize China as a great power who has the ability and will to defend the global economy from the recent recession. With this newly gained confidence, the notion of Tianxia 天下 (all under heaven) is becoming popular in public and official discourses in China (Callahan, 2008). When the China-centered universe, Tianxia, is ignored, the Chinese public, according to the writers of “Unhappy China”, will be disgruntled as much as the Japanese public was infuriated by the seemingly humiliating outcome of the 1905 Portsmouth Treaty.

Notes

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2. Zai yaomohua Zhongguo de beihou 在妖魔化中國的背後 [behind the scene of demonizing China] is one of the anti-American bestsellers published in 1996. This book, written by eight Chinese scholars and journalists who mostly studied in America, argues that the American media is deliberately distorting, or demonizing, the image of China.

3. Kang Liu’s argument on Western political and commercial objectives reminds us of the fanfare of the American media on the rise of nationalism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s. From a journalistic point of view, nationalism in these regions was seen as a “sleeping beauty” that had been long-repressed in the primordial national consciousness, as an expression of denied desires liberated by the kiss of freedom. See Suny (1993: 3).


5. A tacit assumption among post-War Japanese history scholarship was affirmation of the suppressed Japanese civil society, which was inherently the same as Anglo-American civil society. As Rumi Sakamoto suggests, the Post-War intellectuals, such as Maruyama Masao 丸山真男, believed that the source of Japanese ultra-nationalism in the 1930s was the failure to accomplish the mission of total-Westernization – leaving Asia and entering Europe – stated by Fukuzawa Yukichi 福澤諭吉. Nevertheless, when the focus was on the failed Westernization, it was silent about the sheer fact that Japan was highly successful in importing the Western mind-set of imperialism and colonialism based on social Darwinism. This is why Ienaga Saburō 家永三郎, who was deeply lamented about the ruthless suppression of the Japanese intellectuals in the 1930s, has no difficulty
subscribing to the colonialist historiography of the Korean peninsula, which believes that the southern part of the peninsula was a Japanese colony by the fifth century A.D. (see Sakamoto, 2001, and Ienaga, 1979: 3-4).

6. For a fuller discussion on this issue, see Seo (1999).

7. The pioneer work that promoted a new historiography was Kang et al. (1983).

8. Ironically, the new historiography better provides an explanation on why the student activists did not actively resist the May 16th military coup of 1961. Recent studies reveal that most Korean students were impressed by the nationalistic slogans of the new military regime, see Yi (1988).

9. For a long-term symbolic consequences of the massacre, see Lewis (2000).

10. For a detailed description of student activist factions in the Korean student movement, see Pyeonjipbu (1988).

11. A term coined by the Korean mass media to denote a reform-oriented and nationalistic generation emerged through the 1980s democratization movement. When the term first emerged in late-1990s Korean society, the student movement generation was in its 30s. Two later numbers, 8 and 6 indicate that they attended college in the 80s and were born in the 60s.

12. The book was published by Hangilsa (Seoul) and sold more than half a million copies in the Korean book market. Five more volumes were published until 1989.

13. In February 2006, the newly emerging right-wing scholars published a two-volume title, Re-interpreting the History before and after the Liberation. The new title claims that the radical left-wing discourses produced by Understanding History before and after the Liberation were dangerously revolutionary and uncritically absorbed by the contemporary Korean youth. (*Dong-A Ilbo* 동아일보/東亞日報, February 9, 2006)

14. A newly popularized term, “bundan cheje” (the system of division), well reveals this consciousness. A term coined by a renowned left-wing
historian, Man-gil Kang, which means that the division resulted in a
distorted political system in both North and South by producing a group of
politico-economic elites whose interests were vested in the situation of
division itself. The first comprehensive discussion on this issue appears in

15. For the ideological aspect of the Saemaul Movement and Bansanhoe, see

16. For the significance of the National Charter of Education in the nation-
making process in Korea, see Hwang (2005).

17. The actual invention and implementation of the Pledge to the National Flag
were recently reported in a Korean left-wing magazine. See “Let’s Abolish
‘the Pledge to the National Flag’”, “The Current Pledge is Totalitarian” and

18. Song Xiaojun 宋曉軍 et al. (2009). Zhongguo bu gaoxing [unhappy
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Identity and Integration as Conflicting Forces
Stimulating the Sunflower Movement and the Kuomintang’s Loss in the 2014 Elections

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Abstract
Over the past twenty years, there have been two important trends in Taiwan’s political economy whose contradictory implications provide an important explanation for the dramatic events of 2014. The logic of each pulls Taiwan in different directions. In this paper, we describe one of the two contending trends of integration and identity. We then discuss the institutional inheritance from the authoritarian era which we believe is a factor that makes policymaking in Taiwan quite difficult. We conclude by analysing how these phenomena interacted to produce the dramatic events of 2014.

Keywords: Taiwan politics, political economy, integration, identity, Sunflower Movement, cross-Strait relations

JEL classification: D72, D74, F51, F52
1. Introduction

Over the past twenty years, there have been two important trends in Taiwan’s political economy whose contradictory implications provide an important explanation for the dramatic events of 2014, the Sunflower Movement and the major losses suffered by the Kuomintang 國民黨 (KMT) in the local elections. The first of these is the growing sense of a Taiwanese identity in the country; and the second is the increasing economic integration across the Taiwan Strait in terms of trade, investment, integrated production processes, and tourism. The logic of each pulls Taiwan in different directions. During the presidency of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)’s Chen Shui-bian 陳水扁 (2000-2008), the ruling party pushed for more Taiwanization, while the administration of his successor, the KMT’s Ma Ying-jeou 馬英九, pushed for deepening economic linkages with China as the best means for promoting economic growth. The Cross-Strait Agreement on Trade in Services that was negotiated by Taiwan and China in 2013 became highly controversial because it raised fears that it would harm Taiwan economically and undermine the nation’s sovereignty. The Sunflower Movement arose in the spring of 2014 when the KMT threatened to ram the Agreement through the Legislative Yuan with little debate; and in November the KMT received a devastating thumping at the hands of the electorate. Our paper will have four parts. The first two will each describe one of the two contending trends of integration and identity. The third will discuss a factor that makes policymaking in Taiwan quite difficult, the institutional inheritance from the authoritarian era. Finally, we will analyse how the phenomena discussed in the first three parts interacted to produce the dramatic events of 2014.
2. Growing Integration across the Taiwan Strait

The past 25 years have been marked by a growing economic integration between Taiwan and China. By the late 1980s, many of Taiwan’s basic labor-intensive industries were coming under intense competitive pressures because the nation’s rising prosperity and wages were pricing it out of the low-cost labor niche in the global economy. Consequently, their owners started moving their production facilities off shore to take advantage of the lower wages that prevailed in countries at lower levels of development. At first, Southeast Asia was the leading target, but by the mid-1990s the People’s Republic of China (PRC) had become the major destination for outward foreign direct investment (FDI) by the Taiwanese business community. Changed conditions in both Taiwan and the PRC combined to funnel much of this investment outflow and the trade that it generated into China. After four decades of almost complete isolation due to the Cold War hostilities between Taipei and Beijing, Taiwan opened the door for cross-Strait interactions when it allowed indirect trade through third countries in 1984 and then considerably enhanced the opportunity for “indirect” trade with and investment in the Chinese mainland over the rest of the decade (Cheng and Chang, 2003; Clark, 2007; Kastner, 2009). For its part, China was just switching its strategy for industrial development as well. In particular, the PRC embarked upon an economic reorientation with a “coastal development strategy” aimed at attracting the light and labor-intensive industries that were being priced out of Hong Kong and Taiwan and at using them to emulate the export-led industrialization of the East Asian capitalist nations, thereby creating a strong complementarity between the Taiwanese and Chinese economies. Geographic proximity and a common culture and language reinforced this complementarity, thereby making China an extremely attractive base for Taiwanese firms (Kastner, 2009; Leng, 1996; Lin, 2001; Naughton, 1993, 1997; Wu, 1995).
Investment in China by Taiwan businesspeople was negligible until the late 1980s but then took off rapidly. Official data almost certainly understate the amount of this investment since many Taiwanese firms sought to evade continuing restrictions. Still, even the cross-Strait investment flows reported to the Taiwan government (e.g., US$43 billion during the 1990s) are impressive. The nature of Taiwan’s foreign investment became more large-scale and sophisticated as well. Taiwan investors moved from joint ventures to solely owned enterprises and began to build and supply their own factories. Growing trade was accompanied (in fact, stimulated) by this fairly massive flow of outward foreign direct investment. This is because Taiwan companies on the mainland imported machinery and more sophisticated components from Taiwan for the production (primarily assembly) of goods being exported to third markets. Thus, this investment produced a huge surge in exports from Taiwan to China which more than tripled from 5% to 17% of Taiwan’s total exports between 1989 and 1994, but then stayed at that level for the rest of the decade.

The structure of these ventures was also upgraded from simple assembly to upstream heavy and more capital-intensive or high-tech production. In particular, by the mid- to late 1990s the mix of Taiwan investment in the PRC began to shift from predominantly small business in labor-intensive exports to much larger businesses seeking to penetrate the Chinese market in heavy industry (e.g., Formosa Plastics) and consumer goods (e.g., President Enterprises). By the end of the decade, thus, Taiwanese businesses were making a major contribution to the upgrading of China’s economy. For example, at the beginning of the 21st century, it was estimated that nearly 75% of China’s information technology exports came from factories owned by Taiwanese (Bolt, 2001; Kastner, 2009; Kuo, 1995; Leng, 1996; Lin, 2001; Naughton, 1997).
The two sides went well beyond simple trade or the exchange of goods and services. Rather, Taiwan’s businesses set up integrated production networks across the Strait in which different stages (e.g., design and the manufacture of advanced components in Taiwan and final assembly in China) were conducted in Taiwan and the PRC (Bolt, 2001; Chu, 1999; Naughton, 1997; Wu, 1995), creating what Gary Gereffi (1998) has called “commodity chains”. Second, the activities of Taiwanese firms led to a substantial migration of business people to China in the 1990s, resulting in growing Taiwanese communities in many mainland cities with, for example, an estimated a half million Taiwanese citizens living in Shanghai alone. This led some observers even to comment upon the growing “Taiwanization” of parts of China (Bolt, 2001; Clough, 1999; Cooke, 2006). Increasing interactions across the Taiwan Strait, moreover, were not just limited to the economic sphere. A very significant number of Taiwanese also rediscovered their “roots” in Fujian Province. For example, Murray Rubinstein (1995) described the fascinating process of cross-Strait “temple politics” in which temples in Taiwan “adopted” older ones in Fujian.

The past two decades, thus, have witnessed a growing economic integration between Taiwan and China. The political relations between the two sides, however, have been anything but calm and stable. Beginning in the 1990s, there have been a series of contretemps across the Taiwan Strait based on China’s claims to sovereignty over Taiwan and Taiwan’s strong rejection of these claims. The tension was especially high during the presidency of the Democratic Progressive Party’s Chen Shui-bian (2000-2008) who strongly advocated Taiwanese nationalism. Following the election of the KMT’s Ma Ying-jeou as president in 2008, tensions eased between Taipei and Beijing; and several major economic deals were signed, most importantly the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement or ECFA (Bush, 2004, 2013; Clark and Tan,
2012; Tucker, 2009; Zhao, 1999). One would have expected, therefore, that the Chen administration would have seen a decline in economic ties between Taiwan and China, while the Ma administration would have produced a substantial revival in cross-Strait economic ties. However, almost the opposite occurred, leading Clark and Tan (2012) to conclude that economic relations between China and Taiwan have been primarily responsive to economic, not political, forces.

Indeed, by the turn of the new century, a new round of increasing economic interactions across the Taiwan Strait commenced, as both trade and investment rose fairly consistently until the disruptions of the Great Recession at the end of the decade. This new spurt of economic interactions between Taiwan and China was driven by several factors sequentially. First, when Taiwan’s economy was growing robustly during 1999 and the first half of 2000, the high-tech component of cross-Strait relations especially benefited (e.g., two-thirds of the new investment projects approved during 2000 involved the electronics industry). One major project in this area, a US$6.4 billion joint venture for Shanghai semi-conductor plants announced in May 2000, was certainly fraught with both symbolic and political significance since it involved the sons of Jiang Zemin 江澤民, then president of the PRC, and Y.C. Wang, head of the huge Formosa Plastics empire in Taiwan, indicating that those with the best reason to know believed that cross-Strait relations would not blow up despite Chen’s victory. Second, once the global recession in high-tech production hit Taiwan in the autumn of 2000, many domestically oriented businesses on the island tried to expand to the Mainland to make up for the deteriorating economic situation in Taiwan (Bolt, 2001; Cooke, 2006). Finally, as Taiwan’s economy picked up again after the 2001 recession, the initial logic of economic expansion reasserted itself (Fuller and Rubinstein, 2013). For example, two thirds of Taiwan’s outward FDI in 2004 went to China
with 45% of it in the electronics industry (Mainland Affairs Council, 2005).

The rapid growth in cross-Strait interactions during Chen Shui-bian’s presidency is quite striking in terms of trade and investment data. Taiwan’s exports to China jumped from US$21,000 million to US$74,000 million in 2007 which increased their share in Taiwan’s total exports from 17% to 30%, making the PRC Taiwan’s largest trade partner. As noted above, the official data on Taiwan’s investment in China almost certainly understate the real figures by a considerable extent. Yet, they should indicate trends; and they jumped almost four-fold between 2000 and 2008 (Mainland Affairs Council, 2011). In contrast, despite the signing of ECFA and other trade and investment agreements during the Ma administration exports have remained at roughly the levels of 2008; and investment, while spiking in 2010-2011, was back at the 2008 amount in 2014 (Mainland Affairs Council, 2015).

Yet, the explosion of economic interactions across the Taiwan Strait brought perils with the profits or “an opportunity full of threats” (Rigger, 2011b: 117). First, the very rapid increase of Taiwanese investment in China (and elsewhere) raised fears that the “hollowing out” of the Republic of China (ROC)’s economy would destroy its past progress and current prosperity, especially during the two recessions at the beginning and end of the first decade the 21st century. Second, the PRC stands out among developing countries that have been the recipients of the off-shore movement of basic industries from the developed world in its ability to upgrade into fairly advanced economic sectors (Naughton, 2007). Consequently, the fact that Taiwanese industry is overwhelmingly moving to China, rather than other countries with low-cost labor, represents a more severe threat to the continued viability of its domestic corporations, as indicated by the rapid movement of increasingly advanced semiconductor production across the Taiwan Strait noted
above. Finally, the growing economic integration between China and Taiwan creates a unique threat and danger to Taipei because of Beijing’s claims of sovereignty over Taiwan (Chow, 2008; Clark, 2007; Tucker, 2005, 2009), making it vulnerable to the PRC’s using its economic dependence for leverage (Yeh and Chi, 2014) as Nazi Germany did in Eastern Europe during the 1930s (Hirschman, 1980).

3. An Increasingly Taiwanese National Identity

Studies of economic integration have found that it often leads to “spillover” into growing political ties and feelings of commonality between the governments and peoples involved (Deutsch, Edinger, Macridis, and Merritt, 1967; Lindberg and Scheingold, 1971). However, this is certainly not the case for Taiwan and China. Since the mid-1990s, there has been a huge increase in the proportion of Taiwan citizen’s who identify themselves as Taiwanese as opposed to Chinese or as both Chinese and Taiwanese (Clark and Tan, 2012; Ho and Liu, 2003; Shen and Wu, 2008). Consequently, identity and integration in Taiwan were moving in opposite directions, implying that a clash between them was highly likely, if not inevitable.

The issue of the national identity of the residents of Taiwan has had a contentious history during the postwar era. The incorporation of Taiwan into the Republic of China at the end of World War II after a half century of Japanese rule was quite inauspicious at first. Despite the fact that the Taiwanese or Islanders, who had come to Taiwan before it became a colony, welcomed Chinese troops as liberators, Chiang Kai-shek 蒋介石 and his Kuomintang (KMT) or Nationalist party viewed the Taiwanese as collaborators of the hated Japanese. In the economic sphere, the KMT used Taiwan as a source for resources in its battle with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the Chinese Civil War. Thus,
they dismantled factories and grabbed raw materials for shipment to the mainland. In addition, the rampant inflation on the mainland was quickly transmitted to Taiwan. These economic problems were exacerbated by the harsh political repression imposed by the island’s military commander Ch’en Yi 陳儀, which sparked a spontaneous uprising on February 28, 1947. A compromise between Ch’en and the Taiwanese leaders seemed to settle the crisis. However, KMT troops from the mainland invaded the island in mid-March, killing over 20,000 Taiwanese with the intelligentsia and leadership class being singled out for slaughter. Although Ch’en was quickly replaced by a more conciliatory leader and later publicly executed, the trauma and hatred remained. When Chiang evacuated to Taiwan in late 1949 after losing the Civil War on the mainland, hence, the top levels of political officials were primarily Mainlanders who came with the KMT and constituted about 15% of the population (Lai, Myers, and Wei, 1991; Phillips, 2003). Later, after the implementation of the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement in the 1960s, the KMT regime denigrated and discriminated against local culture and dialects by, for example, treating the Mandarin dialect as the official language of government and education, leading to ongoing resentments among the Islanders (Appleton, 1976; Cheng, 1994; Lee, 2005; Lynch, 2004; Makeham and Hsiau, 2005; Tu, 1998; Wang, 2005).

Throughout the authoritarian era, the national identity issue was kept out of public discourse through strong repression under martial law. Thus, many feared that Taiwan’s rapid democratic transition in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Chao and Myers, 1998; Chu, 1992; Copper, 1997; Tien, 1996) would unleash a virulent divide over national identity. Actually, through the 1990s the dynamics of democracy had the opposite effect of moderating ethnic tensions. As it turned out, strong association with extremist positions was a loser at the polls. Consequently, Taiwan’s
parties, especially the two major ones, came under significant pressure to take moderate positions on national identity (Hsieh, 2002; Lin, 2001; Rigger, 2001; Wang, 2000), as “electoral” factions were able to somewhat suppress the demands of more “ideological” factions in both major parties (Fell, 2005, 2012).

In contrast, there was a growing polarization of Taiwan’s politics in the early 21st century around the national identity issue, following the dramatic victory of the DPP’s Chen Shui-bian in the 2000 presidential election. Two distinct types of issues were involved in this polarization. The first was an ongoing struggle over the “localization” or bentuhua 本土化 of the country’s politics and especially culture which was consistently pushed by the Chen administration (Gold, 1986; Hsiau, 2005; Jacobs, 2005; Lee, 2005; Wachman, 1994). The second involved increasingly tense cross-Strait relations with the PRC (Bush, 2013; Tucker, 2005, 2009). For its part, the KMT returned to a much more “China-centric” stance after Lee Teng-hui 李登輝 left the party following its defeat in the 2000 presidential election (Wu, 2011). Indeed, both parties seemed to have reached the conclusion that appealing to their ideological bases would produce more votes than seeking the support of the moderate middle.

However, the situation appears to be somewhat more ambiguous and problematic in Taiwan. Especially during the Chen Shui-bian era, both the DPP and KMT focused their appeals about national identity upon their base constituencies much of the time. Yet, these initiatives (even those by the supposed Independence zealot Chen) appeared strategic in the sense that appeals to Chinese and Taiwanese nationalism were turned on and off depending upon the political situation (Clark and Tan, 2012; Wu, 2011). This pattern continued after the KMT’s Ma Ying-jeou was elected President in 2008. Initially, there was a fierce partisan struggle over Ma’s rapprochement with China, but national identity and
cross-Strait relations played only a minor role in the local elections in 2010. National identity was more pronounced in the 2012 presidential and legislative elections, but the parties were clearly less polarized than earlier in the decade, as, for example, the DPP did not make the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, which they had heatedly opposed when it was negotiated and approved in 2010, a major issue in their critique of the Ma administration (Copper, 2011; Fell, 2012; Rigger, 2010, 2012; Tien and Tung, 2011).

Wei-chin Lee (2005) contrasts Chen Shui-bian’s approach to creating a new national identity for Taiwan with that of his predecessor Lee Tung-hui in the 1990s. Lee sought to create a Taiwanese nationalism and nation that could encompass all residents of the country, representing what has been called “civic nationalism” (Shen and Wu, 2008). This can be seen in his attempt to create the basis for a new national identity during the very high-profile 1998 campaign for Taipei’s mayor in which the KMT’s Ma Ying-jeou challenged Chen Shui-bian, the popular DPP incumbent with approval ratings of 70%. To help Ma overcome the disadvantage of his ethnic heritage, Lee had him proclaim his loyalty to Taiwan in a manner that redefined the categories of national identity on the island:

Taiwan’s President Lee Teng-hui added drama to the Taipei mayoral campaign when he asked the KMT nominee, Ma Ying-jeou, “Where is your home place?” Ma, a Mainlander, replied in broken Minnan dialect, “I’m a New Taiwanese, eating Taiwanese rice and drinking Taiwanese water.”

(Rigger, 1999a: 48)

Lee’s concept of a “New Taiwanese” identity was open to everyone and implied that old ethnic enmities could be left in the past, creating a new
approach to national identity that appeared to be widely popular across the political spectrum (Brown, 2004; Rigger, 1999a).

In contrast to Lee Teng-hui’s broader understanding of a developing Taiwan nation, Lee (2005) believed that Chen Shui-bian was more concerned with appealing to specific groups in what has been called “ethnic nationalism” (Shen and Wu, 2008). In particular, by the middle of the decade, the DPP was primarily appealing to the Minnan ethnic group who had come to Taiwan from Fujian Province and constituted slightly over 70% of the population. In contrast, while the DPP paid lip service to the slogan of the “Four Great Ethnic Groups” (Makeham, 2005), some prominent DPP leaders disparaged not just Mainlanders, a little under 15% of the population, but also two groups of Islanders: Hakka, about the same size as Mainlanders, and aborigines, about 2% of the population (Copper, 2010). Consequently, the Chen approach was much more polarizing than Lee’s strategy.

The polarization over national identity and cross-Strait relations in the elite discourse and party competition in Taiwan would strongly suggest that such polarization exists among the general electorate as well for either of two reasons. The elites might have responded to a sharp polarization in public opinion; or the citizenry may have become more polarized once the elite debate brought the issue to the center of Taiwan’s politics. If neither of these conditions existed and a majority of Taiwanese were in the “moderate middle,” the major parties would have a strong incentive to moderate their policies or risk punishment at the polls.

A variety of public opinion data cast doubt upon the image of a polarized electorate, however, as many of Taiwan’s citizens possess a complex identity that includes both Taiwanese and Chinese components and are wary about extreme positions on cross-Strait relations (Brown, 2004; Rigger, 1999a; Wachman, 1994). For the last two decades, public
opinion surveys have asked whether people identify themselves as Chinese, Taiwanese, or a combination of both. In 1992 just over half the population (52%) expressed a dual identity, while Chinese identifiers slightly outnumbered Taiwanese ones (28% to 20%). This changed dramatically in just eight years. In 2000, about half the population (47%) still had dual identification, but Taiwanese identifiers outnumbered Chinese ones 39% to 14%. The Chen Shui-bian years continued this trend as Taiwanese identification grew from 39% to 51% between 2000 and 2008, while Chinese identification collapsed further to just 4%. Finally, Taiwanese identifiers continued to increase to 55% at a slower rate during the first two years of the Ma administration (Election Center, 1992, 2000, 2008, 2010).

These data certainly show that the “China-centered paradigm” was a thing of the past in Taiwan, as by 2008 or even 2000 the number of purely Chinese identifiers in Taiwan had become minuscule. Wang and Chang (2005) show that this trend was even pronounced among Mainlanders. Chinese identifiers among Mainlanders fell by almost a half from 57% to 29% between just 1994 and 2000 and then fell by nearly a half again to 16% by 2004. Even before the sharp polarization of the 2000s, therefore, Chinese identifiers were a decided minority of the small Mainlander minority (13%) of the total population; and the decline in Chinese identification among Mainlanders continued apace during the first Chen administration despite his escalating appeals to Taiwanese nationalism. Chiang Kai-shek’s Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement was surely dead and buried.

Evaluating the degree of polarization versus moderation concerning the “Taiwan-centric paradigm” is a little more problematic and ambiguous, though. Clearly, a strong and steady increase in Taiwanese identification occurred over the last decade of the 20th century and the first one in the 21st. These data, however, support two quite different
interpretations. On the one hand, there clearly was a massive shift toward Taiwanese identification (Ho and Liu, 2003; Shen and Wu, 2008) which is consistent with the argument that Chen Shui-bian was able to create a new nation rooted in Taiwanese history and culture (Lynch, 2004). This was expressed during the 2004 campaign not just by the supporters of Chen and Lee Teng-hui. Rather, it could also be seen in the actions and words of the Kuomintang leadership. For example, during their final massive campaign rallies both Lien Chan 連戰 and James Soong 宋楚瑜, the presidential and vice-presidential candidates, kissed the ground in Taipei and Taichung respectively to demonstrate their devotion and loyalty to Taiwan (Huang, 2004); and Lien Chan, the KMT Chairman, was quoted as saying, “There is one state on each side of the Taiwan Strait”, thereby echoing what was seen as a provocative argument by Chen Shui-bian just two years earlier (Rawnsley, 2004).

On the other hand, the continuing strong minority of citizens who profess a dual identity is inconsistent with the image of the new totally Taiwanese nation that was supposedly created by what Wei-chin Lee (2005) termed Chen’s “Cultural Reconstruction Movement”. This can also be seen in how the public views the best option for Taiwan’s international status: 1) Taiwan Independence, 2) the current status quo of an uncertain sovereignty, or 3) Unification with the PRC. Over the last two decades, marked majorities of about 60% have supported the diplomatic status quo, ambiguous and even ridiculous as it may be. There was a major change in attitudes about this item over time, though. In particular, between 1994 and 2010 the relative support for Independence and Unification flip-flopped from 14%-25% to 24%-12% (Election Center, 1992, 2000, 2008, 2010). Still, since the Taiwan-centric paradigm advocates Independence, popular opinion does appear to be dominated by the moderate middle.
This strong and continuing support for the *status quo* in Taiwan’s international status is especially striking because, as Rigger (2004) has noted, growing frustration across the political spectrum with Taiwan’s lack of international status and with its treatment by the PRC is very easy to discern. Rather, the dangers of the two extremes are so pronounced that the not particularly satisfactory current situation is accepted as tolerable. In short, the “moderate middle” in Taiwan almost certainly does not have any hesitation in affirming “Taiwan, Yes!” However, its Taiwan-centric allegiances fall considerably short of what the proponents of Taiwan Independence consider to be necessary for a Taiwan nation. For example, Shelley Rigger’s (2011a) interviews of young people found that even the term “Love Taiwan” was viewed with suspicion because it had become so politicized. Thus, Chen’s Cultural Reconstruction Movement may have over-reached, just as Chiang Kai-shek’s Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement did.

4. Taiwan’s Institutional Imbroglio

The complex contradictions between integration and identity that were charted in the last two sections are now exacerbated by what Clark and Tan (2012) call the “institutional imbroglio” in Taiwan’s political system. It is widely assumed that a nation’s political and economic institutions shape public policy to a considerable extent (March and Olsen, 1989; North, 1990; Riker, 1982). John Fuh-sheng Hsieh (2006, 2009) has developed an interesting model of Taiwan’s institutional legacy based on the difference between presidential or parliamentary governmental systems and between election systems with single-member districts (SMDs) or proportional representation (PR). From this perspective, Taiwan’s current institutional imbroglio results from a combination of a complex and somewhat indeterminate constitutional
system, an election system that contained some perverse incentives, and its long era of authoritarian rule. Indeed, Hsieh (2006: 99) concludes that “actual constitutional practice in Taiwan [is] ... contrary to the constitutional arrangement on paper.”

Originally, the government for the Republic of China on Taiwan was (and still essentially is) structured around the 1947 Constitution. This Constitution created the institutions for a liberal democracy and guaranteed civil rights and liberties, although many of its provisions were nullified by the authoritarian rule of the KMT. Thus, at the national level, there were five basic governmental organizations: the Executive Yuan, the Legislative Yuan, the Judicial Yuan, the Control Yuan, and the Examination Yuan. An indirectly elected president stood above these five branches and served as the top political official in the nation (Ch’ien, 1950; Copper, 1979; Winckler, 1984).

The keystone for government was the president, who until 1995 was indirectly elected for six-year terms. The president possessed important constitutional powers, but there were also significant limitations on them as well. He appointed the premier who headed the Executive Yuan and also had appointment powers for the Judicial and Examination Yuans. Moreover, the president became the focal points for several important decision-making bodies, such as the National Security Council that was founded by Chiang Kai-shek in 1967. The NSC has been generally composed of some of the top officials in the regime and seemingly has served as a “super cabinet” at many times. Constitutionally, however, the president did not really appear to be the chief executive. It was the premier who selected and presided over the cabinet; and, at least on paper, the premier and the cabinet were responsible to the Legislative Yuan. It was somewhat ambiguous, therefore, whether the ROC Constitution created a presidential or cabinet system because the exact division of labor between the president and premier was somewhat
unclear and has depended upon their personal power positions. In reality, except for the brief period after Chiang Kai-shek’s death when his vice-president finished out his term, the president has always been preeminent (Barnett, 1963; Ch’ien, 1950; Gurтов, 1968; Hsieh, 2006).

The Legislative Yuan or Taiwan’s parliament is a directly elected body. Even during the long authoritarian era, it passed budgets and legislation and exercised oversight over the executive (e.g., the Executive and Legislative Yuans had vetoing and overriding powers fairly similar to those exercised by the president and Congress in the United States). In reality, the Legislative Yuan was fairly weak, and it is probably fair to describe it as a “rubber stamp” on major policies before the 1990s. Still, the Legislative Yuan held the very important formal power of having to approve presidential appointments of premiers (Ch’ien, 1950; Hsieh, 2006). More informally, legislators did exercise considerable initiative in such important areas as amending legislation, constituent service, local development projects, and overseeing the executive in public interpellation sessions (Chou, Clark, and Clark, 1990).

The formal constitutional structure for any country, of course, is subject to significant modification by informal political practices. This occurred to an extreme extent in authoritarian Taiwan. Not only were the Constitution’s democratic intent and institutions subverted, but an outline of the nation’s governmental bodies completely ignores the central role of the ruling Kuomintang Party. Major decisions about policy and personnel were evidently approved, if not made, by the top party organizations rather than the official government (e.g., the KMT’s Central Standing Committee had to approve the premier’s cabinet choices); and the Executive Yuan was viewed as much more of a policy implemeneter than initiator. The party also had fairly extensive ties with society through such organizations as the China Youth Corps and
Farmers’ Associations. The strong presidential leadership that has marked Taiwan’s politics was based to a goodly extent on control of the ruling party as both Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo 蔣經國 were strong chairmen of the KMT through their presidencies (Bedeski, 1981; Clough, 1978; Copper, 1979; Tai, 1970). This continued in the democratic era, as Lee Teng-hui was chairman of the KMT throughout his presidency (1988-2000) and Chen Shui-bian and Ma Ying-jeou were chairs of their respective parties for part of their terms.

Despite this structure of a party-state and a substantial amount of repression directed against those who challenged the regime, the KMT on Taiwan departed from the totalitarian model in one vital respect. Rather than destroying all pre-existing political and social groups, the regime tried to co-opt and manipulate them whenever possible. This resulted in the Mainlander “national” elite playing “local” Islander factions off against each other and retaining power by acting as the arbitrator among them. This also made elections for local governments and Farmers’ Associations “real” and often fiercely competitive, which had somewhat contradictory implications for Taiwan’s future political development. On the one hand, a significant basis or starting point was created for democratic expansion; on the other, these local bodies were strongly focused on political patronage which was often tied to corruption (Bosco, 1994; Clark, 1989; Rigger, 1999b; Tien, 1989).

This turns attention to the somewhat rare type of election system which Taiwan imported from its former colonial master Japan. As noted above, the two major types of election systems are single-member districts (SMDs) in which the person who gets the most votes wins and proportional representation (PR) in which a party wins the number of seats in a multi-member district that is proportionate to its share of the vote. Taiwan’s traditional system of what is called the single nontransferable vote or SNTV combines elements of both systems. The
candidates for legislative seats run in multi-member districts as in PR. However, each voter can only cast one ballot for a specific candidate (not a party) which cannot be transferred to a second or third alternative if the candidate does not win. The candidates are ranked according to the votes they receive, and the number elected is determined by the size of the district. For example, if a district has eight seats, the eight candidates with the highest number of votes are the winners. Consequently, in large districts fairly small minorities can elect a representative (Hsieh, 2009).

This system appears to have ambiguous implications for the party system. SMDs are usually considered to promote competitive two-party systems because minor party candidates are difficult to elect. This promotes the ability of the citizenry to hold a government accountable but makes the representation of some specific constituencies hard because the major parties must retain a broad appeal. Conversely, a PR system promotes a multi-party system that is good for representation but can undermine accountability. The SNTV system promotes representation by individual legislators but undermines representation by a party because candidates of the same party must compete against each other as well as against the representatives of other parties, which undercuts the cohesion and responsibility of the parties. As John Hsieh (2009: 12) explains nicely:

Since the vote shares of these two parties [the DPP and KMT] are, under normal circumstances, relatively fixed, it can be expected that candidates from the same party will compete against each other for the same pool of voters. In fact, this kind of intraparty competition is more often than not fiercer than competition between the two parties. As voters make their choices, they often first determine which party to vote for, and then pick one out of several candidates from that party. Since the platforms of these candidates are likely to be similar, voters
need to rely upon other cues to make their choices, including personal connections, pork-barrel projects, or even vote buying. Elections may become very personalized. In addition, since each party, in general, wants all its candidates to win, and often needs to show impartiality among its own candidates, these candidates may have to turn to other sources of support to compete against their co-partisans. Factions, big businesses, or even gangsters may be dragged into the process. Corruption may thus sneak in. Moreover, because a candidate may need only a small portion of the vote in the district to get elected, he or she may choose to take extreme positions to attract the support of certain groups of voters. In this way, radicalization may become a constant feature of political life.

There seems to be a parallel between Taiwan’s constitutional and electoral systems, therefore. The constitutional system combined elements of both parliamentary and presidential governments in a somewhat incoherent system that was held together by authoritarian one-party rule. The election system was neither SMD nor PR and appeared to undercut the incentives that one or the other might have provided for establishing a particular type of party system. Democratization, as might well have been expected, exacerbated these problems. The incoherence and ambiguities of the constitutional system became increasingly apparent as competing political forces were given free rein to pursue conflicting interests and goals, and the growing importance of elections accentuated the dysfunctions of the SNTV system.

John Fuh-sheng Hsieh (2006) provides a broader and more theoretical critique of Taiwan’s political system. He argues that constitutional systems can be ranked along a continuum from the liberal objective of protecting human rights to promoting efficient policy-making, with the checks-and-balances of a presidential system
promoting the former and the unified decision-making of a parliamentary system being conducive to the latter. Election systems, similarly, can promote the populist value of individual representation or efficient policy-making by majority parties with PR systems providing the former and SMD ones the latter. He then uses these distinctions to create a typology of four different kinds of democracies. He classifies Taiwan as a presidential system in practice (though fairly parliamentary in constitutional design) and quite populist, at least under the old SNTV system. This creates a “hyperdemocracy” which, according to Hsieh, is the least desirable type because of its tendency for political stalemate and ideological polarization, exactly the problems facing Taiwan today.

5. The Conflict between Identity and Integration Hits Home: The Sunflower Movement and Implosion of the KMT

The contradictory trends in identity and integration were probably destined to clash sooner or later. Still, their violent collision in 2014 was surprisingly spectacular. The student Sunflower Movement was organized quickly during the evening of March 17th after the KMT announced that it would ram the controversial Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) through the Legislative Yuan and occupied the Legislative Yuan the next day with the aid of opposition lawmakers. The Sunflowers ultimately succeeded in that the Legislative Yuan did not pass the CSSTA. More broadly, they stimulated and symbolized what appears to be a fundamental change in Taiwan’s politics. First, in terms of the partisan balance, the KMT emerged from this crisis widely discredited as it took an unprecedented beating in the 2014 local elections and seemed to be in disarray as the 2016 presidential and parliamentary elections approached. Second, the Sunflower Movement marked a major change in the role of civil society in Taiwan politics, as
students, civic organizations, nonprofit groups or NGOs (nongovernmental organizations), and general citizens successfully demanded that they be allowed to participate in the nation’s major decisions.

The storm of 2014 had been building for two years. In January 2012, President Ma Ying-jeou won re-election by a margin of 52% to 46% over the DPP’s Tsai Ing-wen 蔡英文. This was considerably less than his margin in 2008, and the KMT’s majority in Legislative Yuan saw a similar reduction. Still, Taiwan’s citizens had given Ma and the KMT a vote of confidence. It turned out to be an extremely short mandate. Within six months of his election, Ma’s approval rating had plummeted to 15%, which broke Chen Shui-bian’s record low of 18%, and his popularity never rose very significantly after that. This tumultuous drop reflected the confluence of several factors. First, Ma, as is common among many incumbent chief executives, put off several unpopular decisions until after he was re-elected. These included steep rises in oil and electricity prices in response to the global jump in energy prices, a capital gains tax on stock transactions in response to the country’s budget squeeze, and the re-emergence of the ongoing controversy over beef imports from the United States. Second, the secretary general of the Executive Yuan, a Ma protégé, was arrested for bribery, thereby doing substantial damage to Ma’s image as a clean politician. In addition, China undercut Ma’s claims that he was successfully managing relations with Beijing by issuing a thinly veiled rebuke of a speech he made on cross-Strait relations, and Taiwan’s economy slowed markedly from 4.2% growth in 2011 to 1.5% in 2012. Finally, Ma’s troubles were compounded by growing strains within the Kuomintang which weakened his ability to pass items in his program through the legislature (Chen, 2013; Hsieh, 2014).
The stage for the Sunflower Movement was set when the Ma administration signed the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement with Beijing on June 21, 2013. This was a key extension of Ma’s program to promote development and prosperity in Taiwan by increasing the island’s economic integration with China. What the CSSTA sought to do was to extend the liberalization of trade and investment in goods in ECFA and other agreements to the service sector. In all, 80 service segments in China were opened for Taiwanese investment, while 64 segments in Taiwan became available for Chinese investors. This was a major proposal that included financial services, communications, health and social services, business services, transportation, tourism, environmental services, and distribution services. The Agreement immediately became highly controversial. This was far from surprising for two distinct reasons. Since 2000, cross-Strait relations had probably been the most important issue dividing the DPP and KMT; and trade agreements in services are generally harder to be negotiated than those for goods, in part because issues concerning such areas as communications and financial services are often seen as threatening the sovereignty of small nations, which is a highly salient and sensitive issue in Taiwan. A central criticism of the CSSTA was that it had been negotiated in secret. It might be argued that this criticism was somewhat spurious because most international agreements are negotiated out of the public view. However, this does not absolve the party who negotiated the treaty, in this case the Ma administration and the Kuomintang, from responding to questions and criticisms. Rather, the very secrecy of the negotiations makes justifying the agreement all the more vital. In the case of the Service Trade Agreement, there were valid fears that China’s great wealth would allow it to “buy up” Taiwanese firms in such sensitive areas as banking and telecommunications, despite predictions of the pact’s supporters that Taiwanese firms would benefit greatly from
their enhanced access to the Mainland market. More broadly, this criticism came in a context of growing fears of potential Chinese domination of Taiwan among Taiwanese citizens and a growing realization that economic integration across the Strait was contributing significantly to the growing inequality in Taiwan and that the strong economic links with China were transmitting the slowing economic growth there to Taiwan, which was especially harmful to the future prospects of students (Fan, 2014; Hsieh, 2014, 2015).

The Ma administration seemingly realized the breadth and seriousness of the opposition to the CSSTA; and within a week of concluding the Agreement with China; it agreed to a clause-by-clause review in the Legislative Yuan. Then in late September, the KMT and DPP agreed on 16 public hearings, with each party chairing eight. It was here that the process broke down as both parties displayed rather questionable faith in providing a full and fair hearing of the issues involved in the CSSTA. The KMT quickly ran through their eight hearings, while the DPP delayed holding theirs. Even more ominously, a battle between President Ma and Speaker of the House Wang Jin-pyng 王金平 that exploded earlier in the month was seen by many observers as being tied to the CSSTA. Ma charged that Wang had lobbied on behalf of the convener of the DPP caucus in a judicial case and asked the KMT Discipline Committee to revoke his party membership. Since Wang had been elected to the Legislative Yuan as a party-list candidate, this would have removed him from the legislature. Ma’s tactics drew widespread criticism, especially after it was revealed that the charges were based on somewhat questionable wire taps by the Special Investigations Division of the Supreme Prosecutor’s Office, and Wang sought judicial intervention. Ultimately, there was some reconciliation between Ma and Wang, and Wang continued as speaker. There had been antagonism between these two politicians dating back to Ma’s defeat of
Wang in the election for KMT party chair. Beyond this rivalry, many observers believed that Ma intended to ram the CSSTA through the Legislative Yuan, which Wang’s more conciliatory relations with the DPP might have prevented (Hsieh, 2004; Shieh, Mo, and Wang. 2013; Smith and Yu, 2014).

No progress was made for almost six months, as the Ma administration showed no interest in compromise, and the DPP showed no interest in moving forward in the Legislative Yuan’s consideration of the SSSTA. Then a volcano erupted in mid-March 2014. On March 17th, a Joint Committee Review Meeting on the CSSTA in the Legislative Yuan ended in chaos. Lawmakers from the DPP and Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) seized the podium and prevented the KMT’s Chang Ching-chung 張慶忠 from presiding. Three hours of slogan chanting and confrontation ensued. Finally, Chang declared that the meeting was over and that the review period was complete, clearing the way for a vote on the trade pact and leading the DPP to protest vociferously that this move violated the cross-party consensus on reviewing the CSSTA item-by-item. The next day, protests commenced outside the Legislative Yuan, and in the evening, students accompanied by some DPP legislators entered and occupied the Legislative Yuan, thereby setting off the Sunflower Movement (Fan, 2014; Hsieh, 2015; Smith, 2015; Smith and Yu, 2014; Wang, 2014a).

The Sunflower students presented four demands. First, the CSSTA should be reviewed clause-by-clause and renegotiated; second, a mechanism for monitoring cross-Strait agreements should be put in place; third, the CSSTA should not go into effect until such monitoring procedure was operational; and fourth, a Citizens’ Constitutional Assembly should be called. The Ma administration ignored these demands and indicated that the CSSTA should be approved as it is, creating a stalemate. For his part, KMT speaker Wang Jin-pyng allowed
the occupation to continue but did not try to negotiate with them, and massive demonstrations were held around the island. Some students managed to enter the Executive Yuan late on May 23rd, but they were later expelled with a considerable amount of force, deepening the crisis. The occupation of the Legislative Yuan continued for five weeks until Speaker Wang agreed to develop and implement a program for monitoring cross-Strait agreements before acting on the CSSTA. Due to partisan polarization, however, nothing happened (Hsieh, 2015; Liu, 2014; Smith, 2015; Smith and Yu, 2014; Sui, 2015 Wang, 2014a, 2014b; Wei, Wang, and Hsu, 2014).

Overall, the Sunflower Movement appears to be very successful in several areas. It stopped the CSSTA from being rammed through the Legislative Yuan. Public opinion polls in the spring of 2014 showed it to have extremely strong public support. It also represented and stimulated an outburst of fervor by civil society and individual citizens to have a part in decision-making in the fundamental issues facing Taiwan, although how lasting this effect will be is still unclear. In political terms, the Sunflower success made a major contribution, although certainly not the only one, to the fall of the KMT, which was trounced in the 2014 local elections and was trailing badly in the run-up to the presidential and legislative elections in January 2016 (Hsieh, 2015; Loa, 2015b; Smith, 2015; Sui, 2015).

6. Implications
The last section might be taken to indicate that the clash between integration and identity has resulted in the preeminence of the later. The reality seems to be more complex, as indicated by the results of two recent polls. First, the surge in support for the Sunflower Movement and the DPP suggests that a similar surge in support for Taiwan
Independence should have occurred. A *United Daily News* poll in September 2015 presents a different picture, however. Taiwanese perceptions of China are anything but favorable as the Chinese government and Chinese people were rated as “bad” rather than “good” by approximately two-to-one margins of 58% to 28% and 51% to 28% respectively. Still, 55% of Taiwanese prefer the *status quo* versus 28% who want Unification and 13% who want Independence. When those who want the *status quo* in the short term before either Independence or Unification are added, an overwhelming 76% of the population supports the *status quo* (Loa, 2015a). This does not just reflect the fear of China’s rising military strength. Younger Taiwanese in their 20s and 30s are much more likely than their elders to have a wholly Taiwanese identity and to favor Independence. Yet, a third of them want to work in China, implying that the Chinese economy retains a major pull in Taiwan (Sui, 2015). Consequently, the contradictory forces of integration and identity will continue to bedevil Taiwan.

A more positive implication is that Taiwan appears to be moving toward what Shen and Wu term “civic nationalism” in which the source of nationalism is support for the country and nation. This can be seen in the rising importance of civil society as illustrated by the Sunflower Movement and by the changing debate over national identity. In the fall of 2015, for example, President Ma and the DPP presidential candidate Tsai, rather than presenting rival proposals for Unification and Independence, both claimed to be the supporters of the status quo in cross-Strait relations. Ma claimed that his policies had successfully preserved the *status quo*, while Tsai contended that she and the DPP were committed to preserving the *status quo* (Sui, 2015).
Notes

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Development of Democratic Processes in the People’s Republic of China: Prospects of Transformation of the Political Regime+

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Abstract
Rapid economic growth of the PRC has brought new challenges and promoted social transformation in Chinese society. China suffers profound changes involving fundamental principles of public relations. The political regime in China is in a changeable condition, and continues to transform. Some decisions of the Chinese government affect not only the economy and public administration, but also in some ways human rights and political changes. Chinese political regime takes on the pending social problems and begins to gently lift old political bans. There is development of processes which at least by the formal features can be attributed to be democratic or quasi-democratic. However, despite a number of political changes and improving of human rights situation in last decades, China is still an illiberal state. Moreover, the level of repression in China has increased in the last few years. All of these actions raise questions about the political future of China. The scale of the socio-economic changes that have occurred in the PRC is so significant, that the maintaining of the existing governance structure is
not possible. Rapid economic growth reduced public discontent at the disregard to fundamental human rights. Yet the “economic miracle” is coming to an end, and the country desperately needs economic and political reforms. Lack of reforms or its incorrect implementation can put the existing system out of balance, which will lead to adverse effects not only in China but also in the world. Depending on the reforms we can assume several scenarios for further development of the PRC.

**Keywords:** China, Taiwan, democratization, civil society, political regime

**JEL classification:** D72, D73, D74, F52

1. Introduction

Contemporary China is one of the largest and rapidly evolving world powers. The success of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is largely caused by the policy of modernization which has been carried out by its government for the last thirty years and primarily affects the economic sphere.

The “economic miracle” of the PRC, being the result of the “four modernizations” policy, has promoted social transformation in the Chinese society. Rapid economic growth and China’s transformation into the second economic power in the world has brought new challenges. Changes in the political structure of the country affect its public life. China suffers profound changes involving fundamental principles of public relations.

The scale of the socio-economic changes that have occurred in the PRC is so significant, that the maintaining of the existing governance structure is not possible. Therefore adjustment of the governance structure happens all the time.
The modernization of the Chinese economy has not yet led to the creation of a liberal electoral democracy, which would allow at least limited political competition. Nevertheless, the political regime in China continues to evolve.

Some decisions of the Chinese government affect not only the economy and public administration, but also in some ways human rights and political changes: the family planning policy was softened, there was some liberalization of criminal legislation, the system of “correctional” labor camps was abolished. The Communist Party of China (CPC) promotes the development of so-called “inner-party democracy”. China’s government conducted experiments with voting for multicandidate party secretaries. Business people and intellectuals were recruited into the CPC; party consultation with nonparty groups was expanded, feedback mechanisms within the party were improved; Politburo’s proceedings become more transparent.

Specific elements of civil society appear as a system of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) which can form a centerpiece of public authorities and become a bridge between the government and the society. The establishment of the public authorities as a new independent social institution has actualized the issue of “fifth modernization”, a reform of the political system.

Political leaders point to the special conditions of China which allows them to justify many of the provisions incompatible with Marxism, for example, recognition of private property, creation of special economic zones, and others. However, the possibility of further reforming of other spheres of public life, politics in particular, still causes a lot of controversy.

The Chinese political regime considers modernization under the leadership of the Communist Party of China and ensuring stability in society as its main task. It is assumed that the essence of political reform.
should be the improvement of existing political institutions and the rejection of Western democratic models. However, the question of the effectiveness of political reforms carried out in such a manner remains open.

Meanwhile, the ideologist of China’s modernization, Deng Xiaoping 邓小平, recognized the necessity of political reforming. However, when speaking about the prospects of modernization in the political sphere, we should not forget that the Chinese leadership has never meant political reform as transformation based on the model of the Western democracies. The issue of the introduction of elections on a competitive basis, the principle of the separation of powers, a true multi-party system etc. were never widely discussed in China. Chinese leaders have always pointed to “the special conditions of China”, meaning by this, in particular, the rejection of the Western democratic model of development.

Ever since China felt its weakness and backwardness in an encounter with the West, the idea of constructing a strong and prosperous state began to acquire new content in the social and political thought of China. On the one hand, there is growing awareness in China that without learning from the West and borrowing of technical achievements, as well as political institutions and ideas it is impossible to overcome backwardness. On the other hand, many of the Chinese ideologists and political figures have sought learning of the Western experience to preserve their national identity without losing those traditions that, in their opinion, were the essence of China.

However, the political changes have not kept pace with the social and economic developments. Despite a number of positive changes, the Chinese government has intensified repressions and pressure on society. In the background there is a gradual slowing down of the Chinese economy, which can cause serious economic and financial problems and
exposes the accumulated social conflicts. It creates a dangerous situation, fraught with social explosion and mass protests.

The question of the political future of China and the possibility of its democratization is one of the most important in modern political science. Many researchers still believe that the democratization of the political regime in China is impossible. However, in the process of its development, the Chinese leadership has repeatedly destroyed the established stereotypes of Marxism, so it is possible that the country could follow the path of democratization. Thus, the question about the possibility of the political system of China to evolve towards democracy remains open. The processes taking place in China require the most attention and research, both in the interest of international security and in terms of using the experience.

The key scientific challenge of research is to study the features and patterns of the development of democratic processes in the PRC, identifying their quality parameters and the possibility/impossibility of transforming the existing format of interaction with the state.

It seems important to define the capabilities and features of civil initiative manifestation in an authoritarian state, to uncover the degree of coincidence/non-conformity of these interests, and to identify the mechanisms of leveling the contradictions.

Academic novelty of the study is connected with researching the transformation of political regime and the development of elements of a forming civil society, as well as studying and analyzing constructive and negative (inhibiting) factors for the development of dialogue in the “state-society” format. The rates, methods and results of democratization and political transformations in the PRC are specific. They are in many ways unique and very different from the usual approach of the Western democracies. They are especially important for understanding the essence of China’s social development prospects.
The purpose of this study is to consider the processes which at least by the formal features can be attributed to be democratic and to analyze the main directions of these processes in the PRC, as well as make an attempt to suggest possible scenarios of the political future of China.

2. Development of democratic processes in the PRC

Modern China is the biggest authoritarian state in the world, which has a very serious situation with censorship, where more than one billion people live in conditions of a lack of human rights.

But the political regime in China is in a changeable condition, and continues to transform. Since Deng Xiaoping launched the Chinese economic reform (“Reform and Opening up”), the era of Maoism in China was over. The political regime in the PRC has changed from totalitarian to authoritarian. The concept of communism with Chinese characteristics remained only in the rhetoric of some party leaders. In fact, China is close to implementing capitalism with Chinese characteristics (Huang, 2008). Andrew Nathan concluded that “the reforms aimed to change China from a terror-based, totalitarian dictatorship to a “mature”, administered dictatorship of the Post-Stalinist Soviet or Eastern European type” (Nathan 1985). Thus “democracy” in China would not involve elections or participation in decision-making but “the rule of law”, which was based in procedural regularity in the exercise of power.

Since the early 1980s, during economic reforms, China has launched six administrative reforms. The main aims of administrative reforms were solving the socioeconomic issues associated with rapid economic development and aligning the structure of the executive authorities and its functions with the needs of market reforms (Wang, 2010).
Virtually every Congress of the CPC acknowledged the task of reforming as the topical. Herewith there was not only the reorganization of the State Council, ministries and departments, but also the reduction of the number of their workforces (Wang, 1998). One of the goals of the reform was to limit the state intervention in the regulation of the issues that can be resolved at the level of market participants, public organizations and civil society. However, after each reduction there was an increase of the staff of the government officials, and the problem of bureaucracy costs in the management still remains relevant.

Despite the fact that the Chinese government approaches the issue of political reform very carefully, the country has come a long way during this period. Before the start of modernization of the political system it could be characterized as a totalitarian one-party regime with a high role of the party leader and an extremely important role of official state ideology, a full political and ideological monopoly of the party and the absence of any freedom in the economic sphere. The contemporary political regime in China is the new type of authoritarianism. This type of regime is often called “post-totalitarian” or “neo-authoritarian”.

The Chinese post-totalitarian authoritarian regime has preserved totalitarian institutions such as the party, secret police and state-controlled mass media, but “ideological orthodoxy has declined in favor of routinization, repression has declined, the state’s top leadership is less personalized and more secure, and the level of mass mobilization has declined substantially” (Gasiorowski, 2006: 110).

Some scholars have deemed the Chinese system a “fragmented authoritarianism” (Lieberthal, 1992: 9), a “negotiated state” or a “consultative authoritarian regime”. The current Chinese system has created space for autonomy, loopholes for bargaining, and hopes for democratization (Xia, 2006).
Although China remains authoritarian, it is nevertheless responsive to the increasingly diverse demands of the Chinese society. Andrew Mertha argued that the rules of the policy-making process are still captured by the fragmented authoritarianism framework, but that process has become increasingly pluralized: barriers to entry have been lowered, at least for certain actors such as peripheral officials, non-governmental organizations and the media (Mertha, 2009). Despite egalitarianism, which is present in the rhetoric of the party, the designation of the political regime in the PRC as “managed” or “illiberal” democracy is premature.

Despite the fact that China is still an authoritarian state with a lack of human rights, there is development of the individual elements, the formal features of which can be attributed to the democratic process in China.

According to the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, People’s Congresses of cities that are not divided into districts, counties, city districts, towns, townships, and lastly ethnic townships, are directly elected (Article 97). Additionally, village committee members and chairpersons are also directly elected (Article 111). Local People’s Congresses have the constitutional authority to recall the heads and deputy heads of government at the provincial level and below.

Starting in the 1980s, in the period of “Reform & Opening Up”, the government organized village elections in which several candidates would run. However, each candidate was chosen or approved by the CPC. Higher levels of government were indirectly elected, with candidates vetted by the government. As a result, the higher levels of government contain either Communist Party members, their United Front allies, or sympathetic independents. Opposition parties are outlawed.
The right to nominate candidates to the National People’s Congress received not only political parties and public organizations that are part of the United Front but also a group, consisting of at least 10 voters, or deputies (National People’s Congress, n.d.). In addition, people’s congresses above the county level got the opportunity of the election of their standing committees, reinforcing their position.

Elections do not play an important role in Chinese politics today. But since the late 1990s the Chinese authorities have experimented with some electoral methods in the selection and confirmation of Party and government officials at various levels of leadership (Li, 2008). In Jiangsu and Sichuan experiments were conducted with direct election of party secretaries and members of township committees (Lai, 2004).

Despite the undemocratic nature of the system as a whole, the principle of change of power is implemented in the PRC. For officials and military officers a system of job rotation every couple of years was introduced. And most importantly, China’s senior government leaders are changed regularly. This rule established by Deng Xiaoping means that in ten years the leader must resign. Deng resigned, Jiang Zemin 江泽民 and Hu Jintao 胡锦涛 also left their posts, and now leaders of the fifth generation are in the government, headed by Xi Jinping 習近平. The successor is always known in advance, but his views are not known. Note that under the democratic elections it happens the other way: it is not known who will win, but the views of the winner are known in advance. In addition, decisions are not made by one person but by all nine members of the Politburo.

It also should be noted that the lessons learned from the collapse of the USSR promote the development of the so-called “inner-party democracy” (dangnei minzhu 黨內民主) in China. Among the party members apathy is widespread, and “wavering ideals and beliefs, a weak
sense of purpose, and lax organization and discipline” also reportedly alarmed the leadership (Bergsten, Freeman, Lardy and Mitchell, 2009).

Inner-party democracy has been defined as greater competition within the party. The declared aim of inner-party democracy is to establish democracy first within the party, then expand it to society at large – first at the grassroots level and then at higher levels.

Elections inside the CPC are regarded by Chinese leaders as an object of efforts to increase competition. Some experts believe that the development of inner-party democracy is even more important for the long-term political reform in China than the experiments with the local authorities (Thornton, 2008). They believe that if the CPC goes for an open discussion, internal party elections of the heads and decision-making by vote, it will be a precondition to the establishment of democracy in the country as a whole.

At each level of the party, members must vote for the major decisions – including the critical area of personnel appointments – and party standing committees at all levels must deliver annual work reports. Rules governing the convening of party congresses, selection for and retirement from official posts etc. have helped to institutionalize processes in the CPC. The formerly dominant role of paramount leaders and retired elders diminished.

It should be noted that in early 2015 the CPC published a plan for “strengthening the electoral socialist democracy”. However, it is still unclear how the deliberative character would be provided in various government and public institutions, if those of them who are unwilling to change themselves were not be punished.

The co-existence of the various interests within the party promotes the development of inner-party democracy. However, this kind of democracy inside CPC is still in infancy. At this stage of its existence, in most cases this phenomenon manifests itself not in systematization, but
in inconsistency; not in higher level of legal settlement, but in the care to
the scope of personal relationships; not in the presence of clear rules, but
in the dominance of unwritten norms.

The essence of China’s inner-party democracy is not that the
decisions of the party expresses the will of the majority of its members,
but that within the party there is a certain compromise of opinions,
something like the system of checks and balances. However, this, in
turn, inhibits implementation of political reforms: people who do not
want to carry out reforms do not give in to others.

Minxin Pei argues that competitive elections within the CPC are
unlikely to lead to the real deal in China, unless they topple the system
outright (Pei, 2012). In his view, “inner-party democracy” cannot solve
the problems of authoritarian rule.

China carries out the development of so-called “limited pluralism”
or “moderate pluralism” (Gries and Rosen 2004: 237). This pluralism
does not imply party competition; it is built on the principles of
collaboration of the various levels of the social strata represented in the
government. In order to increase the representation of this type, the
ideology of political reform in China has been supplemented by the
theory of the “Three Represents” (sange daibiao 三個代表). According
to this theory, the “Three Represents” are as follows: advanced social
productive forces stand for economic production; the progressive course
of China’s advanced culture stands for cultural development, the
fundamental interests of the majority stand for political consensus. One
of the main goals of the “Three Represents” is to change the CPC into a
governmental and more democratic party. This opens up the Party to
“the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people”, as well as
businessmen and managers. In 2002, the 16th National Congress of the
CPC approved these ideas as guiding, and added them to the Charter of
the party, along with Marxism-Leninism, the ideas of Mao Zedong 毛澤
and the theory of Deng Xiaoping (Zhang, 2004). Thereby, the attempt was made to solve the problem of ensuring representation in power of a new social group, the national bourgeoisie, the appearance of which was due to economic transformations. Thus, business people and intellectuals were recruited into the CPC. In 2004, the doctrine of the “Three Represents” was enshrined in the introduction of the Constitution of the PRC.

The development of “inner-party democracy” and “limited pluralism” under certain conditions can have a significant impact on the greater openness of the different aspects of public life in China and further lead to partial democratization of the PRC in the future.

On 4th December 2015, during his expert interview, Dr Wang Jenn-hwan 王振寰, Chair Professor of the Graduate Institute of Development Studies at the National Chengchi University (國立政治大學), said that development of “inner-party democracy” could be the possibility to push the democratization in the future (Dr Wang Jenn-hwan, 2015, personal communication, 4th December). In his opinion, these kinds of actions within the political establishment of China could potentially open up more space for inner-party competition, possibility of debates, etc., because inner-party democratization and inner-party competition always trigger inner-party conflict and inner-party post struggle. This is the approach we can observe in the future, and there is also a possibility of the rise of the different factions in the party. Of course, at the current stage neither “inner-party democracy” nor “limited pluralism” is really a democratic element. However, it may be a certain reserve for the future, and the development of these elements may be the first step towards greater openness of the political regime in the PRC.

It is also important to note that feedback mechanisms within the CPC were improved. In democracies through elections and through free press there is an inverse relationship between the government and its
people, and it makes the regime resistant. China has no elections, no free media, but regime responsiveness is at a good level (Korolev, 2015). It is a matter of survival of authorities: the people in China are organized well and all the great Chinese dynasties collapsed as a result of uprisings. If China were to move towards a policy of “responsive authoritarianism”, it may prove a gradual step towards a more democratic society while enhancing the CCP’s stability. Authoritarian governments can continue for a long time through the benefit of feedback mechanisms such as NGOs, petitions, complaints, and even local demonstrations. Couched in the language of regime survival, such openness may come to seem attractive to the CPC (Gilley and Diamond, 2008). However, the wall between the party and non-party is still very high. This makes it difficult for the Communist Party to implement their decisions effectively and this negatively affects its credibility. Moreover, irritation of the society caused by closed party offices and deafness to the views of the population is growing.

China has declared the future political reforms to mitigate social tensions, and new forms of relationships between Party members and non-party individuals are probably one of the attempts to liberalize social life and create conditions for political reform.

Politburo’s proceedings become more transparent. The CPC is showing efforts to make its procedures more transparent. It plans to eradicate the “informal politics” that have historically dominated inner-party life. To make Party procedures more transparent, the Chinese media now report on politburo meetings as well as discuss the division of responsibilities among its members. The official media lauded the “democratic processes” applied in the election of the Party’s new leaders at the 17th CPC Congress, where there were 8 percent more candidates than slots available.
The most significant decisions of the Third Plenary Session of the 18th National Congress of the CPC touched upon not only the economy, but also human rights. It is worthy to mention among the most significant changes the easing of the demographic policy, the gradual reduction of articles of the Criminal Code allowing for death penalty as a punishment, the elimination of the “corrective” labor camps, and the simplification of the rules for registration of non-governmental organizations. Concerned about its future, the Chinese political regime takes on the pending social problems and begins to gently lift old political bans.

It is important to note that on the eve of the congress within the Chinese party leadership there was a discussion regarding the inclusion of Mao Zedong’s ideas in the number of basic slogans of the Congress and the new version of the Charter of the Party, because some of the politicians suggested to enclose in the theory of “Chinese socialism” only three leaders – Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, and the name of Mao was not mentioned (Lousianin, 2012). Despite the fact that the mention of Mao remained and was included in the new edition the Charter of the CPC, and the fact that this discussion took place indicates the presence of certain forces within China’s leadership. These forces are configured to separate the class methodology of Mao’s from China’s current modernization, which is constructed on the convergence of socialism and capitalism.

We should also pay attention to the fact that on the eve of the 18th Party Congress an open letter calling for more transparency and more intraparty democracy swirled around the Internet. One of the letter’s authors was Chen Xiaolu 陈小鲁, son of one of the most decorated marshals of the Chinese army Chen Yi 陈毅 who was also a former vice-premier and foreign minister and a trusted aide to former premier Zhou Enlai 周恩来 (Huang, 2013). Chen Xiaolu and many other Chinese
elites no longer believe the status quo is viable. Thus, some of China’s establishment figures have come to believe that stability comes not from repression but from greater political and economic openness.

In addition, some figures and plans for the socio-economic development of China until 2020, which were announced at the Congress, became fundamentally new. Earlier, the Chinese leaders had planned to increase the total gross domestic product (GDP) of China, and at the 18th National Congress of CPC it was first formulated the task of doubling GDP per capita twice as part of the strategy of creating a “moderately prosperous society” (xiaokang shehui 小康社會). In other words, emphasis was placed on the social parameters and improving of the quality of life.

China has embarked on the gradual liberalization of its criminal legislation. In particular, the labor camps that operated in the country since 1957 are now being liquidated. The system of the labor camps created during Mao Zedong’s rule made it possible to send people there without a court order for up to four years and was one of the tools to combat dissent. Until recently there were more than 300 labor camps in China (Wu, 2007), with 260,000 people serving their sentences there (Laogai Handbook 2008). Many of the current generation of Chinese leaders know firsthand about the camps; many of them had also passed this hard school. As part of the partial liberalization, the system of “correction through labor” has been abolished; the list of crimes for which the death penalty is the punishment is reducing; there is an activity to prevent the imposition of illegal court judgments; there is also a struggle with the methods of extracting confessions under torture, physical violence and cruel treatment.

China has launched a new policy in the field of family planning: the policy of “one family – one child” has been softened. Chinese families were allowed to have two children – if one of the parents was an only
child. This has now led to a new two-child policy.

The family planning policy, known as the one-child policy in the West, was an eloquent example of how human rights are sacrificed to the public interest. In the 1970s, the Chinese leadership feared that the unpredictable growth of the population would threaten the planned economic breakthrough. The paradox is that the abolition of these restrictions was also caused by the economy: by 2050 more than a quarter of the population will consist of people over 65 years old, while the number of working-age population will be reduced to 615 million, compared to 1 billion today (Wei and Liu, 2009); that means labor shortages in the future and the possibility of provoking a crisis of the developing pension system.

In the social sector, the phasing out of the official line of “one child in one family” signifies some progress, but this is hardly enough to reverse the unfavorable demographic situation.

Changes in the political system of China inevitably stimulate the formation of various non-governmental organizations. In this regard, it is worth noting that in recent years the Chinese society has been showing signs of growth of the civic consciousness, and political reforms can stimulate social progress and the initiative of NGOs which is coming from “below”.

Economic reforms in China, which began in the late 1970s, have contributed to the rapid growth of NGOs and social organizations (shehui zuzhi 社会組織) in China. In 1965, the number of public organizations in China was only about 100 on the national level and about 6,000 on the regional level. According to the statistics of the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA), in 1992 there were about 154,000 registered social organizations/NGOs, 200,000 in 1996, 230,000 in 2002, 354,000 in 2006, 413,600 in 2008, 439,000 in 2010, and about half a million in 2012 (Nicholas, 2012).
A great number of Chinese NGOs operate without being registered, including some that the party suspects of being too independent or confrontational. They include everything: from self-help groups for the parents of autistic children, to outfits defending the rights of migrant workers, to house-church groups looking after the elderly. According to MCA, about 90 percent of NGOs operating in China were not officially registered (“Unleashing the NGOs”, *Beijing Review*, Vol. 48, No. 43, 2005, p. 4). This figure is estimated at 1.5-3 million.

This was due to the fact that until recently, the process of official registration of NGOs was very difficult. The so-called “dual management system” was the main barrier to registration and activities of NGOs (Shieh, 2015). NGOs are required to operate under a system of “dual management”, in which they must generally first obtain the sponsorship of a “professional supervising unit”, such as a government ministry or provincial government agency, then seek registration and approval from the Ministry of Civil Affairs in Beijing or a local civil affairs bureau, and finally, remain under the dual control of both agencies throughout their organizational life. In practice, it is not easy to obtain such sponsorship, particularly if a social organization lacks good connections in the government or is operating in sensitive sectors such as advocacy, legal aid, labor, religion and ethnic minority affairs.

At the end of 2013, the amendments to the legislation on the current process of registration of NGOs in China came into force (*NGOs in China*, 2013). The most important change was that dual-management system was abolished.

The new registration process will allow direct registration for the following four categories: industry associations, charities, organizations engaged in public services and organizations concerned with the development of science and technology. An organization meeting the criteria of the four categories will register directly with the Ministry of
Civil Affairs of the PRC without prior review and approval of other regulatory authorities and without public institutions as a co-signer. Currently, about 85 percent of registered NGOs in China come under the definition of the four indicated categories. The amendment also formulated the rules for the creation of branches of foreign NGOs or any NGO created by overseas Chinese in mainland China. Exceptions to this new optimized process regulation were provided for them.

The following types of NGOs will still be obliged to pre-register and be adopted by other regulators: NGOs involved in political activities, religious organizations, representative offices of foreign NGOs.

However, the new rules can give an additional impulse to the development and increase in the number of charities and NGOs in China, by giving opportunity to hundreds of thousands of currently unregistered Chinese non-governmental organizations to log in and start working legally in China.

Small reforms are also being carried out in other areas, but they do not lead to genuine transformation of China’s social and political structure. At the end of 2012, on the 18th National Congress of the CPC, the emphasis was made on judicial reform, but until now it has not led to any significant results except administrative restructuring. The decision of the Central Committee adopted at the end of 2014 contained a promise to “strengthen institutions and work mechanisms”, but as the main principle of judicial reform it was proclaimed the approval of the leadership of the Communist Party (Communique of the 4th Plenary Session 2014).

In November 2013, at the Third Plenary Session the forthcoming package of economic reforms was declared, and Xi Jinping as an “authoritarian reformer” was promoting significant economic reforms, including the expansion of free-trade zones (Xinhuanet, 2014), the
linking of mainland stock markets with the Hong Kong exchange, and
the experimentation with the management and purview of state-owned
enterprises (McGuire, 2015). Nevertheless, until now, many of the
initiatives have not been implemented in full, and some researchers
believe that, in general, this ambitious plan proved stillborn
(Shambaugh, 2015). The reforms are blocked by powerful groups,
because they affect the interests of the management of state-owned
enterprises and local party cadres. Meanwhile, China’s economy has
been mired in system traps, from which it is not easy to get out.

Despite a number of conditional democratic transformations, the
Chinese government has taken certain steps to restrict freedom. Under
the leadership of Xi Jinping, the CPC has introduced greater restrictions
to academic freedom: universities were ordered to steer clear of seven
topics in their teaching: universal values, freedom of speech, civil
society, civil rights, historical errors of the CPC, crony capitalism and
judicial independence (Li, 2013).

In 2013, the Central Committee distributed an order among the
members of the CPC, “Concerning the Situation in the Ideological
Sphere” (關於當前意識形態領域情況的通報) also known as
“Document No. 9” (Buckley, 2013). In this way, China launched a
campaign against “Western values” and “Western ideas”, such as
“Western Constitutional Democracy”, freedom of the press, and
universal human rights. They pounce on bloggers who dare mock
Chairman Mao. They scour the nation’s classrooms and newspapers for
strains of Western-inspired liberal heresies (Buckley and Jacobs, 2015).
Moreover, they have taken down professors, journalists and others
deemed disloyal to the Communist Party orthodoxy. The control over
media was tightened.

Thus, despite the relative liberalization in a number of areas, the
level of repression in China was increased. The restrictions concerned
the press, social media, the Internet, intellectuals, students and textbooks. All of these actions raise questions about the political future of China.

3. Possible Scenarios of Transformation of Political Regime in China

Despite a number of political changes and improvements of the human rights situation in China in the last few decades, China is still an illiberal state.

Under the old types of authoritarian regimes, the power of repression and propaganda makes people view the authoritarian rule as safer and more natural than freedom. New forms of dictatorship are based on manipulation of information rather than on mass violence. Modern authoritarian states use propaganda to convince the public that they are competent (Guriev and Treisman, 2015). The same situation can be traced in every authoritarian state.

Rapid economic growth of the PRC reduced public discontent at disregard to fundamental human rights. Yet the Chinese “economic miracle” is coming to an end. According to the International Monetary Fund, China’s GDP growth in 2014 was less than 7.4 percent (International Monetary Fund – World Economic Outlook Database). It is a good result which many states can only envy; but it is the lowest annual figure since 1980, and the forecasts are disappointing.

China’s economy is approaching the middle-income trap (Eichengreen, Park and Shin, 2013). The state strategy, which raised the country out of poverty, will no longer work. Nevertheless, due to political reasons, the government is not willing to change it.

Economic development is not the number one factor in the decline of democracy. The efficiency of the government is the primary problem. If the government cannot provide a safe and equal economic and
political playground then any work in promoting economic development will be useless.

We can assume several possible scenarios of development of China, depending on the way the economic and political reforms will be carried out.

The first scenario for the future of China is maintaining the status quo. Despite the fact that China is experiencing a number of significant problems, the current political model has not yet exhausted itself, and the regime clings to it. Factors such as the demographic potential, urbanization, globalization and the revolution in information technology have contributed to the rise of China. These factors will remain for a few more years, so the regime can continue to gain benefits from them.

Still, it will not last forever. The regime, which is based on the legitimacy of specific achievements, needs continuous economic growth to retain its power. The slower growth of the Chinese economy, financial instability, income inequality, inefficiency of state-owned enterprises, etc. make the current system extremely vulnerable. Possible serious economic problems could spill over into the political sector.

The combination of inactivity and serious challenges threatens to put an end to the economic takeoff of China. The lack of economic and political reforms in China could lead to a crisis (Youwei, 2015). Such an outcome would not be too desirable.

Minxin Pei raises the possibility of China collapsing chiefly due to its “governance deficit” and its regression from a “developmental” to a “predatory” state (Pei, 2006).

Taking into account the peculiarities of the Chinese society and the high potential of the society for conflict, which was historically confirmed, any forcing of the political reforms’ implementation process can put the existing system out of balance, which will lead to adverse effects not only in China but also in the world. In view of the high
degree of PRC’s involvement in the global processes and considering its enormous demographic potential, problems of the PRC tends to gain a global character. Any possible social shocks in this state will not go unnoticed not only for China’s nearest neighbors but also for the global community as a whole, and that is essential for global and regional stability.

In China, the legitimacy of the authoritarian regime is becoming more controversial; the potential for mass protests is growing. One side of a potential conflict wants to rely on the support of the people, as much as Mao Zedong relied on the Red Guards (*hongweibing* 紅衛兵) during the Cultural Revolution because his position in the government elite was severely undermined by economic failures.

In case of damage to the country’s economy and the multiplying of political demands, the number of conflicts in the society will increase. Several “time bombs” which were laid down by the current regime, such as the demographic crisis, damage to the environment and ethnic disagreements, are fraught with an explosion that further complicate the situation. As a result, some new kind of authoritarian regime will likely emerge in China, in response to the chaos.

Economic downturns often prompt an increase in censorship and propaganda. Populism will once again serve the regime. Opponents will try to displace adherents of the already obsolete communist ideology using moderate nationalism. New nationalist (and probably military) regime will not be as peaceful as the present one, and probably will want to do the revision of boundaries and the correction of the “historical injustices”. In such a great power as China, political demagogy, appealing to the glorious past, can arouse the terrible forces of the people. And in order to please them, Beijing will have to transform its foreign policy: start looking for geopolitical enemies and punish them.
It is a worst-case scenario; the emergence and development of the crisis in China is not profitable for the CPC, neither for China’s economic partners who are interested in a strong and stable China.

There is another popular development scenario for China: Singapore-style development, the so-called “Singapore on steroids” (Economy, 2014). If the campaign against corruption is deep and consistent, there may appear a new group that will be able to run the country effectively and generously. Political reforms will continue; the economic potential will be unlocked. As a result, improvement in the efficiency of the economy and progress will ensure legitimacy and authority of the renewed Communist Party.

Lee Kuan Yew 李光耀 realized that gradual democratization should continue, and it would take place one way or another. Singapore still is not a democratic country, but now its regime is much more open than at the beginning of Lee Kuan Yew’s. Singapore is much less authoritarian than China; it has a multi-party system and more political freedoms. Political competition is not quite fair, but during the 2011 elections, opposition parties received about 40 percent of votes (however, it should be noted that due to the nature of the electoral system in Singapore the opposition’s representation in the parliament is not sufficient; in fact the ruling People’s Action Party holds 93.10 percent of the seats in parliament). Nevertheless, in order for China to become similar to Singapore, it will have to expand the political competition significantly.

In China conversations about democratization are still being clamped down on. Despite the fact that the CPC was able to achieve tremendous economic growth, currently Chinese citizens do not benefit from this as much as they could have. Recent research on elections at the local level shows that where there are elections the Chinese authorities are more concerned about the citizens and they steal less (Martinez-Bravo, Padro i Miquel, Qian and Yao, 2011). However, the Chinese
government prefers to distance itself from the policy of democratization, as to not hold elections, and corruption continues.

Xi Jinping has launched a campaign against corruption which is unprecedented in its scale. However, the roots of corruption lie in the one-party system, non-transparent economy, state-controlled media and the lack of rule of law. Corruption permeates not only the Chinese elite but also the entire Chinese society. Instead of encouraging the development of free media, human rights groups and independence of courts to expose and deter corruption, the anti-corruption campaign is carried out from the above and is characterized by secrecy, ruthlessness and political prudence.

In terms of public goods and corruption, we can understand why the super popular CPC does not want to run in elections: where the latter are conducted, more money is spent on public goods for voters; the government becomes more accountable and less corrupt.

Thus, for the implementation of the “Singaporean scenario” it is necessary at least to eliminate corruption and carry out economic and political reforms.

Some observers impressed by the growth of China and shocked by the world financial crisis have recently begun to call authoritarian-state capitalism a viable alternative to “ill-functioning” liberal democracy. These sentiments are fueled by confidence in the fact that market reforms in Eastern Europe failed. However, Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Treisman prove that these sentiments are erroneous, and after a transitional period, the post-communist countries develop rapidly. The results of their research show that among post-communist countries a more significant growth of GDP was achieved by those who conducted reforms more radically (Shleifer and Treisman, 2014). These results can be interpreted also for China, which is experiencing increasingly serious problems.
China desperately needs basic reforms in the economic, financial and administrative areas, in order to maintain economic growth and move forward in the right direction. This has already been declared by the World Bank (Magnier, 2015) and the United States government (Davis, 2015), one of the main economic partners of China.

Integrated and radical reforms can cause another development scenario in China: gradual controlled democratization, following the Taiwanese pattern.

In the 1980s, Taiwan was ruled by a single party. It was an authoritarian rule without freedom of speech and where political prisoners were common. Today Taiwan is a multi-party democratic republic. The change was caused by the newly created middle class who had erupted as the result of the economic freedoms allowed under the authoritarian Nationalist (Kuomintang 國民黨) regime.

Taiwan offers an example of stable democracy in a Chinese context. The opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was formed in 1986, and a year later the ruling Kuomintang lifted the martial law.

The first free presidential elections took place in 1996, with the Kuomintang losing power for the first time since 1949 four years later. Changing of the ruling party has already occurred thrice as a result of free and fair elections (in 2001, 2008 and 2016). The transition of power takes place without any undue chaos or confusion.

Taiwan’s impressive democratization process has had an indirect impact on mainland China. Taiwan has successfully demonstrated that democracy and Confucian values are compatible. Taiwan has shown that democracy and the Chinese culture are not necessarily incompatible. Moreover, it is proof that democracy does not have to be accompanied by chaos or economic decline.
The experience of democratic reforms in Taiwan is particularly interesting as Taiwan is one of the most developed democracies in Asia. While before the end of the 1980s Taiwan attracted the attention of policy-makers and researchers mainly as an area that gave an example of rapid economic development under an authoritarian political regime (the “economic miracle” of Taiwan).

Thus, during the last decades, Taiwan has impressed the world by a quite successful approach to the modernization and democratization of its political system. Political reforms in Taiwan have been implemented rapidly and peacefully, which has been related to the development of a multi-party system and holding free and fair elections. The experience of the Taiwanese political reforms can be applied in PRC’s possible transition to democracy.

Those in support of the position stating that Asian values and liberal Western democracy were not compatible (Fukuyama, 1995) only mean to try to legitimize their own rule and secure their claims to power. Taiwan did not abandon its original values for accelerated development, but these values were successfully connected to the concept of modernization.

This scenario could be the best both for China and for the world. Enlightened political leaders in Beijing could now work on laying the foundation for the subsequent transition. The organization of multi-party elections would be the final step.

In order for China to escape serious upheavals, this should be done gradually and comprehensively. Ensuring the independence of the courts, empowering the National People’s Congress to deal with financial issues, etc. can pave the way for a smoother transition in the future and the strengthening of civil society.
According to Zhao Suisheng, after the end of the Cold War, as other communist regimes were collapsing, Chinese leaders felt increasingly lonely and vulnerable on the world stage (Zhao, 2005). China has had a long history of problematic relations with the West, starting from the Opium Wars. China’s shameful defeat by Great Britain in 1840-1842 pushed the Chinese leadership to rethink the country’s position on the world stage. Since then, China has had a certain peculiar complex in relation to the West, which is expressed in constant attempts to absorb Western ideas (Marxism, capitalism) in a special way and find its own authentic version of nationalism. These attempts were expressed particularly clearly in the dispute of the Chinese “universalists” (supporters of the Western way and gradual democratization of China) with the supporters of the “Chinese exceptionalism” (supporters of the special way and the preservation of the authoritarian system).

Morton Halperin, Joseph Siegle and Michael Weinstein proved that among the group of rich countries the democratic ones grow faster, but among the poorest groups, there is no such dependency on the type of regime. In addition, they concluded that in democratic countries economic disasters happen less often (Halperin, Siegle and Weinstein, 2005). The fact that the most powerful countries are typically liberal democracies creates ideological incentives for China. External pressure has a tendency to inflame nationalism in the Chinese society and weaken the nascent liberalism. In a country as large as China, a state with a rich history, democratization should come from within. Therefore, the best thing that the West could make to contribute to the political evolution of China is to remain strong, liberal, democratic and successful.

The Chinese government has achieved great success in the economy over the past few decades. However, it has proved ineffective at reducing income inequality, fighting against corruption, and reducing
environmental damage. The wider society is not involved in the benefits of progress.

As David Lake and Mathew Baum have shown, democracies provide a higher level of public services compared to authoritarian regimes (Baum and Lake, 2001). Furthermore, countries that make the transition to democracy experience an immediate improvement. Thus, democracy has a profound effect on the daily lives and well-being of people around the world. This has been argued theoretically and supported empirically and thus represents a step forward in the democratic theory, as the causal link between democracy and growth has been tested many times without a consistent pattern emerging. There is no argument that democracy produces a socially optimal level of public services; only that democracy will produce more.

It is already possible to see the positive effects of limited democratization in China. The introduction of village elections has improved accountability and increased expenditures on public services (Martinez-Bravo, Padro i Miquel, Qian and Yao, 2011). The development of local self-government is important for the development and strengthening of democracy, and direct elections of village-level representatives are an interesting phenomenon. Elections at the grassroots level could be more important for building democracy than the elections of highest state leadership; and it is very interesting that sprouts of a civil society appear not only in the developed large cities in the east of the country but also in rural China (Babones, 2015). The civil society in China is still weak, and local elections are held under the supervision of the party, but these quasi-democratic processes can have a significant impact on the development of the political system in China.

Two aspects of the Chinese economy can help to predict that the country is on the path of democratization.
The first aspect is the growth of GDP per capita: China has already surpassed the level of GDP per capita, at which, according to sociologists, societies begin to move toward democracy. With regard to the impact of economic growth on democratization, New York University professor Adam Przeworski and his colleagues set the pattern: a stable democracy occurs at US$13-15 thousand per capita GDP (Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi, 2000).

They claim that the relationship between income and regime types is the result of the impact of higher incomes on the stability of democracies: once democratic countries (regardless of how or why they became democratic) reach a certain level of income, they are extremely unlikely to revert to dictatorship. They believe that upon achieving of this threshold, the reverse transition from democracy to authoritarian regimes becomes impossible.

China has been steadily approaching this level. Moreover, out of the 25 countries which surpass China in terms of GDP per capita and are not free or partly free, 21 countries live at the expense of their natural resources. Besides this special category of countries, all government systems become more democratic with increasing incomes (Huang, 2013).

The second structural prerequisite for the democratization of China is the almost inevitable slow down of incredible economic growth. It will accentuate the existing conflicts within the system and make corruption a heavy burden for the country.

When the economy grows, people are more indulgent to corruption. When there is no growth, the same level of corruption becomes unbearable. If China continues to maintain the political status quo, conflicts will become more acute, and the rate of capital outflow from the country, which is growing now, due to loss of confidence in the political and economic future of China, will increase even more.
If the growing uncertainty about the future among the economic elites of China is ignored, serious financial issues may occur in the country. It is unlikely that a democratic China will outride the current China in the growth of GDP, but, at least, more Chinese people will be able to feel this growth. Proceeds will go not only into the pockets of the government officials and a small group of oligarchs but will be used for the needs of the majority of the population of China, because democracy strives to achieve the maximum good for the greatest number of people.

4. Conclusion

The Chinese leadership has proclaimed a war on “Western values”, including a free press, democracy and the constitutional separation of powers. They believe that all of the above pose an insidious threat to China; yet it is a threat only to the one-party rule. Freedom and human rights are not only Western values; democracy works well not only in the West. On the other hand, the one-party rule could be a threat to China in the future.

China’s liberal-minded public intellectuals have been actively engaged in the political and scholarly discourse on the desirability and feasibility of democracy in China. Yu Keping 余可平, director of the Center for Chinese Government Innovations at Peking University (北京大学), ex-adviser to Hu Jintao and a leading Party theoretician, states that “democracy is a good thing” (Yu, Thornton and Li, 2009), and he means that it is good for the entire human society, not just for the Americans or the Chinese. In his discussion of cultural and political developments in the era of globalization, Yu observes, “globalization not only makes people realize that they share a common fate but also helps them identify with such basic values as freedom, equality, justice, security, welfare, and dignity. Pursuit of such basic values is both the

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core principle, and the ultimate goal, of cultural globalization”.

China is in dire need of further economic, financial, administrative and political reforms. Political reforms obviously will imply more transparency and partial democratization. However, the state cannot accept the basic elements of democracy without adopting them, sooner or later, as the political regime. It is impossible to conduct free local elections while having, at the same time, the central government with elements of the communist dictatorship.

The example of Taiwan, where democracy developed gradually, is very revealing. In the early 1970s, Chiang Ching-kuo 蔣經國, who was supposed to become the president in 1978, began to reform the ruling party, Kuomintang, to permit holding local elections and to include the Taiwanese population in the political process. Prior to these changes only immigrants from mainland China could occupy high posts. In addition, these changes allowed the society to control the budget of the party. Chiang Ching-kuo granted amnesty to political prisoners and significantly loosened the control of the press and public associations. The emergence of the opposition Democratic Progressive Party in 1986 became a logical consequence of the reforms of Chiang Ching-kuo. The next president, Lee Teng-hui 李登輝, successfully completed the reforms in Taiwan and turned it into a developed democratic state.

In almost 50 years, a viable and prosperous society was created in Taiwan. As a result of reforms promoting the establishment of pluralism and democracy, particularly deep and revolutionary changes have occurred. However, this process was well thought out and peaceful. Contemporary Taiwan is one of the major trading nations of the world. Political reforms carried out in Taiwan, the so-called “quiet revolution”, certainly do deserve recognition.

In Taiwan, it proved impossible to draw the line between partial and full democratization. The same may be true for China.
The advantage of democracy is not in providing universal happiness and the power of good, qualified and honest people. It does not bear full justice, equality and even the power to all the people. Nevertheless, under a democratic government the elite is wise enough to reach the agreement on a periodic change of power between different representative groups in order to keep the system as a whole; this is what gives stability.

The famous words of Winston Churchill that “democracy is the worst form of government, except for all the others” are often perceived as a joke. But the famous politician was not joking. Critics of democracy argue that under this form of government the society is overwhelmed with many problems. However, if democracy really takes root, it gives such a level of political stability which makes possible economic development, and the level of freedom and justice acceptable for most people. No worthy alternative to this has been found yet. Of course, the Chinese regime is now stable, but in the long term accumulated problems could come back to haunt it.

In any dictatorship (individual, collective or “people’s”) in case of any problems and crises the social unrest is directed at the elite as a whole. Today, legitimacy in China rests on the fact that it provides a high level of economic growth and improves the welfare of the population. However, history has not shown cases of perpetual growth. Eventually the growth will slow down or stop, and then the one-party elite will become the object of sharp criticism. In case of serious growth of protest moods not only the government will have to resign, but also the elite as a whole; perhaps they will have to resign in an atmosphere of chaos and violence, and so many of their real achievements will be lost.

If Xi Jinping wins in the anti-corruption war, it will be his main achievement. If China starts the much-needed economic reforms it will
make a step towards greater transparency, which in the future may be capable of leading to the democratization of China and its transformation into a legal state.

The example of the collapse of the Soviet Union, which became a historical trauma for China, shows that political reforms should take place only after economic reforms and combat corruption effectively. Examples of the collapse of numerous dictatorships demonstrate that the lack of political reforms could lead to disasters.

In view of the high level of the PRC’s involvement in the global processes and considering its enormous demographic potential, the effects of a possible democratic transition in China would extend far beyond its borders. The lack of reforms in China could lead to the collapse of and serious instability in the entire Asian region. On the other hand, Chinese democratization would likely fatally undermine the authoritarian and totalitarian regimes in neighboring countries, such as North Korea, Vietnam, Laos and Myanmar. The fall of dictatorial regimes in the absence of legitimate and peaceful mechanisms for the transfer of power can radically change the security situation in East and Southeast Asia, and will inevitably lead to instability and conflicts. The international community should prepare for possible upcoming challenges.

The question of democratization in China is fully in the hands of the CPC. Despite the development of some quasi-democratic processes in China, since 1989 there were no truly significant political reforms adopted by the CPC. The CPC remains relying on high growth rates to maintain its rule. However, this strategy works well only in the conditions of the “economic miracle”, but not in a situation where economic growth inevitably slows down. In view of the current situation and possible shocks in the future, there are only two alternatives: the CPC voluntarily begin active economic and political reforms, or they
will be forced to implement reforms under the influence of a serious system crisis. Of course, it would be much better for the Chinese political regime to change gradually and in a controlled manner, rather than through crisis and riots. The CPC could improve China’s political system without having to surrender its power, and acquire the image of reformers, which will positively affect the international prestige of China, investment climate, etc. Very few authoritarian regimes get this kind of opportunity, and it could be a great chance for the CPC.

Notes

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Special Features
Literators of the *Feng Xia*

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**Abstract**

In December 1945, that is, soon after the end of the Pacific War, pro-Chinese Communist Party weekly journal, *Feng Xia*, was published mainly by Chinese literators (writers) who had come to Malaya prior to, or immediately after the War. In the following year, they published *Nan Chiau Jit Pao* as virtually an organ paper of the Malayan branch of the China Democratic League which was a pro-CCP party formed in China. Malayan-born leftist Chinese also contributed articles to *Feng Xia*. While the great majority of articles advocated to support the liberation movement in China, they appealed to fight for the liberation of Malaya as well. This article examines who were inclined to China and who were to Malaya. Why could these two sections co-exist in a journal? Did they support each other to the end? How were their activities forced to come to an end through deportation by the colonial authorities? Their later careers in China will be examined as well.
Keywords: Chinese Communist Party, China Democratic League, Kuomintang, Malayan Communist Party, Zhi Gong Dang, home country, China-oriented, China-born, Malaya-oriented, Malaya-born, double nationality, Nan Chiau Jit Pao, Min Sheng Pao

JEL classification: B24, F54, H12, N45

1. Introduction

Research on the political activities of the Malayan Chinese has thus far been focused on the relations between the Chinese and China until the period of anti-Japanese movements. Their anti-Japanese struggle was cut off from China during the Japanese occupation period. As far as the leftists are concerned, direct political relations between the Malayan Chinese and China that were revived after the Pacific War were almost ignored. In Malaysia and Singapore, it is generally accepted that Malayan Chinese regarded China as their home country before the Pacific War, gradually began to view Malaya as their own place to eternally live in, and during the Independence movements their Malayan orientation (sentiment to regard Malaya as their home country) was nurtured and established. This author once showed a hypothesis that the reason why the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) did not wage an armed struggle against the British when they came back to Malaya in 1945 was that most of its members considered their armed struggle had ended as a result of China’s (their home country’s) victory over Japan. Instead, the MCP hoped to win through the political process and did not abandon their struggle against the British.

This hypothesis was proven by the memoirs of former Party members as well as by interviews with them. Their memoirs stated as below:
Great majority of Chinese had close relations with China. Ever since Japan invaded China, they enthusiastically deployed anti-Japanese movements. Due to Japanese occupation of Malaya, their spite against Japan farther grew. Three ethnic communities, i.e., Malays, Chinese and Indians (who strongly demanded India’s independence at that time) had different nationalisms and therefore could not form a united front to fight against the British colonial army with arms.⁴

A former Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) cadre recalled as below:

At that time, our nation was still China. Attacks against China were attacks against ourselves. We had never thought Malaya as our own country yet. We cannot deny we had a consciousness that our Anti-Japanese War was a part of China’s Anti-Japanese War.⁵

With regard to Malayan Chinese involvement in Chinese politics, Professor Cheah Boon Kheng wrote:

The Chinese nationalists in Malaya, especially those in the Kuomintang [KMT. Nationalist Party of China], embroiled themselves fiercely in the affairs of their motherland and were only slightly interested in Malayan politics. The Chinese in the MCP were divided in their loyalties: some were oriented towards China and some towards Malaya.⁶

It cannot be denied that the China-oriented faction was still strong and the China-oriented sentiment of the Malayan Chinese in general remained substantive. Subjects of research on Chinese political movements of the early post-War years, however, were limited to their,
or MCP’s anti-British colonial struggle opposing the Malayan Union and the Federation of Malaya. These were focused on Malayan internal politics only. Political movements relating to the China-orientation of the Malayan Chinese were set aside. Professor Cheah himself analyses the MCP’s legal struggle for decolonization and the subsequent anti-British armed struggle. He, however, did not refer to what the China-oriented MCP faction did, or how this orientation affected their movements. The China-oriented groups were based on the nostalgic sentiment towards China of the Malayan Chinese in general at that time. There were influential persons who embodied this China-oriented sentiment. Typical examples were Tan Kah Kee 陳嘉庚, the most prominent leader of the anti-Japanese movement of the Nanyang (Southeast Asia) Chinese in the late 1930s, and writers who supported him.

On the other hand, the China-oriented faction also participated in Malayan politics. It was a new current of the era after the end of the War. Their mental complexity between the two orientations have not been well analysed yet either.

The China-oriented group consisted of pro-KMT and pro-Chinese Communist Party (CCP) factions. Reflecting the defeat inside China, the KMT faction was losing its influence in Malaya. For them, the way to be admitted as Malayan political power was open (like H.S. Lee 李孝式 and Lau Pak Kuan 劉伯群, many joined the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) which was formed in 1949). They became Malayan-oriented much more smoothly. As such, the analysis here is restricted to the pro-CCP, or leftist group.

Tan Kah Kee and his supporters founded a daily newspaper, Nan Chiau Jit Pao 南僑日報 on 21st November 1946. The paper continued speaking for the China-oriented Chinese, or patriotic Chinese 愛國華僑 until it was closed down by the British colonial authorities on 20th September 1950. Its chairman was Tan Kah Kee, managing director was...
Hu Yu-zhi 胡愈之, chief publisher was Lee Tiat Min (Li Tie-min 李鐵民), and chief editor was Hu Wei-fu 胡偉夫. Its paid-up capital was 400,000 straits dollars (SD), of which Tan Kah Kee invested SD110,000. Of them, all but Tan Kah Kee were members of the China Democratic League (CDL, 中國民主同盟). Though Tan himself was not a member of the CDL, he was a strong supporter of it. The CDL was formed in 1941 in China as a political party to intermediate between the CCP and the KMT. Ever since then, it has kept close relations with the CCP. Soon after the end of the Pacific War, the CDL established branches in almost all Southeast Asian countries. Their leaders were generally secret CCP members at the same time who had been dispatched to these countries by the CCP in the late 1930s or soon after the end of the War. Its Malayan branch was set up on 29th September 1947. Main contributors of articles to the Nan Chiau were CDL members. Nan Chiau’s circulation number was around 20,000. This figure matched those of the largest commercial Chinese papers, Nanyang Siang Pau (NYSP, 南洋商报) and Sin Chew Jit Poh (SCJP, 星洲日報) whose circulation number at that time was around 30,000 each. When we consider that Nan Chiau was an organ paper of a political party, its circulation and influence among the Chinese should be regarded as quite large.

Before the War, NYSP was still under the control of Tan Kah Kee, its founder. That was why Hu Yu-zhi was invited to NYSP as chief editor in December 1940. After the War, though NYSP resumed publication on 8th September 1945, Tan Kah Kee had no influence on it. In China’s civil war era (1946-1949), both of NYSP and SCJP were pro-Kuomintang. So Tan decided to publish a new paper which should reflect his pro-CCP stand. All these papers were China-oriented and their reports as well as commentaries on China far exceeded those on Malaya at that time.
Prior to issuing *Nan Chiau*, those people who were involved in it had also inaugurated weekly magazines, *Feng Xia* (風下, meaning “leeward”), and *Xin Funü* (新婦女, meaning “new women”). *Feng Xia*, whose managing director cum chief editor was Sha Ping (沙平, pseudonym of Hu Yu-zhi), was issued from December 1945 till June 1948, that is, when the Emergency of Malaya\(^{11}\) was proclaimed. *Nan Chiau* and *Feng Xia* were located in the same building. *Xin Funü*, whose chief editor was Shen Zi-jiu (沈茲九, Mrs Hu Yu-zhi), was issued from March 1946 till June 1948. After the respective closure, *Feng Xia Xin Funü Lianhe Kan* (風下婦女聯合刊, “Unified Issue of Feng Xia and Xin Funü”) was subsequently issued from August 1948 till March 1949.

In this era, many Chinese youths lost education (as Chinese education was banned during the Japanese occupation period) and could not find jobs due to the un-restored economy. According to Chui Kui Chiang, *Feng Xia* tried to encourage and enlighten these youths. For this objective, it established Youths’ Self-study School (青年自學輔導社). Its students’ subscription fee was reduced and excellent students were given scholarship. In February 1948, its students exceeded one thousand. Thus *Feng Xia* received extensive support of the Chinese, especially youths and students.\(^{12}\)

Hu Yu-zhi became a CCP secret member in 1933 and came to Singapore in December 1940 as a chief editor of the *NYSP* which was still under the control of its founder, Tan Kah Kee. With many other writers who came from China, he and Shen concealed themselves (all used pseudonym names) in Sumatra, mainly Bukit Tinggi and Paya Kumbuh, during the Japanese occupation. The reason why they took refuge in Sumatra was (1) only small boats were available to evacuate from Singapore; (2) their faces were not known there; (3) Chinese were scattered in various towns and thus difficult to be carefully watched by the Japanese military; (4) there was anti-Japanese Chinese network
before the War.

After the end of the War, they came back to Singapore. Ever since the CDL established its Singapore office on 18th April 1946, Hu was the highest leader of its activities in Malaya and was appointed the director (主任) of its Malayan branch which was established on 29th September 1947. Shen Zi-jiu also became a CCP secret member in 1939 and came to Singapore in August 1941. After the War, she also joined the CDL and became a leader of its women’s section.13

This article examines the articles of Feng Xia. Though most of its articles naturally dealt with Chinese affairs, accusing the KMT and appealing to support the CCP, views on Malayan affairs were carried as well. As one of the objectives of this article is to explore how the China-oriented faction regarded and were involved in Malayan affairs, their views on Malaya are analysed here. Reversely, the Malaya-oriented faction also positively participated in China’s politics in the early post-War years. This author would like to analyse how this situation emerged, proceeded and ended, and why the two groups could cooperate at that time.

Tan Kah Kee and many in the China-oriented faction involved in Nan Chiau and Feng Xia went back to China prior to or soon after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China. Why they did not finally settle in Malaya but chose the way to go back to China will also be analysed.

Firstly, I show how the China-oriented writers led by Hu Yu-zhi commented on the developments in China and how they connected overseas Chinese with their home country, China. All are summaries. Emphasis is by this author. (Author, volume and date of publication of the Feng Xia are shown in parenthesis.) Inside the quotations, this author’s annotations are shown in square brackets.
2. Views on China

Though articles of this kind far outnumbered those on Malaya, I show only a few here.

(1) “7th July: We will for generations never forget this day”

7th July 1937 was a day when China’s all-out resistance war against Japan began. There are people who say we should not commemorate 7 July. They are those who want split, civil war, dictatorship and colonization. Thinking of the war, miseries, cruelty and strutting secret agents in our home country, everyone recalls a glorious day of nine years ago.

(Hu Yu-zhi. Vol. 31, 6th July 1946)\(^4\)

(2) “Civil war in China and American policy towards China”

The supreme leader of the KMT cum chairman of the central government [i.e. Chiang Kai-shek 蔣介石 ] drove 450 million compatriots into war again. Though the United States of America wants peace of China for their business, if China is freed and democratised, its people will desert the US and overthrow imperialism. Therefore, the US has no other way but to assist the reactionary faction’s suppression of justice, freedom and democracy.

(Yang Dao-qing 楊道清. Vol. 34, 27th July 1946)

(3) “Look at the creator of New China!”

Democrats should also devote themselves to armed struggle. Even though staying abroad, we have to support the struggle by various
means and form a formidable force of South Seas democratic movements.

(Rao Zhang-feng 饒彰風. Vol. 90, 30th August 1947)

It can be discerned that the Feng Xia considered political development in China the most important and supported the CCP, regarded Malayan Chinese as Chinese nationals (compatriots), and requested them to participate in the revolution of their home country.

3. China and Malaya for the Malayan Chinese

In the early post-War period, gradually becoming a serious and important problem for the Malayan Chinese was that whether their home country was China or Malaya, whether they should participate in the political activities of China or of Malaya. Members of the Feng Xia, who were fundamentally China-oriented, could not help being involved in this mental conflict. There appeared subtle difference or split among them. Sometimes, a same person’s view seemed contradicted at a different time.

3.1. Home country and Nationality

“Overseas Chinese came from China. Their ancestors’ houses and graves are in China. Their genuine home country is China” … This perception was scarcely questioned so far. After the end of the War, however, problem emerged. Nationals of colonial and semi-colonial Nanyang territories demanded to be hosts of their own lands. Overseas Chinese were also forced to choose, either to obtain equal political status as the natives, regarding Nanyang as their permanent home, or to be deprived of their political rights as sojourners as before. Nationality Law of China based on *jus sanguinis* made solution of Chinese status more difficult.
Those Chinese who, either born or living long in Nanyang, have foundation of life not in our country [i.e. China] but in Nanyang should not regard China as their sole home country. Otherwise they have no right to participate in local politics, and lose security of economic interests. If they demand equal right with local nationals, they must regard Nanyang as their home country.

Sentiment of the great majority of Chinese is, while participating in local politics on the one hand, to regard China as a sole home country on the other. But, we cannot concurrently obtain both.


According to Chinese custom, the place in which one has lived long is an eternal homeland (永久家鄉), and ancestors’ place is a home country (祖國). Nationality based on a place in which one has lived long is progressive. Nationality based on patriarchal *jus sanguinis* is anachronistic.


Hu deeply understood the emerging complicated sentiment of the post-War Chinese. In the above articles, he clearly supported the newly emerged sentiment of the Chinese that they should regard Malaya as their home country and obtain single Malayan nationality. In this regard, Tan Kah Kee showed similar view in 1956. When he met the delegation of the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce which visited China that year, Tan advised them that once decided that Singapore was their eternal homeland, they should endeavour to obtain its citizenship and to construct a new nation.15 Here we have to take the change of the CCP’s

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overseas Chinese policy into consideration. Until the mid-1950s, the CCP as well as the Chinese government considered all overseas Chinese to be Chinese nationals and made various efforts to garner their support, and proclaimed that the Chinese government would protect them. In the late 1940s, Hu Yu-zhi already understood the new situation. Yet, he also well comprehended that his ultimate task was to implement CCP’s policy. Thus he showed an opposite view as well that the Chinese were to be Chinese nationals. He wrote:

Ma Hua (馬華)’s view that overseas Chinese do not want to return home is wrong. At least, more than half of them want to do so. Chinese participation in local national struggle has nothing to do with their insulation from China. Even if not local nationals, the Chinese can support local national democratic struggle.

(Hu Yu-zhi, “Friend, you have entered too deep into ox-horns”, Vol. 108, 10th January 1948)

On nationality and political activities, Hu’s wife, Shen Zi-jiu, wrote as below.

Political activities have two kinds. One is doing patriotic activities for the home country as an overseas Chinese. Another one is struggling for democracy and freedom of Malaya as a Malayan citizen. Choice should be an individual responsibility.

(Shen Zi-jiu, “Don’t fear politics anymore”, Vol. 79, 14th June 1947)

In this era, the Malayan Chinese began to be bewildered about which nationality they should hold. This seems to have something to do with their cold-heartedness to the Malayan Union proposal of October
1945. As admitted almost equal citizenship to Chinese, the proposal met
evahement opposition of Malays, especially Malay elites, and was
eventually withdrawn. It was not because they were indifferent to
Malayan politics, but because they could not make up their mind to
renounce Chinese nationality in order to obtain Malayan citizenship.

A Malaya-born member of the Feng Xia, Chen Zhong-da 陳仲達
stated on the citizenship as below.

Of the over 2 million Chinese in Malaya, except for a few who came
from our country (國內), who have families there and intend to
return there within a short period, a great majority of them have close
economic relations with this land (當地) and can hardly emigrate.
They face a common problem now: am I a Malayan citizen or Chinese
national? If possible, keeping Chinese nationality, can’t I become a
local citizen?

As China adopts jus sanguinis and Britain jus soli, the problem has
become more complicated. Before the War, nationality was also a
diplomatic problem. But Malaya was still a colony at that time and
there was neither democracy nor freedom. The Chinese considered
themselves as Chinese (nationals).

After the end of the War, however, situation changed. The Malayan
Union (MU) proposal referred to citizenship for the first time. The
contents of citizenship of the Federation of Malaya (FM) proposal,
which was announced recently, have no much difference. The People’s
Constitutional Proposal16 stipulates the contents of citizenship more
clearly. Its main points are (1) denial of double nationality; (2)
creation of a new unified national called Melayu that consists of
various nations who make Malaya as their eternal homeland and swear
allegiance to Malaya. In this situation, we have to immediately decide
whether to be Malayans or Chinese.
One and a half years ago, Qu Zhe-fu 屈哲夫 wrote “Nanyang Chinese (Huazu 華族) and politics” in Volume 6 of this magazine. There he asserted that the sojourning character does not exist among the absolute majority of the overseas Chinese. The word “overseas Chinese” should be replaced by Huazu or overseas Huazu. But as Huazu produces double nationality, it is not a good solution at all. Luo Sao 羅騫 17 contributed a long article entitled “Chinese and Malayan political system” to the Min Sheng Pao 民聲報 [legally published organ paper of the MCP] 18 in this year [1947]. There he also used “Huazu” and insisted that qualified Huazu could be a Malayan citizen without abolishing Chinese nationality.

Recently, Ang Shih Shih (Hong Si-si 洪綽絲), too, published a long article in Volume 70 of the Modern Weekly (現代週刊) [organ paper of the CDL Penang division]. He asserted that though he did not oppose to obtaining Malayan citizenship by renouncing Chinese nationality, and that if double nationality is possible, it might be the most ideal means.

The Chinese have two interpretations over double nationality. One is that if one obtains local citizenship, it is not necessary to renounce Chinese nationality. Another one is that after obtaining Malayan citizenship, one temporarily loses Chinese nationality while living in Malaya, and on return to China, will regain Chinese nationality and lose Malayan citizenship. This might bring about unsolvable difficulties. If the Chinese insist to have double nationality, it will cause other nationals’ misunderstanding and discontent, and jeopardise the future of nation-building. The representative of the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC), 19 Mr John Thivy, also asserts that Malayan Indians could have only one nationality. While the Chinese should abandon the consciousness of great nationals and obtain
Malayan citizenship, the Chinese government should change its Nationality Law.

(Chen Zhong-da, “To be Chinese or to be Malayans?”, Vols. 95, 96, 9th October 1947)

Chen stated that citizenship stipulated in the MU and in the FM were almost same. In reality, one of the most important objectives of the FM was to severely restrict the qualification of non-Malays for citizenship. It seems that what mattered for Chen was the consciousness of the Chinese, and not the restrictions by the colonial government. Nonetheless, compared with Hu and Shen, we can discern Chen’s strong inclination to Malaya.

3.2. Participating in Malayan politics or in Chinese politics?

The question of which country, China or Malaya, is regarded as a home country is related to in which country’s politics the Chinese should be involved. In this era, such Malaya-oriented writers as Ma Hua and Zhou Rong ( 周容, alias Jin Zhi-mang 金枝芒, referred to later) insisted that the Malayan Chinese should write novels narrating the Malayan situation in order to liberate Malaya. Criticizing them, Sha Ping (Hu Yu-zhi) wrote as below.

Everything is a product of unification of two opposing sides. The overseas Chinese unify two opposing elements, that is, relation with China and relation with the living place. By participating both in local and homeland politics, their position can be raised. If one proceeds exclusively deep into one side only, one would come to a dead end. In the field of literature, Zhou Rong’s opinion that the Malayan Chinese novelists should only write on Malayan problems means to repatriate sojourner as well as evacuee Chinese novelists to China.
(Sha Ping (Hu Yu-zhi), “Explanation of ‘ox-horns’ by chart”, Vol. 112, 7th February 1948; with regard to “ox-horns”, see p. 8.)

Hu said that the Malayan Chinese should be involved in both kinds of politics here. In reality, the Feng Xia was far less enthusiastic to inspire readers to be involved in the Malayan politics. Both views are shown below.

3.2.1. Involvement in or concern about Malayan politics

Malayan Chinese were indifferent to the first proposal on the Malayan political system [i.e. the MU proposal]. Proclaiming “to become a Malayan citizen is to forget the home country; if you want to unite with the savages, you should become a savage”, some Chinese showed off Great Han nationalism (大國民主). They, especially the upper strata of them such as the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, however, began to demand equal rights for them in Malaya. Comparing with other Nanyang Chinese, this is a great progress.

(Shen Zi-jiu. Vol. 63, 22nd February 1947)

Nation-wide Hartal movement\(^{20}\) to oppose an undemocratic constitution of the FM proposal was a peaceful resistance that was realized due to the progress and awareness of various Malayan nations.

(Shen Zi-jiu. Vol. 98, 25th October 1947)

In these two articles above, Shen regarded Malayanization of the Chinese as “progress”.

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\(^{20}\) Hartal is a mass protest or a boycott of business activities that is held in Malaysia.
Xia Yan 夏衍 wrote in the Nan Chiau on 13th April 1948 that the present national, political cultural problem of Malaya was the most complicated and difficult one in the world. The real problem, however, lies in our lack of understanding of Malaya.

(Zhang Ming-lun 張明倫, “Understanding Malaya”, Vol. 126, 15th May 1948. On this issue, a notice to seek articles on Malayan affairs was carried. Notwithstanding it, such articles remained scarce till the end.)

The Malayan Democratic Union (MDU) is struggling for democracy in Malaya. The British Labour government, which claims to proceed with bloodless socialist revolution in its own country, implements unjust discriminatory policy towards nations in Malaya.

(Li Run-hu 李潤湖, “Post-War change of Malaya and the present crisis”, Vol. 66, 15th March 1947)

In the Federation of Malaya, the Legislative Council members are to be appointed, not elected. In Singapore, which is separated and kept as a colony, out of the 900 thousand population, only 22 thousand are given suffrage. This is a paper democracy.


If Britain postpones the self-government, various ethnic communities of Malaya should firmly unite to gain democracy and self-government.

(Hu Yu-zhi, “Go slowly”, Vol. 112, 7th February 1948)
While Li Run-hu’s remark referred to concrete difficulties of the Malayan Chinese, Hu Yu-zhi’s referred to colonialism in general. Li can be regarded as more familiar with Malayan affairs. Different stands on Malayan affairs are clearly shown on other occasions. First, on the upper-strata Malayan Chinese:

The Associated Chinese Chambers of Commerce of Malaya [the then president was Lee Kong Chian 李光前] protects the dictator-cum-traitor (獨裁賣國) government [meaning the Chiang Kai-shek government] on the one hand, and supports local struggles to obtain democracy and self-government as well as nation-wide hartal on the other.
(Hu Yu-zhi, “People’s wish”, Vol. 98, 25th October 1947; Shen Zi-jiu, “Contradictory, strange phenomena”, Vol. 100, 8th November 1947)

Among the Malayan Chinese (Ma Hua 馬華), there are such enlightened national bourgeoisie as Tan Cheng Lock (陳禎祿) and Tan Kah Kee. Contradiction between the upper-strata Chinese and the lower-strata Chinese is much smaller than that between the British colonialists and the upper-strata Chinese. There are KMT members among the upper-strata Chinese. They, however, joined the KMT to merely pursue profits in Malaya and not to sympathise with the dictatorship of the KMT in our home country. They can be included in our united front.


To this view, a CDL member, Wang Jin-ding 汪金丁, replied in the same issue that the fact that they joined the KMT to pursue profits itself shows that their interests accord with the reactionaries.
While the Malaya-inclined personnel of the *Feng Xia* were sympathetic to the Chinese social leaders who participated in the anti-colonial movements in Malaya, such China-inclined personnel as Hu Yu-zhi, Shen Zi-jiu and Wang Jin-ding criticised them as pro-KMT. Meanwhile, the MCP, through its various affiliated organisations, participated in anti-FM struggle led by Tan Cheng Lock, and subsequently supported Tan’s proposal of the Malayan Chinese League (MCL, 马来亚华人联盟)\textsuperscript{23} until early April 1947. MCP’s organ paper *Min Sheng Pao* positively referred to the MCL several times.\textsuperscript{24} Interview records with Tan were also carried on the paper twice.\textsuperscript{25} Its stand suddenly changed when the paper criticized Tan as a representative of the capitalists on 11th April 1948. This change coincided with the fundamental change of the MCP from the legal struggle line to the armed struggle line. Positive view towards these upper-echelon Chinese might be relevant to the stand of the MCP in this short period of legal struggle.

Secondly, with regard to the Malay leftists, the Malay Nationalist Party (MNP)\textsuperscript{26}, conflicting views were shown as below:

> Under the leadership of the aristocrats, the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO)\textsuperscript{27} deceived and sold Malays in order to protect the interests of a few. On the contrary, supported by passionate youths and enlightened masses, the MNP is steadily opening the way.

> (Ma Hua, “Progress of the Malays”, Vol. 100, 8th November 1947)

> The UMNO, which is based on the feudal forces, aristocrats and the colonial forces, is shocked by the emergence of genuine patriotic movements, for the MNP began to demand abolishment of the
penghulu (village head) system, implementation of popular elections, and the separation of religion from politics.

(Ma Hua, “How Malays are ruled”, Vol. 114, 21st February 1948)

The UMNO represents aristocrats who claim that Malaya belongs to the Malays. The MNP is self-styled leftist who intends to unify Malaya with Indonesia and claims that all the Malays in the Malay Archipelago are Malayan citizens.

(Lin Zi-wen 林子文, “The Malays and the Malayan Union”, Vol. 32, 13th July 1946)

From the end of the War until early 1948, the Malayan Chinese leftists headed by the MCP tried hard to cooperate with the Malay leftists in the anti-British legal struggle. The main group of the Feng Xia seems not to understand this local situation.

3.2.2. Dialectic solution of orientation

Though putting priority overwhelmingly on Chinese affairs, the Feng Xia ostensibly asked the Malayan Chinese to participate in both Chinese and Malayan affairs. I would like to see how they solved this problem here.

Before the new radical line of the MCP was openly known, the Feng Xia carried an article below:

There occurred confusion: which movement should the Malayan Chinese youths participate in – anti-Chiang, anti-US, and democracy struggle of China, or democracy and self-government movement of Malaya? The Communist Youth Conference\textsuperscript{28}, which resolved to strengthen the anti-US United Front and the anti-imperialism struggle,
ceased this confusion. Following this resolution, the Malayan Chinese democracy movement should firmly unite with the various nations ( 民族 ) of Asia and strongly connect with the revolutionary movement of China.29 We have to learn from and support the struggle in our home country.

(Fang Hua 方華, “New direction of the Malayan Chinese Youth Movement”, Vol. 122, 17th April 1948)

This meant that the Malayan Chinese should give priority to the struggle in China. Hu Yu-zhi explained why strengthening anti-imperialism struggle was linked to attaching importance to China. Hu said:

China is the largest country of Asia. The overseas Chinese are medium between China and the various nations ( 民族 ) of Southeast Asia. Thus, the Chinese people’s anti-imperialism struggle is to lead the oppressed nations of Asia.

(Sha Ping (Hu Yu-zhi), “Chinese Revolution and the nationalism movements of Asia”, Vols. 95, 96, 9th October 1947)

Another China-inclined member wrote as below:

There are people who, having dislike of the word “overseas Chinese”, call themselves Ma Hua. At any rate, liking changes following the transformation of the environment.

The tasks of the overseas Chinese are twofold. We cannot mechanically decide which one is more important. While the liberation of the people in China is imminent, the movement in Malaya still stagnates in constitutional struggle.

(Wang Jin-ding 汪金丁, “Open the window and ventilate – Discussion with Mr Zhou Rong 周容 on the Malayan Chinese Literature”, Vol. 113, 14th February 1948)
Wang meant here that importance should dialectically be judged based on the real circumstances. Here in this era, the Malayan Chinese should participate in the revolutionary struggle in China that had much more real significance.

In the last issue of the *Feng Xia*, another member appealed as below:

In the liberated area in China, human resources are extremely lacking. Let children of the overseas Chinese go back to our home country as engineers for the construction of New China!

(He Sheng 赫生 (Peng Shi-zhen 陳世禎), “Let’s become engineers for the construction of New China”, Vol. 132, 26th June 1948)

Go back to China – it was a final conclusion of the main stream members of the *Feng Xia*.

The most influential leader of the *Feng Xia* group as well as the CDL, Hu Yu-zhi, together with his wife, Shen Zi-jiu, had earlier went back to China on his own will in March 1948 and devoted himself to the final stage of the civil war against the KMT. Eventually, many other members followed him.

4. MCP, *Feng Xia*, CDL and China

4.1. Cooperation between the Two Groups

Cooperation between the Malaya-oriented group and the China-oriented group has not been analysed enough so far. Indeed, though the *Feng Xia* advocated Malayan Chinese to participate in anti-imperialism movements in Malaya as well, it seldom referred to the MCP *per se* that led the movements. Rare exceptions were condolences to the MCP’s Singapore representative, Lin Ya-liang 林亞亮 who died soon after his
release from detention of 6 months (Vol. 90, 30th August 1947; Vol. 91, 6th September 1947; Vol. 94, 27th September 1947)\textsuperscript{30}. Articles of the leaders of the MCP also seldom appeared in this magazine. Rare exceptions were the serial reports on the World Democratic Youth Conference, which was held in Czechoslovakia, by Chen Tian 陳田\textsuperscript{31} (Vol. 86, 2nd August 1947; Vol. 92, 13th September 1947; Vol. 94, 27th September 1947; Vol. 95/96, 9th October 1947; Vol. 104, 6th December 1947; Vol. 105, 13th December 1947). It seems that both sides, the MCP and the CDL, had a common understanding to have a separate venue to appeal to the Chinese masses. Another reason might be that China-oriented leaders intended to refrain from being involved in the internal politics of Malaya as much as possible in order to avoid suppression.

It did not necessarily mean, however, that both sides opposed each other, or did not cooperate. We can find many cases which showed close cooperation between them.

4.1.1. Exchange of support

The Nan Chiau of the CDL frequently reported the activities of the MCP and its affiliates. The Min Sheng Pao, in return, frequently reported the activities of the CDL group. Advertisements of the MCP group appeared in the Nan Chiau often. For instance, when Lau Yew 劉堯\textsuperscript{32}, Chief of the Central Military Committee of MCP during the War, got married, congratulatory address of Hu Yu-zhi, Ang Shih Shih and several other CDL leaders was carried on the Nan Chiau. On the first anniversary of the Nan Chiau, many regional branches of such MCP-influenced organisations as the New Democratic Youth League (NDYL, 新民主青年團) and the Federation of Trade Unions (FTUs, 職工聯合總會) put congratulatory messages in the paper. And when some CDL leaders living in Singapore visited its divisions in the Peninsula, local MCP leaders also attended the welcome party, and vice versa. Min Sheng
Pao’s editor, Lin Fang-sheng 林芳聲, joined the Nan Chiau Ban Pao 南僑晚報 (Nan Chiau’s evening edition) as chief editor after having resigned from the former at the end of 1947. The secretary-general of the MDU and a secret member of the MCP, Eu Chooi Yip 余柱業 33 worked in the Nan Chiau after the MCP publications were all banned.

Former Malayan Chinese who were mostly deported to China (a minor portion of them went back to China on their own will) published a two-volume Who’s who of returned overseas Chinese recently. On this list brief personal histories of several hundred returnees are recorded. All depict their anti-Japanese and anti-British struggles in Malaya. According to this, out of those who were deported to China, ten persons joined the CDL in Malaya. Of them, five had earlier joined the MCP as well. One of them, Chen Qi-hui 陳其揮 had joined the CCP in 1929 (a year before coming to Malaya) and the MCP in 1939. One joined the Women’s Federation (婦女聯合會), which was led by the MCP, as well. One was a leader of the youth wing of the MCP, the New Democratic Youth League (新民主青年團). One joined the CDL following the directions of the MCP.

There were five non-CDL members who worked in the Nan Chiau. Of them, one (MCP member) had earlier worked in the Min Sheng Pao, another one (MCP member) had worked in the Qianfeng Bao 前鋒報 (Vanguard, organ paper of the FTUs) as well. Besides them, one returned to China in 1950 following the proposal of the CDL. One states that he was an ardent reader of the Nan Chiau and participated in a meeting jointly organised by the MCP and the CDL. One studied in the Feng Xia Youths’ Self-study School organised by the CDL in Singapore. One MCP member could manage to return to China aided by Hsue Yung Shu 薛永شع (Xue Yong-shu) who was the director of the Malayan branch of the CDL after Hu Yu-zhi returned to China in March 1948.34
The CCP seems to have a secret youth wing for overseas Chinese, namely the Overseas Chinese Democratic Youth League (華僑民主青年同盟). Three persons listed in the above Who’s who, who did not affiliate to any political party in Malaya, joined this OCDYL in 1947, 1948 and 1949 respectively.35

The same group of the former Malayan Chinese leftists who were living in Hong Kong or China published a memoir recently. One of the commemorated heroes referred to here was an MCP district leader during the anti-Japanese war and a CDL member in the early post-War era. Soon after the emergency began, he was arrested and deported to China.36

These records show that among those who fought for the liberation of Malaya with might and main some were concurrently involved in the struggles in China.

Nonetheless, their cooperation was not equally bilateral. As the China-oriented group tried to avoid oppression by the colonial authorities, the Malaya-oriented group’s support for or participation in China politics far surpassed the reverse. This was shown in the membership of the China-oriented organisations. Unlike political parties, these organisations were joined by both sections.

4.1.2. MCP affiliates’ participation in the China-oriented organisations and activities

Besides branches of such political parties as the CDL and the Zhi Gong Dang 致公党 (ZGD)37, various organisations to support the CCP were formed in Malaya. A typical one was the Federation for Peace and Democracy in China (FPDC, 促進祖國和平民主聯合會). The first federation was set up on 27th October 1946 in Singapore. Its president was Tan Kah Kee. By the end of 1947, eleven States or cities including Selangor had such federations. The Selangor FPDC consisted of the
CDL, the ZGD, the Ex-service Comrades Association (ESCA, 退伍同志會)\textsuperscript{38}, the FTUs, the NDYL and the like. The former two were branches of China-based political parties, the latter three being MCP-led mass organisations. The East Pahang FPDC included, besides the same affiliates as Selangor, the Women’s Federation (WF, 婦女聯合會) and the Literators’ Union (LU, 文聯), both also led by the MCP.

When the MCP-led organisations were banned soon after the Emergency, these FPDCs might also be dissolved. Although the MCP itself did not affiliate with the FPDC directly, it is obvious that the Party was indirectly involved in the FPDC and its movement.

In this period, various mass rallies to support the CCP’s struggle were held. The largest-scale ones were the Anti-Civil War Rallies held in many States between May and June of 1946 and of 1947 again. These were participated by the CDL and such MCP affiliates as the NDYL, ESCA, the General Labor Union (GLU, 各民族各業總工會)\textsuperscript{39} and the FTUs. In the rally held in Negeri Sembilan on 22nd June 1946, the MCP and the People’s Committee, which was set up by the MCP to administer the liberated areas soon after the Japanese surrender, participated as well.

Then, why could this cooperation, more accurately, MCP’s involvement in China politics, be realized?

\textbf{4.2. Background of the Cooperation}

The \textit{Nan Chiau} of 13th June 1947 presented a result of its opinion survey which it had carried out from March that year. According to it, 95.6 per cent of the Malayan Chinese wanted to become Malayan citizens while retaining Chinese nationality. This inclination towards China reflected the general sentiment of the Malayan Chinese including the MCP at that time. On 7th May 1946, \textit{Min Sheng Pao}’s editorial stated as below:
We have two principles. First, we Chinese (中 国 人) do not waive our rights and duty as overseas Chinese. These are bestowed by our home country. Secondly, overseas Chinese in Malaya should possess equal civilian rights as other nations, which include the minimal democratic rights such as freedom and the franchise.

It should be noted that the MCP’s paper itself called China as the home country. This editorial coincided with a public discussion on Malayan citizenship to be held on the following day. In the discussion organised by the Consulate of Republic of China in Kuala Lumpur, most attendants insisted on equal citizenship in addition to Chinese nationality. More emphasis was laid on the absolute freedom to fulfill duty to their home country. Only one or two opposed double nationality.40

Public discussions were convened in many places in mid-1946. Almost all of them resulted in resolutions that the Malayan Chinese should be allowed double nationality. In several places resolutions purposely stated that they would support the Five Point Claims of the MCP, which were said to include approval of double nationality.41

In a special committee appointed by the Governor of Malayan Union, Chairman of the Perak People’s Committee which had been set up by the MCP, Chen Tian-hua 陈天华, asserted that all of those who were granted Malayan citizenship should be allowed to retain their home country’s nationality. In this committee, a baba of Keluang strongly opposed double nationality. Min Sheng Pao criticized him for having colonial baba’s narrow viewpoint.42

In September 1946, an article of the Min Sheng Pao persisted that the MCP should clearly be distinguished from the CCP and demanded the MCP to refrain from hoisting either Sun Yat-sen’s picture or China’s
national flag. But the *Min Sheng Pao* seemed to have dared not pursue the matter further. Probably, this article might merely have reflected a minor group’s view. Even in mid-1947, this paper appealed twice to equally participate in both countries’ liberation movements.

In this regard, a well-known writer, Han Suyin 韓素音, wrote as follows:

In 1947, two eminent writers of China, Kuo Mo-jo [ 郭沫若, Guo Mo-ruo] and Hsia Yen [ 夏衍, Xia Yan], were also involved in the debate and gave their views; Hsia Yen had paid a previous visit to Malaya. [They] accepted the definition of local writers, namely, that Malayan-Chinese literature had a life of its own, unfettered by Chinese social context, and its aim was to portray Malaya, and not China. Guo was already a very influential intellectual in China at that time and had many friends among Chinese writers sojourning in Malaya. That is why the latter were eager to know Guo’s view.

It seems that Han Suyin looked at one side only. Guo certainly wrote in January 1948 that the Malayanisation of the Malayan Chinese was absolutely correct and that Malayanized literature did not mean insulation from Chinese literature but enrichment of it. When shown the result of *Nan Chiau’s* opinion survey by Xia Yan, however, Guo changed his stand. In March 1948, Guo sent an article to *Nan Chiau* stating that the reality was not merely the one before one’s eyes. Both the reality of Malaya and of China should be depicted. Han also ignored the fact that Xia Yan had been dispatched by the CCP in March 1947 in order to garner support for the CCP among the Malayan Chinese.
The reality of strong China-inclination of the Malayan Chinese in general forced Guo Mo-ruo to actually withdraw his support for the Malayan Chinese school of literature.

But towards the end of 1947, the situation changed.

4.3. Desinicisation of the MCP

The organ paper of the ESCA, the *Combatants’ Friend* (戦友報), carried an interview article with Eu Chooi Yip, the secretary-general of the MDU, on 21st November 1947. There Eu said: “Only those who harbour feudalistic thought would support double nationality. Malaya is our permanent home.” Two weeks later, another article written by Xu Jing 徐經 asserted that double nationality would hinder the formation of a solid Malayan nation (一個統一強大的民族). In this paper’s New Year special issue for 1948, the top article of the front page written by Ma Hua stated:

> Nowadays, many Chinese (中国人) are inseparably bound up with Malaya. We cannot help participating in the local national democratic struggle. In order to build up a strong national movement to win domestic self-rule, we must definitely abandon double nationality.

*Min Sheng Pao* of 8th January 1948 also decisively opposed double nationality and insisted that the task of the leftist Malayan Chinese was to devote themselves to the Malayan people.

In March 1948, Ma Hua wrote again:

> Although most Malayan Chinese still regard China as their home country in their hearts, socio-economically they are deeply involved in Malaya. Therefore we must carry out democratic movement in Malaya first and foremost.
Two months later, that is a month before the Emergency, a more decisive article, written by Di An 狄安, was carried on the paper. It clearly criticised the China-oriented polemics as below:

Someone argue that those who are interested in the home country [i.e. China] should be engaged in the struggle for China. It is undemocratic to betray a tenacious home country sentiment and national consciousness of the Malayan Chinese (cf. Nan Chiau’s opinion survey). While the Chinese revolution is imminent, the Malayan revolution is a far future problem. These arguments do not understand the demand of the Chinese lower-class masses, i.e. workers and peasants. The Malayan-born consciousness is stronger and more realistic now. Workers and peasants did not participate in Nan Chiau’s opinion survey. Nowadays, the struggle for the right to live [i.e. struggle for a democratic Malaya] is of much greater priority.52

Coincidentally, a fundamental change of the MCP’s political line, from the legal, peaceful line to the armed struggle line, took place at the same time, March to April 1948. Party members had no other way but to concentrate in the struggle in Malaya without being involved in Chinese politics.

In this way, close cooperation between the MCP supporters and the CCP supporters, more precisely MCP affiliates’ participation in support-CCP movements, became difficult between late 1947 and early 1948. The co-existence of both groups in the Feng Xia also was to come to an end.
5. Writers Who Went (Back) to China

5.1. Writers Who Were Born in China

It is believed that while those Chinese writers who were born in China and merely sojourned in Malaya stressed the importance of Chinese politics, the Malayan-born Chinese stressed the importance of Malayan politics. In order to compare the two, I made two tables to show the well-known writers of each group. Please refer to Table 1 and Table 2 at the end of this article.

Of twenty-three persons listed in Table 1, many were born in Fujian and Guangdong as usual overseas Chinese. It is conspicuous, however, that six were from Zhejiang 浙江. It might mean that there were many left-wing literators from that province at that time in China. Of 23 persons, 5 or 6 joined the MCP. Of them, 4 had lived in Malaya for more than 10 years. While 8 persons were already CCP members when they came to Malaya, 4 joined the CCP after they returned to China. Two were members of both the CCP and the MCP. There were 11 CDL members, mostly joined it in Malaya. Of the 11, seven persons were concurrently CCP members, one was MCP member. There were two Zhi Gong Dang members, of whom 1 joined two other parties, that is, the CDL and the MCP as well. From here, we can understand that many writers were dispatched by the CCP in order to propagate its causes. But as the CCP was not a legal organisation in British Malaya, most of them carried out their task as CDL members. Among these writers, those who played important roles in the Feng Xia and the Nan Chiau were Hu Yu-zhi, Shen Zi-jiu, Wang Jin-ding, Hong Si-si, Rao Zhang-feng, Xia Yan, Gao Yun-lan, Zhang Ming-lun and Wang Ren-shu as China-oriented advocates and Zhou Rong as an exceptional Malaya-oriented advocate. Hu, Wang, Gao and Xia were directed by Zhou En-lai 周恩来 to come to Malaya to mobilize Chinese support to the CCP.53 Xia and Rao seemed
to be the highest-ranking CCP members in Malaya as a director of the secret party agent called “Cultural Cell” (文化小组). During the Japanese occupation period, 7 of these writers, Hu, Shen, Gao, Hong, Wang Ren-shu, Zhang Ming-lun and Wang Jin-ding concealed themselves in Sumatra. Except for Wang Ren-shu, who continued the Indonesian Independence struggle against the Dutch, six others came back to Malaya after the Japanese surrender. Wang Ren-shu, who was arrested by the Dutch colonial government and deported to China in 1947, occasionally contributed articles to the Feng Xia and the Nan Chiau.

On the contrary, the MCP members who had long stayed in Malaya participated in the anti-Japanese guerrilla war. They did not positively advocate taking part in China politics. A typical person is Zhou Rong. Before the Pacific War, he wrote anti-Japanese novels praising the Malayan Chinese’s patriotism towards China. During the War, he joined the MPAJA and the MCP. After the end of the War, he began to stress that Malaya should become the homeland of the Malayan Chinese and was regarded as one of the most influential advocators of the Malaya-oriented group.

Earlier, I referred to Ma Hua as a Malaya-oriented writer. According to a prominent critic of Malayan Chinese literature, Fang Xiu, Ma Hua was 80 per cent the same person as Zhou Rong.54

Whatever role they played, most of them were finally regarded as threat to the colonial rule. Those who were more directly related to the MCP were deported first, mainly soon after the proclamation of the Emergency in June 1948. Those who were China-oriented were allowed to continue China-oriented activities for a while. But within a few years they were also deported. On 12th May 1949, branches of the KMT and the CDL were banned in Malaya. Thus there remained no room for them to spread their thought and influence in Malaya.
While the mainstream China-oriented writers assumed various important Party as well as national positions such as member of the National People’s Representative Congress, the Malaya-oriented writers’ position tend to remain to be of provincial level at the highest. Zhou Rong was conspicuous here too. He participated in the MCP’s anti-British national liberation war in June 1948. In 1961, following the order of the Party, he left the guerrilla base in South Thailand and, through Laos and Vietnam, entered China by land. In China, he was steadfastly reluctant to participate in China politics and remained to be one of the representatives of the MCP. After the MCP’s radio station, Voice of Malayan Revolution (馬來亞革命之聲), was established in Hunan in 1969, he was in charge of the Chinese language broadcasting till the closure of the station at the end of June 1981.

During the Cultural Revolution between the mid-1960s and the mid-1970s, most of them were criticised or persecuted and a few of them killed. At that time returned overseas Chinese as a whole were accused to have black connections with capitalists living abroad. Wang Ren-shu was criticised in the early 1960s to have given priority to human heart than to political principles and was prosecuted during the Cultural Revolution for having received money from the KMT in the 1930s.55 Rao Zhang-feng was impeached for establishing various joint ventures with overseas Chinese capitalists in Guangdong in the early years of the People’s Republic and for protecting the intellectuals from the anti-rightists campaign in Guangdong in the 1960s.56 All were rehabilitated and their honour retrieved after the end of the Cultural Revolution.

5.2. Writers Who Were Born in Malaya

Seven writers who were born in Malaya and forced to go to China for good later are listed in Table 2. (Please see table at the end of the article.)
Of them, 5 went to China to study and once came back to Malaya. Their close attachment to China must be nurtured through this experience. Though only two are supposed to have joined the MCP, all of them actively participated in Malayan politics. At the same time, reflecting the China-oriented sentiment of the Malayan Chinese in general and of the MCP in particular in the early post-War period, they were also involved in China politics. Chen Qiu-fang 陳秋舫 worked both for Min Sheng Pao, MCP’s organ paper, and for Xiandai Ribao 現代日報 (Modern Daily News), CDL Penang Division’s organ paper. Chen Zhong-da, Han Meng 韓萌 and Wu Liu-si 吳柳斯 were involved in Nan Chiau. Chen Zhong-da was involved in Feng Xia as well. Notwithstanding this, almost all of them were deported by the colonial authorities due to anti-British activities, not due to pro-CCP activities. Though Chen Qiu-fang and Lin Zi 林紫 (his pen-name is Mi Jun 米軍) were not officially deported, they had no other way but to flee from Malaya to evade arrest.57 Ma Yang 馬陽, who is much younger than others, attracted attention due to anti-colonial novels in his higher secondary school days and was expelled from school. He went to China to continue his study and to pursue his political idealism.58 It can be assumed that their twofold priority of China and Malaya gradually changed and, prior to their deportation, their priority was given to Malayan politics. A typical person was Chen Zhong-da. He was so well acquainted with the China-born writers led by Hu Yu-zhi that he fled to Sumatra with them during the Japanese occupation period. After coming back to Singapore in August 1945, he was involved in both of Nan Chiau and Feng Xia and joined the CDL. Yet, his different stance became gradually noticeable. With exceptional consistency, he stressed the importance of Malayan consciousness and Malayan politics in these publications.
Like the China-born writers who had long lived in Malaya, their positions in China were restricted to the provincial level at the highest. Most of them were also oppressed during the Cultural Revolution. Especially, Chen Zhong-da died due to persecution in the early stage of it. Xiao Cun 蕭村 survived this turmoil period as an economist, not a novelist. After being re-admitted into the literary circle, his works are well received in Malaysia and Singapore. A few of them were published by a publisher, which was set up by a former MCP member, in Hong Kong. An anthology of Ma Yang’s prose was published in Singapore in 1987. It seems that the Malaysian as well as Singaporean Chinese now have closer attachment to them than the China-born writers who did not stay in Malaya for long.

6. Conclusion

In the early post-War years, the Malayan Chinese in general and the Chinese members of the MCP in particular considered themselves as Chinese nationals. When Malayan citizenship was proposed by the colonial authorities, they wanted to have double nationality. They considered that it was their right as well as obligation to participate in political struggle not only in Malaya but also in China. Here existed common understanding between those who were China-oriented and those who were Malaya-oriented. The main advocators of the former group were writers who came to Malaya in the late 1930s. Both the China-born writers who came to Malaya earlier and had lived there for more than 10 years and the Malaya-born writers tended to become the advocators of the latter group. The former comparatively stressed the importance of the struggle of China, the latter of Malaya. While both groups considered that the Malayan Chinese should participate in the struggle both in China and in Malaya, Feng Xia provided a common
place to publicise their view. Rift between the two groups, however, gradually widened and deepened. When the MCP renounced the double nationality theory and decided to wage an armed struggle by early 1948, the difference between the two groups’ stands became obvious. The Malaya-oriented group was involved in the MCP’s anti-British struggle. The China-oriented group chose a way to participate in the final struggle against the KMT and in the construction of the new China, the People’s Republic of China. As the Malaya-oriented group was regarded a direct threat to the colonial authorities, they were arrested and deported to China soon after the proclamation of Emergency. The China-oriented group was allowed to continue their pro-CCP activities for a few years. With the banning of the CDL’s papers, Nan Chiau and Xiandai Ribao (Modern Daily News) on 21st September 1950, their activities in Malaya totally came to an end. By that time, almost all of the China-oriented writers were also deported to China.

After coming back to China, most of the China-oriented writers played important roles on the national level. Meanwhile, the Malaya-oriented writers’ positions were on the provincial level at the highest. Anyhow, almost all of them were criticised and suppressed during the Cultural Revolution and only retrieved their honour after the Cultural Revolution.

Nowadays, their works, especially those of the Malaya-oriented writers, are also published in Malaysia and Singapore. This seems to show that their past activities in Malaya have been re-evaluated or re-esteemed several decades afterwards.
Notes

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1. If not mentioned otherwise, Malaya in this article includes Singapore.


5. Interview with Mr Chen Rui-yao 陳瑞瑤. 4th September 1994. Singapore.


7. Both H.S. Lee and Lau Pak Khuan were leaders of the Kuomintang Movement in Malaya since the 1930s and were founding leaders of the MCA.


11. As a result of increased tension between the British colonial administration and the Communists, State of Emergency was proclaimed in whole Malaya and mass arrests were executed on 20th June 1948. Armed struggle of the MCP began.


14. At that time around, to fight against the CCP, the KMT sought a cordial relation with Japan and thus was reluctant to commemorate 7th of July.
16. The People’s Constitutional Proposal was drafted by Malay, Chinese and Indian leftists on 10th August 1947. It was an outcome after a few months of discussion within the Putera-AMCJA coalition (Putera, i.e. “Pusat Tenaga Rakyat” – Malay leftists; AMCJA, i.e. “All Malaya Council of Joint Action” – Chinese and Indian leftists). It stipulates, among others, to give Melayu nationality to all those who consider Malaya as their own eternal home country.
17. Prior to the Japanese invasion, Luo Sao was a member of the Singapore Intellectuals’ Anti-Japanese Association (星洲文化界戰時工作團 whose director was Yu Da-fu and deputy director was Hu Yu-zhi) and was in charge of political training of the Singapore Chinese Volunteer Force (星洲華僑義勇軍). See: Zhang chu-kun 張楚琨 (2007). 〈回憶流亡中的郁達夫〉 [Yu Da-fu in exile in my memoir”] <http://www.gmw.cn/content/2007-02/28/content_560359.htm> (accessed on 7th August 2013).
18. *Min Sheng Pao* was inaugurated at the end of August 1945 as an MCP’s organ daily paper. Its managing director was Li Shao-zhong 李少中 (1919-1951), chief editor Liew Yit Fan 劉一帆 (Liu Yi-fan. 1915-1984). When the War ended, the MCP had a membership of 8,000. According to a former *MSP* staff, while another MCP paper issued by the former anti-Japanese guerrillas, *Combatants’ Friend* (Zhanyou Bao 戰友報) was circulated inside the MCP only, *MSP* was openly sold to the public and had a foremost influence in Malaya (Qiu Yihong 邱依虹 (2006). Xiao Hua 小花 (僑史資料). 福建僑聯網, 3rd March 2006. 福建省歸國華僑聯合會 (Returned Overseas Chinese Federation of Fujian) <http://www.fjql.org/qszl/a34.htm> (accessed on 10th August 2013). (原載：校友通訊，福建師範大學校友總會編, 2005年第1期.). On 17th June 1948, the *MSP* was banned. Li joined the guerrillas and died in the jungle. Liew was arrested and deported to China in 1955.
19. The Malayan Indian Congress was formed by the Malayan Indians in August 1946. It was a member of the AMCJA.

20. Led by the Putera-AMCJA coalition, commercial activities all over Malaya were stopped to oppose the FM proposal on 20th October 1947.

21. The MDU was formed by the moderate leftists on 21st December 1945. Its members consisted mainly of the English-educated Chinese. It was dissolved soon after the proclamation of Emergency.

22. Tan Cheng Lock (1883-1960) was a leader of the ALCJA and the founder of the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA).

23. Tan Cheng Lock proposed to set up the Malayan Chinese League on 25th November 1947. It was to be realised as the MCA on 27th February 1949.


26. The Malay Nationalist Party (Partai Kebangsaan Melayu Malaya. PKMM) was formed in September 1945 mainly by the former KMM (Kesatuan Melayu Muda) members. It led the Putera in the anti-FM movements and was banned in April 1950.

27. The United Malays National Organisation was formed in May 1946 to oppose the Malayan Union proposal which they regarded as infringing the rights of the Malays.

28. The Communist Youth Conference was held from 19th February 1948 to 24th February 1948 in Calcutta (present Kolkata), India.

29. It was formerly said that this resolution had prompted the MCP to start an armed struggle against the British colonial rule. As far as the China-inclined Chinese are concerned, however, this theory is apparently wrong.

30. According to these articles, during the Japanese occupation, Lin Ya-liang was caught by the Japanese military police (*tokkō* 特高) on 28th September 1944. Though freed soon after Japanese surrender, he was weakened. He was re-arrested by the colonial authorities in February 1947.
31. Chen Tian (1923-1990) was the Commander of the 4th Regiment of the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army. He was an aide of Chin Peng 陈平 at the Baling Peace Talks in December 1955. He was appointed an MCP’s Central Committee member in 1959.

32. Lau Yew (1915-1948) was the president of the Ex-service Comrades Association that was formed when the MPAJA was disbanded on 1st December 1945. He was killed by the British army in July 1948.

33. Eu Chooi Yip (1918-1995) led the underground movement of the MCP in Singapore until he secretly migrated to Indonesia in 1953. He was appointed an MCP Central Committee member in 1959 and the deputy representative of the MNLL Indonesian Office in 1965.


37. Zhi Gong Dang is originated from an anti-Qing dynasty secret society, Ang Bin Hui 洪門會. It supported Dr Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary movement and subsequently had, and still has, close connection with the CCP.

38. See Note 24.

39. The General Labor Union was formed on 16th February 1946 under the MCP leadership. In order not to breach the new colonial regulations, it was reorganised into the FTUs on 17th February 1947.
40. Min Sheng Pao, 10th May 1946.
41. Min Sheng Pao, 27th and 31at May 1946, 7th June 1946.
42. Min Sheng Pao, 3rd June 1946. “Baba” refers to Chinese descendants who had lived in Malaya for generations and adapted to Malay customs.
43. Min Sheng Pao, 7th September 1946.
44. Min Sheng Pao, 2th May and 14th September 1947.
47. Nan Chiau Jit Pao, 16th March 1948.
51. Combatants’ Friend, 16th March 1948.
52. Combatants’ Friend, 16th May 1948.
54. Interview with Mr Fang Xiu in Singapore on 23rd May 1988. / On the other hand, a former leader of the MCP, Mr Chang Ming Ching 張明今 (Zhang Ming-jin) said to me that Ma Hua was a pseudonym of an MCP leader Yang Mu 楊木 (interview with Mr Chang in Guangzhou on 3rd
September 1993). According to an MCP web-site, Yang Mu was an MCP South Johor Regional Committee member in 1942, Central Committee member in 1947 and killed by the British army in 1957 <http://www.of21.com/doku.php?id=%E7%83%88%E5%A3%AB:%E6%8A%97%E8%8B%B1%E6%88%98%E4%BA%89%E4%B8%AD%E5%8C%8A%E4%B8%8A%E9%9C%B9%E9%9B%B3%E7%89%BA%E7%89%B2%E7%9A%84%E7%83%88%E5%A3%AB&s=%E6%9D%A8%20%E6%9C%A8> (accessed on 1st March 2013).


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Chui Kui Chiang 崔貴強 (Cui Gui-qiang) (1989). Xin-Ma Huaren guojia rentong de zhuoxiang, 1945-1959 新馬華人國家認同的轉向，1945-


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<td>Writer, Ass. Prof., Xiamen University</td>
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<td>Hu Yu-zhi (Sha Ping)</td>
<td>CCP (1933), CDL</td>
<td>NYSP, Nan Chiau, Dir., Malayan Br., CDL</td>
<td>Dep. Minister of Culture (1956), St. Com., PRC (I-V), Dep. Pre., PRC (VI), PPCC (II-IV), Vice-Chair, PPCC (V), Vice-Chair., CDL (1958)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Li Wei-gang (Li Mei-zi)</td>
<td>CDL (1946), MCP (1948), ZG (1948. after return)</td>
<td>Teacher, Writer, MPAJA, Nan Chiau, SCJA, Dir., Publicity Dep., CDL Sp.</td>
<td>PPCC (VI), Dep.Chair., Guangzhou PPCC, Chair., Guangzhou FROC, St. Com., ZG (1988)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lin Feng</td>
<td></td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>Guangdong ROCWA</td>
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<td>Ma Ning (Huang Zhen-cun)</td>
<td>CCP (1930), MCP</td>
<td>Teacher, Writer, Malayan AIL, KWYP</td>
<td>Novelist, Fujian PRC (I-III), Fujian PPCC (IV), Dir. Cultural Bureau, Fujian</td>
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<td>Mei Xiu / Mui Sau (Mei Jin-hua)</td>
<td>MCP ?</td>
<td>Writer, MPAJA, Qianxian Bao</td>
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<th>Activities or Affiliations in China</th>
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<tr>
<td>Peng Shi-zhen (Peng He-sheng)</td>
<td>CCP (1937), CDL (1946)</td>
<td><em>Nan Chiau, Feng Xia</em></td>
<td>Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, Renmin Chubanshe</td>
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<tr>
<td>Qin Mu (Lin Jue-fu)</td>
<td>CDL (1944), CCP (1963)</td>
<td></td>
<td>CCP (XII), PRC (VII), Vice-Chair, Guangdong FLAC (1978), Guangdong PRC (I-IV)</td>
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<td>Qiu Jia-zhen (Qiu Shi-zhen)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Teacher, Writer, <em>Min Sheng Pao</em></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Shen Zi-jiu</td>
<td>CCP (1939), CDL</td>
<td><em>Feng Xia, Xin Funü</em></td>
<td>PRC (I-III V VI), PPCC (I-III), St. Com. ACFROC (I II), St. Com., CDL (1958, 1979, 1983)</td>
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<td>Wang Jin-ding (Jin Ding)</td>
<td>CCP (1924), CDL</td>
<td>Teacher, Writer, <em>Feng Xia</em></td>
<td>PPCC(VI), Prof., Peopl's Univ., Cen. Com., CDL</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wang Ren-shu (Ba Ren)</td>
<td>CCP (1927)</td>
<td>Teacher, Writer, <em>NYSP Feng Xia, Nan Chiau</em> <em>Qianjin Weekly</em> (Medan)</td>
<td>Ambr. to Indon (Jul.50-Jan.52), ACFROC (49), Man. Dir., People's Literature Pub. (1957)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yang Jia (Li Xuan)</td>
<td></td>
<td>AEBS, <em>Nan Chiau</em>, Writer, Teacher</td>
<td>Prof., Jinan University, China Writers’ Association, Dep. Chair., Guangdong ROCWA (1981)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name (Alias Name in Brackets)</td>
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<td>Activities or Affiliations in Malaya</td>
<td>Activities or Affiliations in China</td>
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<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
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<td>--------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhang Ming-lun (Zhang Qi-cheng)</td>
<td>CDL</td>
<td>NYSP, Feng Xia, SCJA, Esperantist</td>
<td>Sec. Gen., National Esperantists Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhou Rong (Jin Zhi-mang)</td>
<td>MCP (War time)</td>
<td>Writer, MPAJA MNLA</td>
<td>Voice of Malayan Revolution Sec., Overseas Office, MCP</td>
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**Table 1 (Cont.)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name (Alias Name in Brackets)</th>
<th>Main Works in Malaya</th>
<th>Main Works in China</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bai Han (Xie Yao-hui)</td>
<td>Xinjiapo Hepan (1950)</td>
<td>Selected Works of Bai Han (2002)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bing Mei (Yang Zhi-zhen)</td>
<td>Qiong Huang Ye Cao (1955)</td>
<td>To Hong Kong (1975)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Chen Ru-jiu (Chen Zu Chiu)</td>
<td>Jin Ye-qiong Si Jun (1938)</td>
<td>Dismissed from CCP, xiafang (1958)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Dongfang Bingding</td>
<td></td>
<td>Rehabilitated (1979)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ding Bo (Li Ye-qin)</td>
<td>Fengyu Nanyang Xing (1988)</td>
<td>Persecuted in Cultural Revolution</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Gao Yun-lan (Gao Yi-chang)</td>
<td>Chunqiu Que (1946)</td>
<td>Xiaocheng Chunqiu (1956)</td>
<td>Translated into Japanese (1964)</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name (Alias Name in Brackets)</th>
<th>Main Works in Malaya</th>
<th>Main Works in China</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hong Si-si / Ang Shih Shih (Hong Yong-an)</td>
<td>Shaonian Hangkong Bing (1942), Hu Yu-zhi Zuopin Xuan (1979)</td>
<td>Yixiang Qiyu (1980) <em>Xiafang, laogai in Cultural Revolution</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hu Yu-zhi (Sha Ping)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Li Wei-gang (Li Mei-zi)</td>
<td>Shu Junshi de Gushi (1930s)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lin Feng</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ma Ning (Huang Zhen-cun)</td>
<td>Lülin Zhong (1932) <em>Selected Works of Ma Ning</em> (1991)</td>
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<td>Mei Xiu / Mui Sau (Mei Jin-hua)</td>
<td>Xiaocheng Youmeng (1946 ?)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peng Shi-zhen (Peng He-sheng)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Qin Mu (Lin Jue-fu)</td>
<td>Huangjin Hai’an (1955) Fennu de Hai (1982)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Qiu Jia-zhen (Qiu Shi-zhen)</td>
<td>Baba ya Niangre (1932) Fuchou (1948)</td>
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<td>Rao Zhang-feng (Rao Gao-ping)</td>
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<table>
<thead>
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<th>Name (Alias Name in Brackets)</th>
<th>Main Works in Malaya</th>
<th>Main Works in China</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shen Zi-jiu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mrs Hu Yuzhi Studied in Japan (1921-25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang Jin-ding (Jin Ding)</td>
<td>Lunxian Yihou (1938)</td>
<td>Lu Haimeiyou Zouwan (1997)</td>
<td>Criticised during the Cultural Revolution</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Jinding Zuopin Xuan (1979)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Xia Yan (Shen Duan-xian)</td>
<td>Xue Shu (1948, HK)</td>
<td>Fengyu Diren Qing (1996)</td>
<td>Persecuted during the Cultural Revolution</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yang Jia (Li Xuan)</td>
<td>Xingzhou Er Fangdong (1946)</td>
<td>Luying Quansheng (1960), Haiwai Liufeng (1992)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zhang Ming-lun (Zhang Qi-cheng)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Zhou Rong (Jin Zhi-mang)</td>
<td>Ba Jiu Bai Ge (1938)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ba jiu – translated into Japanese in 1994</td>
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Notes:
ZG – Zhi Gong Dang 致公黨
ACFROC – All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese （中華全國歸國華僑聯合會）
SCJP – Sin Chew Jit Poh 星洲日報
New Democracy (新民主報)
FLAC – (China) Federation of Literary & Art Circles ([中國] 文學藝術界聯合會 / 文聯)

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Jh – Johor
KL – Kuala Lumpur
CDL – China Democratic League (中國民主同盟)
NYSP – Nanyang Siang Pau 南洋商报
AEBS – Anti-Enemy Backing-up Society (抗敵後援會)
Xinjiapo Hepan 新加坡河畔
Qiong Huang Ye Cao 穷荒野草
Jin Ye-qiong Si Jun 金葉瓊思君
Fengyu Nanyang Xing 風雨南洋行
Yexin Jia 野心家
Zhuri Zhe 逐日者
Chunqiu Que 春秋却
Xiaocheng Chuqiu 小城春秋
PRC – People’s Representative Congress (全人民代表大會)
PPCC – People’s Political Consultative Conference (中國人民政治協商會議)
Shaonian Hangkong Bing 少年航空兵
Hu Yu-zhi Zuopin Xuan 胡愈之作選
SCJA – Singapore Chinese Journalists’ Association (星華記者公會)
Shu Junshi de Gushi 鼠軍師的故事
AIL – Anti-Imperialism League (反帝大同盟)
KWYP – Kwong Wah Yit Poh 光華日報
Lülin Zhong 綠林中
ROCWA – Returned Overseas Chinese Writers’ Association (歸僑作家聯誼會)
Xiaocheng Youmeng 小城優夢
Yixiang Qiuyu 異鄉奇遇
Xiafàng 下放 – sent down to the countryside
Laogai 勞改 – reform through labour
Qianxian Bao 前線報
Huangjin Hai’an 黃金海岸
Fennu de Hai 憤怒的海
Min Sheng Pao 民聲報
Baba yu Niangre 嬸嬸與娘惹
NCNA – New China News Agency (新華社)
Fuchou 復仇
Lunxian Yihou 渾陷以後
Jinding Zuopin Xuan 金丁作品選
Lu Haimeiyou Zouwan 路還沒有走完
Qianjin Weekly (前進週刊)
Liangdai de Ai 兩代的愛
Long E 龍厄
Fengzi 風子
Yinni Jindai Shi 印度尼西亞近代史
OCAC – Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee (華僑事務委員會, PRC)
Xue Shu 血書
Fengyu Diren Qing 風雨敵人情
Xingzhou Er Fangdong 星洲二房東
Luying Quansheng 鹿影泉聲
Haiwai Liufeng 海外流風
MNLA – Malayan National Liberation Army (馬來亞民族解放軍)
Ba Jiu Bai Ge 八九百個
Duyangyang he Tade Buluo 督央央和他的部落
Ji’e 飢餓
Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe 世界知識出版社
Renmin Chubanshe 人民出版社

Table 2 Malaya-Born Malayan Chinese Writers Who Went to China

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name (Alias Name in Brackets)</th>
<th>Years of Birth and Death</th>
<th>Place of Ancestral Origin</th>
<th>Year Came to Malaya</th>
<th>Year Returned to China</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chen Qiu-fang (Shi Ting)</td>
<td>1926</td>
<td>Guangdong (Mei Xian)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1949</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chen Zhong-da (Zhong Zhao-rong)</td>
<td>1912 1966 Singapore</td>
<td>Guangdong (Nanhai)</td>
<td>1937 (from student)</td>
<td>1930 (study), 1945 (from study)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1948 (deported)</td>
<td>(1942-45 Indonesia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Han Meng (Chen Jun-shan)</td>
<td>1922-Kedah</td>
<td>Chaozhou</td>
<td>1946 (from student)</td>
<td>1937 (study), 1951</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lin Zi (Mi Jun)</td>
<td>1922-2004 Kedah</td>
<td>Chaozhou</td>
<td>1947 (from student)</td>
<td>1941 (study), 1949</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name (Alias Name in Brackets)</th>
<th>Years of Birth and Death</th>
<th>Place of Ancestral Origin</th>
<th>Year Came to Malaya</th>
<th>Year Went to China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Ma Yang</td>
<td>1938-1944, Johor</td>
<td>Guangdong</td>
<td>1961 (study)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wu Liu-si</td>
<td>1918-2000, Ipoh</td>
<td>Guangdong</td>
<td>1948 (deported)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Xiao Cun (Li Jun-zhe)</td>
<td>1929-1950, Singapore</td>
<td>Fujian</td>
<td>September 1945 (from student)</td>
<td>early 1940s (study)</td>
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Table 2 (Cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name (Alias Name in Brackets)</th>
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<th>Activities or Affiliations in China</th>
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<td>Chen Qiu-fang (Shi Ting)</td>
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<td>Anti-Jap. movement, <em>XDRB,</em> <em>Min Sheng Pao</em></td>
<td>Dep. Dir., Guangdong ROCWA</td>
</tr>
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<td>Chen Zhong-da (Zhong Zhao-rong)</td>
<td>CDL, CCP</td>
<td><em>Nan Chiau, Feng Xia,</em> Teacher, SCJA</td>
<td>St. Com., Guangzhou Cultural Bureau, St. Co., Guangzhou PPCC (V), Dep. Chair., Guangzhou FLAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Han Meng (Chen Jun-shan)</td>
<td>MCP ?</td>
<td>Teacher, Writer, <em>Nan Chiau</em></td>
<td>Guangdong PPCC, Dep. Chair., Swatou FROC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lin Zi (Mi Jun)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Teacher, Writer</td>
<td>Dir., Guangdong ROCWA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ma Yang</td>
<td></td>
<td>Writer</td>
<td>Teacher, Writer, Dir., Guangdong Society of Overseas Chinese Studies</td>
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<tr>
<th>Name (Alias Name in Brackets)</th>
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<th>Activities or Affiliations in Malaya</th>
<th>Activities or Affiliations in China</th>
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<tr>
<td>Xiao Cun (Li Jun-zhe)</td>
<td>MCP ? CCP</td>
<td>Teacher, Writer, Painter</td>
<td>Economist, Liaoning Economic Institute, Vice-President, Liaoning Society of Overseas Chinese History</td>
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**Table 2 (Cont.)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name (Alias Name in Brackets)</th>
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<th>Main Works in China</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
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<tr>
<td>Chen Qiu-fang (Shi Ting)</td>
<td>Biele, Xinjiapo (c. 1948)</td>
<td>Chunri Manyu (1990)</td>
<td>Criticised as rightist (1958) Rehabilitated (1979)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chen Zhong-da (Zhong Zhao-rong)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Zenyang Xuexi Shishi (1950)</td>
<td>Died due to persecution during the Cultural Revolution; rehabilitated later</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name (Alias Name in Brackets)</td>
<td>Main Works in Malaya</td>
<td>Main Works in China</td>
<td>Remarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wu Liu-si (Sheng yu Si de Jiaozhu (1945)</td>
<td>Wangshi Boluan (1992)</td>
<td>1956-78. No place in literary circles in China</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:

*XDRB – Xiandai Ribao* 现代日报
Biele, Xinjia 50, 昂加坡
Chunri Manyu 春日漫语
Zenyang Xuexi Shishi 怎様學習時事
Guopian Xinniang 過番新娘
Qizhouyang Shang 七洲洋上
Xungen Qiyu 尋根奇遇
Redai Shichao 熱帶詩抄
CAPW – China Association of Playwrights (中國劇家協會)
Zhan Ai Ji 戰癌記
Tiao Longling Liangie 爬瓊玲戀歌
Shahe Anshang de Liangie 沙河岸上的戀歌
Aiqing Shiqing Shiqing 愛情·詩情·世情
Tianya 天涯
Yingwai Suping 瀰外訴詳
*YCW – Yangcheng Wanbao* 羊城晚報
Sheng yu Si de Jiaozhu 生與死的角逐
Wangshi Boluan 往事波源
Guoshu Shi 國術師
Qiaoxiang Renjia 僑鄉人家
Hunying Nanyang 魂萦南洋
### Appendix Table Literators of the *Feng Xia*: Names and Noms de Plume

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Alias name</th>
<th>Real name</th>
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<tr>
<td>Bai Han</td>
<td>Xie Yao-hui</td>
<td>Chen Shu-ying</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bing Mei</td>
<td>Yang Zhi-zhen</td>
<td>Shi Ting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chen Ru-jiu</td>
<td>Dongfang Bingding</td>
<td>Zhong Zhao-rong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ding Bo</td>
<td>Li Ye-qin</td>
<td>Chen Jun-shan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Du Bian</td>
<td>Su Zhong-ren</td>
<td>Ma Yang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gao Yun-lan</td>
<td>Gao Yi-chang</td>
<td>Wu Liu-si</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Si-si</td>
<td>Hong Yong-an</td>
<td>Xiao Cun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hu Yu-zhi</td>
<td>Sha Ping</td>
<td>Lin Zi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Wei-gang</td>
<td>Li Mei-zi</td>
<td>Ma Yang</td>
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<td>Lin Feng</td>
<td>Huang Zhen-cun</td>
<td>Chen Shu-ying</td>
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<td>Ma Ning</td>
<td>Mei Jin-hua</td>
<td>Shi Ting</td>
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<td>Peng He-sheng</td>
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<td>Chen Jun-shan</td>
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<td>Rao Gao-ping</td>
<td>Lin Zi</td>
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<td>Jin Ding</td>
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<td>Lin Zi</td>
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<td>Jin Zhi-mang</td>
<td>Han Meng</td>
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</table>
Population Change during China’s “Three Years of Hardship” (1959-1961)

Sun Jingxian*
Shandong University / Jiangsu Normal University

Abstract
Much of the debate about population change following China’s “Great Leap Forward” has relied on the population statistics released by China’s National Bureau of Statistics in 1983. However, few have investigated the methods by which the statistics were gathered, and the extraordinary historical conditions of both population movement and its recording process in those affected decades before market reforms. This report offers such an investigation and notes dramatic discrepancies in demographic statistics between 1954 and 1982. It also examines what caused these discrepancies and argues that any research in famine deaths should not and cannot be separated from its larger context and the discussion of anomalous population change both before and after the Leap.

Keywords: Great Leap Forward, “famine deaths of 30 million”, abnormal population change, hukou system, statistic compilation and analysis
**JEL classification:** C81, J11, J61, N35

1. Introduction

Much of the debate about population change during China’s “three years of hardship (1959-1961)” has relied on the population statistics released by China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) in 1983. However, few have investigated the methods with which the statistics were gathered and the extraordinary historically-conditioned messiness and irregularity that accompanied the process of recording population movement. This report offers such an investigation and notes dramatic discrepancies in demographic statistics between 1954 and 1982. It also examines what caused these discrepancies and argues that any anomalous population change during and following China’s “Great Leap Forward” (GLF) should be understood in the larger context of anomalous population change both before and after the GLF.

In 1983, Li Chengrui, Director of the National Bureau of Statistics, stated that “China’s current population statistics are derived from household registration via the Public Security Bureau. Household registration numbers during the ‘Great Leap Forward’ and the period of economic hardship following have remained unpublished for some time … In 1983, the State Council approved a request by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) to include these statistics in the 1983 edition of the *China Statistical Yearbook.* This was the first time that yearly figures for China’s registered population were released externally.”¹ This comment clearly tells us that the population data released in 1983 by the NBS was derived from household registration figures.² It is therefore apparent that changes to the actual household registration system have a major impact on resultant statistics. In order to adequately research the 1983 data, we must understand the overall makeup and changes to the registration
system in history. The sole purpose of this article is to analyze what caused the dramatic discrepancies in demographic statistics in those years, according to the changing patterns of China’s household registration. This will allow us to gain reliable knowledge of China’s population changes during 1959-1961.

2. The Evolution of China’s *Hukou* System and Statistics Collected Under the System

Before 1949, there was no complete national household registration management system in place. After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the country began to gradually establish such a system. The work took roughly two phases.

2.1. Phases of Establishment of Household Registration (Hukou) System

**Phase One (before 1958): Initial Set-up**

In October, 1950, the Public Security Bureau (PSB) convened its first national work conference, ruling that household registration “... would begin in the cities, and rural household registration work can begin in townships, and gradually expand from there.” In July, 1951, the PSB issued a temporary ruling: “Interim Regulations on Urban Household Registration”. This ruling only applied to cities, and as a result, 87% of China’s population in the countryside was not yet included in the household registration work around 1951.

The nationwide census undertaken in 1953 was the first time that China’s overall population had been tabulated, including in rural regions with a rudimentary household registration system. In 1954, the “*hukou* change statistical annex” was published by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, leading to the establishment of a unified, national household
registration yearly statistical system. In other words, it was not until 1954 that China had a nationally unified statistical series from the household registration system.

On June 22, 1955, the State Council issued a “Directive on Establishing a Permanent Household Registration System”, requesting that “within a few years, a permanent household registration system gradually be set up and implemented.” This shows that in 1955 and several years following, China was only starting the process of gradually establishing a rigorous and permanent household registration management system. That is, during this period the system and population statistics were still incomplete and simply cannot be expected to be adequately accurate.

**Phase Two (1958-): The Uncommon Background of Implementation**

On January 9, 1958, the PRC Household Registration Statute was issued to set up a complete household registration system. “It was a milestone in the formal formation of a national and urban-rural unified household registration system.” However, because of the onset of the Great Leap Forward and the People’s Communes movement, its actual implementation was in effect postponed. It was not implemented nationwide until the time period between the second half of 1958 and 1961, coinciding with the “three difficult years”.

Here are a few examples. Sichuan Province has the highest population of any province in China. In the beginning of 1960, the Sichuan Provincial Party Committee issued the “Decision Regarding Strengthening Household Registration Statistical Work”, requesting that a population census be undertaken. Shandong is the second most populous province in China. On September 4, 1959, the Shandong Provincial Party Committee selected one full-time individual from each People’s Commune to serve as a household registration official,
allocating 800,000 yuan for the production of household registration cards.\textsuperscript{10} Guizhou Province was one of the provinces with the highest death rates in 1960. In that year, “the Provincial PSB began to undertake a provincial-wide household census as per order by central PSB.”\textsuperscript{11} These recorded efforts show that the implementation of the PRC Household Registration Statute on a nationwide scale began in 1960, around the time of the famine.

This exceptional background factor that the embarking of the system coincided with the famine years undoubtedly had a major impact on China’s population statistics (including statistics of deaths). This can be, for example, illustrated by examining the situation in Shandong. In order to implement the Statute and obtain accurate population statistics, in September 1959 the province conducted its first rural population census. According to the Provincial History Gazetteer, “[this census] discovered that some communes, production brigades, mines, government agencies, and schools, have over-reported their population by 1.52 million in order to receive larger shares of grain.”\textsuperscript{12} This was 2.81% of Shandong Province’s total 1959 year-end population of 54.025 million. This error was corrected in the household registry during the census. But this cancellation of the falsely reported extra figure must have had a direct impact on the population statistics of Shandong Province during this period – a large-scale reduction in the registered population of 1.52 million.

If we extrapolate based on the ratio of Shandong Province, it would mean that 18.9 million individuals would have been struck from the national population statistics. Of course other provinces might not have a similar proportion of over-reporting (it could be smaller but also even larger). But Shandong was certainly not an isolated case. Over-reporting was a common practice at the time for well-known incentive-based reasons during the Leap’s implementation. But if the household
registration for such an over-reported “population” figure would be duly removed as the Statute was implemented, then it would lead to a large reduction in the hukou-based population numbers during the 1959-61 period. Clarifying this matter has a decisive significance for researching famine deaths in China. Yet the point has been almost completely ignored by all research to date.

2.2. Household Registration Management and the Collection and Compilation of Hukou Statistics

In order to best analyze the statistics released by the NBS in 1983, we need a basic understanding of the content and the process of collecting and compilation of population data within the hukou system. Based on the 1955 State Council Directive, on January 9, 1958, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress issued the “PRC Household Registration Statute”. These are two most important legal documents that guide China’s household registration work with clearly specified legal requirements for collection and compilation of population statistics. The basic framework of the two documents is as follows:

1) Household registration agencies: “The hukou jurisdiction will be identical to the Public Security Bureau jurisdiction in cities, as well as rural townships with Public Security Bureau offices; in townships without Public Security Bureau offices the hukou jurisdiction will be that of the (rural, urban) townships. The People’s Committees of the townships, as well as the Public Security Bureau offices will serve as the household registration agencies.” After People’s Communes were set up, the Management Committees of People’s Communes were the agencies responsible for household registration management in rural areas. Birth, death, and outward and inward migration of citizens were supposed to be registered at the designated local offices.
2) In rural areas, the basic principles are the same as for urban areas: “concerning townships and commercial towns that have not set up Public Security Bureau offices, the Township People’s Committees should establish township household registration and document birth, death, outward and inward migration.” That is, “township registration should record the entire permanent population of the townships, and should reflect population changes, adding or removing registrations [as the population changes], thereby grasping the actual population situation in the entire township.” In other words, the population of a particular township was based on the local household registration on the ground; this was the source of the total township population statistics. Moreover, “birth, death, out-migration and in-migration were recorded in four registers to timely track population changes.” In other words, numbers reflecting population changes in any township were based on recorded registration.

3) Household registration information was updated “once a year”, and “townships and other regions should report statistics reflecting population changes for the previous year to the county by February. Counties should collect and report this information to the provincial level by March, and provinces should pass on the information to the Ministry of Internal Affairs by April.” (“Reporting to the Ministry of Internal Affairs” changed in 1956 to “Reporting to the Public Security Bureau”.)

The above rules show that the data collection process was characterized by the following. For townships, if they possessed statistics about the year-end population from the previous year and changes for the current year (birth, deaths, out-migration and in-migration), then the year-end population for the current year could be easily calculated with the following equation:
Year-end population of current year = year-end population of
previous year + (current year births – current year deaths) +
(current year out-migration – current year in-migration)

In other words, the process of calculating the “year-end population” of a particular township was unified with the collection of statistics on its population changes. It was not necessary to independently calculate the “year-end population”. This is the basic characteristic of population statistics that are calculated on the basis of household registration information.


The 1983 NSB data are based on household registration for the years 1949-1982. The data show that China experienced a large and unexpected fall in population from 1960 to 1961.

Table 1 China’s Population, 1957-1962

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Year-end population (million)</th>
<th>Yearly change (million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td></td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td></td>
<td>12.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>662.07</td>
<td>–10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>658.59</td>
<td>–3.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>672.95</td>
<td>14.36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1 shows that China’s year-end population dropped by 10 million during 1959-1960, and fell again by 3.48 million during 1960-1961. Considering that the yearly population growth during these years was around 12 million a year, the drop in population during these two years is striking. The release of the statistical series created a stir in China and news headlines abroad in the mid-1980s. The Kyodo newswire stated that this was the most significant population event during peacetime.16

However, it was quickly realized that the data from the NBS are contradictory and their origins difficult to explain. During that period, international migration out of China was negligible. Theoretically, then, in order to arrive at a reasonable figure for the decline of the population we should subtract “year-end population from the previous year” from “year-end population of the current year”; this must then be equated or balanced with the “current year births” minus the “current year deaths”. The major discrepancy in the 1983 statistical series is that in most years of 1954-1982, the sums on either side of this equation appeared vastly different. This contradiction has not been explained since. In order to gain the truth of population change during the famine of 1959-1961, we must seek a sound explanation.

Let us begin with what we call the basic “population balance equation”. Again, if international migration is small enough to be ignored, a country’s population during a particular period should satisfy the equation below:

\[
\text{Year-end population of the current year} - \text{year-end population from the previous year} = \text{current year births} - \text{current year deaths}
\]
But such an equation does not exist in most years of the NBS 1983 data. To find the real cause of this vast discrepancy, we refer to the sum computed from the following formula as the “anomalous population change”:

\[
\text{Yearly anomalous population change} = (\text{year-end population of the current year} - \text{year-end population from the previous year}) - (\text{current year births} - \text{current year deaths})
\]

If the figure of “anomalous population change” is larger than zero, then the population has “anomalously increased”, and if negative, then the population has “anomalously decreased”. It must be pointed out that the existing data inputted into the above equation is based on household registration statistics. Therefore, “anomalous population change” refers to anomalous changes to population accounted for in the household registration system rather than to the actual population. The concept of “anomalous population change” plays a pivotal role in explaining the discrepancy in the NBS data.

Below is a preliminary analysis of “anomalous population change” in China during 1954-1982. We have chosen the start year of 1954 and end year of 1984 because the first national census took place in 1952 and the third national census was in 1982.

Table 2 shows that the total year-end population was 587.96 million in 1953 and 1,015.41 million in 1982. For the sake of argument these numbers can serve as benchmarks for research into population changes between 1954 and 1982. The adequate quality of the 1953 and 1982 censuses is recognized by demographic experts in China and abroad. The table also shows that in the 29 years from 1954 to 1982, the “anomalous population change” was more than one million for 17 of those years, more than 3 million for seven years, and exceeded 5 million
Table 2 China’s Yearly “Anomalous Population Changes”\textsuperscript{17}
(unit: 10,000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Year-end population</th>
<th>Overall population growth</th>
<th>Natural population growth</th>
<th>Anomalous population changes</th>
<th>Accumulated anomalous population changes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>58,796</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>60,266</td>
<td>1,470</td>
<td>1,466</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>61,465</td>
<td>1,199</td>
<td>1,233</td>
<td>−34</td>
<td>−30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>62,828</td>
<td>1,363</td>
<td>1,270</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>64,653</td>
<td>1,825</td>
<td>1,479</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>65,994</td>
<td>1,341</td>
<td>1,124</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>67,207</td>
<td>1,213</td>
<td>677</td>
<td>536</td>
<td>1,162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>66,207</td>
<td>−1,000</td>
<td>−304</td>
<td>−696</td>
<td>466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>65,859</td>
<td>−348</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>−597</td>
<td>−131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>67,295</td>
<td>1,436</td>
<td>1,794</td>
<td>−358</td>
<td>−489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>69,172</td>
<td>1,877</td>
<td>2,270</td>
<td>−393</td>
<td>−882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>70,499</td>
<td>1,327</td>
<td>1,927</td>
<td>−600</td>
<td>−1,482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>72,538</td>
<td>2,039</td>
<td>2,026</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>−1,469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>74,542</td>
<td>2,004</td>
<td>1,928</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>−1,393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>76,368</td>
<td>1,826</td>
<td>1,927</td>
<td>−101</td>
<td>−1,494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>78,534</td>
<td>2,166</td>
<td>2,121</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>−1,449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>80,671</td>
<td>2,137</td>
<td>2,076</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>−1,388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>82,992</td>
<td>2,321</td>
<td>2,114</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>−1,181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>85,229</td>
<td>2,237</td>
<td>1,954</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>−898</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>87,177</td>
<td>1,948</td>
<td>1,910</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>−860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>89,211</td>
<td>2,034</td>
<td>1,842</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>−668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>90,859</td>
<td>1,648</td>
<td>1,574</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>−594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>92,420</td>
<td>1,561</td>
<td>1,438</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>−471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>93,717</td>
<td>1,297</td>
<td>1,178</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>−352</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
in four years. Large anomalous population increases and/or decreases took place.

From Table 2, patterns to the anomalous population changes can be summed up into three phases: During the first, from 1956 to 1959, the population anomalously increased, amounting to 11.92 million “extra” people. In the second phase, from 1960 to 1964, the population anomalously decreased, ending up with a total of 26.44 million “missing” people. In the third phase from 1968 to 1979, China’s population anomalously increased greatly by a total of 15.57 million in a consecutive 12 years.

Overall, the issue of anomalous population changes in China from the 1950s to the 1970s raises three questions: (i) From 1956 to 1959, what was the cause of the large jump in the anomalous population for those four years? (ii) Why was there an anomalous population drop for the five years from 1960 to 1964? (iii) What was the cause of the anomalous population increase for the twenty years of 1968-1979?
If we carefully examine Table 2 above, we discover that China’s population anomalously decreased by 26.44 million from 1960 to 1964. But the population also anomalously increased by 11.62 million from 1954 to 1959, and then 14.83 million from 1965 to 1982 – combined, this is an anomalous population increase of 26.45 million. There is a striking similarity between these two figures for anomalous population changes: 26.44 million and 26.45 million. Assuming this is no mere coincidence, it leads to a fourth question: (iv). What is the cause of the high degree of similarity between these two numbers of increase and decrease?

In fact this high degree of similarity might reveal a key to the anomalous population changes during this period. The true reason for the anomalous population decrease of 1960-1964 could be found, at least partly, in the causes of the anomalous population increases in the previous period (1954-1959) and the subsequent period (1965-1982).

From the perspective of historical and demographic complexities, China’s population change from the beginning of 1954 to the end of 1982 must be researched as an integrated whole. If we isolate population changes in the years around 1960 as independent of changes to those of the other periods, we will fail to reach any credible conclusion.

Most of the research on this topic in China and abroad only focuses on the second question (the drop between 1960 and 1964), and either glosses over or downplays the first and third questions (increases before and after the GLF). The fourth question, i.e. the similarity between these “missing” and “gained” population amounts, is completely ignored. Regarding why China’s population anomalously fell by 26.44 million from 1960 to 1964, some scholars contend that the drop was solely caused by large-scale death from famine. This is the main source of the claim that 30 million starved to death (“饥死三千万”) during the great
leap adventure. But these scholars have not also explained why there were anomalous population increases in the preceding and following periods. That is, these four questions are closely interrelated. If we want to get to the bottom of the anomalous population changes in China and explain the major conflict in the NBS statistics, we must answer all four of the above questions.

4. What Are Anomalous Household Registration Population Changes Related to?

The 1983 NBS statistics were calculated based on household registration data. Therefore, we must begin by understanding “household registration” as the most basic factor in our research.

Preliminarily, “actual population” referred to the actual living total population during a particular period in the nation. Household registration population referred to the population statistics derived from collecting information at a particular time from the household registration system. Based on stipulations of China’s household registration system, each time a citizen was born, died, in-migrated or out-migrated, this basic information would be recorded by the related grassroots household registration office personnel. Under ideal conditions, the “household registration population” would be identical to the “actual population”.

“Ideal conditions” would include: i) each birth or death would be recorded within the year it happens; ii) each in-migration or out-migration would be accurately recorded, and the registration of such migration would be recorded in the same year; iii) there would be no false reporting, or fictitious household registrations; iv) household registration statistical agencies would honestly and correctly report household registration to higher levels based on the rules established in
the household registration system. If all of these conditions were met, then the “household registration population” should equal the “actual population”.

But real conditions rarely lived up to this ideal scenario. The earlier mentioned case of errors in reporting in Shandong Province is only one of many examples. Moreover, an easy illustration follows. Suppose that a factory shut down in a city in December 1960. 10,000 workers in the factory who had come from the countryside returned to their homes. They would each fill out paperwork relocating their household registration out of the city in the second half of December, and would return to their homes in January 1961 and fill out paperwork to relocate their household registrations back to their villages. It is clear that this population of 10,000 was then not registered in the household registration system at the end of 1960 (before midnight, December 31), and as such not be counted towards the 1960 year-end registered population. In this way the 1960 year-end household registration population would be reduced by 10,000. This has nothing to do with actual births or deaths, but resulted in an anomalous population reduction of 10,000. This example reveals an important fact: The anomalous population reduction within the NBS data only refers to a change in “household registration population”, and this does not necessarily imply a reduction in the actual population. Therefore, we must strictly distinguish between the “actual population” and the “household registration population”.

When the births, deaths, in-migrations or out-migrations of some members of society are not accurately registered, it will result in an inaccurate household registration population. Precisely because the “actual population” differs from the “household registration population”, we must put forth the concept of “anomalous household registration population changes”. This concept refers to household registration
population numbers that are not identical with the actual population. In other words,

\[ \text{Anomalous household registration population} = \text{household registration population} - \text{actual population} \]

Changes to the actual population – if there is no international migration – is solely dependent upon births and deaths. Any change to the anomalous household registration population is the total difference between the registrations and the actual population (including registrations of births and deaths, and in-migrations and out-migrations). China’s population is very large, therefore the emergence of even a very small percentage of anomalous household registration population will result in a very large discrepancy between the household registration population and the actual population.

In most conditions, the emergence of an anomalous household registration population is random, that is, there is an equal probability for the emergence of a positive anomalous household registration population as a negative one. If this obtains, then we can largely ignore the influence of the anomalous household registration population, and the household registration population will basically reflect the actual population. However, in some special historical periods and under special socioeconomic conditions, it becomes highly probable that anomalous household registration population numbers skew in a particular direction (either positive or negative). If this is the case, then large anomalous household registration population numbers (positive or negative) can emerge. This is reflected in large discrepancies between the household registration population and the actual population. China experienced a special historical period during the 1950s through the 1970s.
4.1. Anomalous Population Changes Are Unrelated to Recorded Births and Deaths

Based on China’s laws and regulations, household registration data are calculated from recorded births, deaths, in-migrations and out-migrations. The laws stipulate that when a citizen dies, related individuals should register the death and de-register the deceased’s household registration. There are two possibilities here. The first is that the death is recorded in the same year that it occurred. The second is that the death is not recorded or not recorded in the same year that it occurs.

Consider an individual who died in a particular year but whose death was for various reasons not registered in that year (as specified below), but only later in another year. If this were to happen, it would be considered an unrecorded death in the first instance and a delayed or remedially recorded death in the second instance. This is a crucial point for our research, as some researchers indeed very specifically use the unrecorded deaths to explain the sudden drop of China’s population during 1959-1961.

We can reach the following conclusions about the relationship between unrecorded deaths, retroactively recorded deaths, and anomalous population changes:

Conclusion 1. In terms of household registration population data, neither unreported deaths nor retroactively reported deaths have an impact on anomalous population change numbers. (This argument can also be deduced from Conclusion 3 below.)

When researching the large anomalous drop in China’s household registration population in the few years immediately following 1960, some scholars conclude that it was caused by large-scale unreported deaths. They therefore further argue that there were tens of millions of abnormal deaths during the famine. Their research commits a major error by not distinguishing between the data from the new household
registration system of the time and the real population changes. But as long as we understand the basic content and mathematical method of the system, we can see how this viewpoint is mistaken. In entirely the same way, we can prove the following proposition:

Conclusion 2. Regarding household registration statistics, neither non-reported births nor retroactively reported births will influence the anomalous population change statistics.

4.2. The Correlation of Anomalous Population Changes and Registered Migration – the Formula for Calculating Accumulated Anomalous Population Changes

If anomalous population changes are unrelated to normal deaths, births and their registration, then what is the real reason behind the anomalies?

In addition to the recording of births and deaths, recording in- and out-migrations is another household registration factor that affects total population numbers. The recording of migrations is fundamentally different from that of deaths and births, and this is seen in the following. The recording of births and deaths is completed with a single registration, but the registering of migrations requires an out-migration registration and an in-migration registration. Only when both of these registrations are completed is the migration registration itself fully complete.

In the case of a migrant population, if the out-migration and the in-migration are registered in the same year, then this will not have an effect on the national household registration population numbers (as mentioned, this does not include consideration of international migration). But in practice the opposite often occurs.

Duplicate migration registration: Consider Ms. Zhang, who migrated in 1958 from her original home to another location. She did not cancel her household registration in her hometown, but registered as an
in-migrant in the locale she moved to (in other words, her household was registered in both locales). In 1960, one of these household registrations was cancelled as a correction. In this situation, we can say that this individual caused a duplicate migration registration in 1958, and a cancelled duplicate migration registration in 1960.

*Un-recorded migrations:* Consider Mr. Wang, who in 1963 moved away from a city and cancelled his household registration there. He returned to his original home in the countryside, but did not complete his in-migration household registration until 1969. In this situation, we can say that this individual led to an un-recorded migration in 1963, and a retroactive migration registration in 1969.

In terms of household registration statistics, the formation of “year-end population levels” is identical to the collection of statistics on population changes (births, deaths, migrations). Based on this, mathematically:

*Conclusion 3:* In terms of household registration statistics, each year’s anomalous population change is comprised of that year’s “duplicate migration registrations”, “cancelled duplicate migration registrations”, “un-recorded migrations”, and “retroactive migration registrations”. This final figure is unrelated to either registered or unreported births and deaths.

Assuming the nationwide census undertaken in 1953 is largely reliable, there should be no significant duplicate migration registrations or un-reported migrations at the end of 1953, and the statistics from that census can be used as a baseline. From 1954 to 1982, the “accumulated anomalous population change” for any particular year can be defined as being equal to the total of the “anomalous population change” of each year since 1954. This is the last row of figures from Table 1. The “accumulated anomalous population change” can be proven with the following formula:
Accumulated anomalous population change of the year = year-end duplicate migrations – year-end un-reported migrations

This formula is a basic tool for researching the anomalous population changes, especially population changes during the “three years of hardship”.


Based on the NBS data, we can determine the yearly anomalous population changes and the accumulated anomalous population change from 1954 to 1982. Our calculations of year-end anomalous population changes use statistics from the end of 1953 as a baseline. Accumulated figures for year-end anomalous population changes are found in Figure 1.

Based on Figure 1, we can divide China’s anomalous population changes during this time into three periods.

First Period: 1954 to 1959. From the start of 1954 to the end of 1959, China’s “accumulated anomalous population change” rose from 0 to 11.62 million, experiencing a rising trend. The rate of growth was relatively slow from the end of 1953 to the end of 1956, while the pace of growth picked up from the end of 1956 to the end of 1959. Utilizing the “accumulated anomalous population change” formula we can make the following basic points.

Inference 1: A very large number of duplicate migration registrations occurred between 1954 and 1959. The net figure is 11.62 million. It is determined by subtracting un-reported migrations from the gross figure. Below is the estimated net figure of duplicate migrations minus un-reported migrations. The population figures in the second and fourth deductions are also net figures.
**Figure 1** Accumulated Figures for China’s Year-End Anomalous Population Changes, 1954-1982 (unit: 10,000)

N.B.: The vertical coordinate indicates accumulated figures of anomalous population changes.

**Second Period: 1960-1964.** From the end of 1959 to the end of 1964, the “accumulated anomalous population change” dropped from 11.62 million to −14.82 million, a total fall of 26.44 million. That is, not only was the initial net duplicate migration registration of 11.62 million cancelled by a net unreported migration figure, the latter also additionally created a negative figure of 14.82 million. Combined, in five years the population appeared to have decreased by 26.44 million. This anomalous population change will be further explained later. Based on this we may consider:
Inference 2: The 11.62 million duplicate household registrations of the first period were cancelled in the period from 1960 to 1964.

Inference 3: A large number of unreported migrations took place from 1960 to 1964, reaching a net 14.82 million.

**Third Period: 1965 to 1982.** In the period from the end of 1964 to 1982, the “accumulated anomalous population change” exhibited a rising trend. This allows us to reach the following:

Inference 4: The 14.82 unreported migrations from inference 3 were subsequently retroactively registered from 1965 to 1982.

This allows us to present a unified reply to the four question raised above. Very importantly, from 1960 to 1964, China’s registered population anomalously fell by 26.44 million in statistics largely due to household migrations. This drop was unrelated to population deaths.

5. Abnormal Population Changes and an Analysis of Their Causes, 1953-1959

Does the statistical analysis above reflect the real changes to China’s populations in the 1950s to the 1970s? What are the social causes for the numerical changes to the population? What is the reality of population changes in China? Population changes in China during 1959-1961 should be seen against the backdrop of population changes from 1954 to 1959. So we must first analyze the true reasons for the anomalous population changes in that period.


China’s economic development began to pick up pace in 1953, and this brought about a high point in internal migration. There are two characteristics to the migrations in China during this period.
Rural-urban migrations: Due to the massive expansion of demand following the launch of the Great Leap Forward, a large number of migrants began to move from the countryside to the cities. China undertook its first five-year plan in 1953. According to a major research: “In order to facilitate national construction, and the establishment and expansion of mining and manufacturing enterprises, the government organized the migration of a large number of farmers to the cities, and absorbed a large number of spontaneous migrants from the countryside. This formed a wave of migration that mainly consisted of rural-to-urban migrants.” The launching of the Great Leap Forward in 1958 “led to the rapid expansion of urban industrial production and a sharp increase in demand for labor power. This induced a boost in migrants, and led to a wave of rural-urban migration on a scale unprecedented since the founding of the PRC.” In this period, “population migration was extraordinarily active, and the main stream was rural-to-urban migration spurred on by the Great Leap Forward.” It is estimated that “in the three years of the Great Leap from 1958 to 1960, more than 10 million farmers moved to the cities each year.”

Particularly notable was also migration in the eastern and northern areas. During the First Five-Year Plan: “There were a large number of both industrial migrants as well as reclamation migrants. People from coastal regions in the east and heavily populated central regions migrated to the northeast, northwest and northern central China to build industrial districts and reclaim wasteland.” From 1958 to 1960 industrial and reclamation migrants made up most of the overall migration.

The large-scale migration that took place during this period had a great and lasting effect on China’s population changes. For instance, from 1954 and especially 1958 to the first half of 1960, the large migration of people from the countryside to the cities necessarily led to a large reduction in the rural population. At the same time given the large
numbers of migrants from eastern (and central) China to the north and border areas to work in industry or to open up new land, this in turn led to a reduction in the population of eastern (and to a lesser extent central) China. Yet these facts have been overlooked by some researchers.

5.2. Urban and Rural Population Change and Their Causes, 1956-1959

Because the Public Security Bureau announced and implemented the “Provisional Regulations on Urban Household Registration Management” as early as 1951, and because the focus of household registration was on urban areas, the management of household registration was much more strict in urban than rural areas. Hence statistics for urban household registration are more accurate. Let us examine China’s urban population changes during this period.

**Table 3 Urban Population Changes, 1956-1959 (unit: 10,000)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Year-end Household Registration Population</th>
<th>Natural Population Growth Rate (%)</th>
<th>Natural Population Growth</th>
<th>Household Registration Population</th>
<th>Net Household Registration Population In-Migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>8,285</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>9,185</td>
<td>30.44</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>9,949</td>
<td>36.01</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>764</td>
<td>419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>10,721</td>
<td>24.33</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>772</td>
<td>521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>12,371</td>
<td>18.51</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>1,650</td>
<td>1,436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Totals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,076</td>
<td>4,086</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In Table 3, the year-end urban household registration numbers were taken from the NBS 1983 data. Because the yearly statistical yearbook did not include the natural population growth rate of the “urban” population (or the number of natural population increase), and only published the “municipal” and “county” natural population growth rate,\(^{21}\) we will use the “municipal” natural population growth rate to estimate the “urban” natural population growth rate.\(^{22}\) In the table, the growth of household registered population = year-end household registered population – previous year year-end population; net household registered migration = household registration population increase – natural population increase, and this is also the net migration between urban and rural areas. A positive number is in-migration, while a negative number is out-migration.

Based on data from Table 3, in the four years from 1956 to 1959, China’s household registered urban population increased by 40.86 million. Of this growth, only 10.76 million was accounted for by natural population growth (increase taking into account births and deaths). This left 30.1 million unaccounted for, which in turn means that 30.1 million individuals migrated from the countryside to urban areas, and is the net figure of migrants who registered their household in urban areas.\(^{23}\) This fits with the historical reality of large-scale migration in China during this period that rural people “moved into the cities like a wave”, and “the total number of rural-to-urban migrants each year surpassed 10 million”.\(^{24}\) This also shows that the urban household registrations from then on fairly accurately reflect the real population changes in urban China during this period.

Let us now examine population changes to the rural population during this period.
Table 4 Rural Population Changes, 1956-1959 (unit: 10,000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Year-end Household Registration Population</th>
<th>Natural Population Growth</th>
<th>Household Registration Population Growth</th>
<th>Net Household Registration Population In-Migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>53,180</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>53,643</td>
<td>1,004</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>-541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>54,704</td>
<td>1,134</td>
<td>1,061</td>
<td>-73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>55,273</td>
<td>873</td>
<td>569</td>
<td>-304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>54,836</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>-437</td>
<td>-900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,474</td>
<td>1,656</td>
<td>-1,818</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5 Rural-to-Urban Migration, 1956-1959 (unit: 10,000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Urban Household Registration Net In-Migration</th>
<th>Rural Household Registration Net In-Migration</th>
<th>Anomalous Population Changes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>634</td>
<td>-541</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>-73</td>
<td>346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>521</td>
<td>-304</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>1,436</td>
<td>-900</td>
<td>536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>-1,818</td>
<td>1,192</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In Table 4, year-end rural household registration data are again taken from the same NBS data. Because the statistical almanac from that year did not release data on the natural population growth rate of the rural population (or the total natural population increase), the estimates we employ are arrived at by subtracting the urban natural population growth (Table 3) from the national natural population growth numbers (see Table 2). Household registration growth numbers and household registration net migrations are shown in Table 3. Table 4 reveals that in the four years from 1956 to 1959, China’s rural population increased by 34.74 million, but the household registration population only increased by 16.56 million, leaving a discrepancy of 18.18 million. Linking this to the historical fact of the large-scale rural-to-urban migration that occurred during this period, we can conclude that this 18.18 million represents the net figure of rural-to-urban migrants that canceled their rural household registration. Using data from Table 3 and Table 4, we can merge the data on the rural-to-urban household registration migrants into Table 5. Positive numbers represent in-migration, while negative numbers represent out-migration.

The last column in Table 5 is the sum of column 2 and column 3 which is precisely the anomalous population change for each year (these figures match those found in the last column of Table 2 for the corresponding years). It is easy to see how this would be the case. We can now further engage in analysis of the source of China’s anomalous population change during this period.

The second column of figures in Table 5 shows that from 1956 to 1959, China’s urban population increased by 30.10 million due to in-migration. It is obvious that this migration came mainly from rural areas. If these individuals had registered as out-migrants and canceled their rural household registration, then China’s rural household registration
numbers should have decreased by 30.1 million, after taking into consideration natural population growth. However, column 3 in Table 5 (and Table 4) tells us that China’s rural household registered population only decreased by 18.18 million, after taking into consideration natural population growth. This is 11.92 million less than anticipated.

This reveals the fact that 30.1 million individuals migrated from rural areas to urban areas and registered their households in urban areas. But only 18.18 million of these migrants submitted out-migration registration in their original rural residency areas. The remaining 11.92 million did register their households in urban areas, but failed to deregister their original rural residency. As a result these individuals came to have duplicated household registrations (in both rural and urban areas). The last column in Table 5 shows figures for each year’s duplicate household registrations created due to migration, and these are precisely the anomalous population change numbers for each year. This clearly shows that from 1956 1959, the anomalous population changes in China were mainly due to migration, unrelated to births and deaths and their recording during this period.

The above discussion deals with the conditions from 1956 to 1959. For the years 1954 and 1955, Table 2 shows that there were over 300,000 unrecorded migrants during those two years. Subtracting this 300,000 from the aforementioned 11.92 million duplicate household registrations due to migration, we can conclude that by the end of 1959 there were net duplicate household registrations reaching 11.62 million.

The above analysis shows that the total population statistics for China at the end of 1959 included 11.62 million duplicate (and falsely reported) household registrations that have been caused by migration. The case of Shandong’s overestimation of its population by 1.52 million in 1959 by including duplicate registrations provides an excellent illustration of our conclusions.
The facts listed above show that large-scale migration within China resulted in very large anomalous population changes in household registration statistics. Clarifying this point is first key step in solving the puzzle of the anomalous population changes during China’s famine. Our analysis explains the reasons behind such changes from 1956 to 1959. This is a blind spot in nearly all of the research on this issue within China and internationally.

During this period there were also legal gaps in China's household registration system. The “State Council Directive on Establishing a Regular Household Registration System” stipulated that: “If an entire household or individual moves to a new address ... they must provide an out-migration certificate or other proof ... before being registered in the new location.”\textsuperscript{25} In other words, when migrating it was possible to not register as an out-migrant, yet still register as an in-migrant, as long as one possessed “other proof” (such as a work ID, a voting certificate, or a diploma of graduation). This legal gap and duplicate household registrations were exacerbated by various economic and other interests, leading to large-scale duplicate household registrations in China during this period.

6. **Anomalous Population Changes in China from 1960 to 1964, and an Analysis of Their Causes**

6.1. **Large-scale Urban Population Reduction in China, 1960 to 1964**

In the second half of 1960, due to serious difficulties in the Chinese economy, the central government decided to undertake major policy changes. Against this backdrop, from the second half of 1960 to 1964, China’s migration patterns underwent a major shift, changing fundamentally from rural-to-urban migration to urban-to-rural migration.
The significant reduction in urban population began in the second half of 1960, but mainly occurred from 1961 to 1963.

“In the second half of 1960, based on the spirit of a series of instructions from the party central committee, various locales quickly undertook a clearing out of labor to fill out the front lines in rural production. A portion of employees in various agencies were sent down.” At the Central Work Conference in Beijing, May and June 1961, a major decision was reached to undergo a large-scale reduction in the urban population. The conference passed the “Nine Ways of Reducing Urban Population and Urban Grain Consumption”, which clearly stipulated that “according to the baseline urban population level of 129 million, within three years the urban population will be reduced by 20 million. And this year’s goal is at least 10 million.” The result of this nationwide work was that the urban population fell by 10 million during the course of 1961 alone.

On February 14, 1962, the party central committee issued a “Decision Regarding Continuing To Reduce the Urban Population by 7 Million in the First Half of 1962”, stipulating that the main target of the urban population reduction would be new workers who had moved to urban areas since 1958. The Central Work Conference held in May decided that based on the urban population reduction of 10 million in 1961, the urban population would be reduced by a further 20 million by the end of 1963. On May 27, the party central committee and the State Council issued the “Decision Regarding Continuing To Streamline Urban Employees and Lower the Urban Population”. It instructed that “employees that migrated from rural areas since 1958 ... in most cases should return to their hometowns. Employees that migrated from rural areas before the end of 1957 should also be advised to return to their hometowns if this is feasible.” This shows that the major reduction in the urban population took place after 1956, and had a particular effect on
rural migrants to urban areas after 1958. These individuals returned to their rural hometowns.

6.2. Urban and Rural Population Changes and Their Causes, 1961 to 1963

Due to the fact that household registration statistics for urban areas are relatively accurate, we begin by analyzing the population change in urban areas during this period.

Table 6 Urban Population Changes, 1961-63 (unit: 10,000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Year-end Household Registration Population</th>
<th>Natural Population Growth Rate (%)</th>
<th>Natural Population Growth</th>
<th>Household Registration Population Growth</th>
<th>Net Household Registration Population In-Migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>13,073</td>
<td>10.24</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>-366</td>
<td>-498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>12,707</td>
<td>27.18</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>-1,048</td>
<td>-1,379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>11,659</td>
<td>37.37</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>-13</td>
<td>-448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>11,646</td>
<td>37.37</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>-13</td>
<td>-448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>898</td>
<td>-1,427</td>
<td>-2,325</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The sources, definitions, and methods of calculation for data in Table 6 are the same as for Table 3.32

Table 6 shows that in the three years from 1961 to 1963, China’s urban household registered population dropped by 14.27 million, despite a natural population growth of 8.98 million. Taking into consideration natural population growth, China’s urban household registered
population fell by 23.25 million during this period. This figure represents the urban population that migrated out of urban areas and had their urban household registration canceled during the population reduction movement.

In rural areas, Table 7 shows the population changes from 1961 to 1963. Data in this table were calculated in the same fashion as for Table 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Year-end Household Registration Population</th>
<th>Natural Household Population Growth</th>
<th>Household Registration Population Growth</th>
<th>Net Household Population In-Migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>53,134</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>53,152</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>–99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>55,636</td>
<td>1,463</td>
<td>2,484</td>
<td>1,021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>57,526</td>
<td>1,835</td>
<td>1,890</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,415</td>
<td>4,392</td>
<td>977</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7 reveals that in the three years from 1961 to 1963, the natural growth of China’s rural population (calculated from natural births and deaths) was 34.15 million, while the household registered population increased by 43.92 million. There is a discrepancy of 9.7 million between these two figures. Linking this finding with the historical fact of the urban population reduction movement that was ongoing at the same time, we can understand that this figure of 9.7 million is the net figure of
migrants who were sent down from the city back to the countryside and registered in rural areas as in-migrants.

Table 8 combines data from Table 6 and Table 7, which include the sums of population that migrated from urban to rural areas. Positive numbers in the two columns signify in-migration, while negative numbers stand for out-migration.

**Table 8 Urban-to-Rural Migration, 1961-1963 (unit: 10,000)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Urban Household Registration Net Migration</th>
<th>Rural Household Registration Net Migration</th>
<th>Anomalous Population Changes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>-498</td>
<td>-99</td>
<td>-597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>-1,379</td>
<td>1,021</td>
<td>-358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>-448</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>-393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>-2,325</td>
<td>977</td>
<td>-1,348</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The last column in Table 8 is the sum of column 2 and column 3, and is identical to the yearly abnormal population change figures (also identical to the last column of Table 2 for the corresponding years). This correspondence is predictable.

The second column of figures in Table 8 shows that China’s urban population dropped by 23.25 million from 1961 to 1963, due to the population reduction movement. It is apparent that this population migrated from urban to rural areas. If all of these individuals registered their households in rural areas, the rural population should have increased by 23.25 million, excluding natural population growth. However, the 3rd column in Table 8 (as well as Table 7) reveals that the
rural household registered population only increased by 9.77 million during this period, 13.48 million less than expected.

This shows the fact that of the 23.25 million out-migrants from urban areas who cancelled their urban household registration, only 9.77 million (re)registered their households in rural areas. The remaining 13.48 million did cancel their urban household registration before migrating to rural areas, but did not undertake rural in-migration registration, and as a result were unreported within the household registration system. The last column in Table 4 and 6 shows the figures for this population by year (this is also one of the sources of the abnormal population changes). This clearly shows that the abnormal population change of 1961 to 1963 (reflected in abnormal numbers of population change) was caused by migration, and unrelated to births, deaths and their recording.

This was the situation from 1961 to 1963. If we consider the conditions from 1960 to 1964 (as the urban population reduction work had already begun by 1960), then we can conclude that there were 14.82 million unreported migrations by the end of 1964.

6.3. On the Question of Whether Non-Registration Would Affect An Individual’s Ability to Survive

Given the novelty of the above conclusions, critiques are expected. Debating central and related issues would be an excellent way of promoting sound further research. Yang Jisheng, for example, has raised the question: “Everyone knows that in that era, individuals’ basic material provisions were obtained through food coupons and other supply certificates. If a person moved from one locale to another ... without registering in the new location, he/she would not be able to eat. Yet Mr. Sun concludes that tens of millions of individuals migrated without registering. What did these people eat?”33 This is a serious
objection and must be adequately replied.

There were two distinct conditions for securing food in China during this period. For urban residents, “household registration” was a precondition for a supply of grain and other food coupons. If an individual was not registered within a household, then s/he would not have the needed certificates to gain regular access to a secure food supply, and would find it difficult to survive. But most of China’s population were rural residents. The majority of them could produce their own grain, and did not need to purchase it or use any food coupons. At the time, as long as a rural resident participated in collective labor they would receive a proportionally distributed grain according to the “individual-labor ratio” [of the production unit].

China experienced a large-scale rural-to-urban migration from 1956 to 1959, and then an urban population reduction from 1961 to 1963. When the rural migrants returned to the countryside, the vast majority returned to their home villages where they had families and houses to live in. Obviously in normal cases they participated in collective labor and could receive their due reward without purchasing commodity grain. So there was no issue of them “being unable to eat”. For this population, the lack of household registration had a limited impact on their lives. If they were not registered, they might not have been able to receive cloth and cooking oil ration tickets, but many rural areas produced their own cotton and oil crops. Moreover, for most of those migrated individually without bringing their families with them, the family members had remained registered, and would receive their own cloth and cooking oil ration tickets to share. As such individuals who had not registered their household would not be impacted heavily. As the focus of China’s household registration system was to control the flow of rural residents into the cities, the system had a much smaller effect on the daily lives of rural residents.
The figure of 14.82 million missed household registrations is a large number in absolute terms, but only accounts for approximately 2.1% of China’s total population at the time. Given the conditions in those years, it should be considered normal to have an unregistered population of such a scale in rural areas overall.

From 1960 to 1964, a large number of duplicate household registrations were gradually cancelled (reaching 11.62 million individuals). But a large number of unreported household registrations also occurred (reaching 14.82 million). Added together the figure is 26.44 million. These twin causes are the real reason for a large anomalous drop in the population for five consecutive years from 1960 to 1964, according to household registration statistics. As to why the 1964 census did not correct the error of unreported population, the obvious explanation is the fact that the focus of that census was to clarify duplicate registration in response to the pressure of shortage of food supply. Moreover, from the point of view of household registration management, duplicate registration with documented record was easy to rectify as compared with unreported population without a complete record in household registration.


Following the recovery and growth of China’s economy, industry and other sectors in urban areas needed a large number of new workers again. Most of the 14.82 million individuals who were sent back to the countryside but did not reregister in their hometowns between 1960 and 1964 now asked to return to urban areas. As a result during the long period from 1965 to 1979 (mainly from 1970 to 1979), various government departments at all levels expended an exceptional amount of energy to deal with this issue that history had left over. As the cases of these individuals were gradually solved, the majority of the 14.82
million people returned to cities and registered their households in urban areas. The remainder for various reasons also registered their households in rural areas. This led to an abnormal and continuous increase in the household registration from 1970 to 1979.

This can answer the third question posed above ("What was the cause of the anomalous population increase for the twenty years of 1968-1979?"), and confirm inference 4 ("The 14.82 duplicate migration registrations were subsequently retroactively registered from 1965 to 1982"). From 1965 to 1982, China’s abnormal population growth reached 14.83 million (see Table 2), a figure that very closely matches the sum of 14.82 million. This proves from a different perspective that there were really 14.82 million missed household registrations from 1960 to 1964. As a result, from 1956, China experienced 24 years of household registration abnormal population change, sometimes positive, and sometimes negative. This situation roughly ended in 1979.

As we have demonstrated, the population statistics released by the NBS in 1983 were based on aggregated national household registration data. The NBS did not revise or fabricate these data. However, there was a major problem in these data, as seen in their “abnormal population changes”. What we should realize is that these data came from household registrations, and confirmed the patterns and specificities of that system. The problems and contradictions exhibited in the data were only superficial, and can be resolved through rational explanation of their causes.

If the data’s major contradiction can be plausibly explained as we have attempted above, the abnormal population reduction of 26.44 million in China’s official record from 1960 to 1964 may not be attributable to abnormal deaths during the GLF famine. The prevailing view on the famine toll might be untenable given the historical evolution of the household registration system and its attendant data. In light of
our research, this specific reduction of 26.44 million was unrelated to actual deaths.


Further from the analysis in the previous sections, we can now address the specific question concerning China’s famine deaths during the “three difficult years”.

Table 9 China’s Mortality Rates 1949-1958

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mortality %</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mortality %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>20.00</td>
<td>1954</td>
<td>13.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>18.00</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>12.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>17.80</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>11.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>17.00</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>10.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>14.00</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>11.98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As shown in Table 9, China’s gross mortality rate was 20% in 1949 and 10.80% in 1957. Within merely eight years, that rate had astonishingly declined almost by half on paper, while the same reduction took 30 years by the world’s average speed.

Table 10 below tells us that normally a reduction of mortality rate from 20% to 10% would take 20-35 years, which is far more than China’s record of eight years. In eight years, from the starting point of 20%, the marks of all the countries recorded reached no further than 15.3% as compared to China’s 10.8%. Given that China is the world’s most populous country and its mortality reduction should show more inertia than others, apparently the existing statistics of its mortality rate
in that period was incredibly low or the decline of that rate was too fast to be credible.

**Table 10** Mortality Rates of States in Asia and the Middle East\(^{35}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>Time needed for mortality reduction from 20%() to 10%() (year)</th>
<th>Mortality reduction from 20%() in eight years (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Philippines</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The explanation of these extraordinary figures can be found precisely in the major shift in China’s household registration system discussed above. That is, since that system had not been rigorously operational until 1958, there was a serious underreporting of deaths (mainly in rural areas). The actual mortality rate between 1949 and 1957 (especially 1953-57) could not be as low as what was recorded. The mortality rate of the same period should be adjusted upward.

In the 1950s, the government conducted two sampling surveys which confirmed our findings. In 1953, a dynamic national survey of
30.18 million people resulted in a mortality rate of 17%.\textsuperscript{36} The 1957 survey of age differentials of the population and ages at death included 52.25 million people in 126 cities and counties and 171 townships in 19 provinces, autonomous regions and centrally administered municipalities. The resulting mortality rates were 8.59\% for cities and 13.43\% for counties.\textsuperscript{37}

Based on these numbers, the estimation of the rate of underreported deaths is 17.65\% in 1953 and 16.34\% in 1957. The actual mortality rates should therefore be adjusted accordingly.

**Table 11 Adjusted Mortality Rates, 1953-1958\textsuperscript{38}**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Published mortality rate (%)</th>
<th>Published deaths (10,000)</th>
<th>Underreporting of death (%)</th>
<th>Adjusted mortality rate (%)</th>
<th>Adjusted death (10,000)</th>
<th>Underreported death (10,000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>814</td>
<td>17.65</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>988</td>
<td>87 (half year)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>13.18</td>
<td>779</td>
<td>17.32</td>
<td>15.94</td>
<td>943</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>706</td>
<td>16.67</td>
<td>13.68</td>
<td>848</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>688</td>
<td>16.34</td>
<td>12.91</td>
<td>822</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>11.98</td>
<td>781</td>
<td>8.17</td>
<td>13.05</td>
<td>851</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on adjusted mortality rate, we can work out that between the first national census in 1953 (by 30 June) and the end of 1958, underreported deaths were about 7.5 million in total.

During 1959-61, the government implemented "Regulations on Household Registration" (\textit{hukou tiaoli 户口条例}) and it became clear

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that there was a problem of underreporting. Further analysis allows us to also note that among the estimated 7.5 million of underreported deaths, about 6.75 million were cleared during the famine years by deregistration from the hukou record. This correspondingly created a false increase of deaths in the same number of 6.75 million.

During those three years, the total number of registered deaths was 36.02 million. This number should be deducted by 6.75 million of unreported deaths. The actual mortality of the period would then be 29.27 million. We could thus make statistical adjustments accordingly.

**Table 12** Adjusted Statistics of China’s Demography, 1953-1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Registered numbers</th>
<th>Adjusted numbers</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>End-of-year population (10,000)</td>
<td>End-of-year population (10,000)</td>
<td>Birth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>58,796</td>
<td>58,709</td>
<td>2,245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>60,266</td>
<td>60,011</td>
<td>1,978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>61,465</td>
<td>61,091</td>
<td>1,976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>62,828</td>
<td>62,219</td>
<td>2,166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>64,653</td>
<td>63,564</td>
<td>1,905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>65,994</td>
<td>64,618</td>
<td>1,647</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>67,207</td>
<td>65,295</td>
<td>1,389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>66,207</td>
<td>65,666</td>
<td>1,188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>65,859</td>
<td>65,915</td>
<td>2,460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>67,295</td>
<td>67,686</td>
<td>2,954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>69,172</td>
<td>69,933</td>
<td>2,729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>70,499</td>
<td>71,981</td>
<td>2,729</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Table 12 (Cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Registered numbers</th>
<th>Adjusted numbers</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>End-of-year population (10,000)</td>
<td>End-of-year population (10,000)</td>
<td>Birth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>72,538</td>
<td>74,008</td>
<td>2,704</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>74,542</td>
<td>75,936</td>
<td>2,577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>76,368</td>
<td>77,863</td>
<td>2,563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>78,534</td>
<td>79,984</td>
<td>2,757</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>80,671</td>
<td>82,060</td>
<td>2,715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>82,992</td>
<td>84,174</td>
<td>2,736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>85,229</td>
<td>86,128</td>
<td>2,567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>87,177</td>
<td>88,038</td>
<td>2,566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>89,211</td>
<td>89,880</td>
<td>2,463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>90,859</td>
<td>91,454</td>
<td>2,235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>92,420</td>
<td>92,892</td>
<td>2,109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>93,717</td>
<td>94,070</td>
<td>1,853</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>94,974</td>
<td>95,208</td>
<td>1,787</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>96,259</td>
<td>96,355</td>
<td>1,745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>97,542</td>
<td>97,480</td>
<td>1,727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>98,705</td>
<td>98,640</td>
<td>1,779</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>100,072</td>
<td>100,080</td>
<td>2,069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>101,541</td>
<td>101,541</td>
<td>2,126</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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If we are correct about China’s actual total deaths as 29.27 million during 1959-1961, then using the adjusted mortality rate of 1957 as the baseline, the famine death toll due to starvation should be about 3.66 million. This figure cannot be treated as exact and conclusive, but is nonetheless a logical conclusion from examining anomalous population change data for the three periods discussed above. The point is that any discussion of the anomalous population change during the GLF should not, and cannot be separated from discussing anomalous population change both before and after. More extensive discussions and mathematical proofs are forthcoming (in Return Truth to History: A Rebuttal about “30 Million Famine Deaths”). We fully acknowledge that this research remains preliminary and should be followed by serious and more extensive scholarly scrutiny and debate.

Notes

* Sun Jingxian 孙经先, Professor of Mathematics at Shandong University ( 山东大学) and Jiangsu Normal University ( 江苏师范大学), is an independent and experienced scholar in applied mathematics within the social sciences. He is completing a book about anomalous deaths during the Great Leap Forward, in which he carefully examines an established literature produced in part by such influential scholars as Ansley J. Coale and Judith Banister, as well as Jiang Zhenghua 蒋正华, Cao Shuji 曹树基, Yang Jisheng 杨继绳 and others. Based on extensive historical and archival research, including over 2,000 local chronicles and county chorographic records, he identifies a series of major errors in statistical compilation, computation, and analysis. His conclusion shows how the previous consensus on a famine death toll of around 30 million is fundamentally flawed. This paper forms a part of this research project, one that he has embarked on since 2010; in it he proposes an innovative
approach to explain discrepancies in the official demographic statistics for 1954-82. The author would like to thank Professor Yan Hairong 严海蓉 and her colleagues Daniel Vukovich 胡德, Lin Chun 林春, Gao Mobo 高默波, and Cao Tianyu曹天予 for their support and help, and Jonathan Lassen for his original translation of this paper into English. <Email: jxsun7083@163.com>


4. Based on the first nationwide census, China’s rural population accounted for 86.75% of China’s total population (ibid., p. 855).

5. Ibid., p. 914.

6. Ibid., p. 924.


15. Ibid.


18. The selection of a baseline at 0 is only to facilitate discussion. Even if it were the case that there were duplicate migration registrations or unreported migrations at the end of 1953, it would not have a practical impact on the statistics discussed in the following pages.

20. Ibid., pp. 401-405, 407-408.


22. A certain amount of error is introduced by using the “municipal” natural population growth rate to estimate the “urban township” natural population growth rate. But because the city population is the largest component of the “urban” population, the difference between the city and urban township’s natural population growth rate cannot be very large. This means that our use of the “municipal” statistics to stand for “urban” statistics will not significantly affect our conclusions.

23. There may have been a number of individuals who migrated from urban to rural areas during this period, and the net figure here excludes these individuals. Data for migrants is understood in this fashion throughout this paper.


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29. Ibid., pp. 185-186.

30. Ibid., p. 197.


32. In Table 6, we take the natural population growth rate of the “city” as representing the “urban” natural population growth rate to incorporate also that of urban townships. This, as noted earlier, will create a statistically insignificant error. Such errors (also in Table 7 and Table 8) do not affect the abnormal population change statistics.


35. Yao Qiyuan 姚齐源 and Song Xiaoli 宋晓丽 (2010/2011). 三年困难时期异常死亡人数新探 [new research on abnormal death during the three years of hardship]. <http://wenku.baidu.com/link?url=Ye3-Ywqrbl0eBNfjwGr7qyd1a0FCbac4fIOBe1JPrceOtzaAaKhsuzb1XF7dPdHzS2ZSSvMAe9768_vac869B52YGGqvUQy3qCgFnZufOt>


39. In the table, death rate is calculated according to the baseline of adjusted end-of-year population. In the earlier sections adjusted death rate is calculated according to registered statistics. Insignificant discrepancies thus appear between the figures resulted from these two methods.

40. This famine death toll due to starvation is known in the scientific literature as a “superlinear death toll” (“超线性死亡”人数):

\[
\text{Superlinear death of a given year} = \text{a given year's average population } x \ (\text{a given year's mortality rate} - \text{mortality rate of baseline})
\]

A given year’s average population = (beginning of the year’s population + end of the year's population) ÷ 2. This paper uses 1957 as the baseline (基准年). Death toll due to starvation is only part of superlinear death.
Policy Comments
The Legal Basis of the People’s Republic of China’s East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone

Ching Chang

ROC Society for Strategic Studies

Abstract

As the People’s Republic of China defined its East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) on November 23, 2013, there were three legal decrees, the Law of the People’s Republic of China on National Defense established on March 14, 1997, the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Civil Aviation established on October 30, 1995, and the Basic Rules on Flight of the People’s Republic of China established on July 27, 2001, which have been quoted as the legal basis to define the airspace within the area enclosed by China’s outer limit of the territorial sea and another six geographical points specified by the statement as the PRC East China Sea ADIZ. Following the government statement, another announcement of the aircraft identification rules for the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone of the People’s Republic of China was immediately issued by the PRC Ministry of National Defense. The purpose of this paper is to explore various key legal issues to ascertain the legal basis of this East China Sea ADIZ. Besides, the paper will further compare the air defense identification
zone with airspaces such as aerodrome flight airspace, airway, air route, prohibited area, restricted area and danger area as well as air corridor, fuel dumping area and temporary flight airspace defined by the previously mentioned PRC legal decrees in order to identify their differences and similarities. It may also be assessed by the factual consequences after establishing the air defense identification zone to decide whether treating the measures of defining air defense identification as the attempt of claiming sovereignty, expanding sovereign territory or sphere of influence, enlarging air defense region, increasing the coverage of air military activities or even using it to present national strength and establishing pride or to test the responses of other states around the disputed territories is eventually reasonable judgments or overstated speculations. This article will be concluded with a brief discussion on the matter of defining an air defense identification, and as with no international law to be the legal basis whether it may still need to adopt any domestic law as its legal basis.

**Keywords:** air defense identification zone, territorial airspace, flight information region, sovereignty claim

**JEL classification:** F51, F52, F59, K33

1. Introduction

A government statement was released by the Xinhua News Agency, as shown in Box 1, representing the PRC on establishing the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone on November 23, 2013. In its content, it has quoted the Law of the People's Republic of China on National Defense (March 14, 1997), the Law of the People's Republic of China on Civil Aviation (October 30, 1995) and the Basic Rules on
Flight of the People's Republic of China (July 27, 2001) as the basis to define an airspace within the area enclosed by China's outer limit of the territorial sea and the six geographical points noted by the statement as the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone.¹

**Box 1** Statement by the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Establishing the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone

| Statement by the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Establishing the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone

The government of the People’s Republic of China announces the establishment of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone in accordance with the Law of the People's Republic of China on National Defense (March 14, 1997), the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Civil Aviation (October 30, 1995) and the Basic Rules on Flight of the People’s Republic of China (July 27, 2001). The zone includes the airspace within the area enclosed by China’s outer limit of the territorial sea and the following six points: 33°11'N (North Latitude) and 121°47'E (East Longitude), 33°11'N and 125°00'E, 31°00'N and 128°20'E, 25°38'N and 125°00'E, 24°45'N and 123°00'E, 26°44'N and 120°58'E.


As the Xinhua News Agency on behalf of the PRC released the government statement, a sketch map, as shown in Figure 1, was attached. It is not a part of the formal content of the People’s Republic of China government statement.
Figure 1 Sketch Map of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone Attached by the Xinhua News Agency in Releasing the PRC Government Statement

Source: Same as Box 1

After the People’s Republic of China released the abovementioned government statement, the Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, in accordance with the Statement by the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Establishing the East China Sea
Air Defense Identification Zone, subsequently declared the Aircraft Identification Rules for the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone, as shown in Box 2, to regulate the details of the identification process applicable to aircrafts within the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone.

**Box 2** Announcement of the Aircraft Identification Rules for the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone of the People’s Republic of China

Announcement of the Aircraft Identification Rules for the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone of the People’s Republic of China

The Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, in accordance with the Statement by the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Establishing the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone, now announces the Aircraft Identification Rules for the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone as follows:

First, aircraft flying in the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone must abide by these rules.

Second, aircraft flying in the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone must provide the following means of identification:

1. Flight plan identification. Aircraft flying in the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone should report the flight plans to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China or the Civil Aviation Administration of China.

2. Radio identification. Aircraft flying in the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone must maintain the two-way radio communications, and respond in a timely and accurate manner to the identification inquiries from the administrative organ of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone or the unit authorized by the organ.

3. Transponder identification. Aircraft flying in the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone, if equipped with the secondary
radar transponder, should keep the transponder working throughout the entire course.
4. Logo identification. Aircraft flying in the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone must clearly mark their nationalities and the logo of their registration identification in accordance with related international treaties.
Third, aircraft flying in the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone should follow the instructions of the administrative organ of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone or the unit authorized by the organ. China’s armed forces will adopt defensive emergency measures to respond to aircraft that do not cooperate in the identification or refuse to follow the instructions.
Fourth, the Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China is the administrative organ of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone.
Fifth, the Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China is responsible for the explanation of these rules.
Sixth, these rules will come into force at 10 a.m. November 23, 2013.


From the previous “Statement by the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Establishing the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone” we may well know that the PRC government adopted the Law of the People’s Republic of China on National Defense enacted on March 14, 1997, the Law of the People's Republic of China on Civil Aviation enacted on October 30, 1995 and the Basic Rules on Flight of the People’s Republic of China enacted on July 27, 2001, as the legal basis for defining the PRC East China Sea ADIZ for sure. Nonetheless, whether these legal decrees may specifically contain proper terms and texts unquestionably authorizing the government in Beijing to
define an air defense identification zone is indeed worth further study.

The paper may therefore individually scrutinize these three legal decrees in order to judge the validity of its edition, the governing jurisdiction, and inspect the substantial contents of these legal decrees by a three-level process of text identification, context examination and subtext interpretation. By so doing, it would attempt to grasp and understand the legality causation relationship between these judiciary decrees and the East China Sea ADIZ substantively defined by the PRC government in order to explore the following legal issues:
1. Is there any definition of the air defense identification zone specifically noted within the texts of these three legal decrees and does the appropriate authorization to define such airspace exist in their texts?
2. Can the jurisdiction based on the ratione loci principle noted by these decrees be sufficient to define such air defense identification zone?
3. Would the legal basis for the aircraft identification rules for the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone be sufficient?
4. Can these abovementioned decrees be the appropriate legal basis for the actions of defining the ADIZ and directing the identification rules?

Further, measures for other states to define their own air defense identification zone will also be compared and discussed in this paper.

This paper will further compare the air defense identification zone with airspaces such as aerodrome flight airspace, airway, air route, prohibited area, restricted area and danger area as well as air corridor, fuel dumping area and temporary flight airspace defined by the previously mentioned PRC legal decrees in order to identify their differences and similarities. It may also be assessed by the factual consequences after establishing the air defense identification zone to decide whether treating the measures of defining air defense identification as the attempt of claiming sovereignty, expanding sovereign territory or sphere of influence, enlarging air defense region,
increasing the coverage of air military activities or even using it to present national strength and establishing pride or to test responses of other states around the disputed territories is eventually reasonable judgments or overstated speculations. This article will be concluded with a brief discussion on the matter of defining an air defense identification, and as with no international law to be the legal basis whether it may still need to adopt any domestic law as its legal basis.

2. The Validity of Edition for the Legal Decrees and the Jurisdiction

2.1. The Validity of Edition for the Legal Decrees

Before actually examining the contents of these three legal decrees, we should inspect whether their editions may still be valid. First, regarding the “Law of the People’s Republic of China on National Defense”, it was adopted at the Fifth Meeting of the Eighth National People’s Congress on March 14, 1997, and promulgated by Order No. 84 of the President of the People’s Republic of China on March 14, 1997, as well as enacted on the same day.³

This is basically consistent with the legal terms information with which the PRC defined the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone. Nonetheless, the content of Article 48 of this law was amended at the Tenth Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Eleventh National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China on August 27, 2009, by adopting a legislative decree known as the “Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Amending Some Laws”.⁴ It was subsequently promulgated and came into force on the date of promulgation by Order No. 18 of the President of the People’s Republic of China on the same day.⁵

According to Article 2 of the abovementioned the “Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Amending
Some Laws”: The provisions containing “expropriation” in the following laws and legal interpretations shall be amended. Also by Paragraph 2 of the article, it is noted that: The term “expropriation” in the following laws and legal interpretations shall be amended as “expropriation or requisition”. Item 8 of Paragraph 2 therefore specifically addressed that the amendment is applied to Article 48 of the National Defense Law of the People’s Republic of China.6 The valid edition of the PRC National Defense Law, if precisely correct, should be the one revised and promulgated after the amendment on August 27, 2009.

To examine another legal decree titled as the “Law of the People’s Republic of China on Civil Aviation” also noted by the PRC government statement with the same scheme, it can be confirmed that it was adopted at the Sixteenth Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Eighth National People’s Congress on October 30, 1995, and promulgated by Order No. 56 of the President of the People’s Republic of China on the same day. According to Article 214 of the Law, it came into effect as of March 1, 1996.7

In principle, this is basically consistent with the legal terms information with which the PRC defined the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone. Yet, the content of this law was also amended at the Tenth Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Eleventh National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China on August 27, 2009, by adopting a legislative decree known as the “Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Amending Some Laws”.8 Likewise, it was subsequently promulgated and came into force on the date of promulgation by Order No. 18 of the President of the People’s Republic of China on the same day.9

According to the previously mentioned “Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Amending Some
Laws”, many terms of this legal decree were revised by this amendment document. First, Article 3 of this “Decision” already noted that: Revisions shall be made to the provisions concerning criminal responsibilities in the following laws. Consequently, Paragraph 1 of this article also addressed that: The provisions of “in accordance with Article X of the Criminal Law” and “by reference to Article X of the Criminal Law” shall be revised as “in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Criminal Law”. Item 38 of this article therefore explicitly indicated that it may be applied to Article 194, 196, 198 and 199 of the “Law of the People’s Republic of China on Civil Aviation”.\textsuperscript{10}

Further, according to Article 3 of the aforesaid “Decision”, it is noted that: Revisions shall be made to the provisions concerning criminal responsibilities in the following laws. Also, in Paragraph 2 of this article, it is also specified that: The provisions of the decisions concerning punishment of crimes which are incorporated into the criminal law yet repealed that are quoted in the following laws shall be revised as “in accordance with the relevant provisions of the criminal law”. Item 47 of this article therefore specifically indicated that it may be applied to Article 191 of the “Law of the People’s Republic of China on Civil Aviation”.

In addition, based on Article 3 of the “Decision”, it was noted that: Revisions shall be made to the provisions concerning criminal responsibilities in the following laws. Also, it was explicitly addressed that: Revisions shall be made to the specific provisions on prosecution for criminal responsibilities in the following laws. Subsequently, Item 56 of the article regulated that: Article 192 of the Civil Aviation Law of the People’s Republic of China shall be revised as: “Any individual who uses force on the persons aboard a civil aircraft in flight which imperils air safety shall be prosecuted for criminal responsibilities in accordance with the relevant provisions of the criminal law”.

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Moreover, Paragraph 1 of Article 193 shall be revised as: “Any individual who carries explosives, detonators or hazardous substances in a concealed way boarding on a civil aircraft, or consigns transport of dangerous cargoes in the name of non-dangerous items in violation of provisions herein shall be prosecuted for criminal responsibilities in accordance with the relevant provisions of the criminal law”. Likewise, Paragraph 3 of the same article shall be revised as: “Any individual who carries firearms, ammunition and controlled knives in a concealed way in boarding on a civil aircraft shall be prosecuted for criminal responsibilities in accordance with the relevant provisions of the criminal law”.

Similarly, Article 195 shall be revised as: “Any individual who intentionally places or instigates others to place hazardous articles on civil aircraft in use enough to destroy the aircraft and imperil air safety shall be prosecuted for criminal responsibilities in accordance with the relevant provisions of the criminal law”. And Article 197 shall be revised as: “Any individual who steals or intentionally damages or destroys or moves aviation equipment in use which endangers air safety and is enough to cause falling or wrecking of the civil aircraft shall be prosecuted for criminal responsibilities in accordance with the relevant provisions of the criminal law”.

Finally, according to Article 4 of the “Decision”, it is noted that: Revisions shall be made to the provisions concerning security administration punishment in the following laws and decisions on the relevant legal issues. And in Paragraph 1 of this article, it was explicitly expressed that: The “regulations on security administration punishments” quoted in the following laws and decisions concerning the relevant legal issues shall be revised as “law on security administration punishments”. Also, in Item 70 of this article, it is clearly indicated that it may be applied to Article 200 of the “Law of the People’s Republic of
China on Civil Aviation”. Based on those legal terms unambiguously noted by the previously mentioned “Decision”, to be precisely accurate, the current valid edition of this law should also be the one revised and promulgated after the amendment on August 27, 2009.

If the same principle for examining the valid date of the previously noted “National Defense Law of the People’s Republic of China” and “Law of the People’s Republic of China on Civil Aviation” is adopted to inspect the third legal decree, the Basic Rules on Flight of the People’s Republic of China, addressed by the PRC government statement as defining the East China Sea ADIZ, it may reveal that the suitability of the version for this regulation can be even more controversial.

From various information sources,11 we may conclude that an initial edition of the “General Flight Rules of the People’s Republic of China” was promulgated by the Order of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China and the Central Military Commission of the People’s Republic of China No. 288 on July 24, 2000, after completing a significant revision on the ruling document with the same name originally jointly issued by the PRC State Council and the Central Military Commission on April 21, 1977.12 It has been further firstly revised in accordance with the “Decision of the State Council and the Central Military Commission on Amending the General Flight Rules of the People’s Republic of China” on July 27, 2001, and promulgated by the Order of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, the Central Military Commission of the People’s Republic of China No. 312. According to text of Article 124 of the 2001 edition “General Flight Rules of the People’s Republic of China”: These Rules shall come into force as of zero hour August 1, 2001.13 Subsequently, the second-time revision was settled with the same titled “Decision of the State Council and the Central Military Commission on Amending the General Flight Rules of the People’s Republic of China” on October 18, 2007, and
promulgated on the same day by the Order of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, the Central Military Commission of the People’s Republic of China No. 509. The revised general flight rules took effect on November 22, 2007, as directed by this order.¹⁴

From the facts addressed above, we may prove that the “General Flight Rules of the People’s Republic of China” adopted by the PRC government statement for defining the East China Sea ADIZ was neither the initial edition as the two previously mentioned legal decrees, nor the nearest and current valid edition. The legitimacy and legality of this legal decree therefore is indeed questionable. In adopting any legal decree as the legal basis of a political statement, it is necessary to note its revision history in order to let the audiences to apprehend that it is the nearest and current valid version in order to satisfy the basic requirement of presenting any legal statement. Those articles that have been revised might not be necessarily relevant to the issues stated, yet, for the act of adopting legal decrees, it should be strictly accurate. Otherwise, as these details are questioned and challenged by other parties, the authority and professionalism of the government statement will be naturally undermined. Particularly for the third legal decree, its effective date was neither the date of revision or date of taking effect for the initial edition nor the date of the nearest edition. Although it was consistent with the incorrect edition shown by the official website of the PRC governing authority, Civil Aviation Administration of China,¹⁵ it may only indicate making the same mistake and still being unable to justify the existing fallacy.

2.2. The Coverage of the Jurisdiction

We may first examine the territories covered by the jurisdiction noted in the “Law of the People's Republic of China on National Defense”.

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Principally, this legal decree does not specifically define the geographical coverage of its jurisdiction. Nevertheless, as in its Chapter 4 addressing “Defense of the Frontiers, Seas and Air Space”, contents of Article 26 does precisely note with texts such as “territorial land, inland waters, territorial seas and territorial air space”. Further, at the end of this article, it also mentions terms like “safeguard the maritime rights and interests of the country”, which may extend its territories involved further externally. Nonetheless, it is by no means a solid basis to indicate that its jurisdiction may also extend outwardly by so addressing.

On the other hand, if judging from Article 8 of Chapter 1 “General Provisions” in this legal decree, The People’s Republic of China, in its military relations with other countries, safeguards world peace and opposes acts of aggression and expansion, and Article 66 of Chapter 11 “Foreign Military Relations” in the same law, The People’s Republic of China supports the world community in its military-related actions taken for the benefit of safeguarding world and regional peace, security and stability and supports it in its efforts to impartially and reasonably resolve international disputes and its efforts for arms control and disarmament, then the geographical sphere for taking actions according to this legal decree may reach all places in the world. Nonetheless, it is by no means implying that its jurisdiction may also extend to worldwide coverage accordingly. Regardless of any terms regarding the jurisdiction coverage within the texts noted above, none of them may be relevant to defining an air defense identification zone. Even for those matters regarding the efforts of air defense, its coverage is still limited to the territorial airspace, which is very different from the airspace defined by the air defense identification zone.

By further securitizing the geographical coverage of the jurisdiction noted by the “Civil Aviation Law of the People’s Republic of China”, based on Article 1 of Chapter 1 “General Principles” of the law, This law
has been formulated to safeguard the national sovereign right over the territorial sky and the right of civil aviation, ensure the safe and orderly operation of civil aviation, protect the legitimate rights and interests of the parties involved in civil aviation, and promote the development of civil aviation, and Article 2, The air space above the territorial land and waters of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is the territorial sky of PRC, which enjoys complete and exclusive sovereignty over its airspace, we may principally confirm that its geographical jurisdiction is applied to its territorial airspace. Moreover, from all those regulations on the civil airports within its own territory noted in Chapter 6 “Civil Airport” of the law, then its jurisdiction may of course cover all civil airports. If judging from all articles of Paragraph 1 “Airspace Control” of Chapter 7 “Aerial Navigation” and the partial texts of Article 76 of Paragraph 2 “Flight Control” in the same chapter, … Aircraft flying over PRC territories must follow the unitary flight rules …, as well as Article 81, Civil aircraft should not fly out of PRC airspace without permission. The departments concerned have the right to take necessary measures according to circumstances to stop the aircraft flying out of PRC airspace without permission, we may further confirm that its jurisdiction is indeed limited to the territorial airspace.

Particularly, as noted by Article 173 of Chapter 13 titled “Special Provisions for Foreign Civil Aircraft” in this law, The operation of civil aviation by foreign nationals using foreign civil aircraft inside PRC territories should be undertaken in accordance with provisions in this chapter as well as other relevant provisions in this law where this chapter does not cover, and many other articles subsequently listed within the chapter all noted with terms like “inside PRC territories” and “PRC territorial air”, we may further specifically confirm the jurisdiction coverage of the law. Conversely, the “search and rescue zone of PRC” noted by the text of Article 182, The owner or country of registration of
foreign civil aircraft should have the approval of CAA or act in accordance with the agreement between the two governments in the search and rescue of aircraft in distress in the search and rescue zone of PRC, is based on the “Provision of the People’s Republic of China on Search and Rescue of Civil Aircraft” that was approved by the State Council on December 8, 1992, and promulgated by Decree No. 29 of the Civil Aviation Administration of China on December 28, 1992. According to Article 6 of Chapter 1 of this administrative regulation, The Civil Aviation Search and Rescue Area of the People’s Republic of China covers the territory of the People’s Republic of China and such portion of the high seas where China shall undertake search and rescue operations as stipulated in the international treaties concluded or acceded to by the People’s Republic of China. The Civil Aviation Search and Rescue Area shall be divided into several regional civil aviation search and rescue areas, the delineation of which shall be published by CAAC, it can be understood that as applying this law beyond the PRC territories, its practices will be directed by certain international treaties and can never be exclusively decided by the PRC authorities.

As for the objectives applicable for the law, from the text noted by Article 5 of Chapter 2 “Nationality of Civil Aircraft” of this law, Civil aircraft mentioned in this law refer to aircraft other than those used for flying mission of military, customs and police operations,17 we may confirm that aircrafts serving military, customs and constabulary missions will be excluded from the jurisdiction of this law. If further referring to Article 91 of Chapter 8 “Public Air Transportation Enterprises” of the law, A public air transport enterprise refers to a corporate enterprise which uses civil aircraft for the transport of passengers, baggage, postal matter and cargoes for the purpose of profit-making, Article 106 of Chapter 9 “Public Air Transportation” of the same law, The provisions in this chapter are applicable to the
transport of passengers, baggage and cargoes by civil aircraft undertaken by airlines, including free transit. The provisions do not apply to mail transit by civil aircraft. The provisions are applicable to that part of multimodal transport which concerns air transportation, Article 107, Domestic air transport mentioned in this law refers to the contracted air transport whose places of departure, prearranged stopover and destination are all inside PRC territories. International air transport mentioned in this law refers to the contracted transport, with or without stopover or transshipment, whose place of departure or destination, or one of the prearranged stopovers is not inside PRC territories, as well as Article 145 of Chapter 10 “General-Purpose Aviation” of the law, General-purpose aviation refers to civil aviation by means of civil aircraft other than public air transportation. Such aviation includes professional flights for industrial, agricultural, forestry, fishery, architectural, medical, rescue, relief, meteorological, observation, ocean monitoring, scientific research and experiment, educational training and cultural and sports purposes, we may well understand the objectives applicable to the law. The term of “the third party” is unquestionably noted in the texts of the law. Regardless of the matters and excuses for causing infringement or damage to the third party, it may certainly be applicable to this law.

After reviewing the applicable coverage and objectives of the “Civil Aviation Law of the People’s Republic of China”, we subsequently inspect the geographical jurisdiction and governing objectives of the “General Flight Rules of the People’s Republic of China”. According to Article 1 of Chapter 1 “General Provisions” of this legal regulation, These Rules are formulated with a view to safeguarding the sovereignty of territorial airspace of the State, standardizing the flight activities within the territory of the People’s Republic of China and ensuring the safe and orderly conduct of the flight activities, it is specifically noted
that the geographical coverage for applying this regulation is only within the territory of the People’s Republic of China. And the content of Article 2, *All units and individuals with aircraft under their charge and all flight-related persons and their flight activities shall abide by these Rules*, on the other hand specifies the objectives within the jurisdiction of this regulation. As we are considering the jurisdiction of this regulation, it naturally needs to satisfy both terms mentioned above in order to assure a sufficient jurisdiction.

Reviewing the contents of Article 11 to Article 27 of Chapter 2 “Airspace Management” in this regulation reveals that the flying areas defined by this regulation are all located within the territory of the People’s Republic of China except the international airways noted by Article 15. This is basically consistent with the geographical coverage of jurisdiction addressed by Article 1 of Chapter 1 “General Provisions”. Nonetheless, based on the partial content noted by Article 35 of Chapter 3 “Flight Control” of this regulation, … *For aircraft approved to fly into or out of the territorial airspace of the People’s Republic of China, their flights into or out of the territorial airspace of the People’s Republic of China or their flights across flight control areas shall be subject to approval by the Air Force of the People’s Liberation Army; …, the jurisdiction coverage is essentially extended by this application and approval procedure to those units and individuals with aircrafts under their charge that ever apply for the permissions of the PRC authorities. It is particularly necessary to remind that the jurisdiction only covers those aircrafts applying for permission to depart from or enter the PRC territorial airspace. By the criterion of geographical jurisdiction or the standard of *ratione loci*, it should not be interpreted as an expansion.*

In addition, as referring to the contents of Chapter 3 “Flight Control”, Chapter 4 “Operations within Aerodrome Areas”, Chapter 5 “Operations on Airways and Air Routes”, Chapter 6 “Flight Separation”,

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Chapter 7 “Flight Command”, Chapter 8 “Handling of Special Situations in Flight”, and Chapter 9 “Support of Communication, Navigation, Radar, Meteorology and Aeronautical Information”, all matters regulated by this legal decree are limited within its own territory except contents noted by Article 102, *When a military aircraft is in distress, the relevant department shall make a prompt report to the local government and garrison. The local government and garrison shall immediately take actions to conduct search-and-rescue operations. When the operations of searching and rescuing the distressed aircraft are conducted over waters, a report shall also be made to the national maritime search and rescue organization and the adjacent maritime search and rescue organization, which shall be alerted for prompt actions in the conduct of search-and-rescue operations. When a civil aircraft is in distress, the search-and-rescue operations shall be conducted in accordance with the relevant provisions of the State, and Article 103, When an aircraft is in distress outside the territory of the People’s Republic of China, the internationally accepted distress signals and frequencies shall be applied. Where a distress situation takes place over waters during flight operations, 500 kilohertz-frequency shall also be used for the transmission of distress signals if its radio equipment permits. However, as observing from the contents of these two articles, it obviously and fully respects the international norms and never requests exclusive jurisdiction. It also specifically addresses the joint effort together with other parties in the texts.*

Further, by the contents in Chapter 10 “Special Provisions Governing Foreign Aircraft” of this legal decree, all the regulations noted from Article 112 to Article 115 on the foreign aircrafts are only relevant to their departure and entry through the PRC territory and territorial airspace. By the criteria of *ratione loci*, it is indeed completely consistent with the overall defined coverage of this regulation. As for the
texts in Chapter 12 “Legal Liability” they are specifically addressed on
the objectives under its jurisdiction and never associated with the
geographical jurisdiction. Moreover, objectives under its jurisdiction are
also principally identical to the ones defined by Article 2 of this
regulation. As for Article 121 of Chapter 12 “Supplementary Provisions”
of this regulation, In regard to the aircraft of the People’s Republic of
China operating over the contiguous zones, exclusive economic zones or
high seas beyond the territorial waters of the People’s Republic of
China, where the provisions of an international treaty concluded or
acceded to by the People’s Republic of China are different from the
provisions of these Rules, the provisions of that international treaty shall
apply, except the provisions for which reservation has been declared by
the People’s Republic of China, although it has seemingly extended the
geographical jurisdiction out of its territorial waters and to cover the
airspaces above the contiguous zones, exclusive economic zones and
high seas, the objectives are obviously only applied on the aircrafts with
the PRC nationality. It also never definitely excludes the jurisdiction on
the aircrafts of its nationality according to the international treaties.
Nonetheless, we may firmly confirm that it may not have any
jurisdiction on foreign aircrafts in the airspaces out of its territorial
waters.

Lastly, we may inspect the texts of Article 122, The signals used in
the interception of aircraft violating these Rules and the response signals
by the intercepted aircraft shall be in compliance with the provisions in
Appendix III to these Rules. Appendix III of this regulation is “The
Maneuvers and Signals for Intercepting Aircraft and Intercepted
Aircraft”. As we refer to Article 29 of Chapter 3 “Flight Control” of this
regulation, The basic tasks of flight control are: (1) supervising aircraft
in strict adherence to their approved flight plans, maintaining order of
flights, and preventing unapproved flights of aircraft; (2) preventing
unapproved entries of aircraft into prohibited areas, temporary prohibited areas and unapproved entering or leaving the national border (frontier); (3) preventing collision between aircraft or their crash onto ground obstacles; and (4) preventing inadvertent firings at aircraft by ground-to-air weapons or devices, and the texts of Article 37. For any unapproved takeoff or liftoff of an aircraft, the relevant unit shall find out the causes immediately and take necessary measures up to the extent of forcing it to land, apparently, its geographical jurisdiction should be limited to the airspaces within its territory and territorial air.

2.3. Text Identification, Context Examination and Subtext Interpretation

After inspecting the three legal decrees adopted by the PRC government statement for defining the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone, we may discover that the suitability of the valid editions, geographical jurisdiction and objectives under governance jurisdiction, in terms of adopting as the legal foundation for defining the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone, was indeed never properly authorized. If we further compare the wordings and terms applied, it is even harder to verify any causation linkage relationship for legal authorization. First, for the terminology of air defense identification zone itself, it is never explicitly mentioned by any of these three legal decrees. Therefore, there has been no standard legal definition of this jargon in these legal regulations.

Second, as we review the announcement released by the PRC Defense Ministry for aircraft identification rules, the identification methods, for instance, the flight plan, has never been mentioned in the text of the “Law of the People’s Republic of China on National Defense”. This term is noted by Article 167 and Article 178 of the “Law
of the People’s Republic of China on Civil Aviation” for three times,\textsuperscript{19} but their significance is totally irrelevant to providing flight plan for identification within the air defense identification zone. The term of flight plan has been twice mentioned by the “General Flight Rules of the People’s Republic of China” in Article 39 and Article 90,\textsuperscript{20} but likewise, they are completely unrelated to the identification process within the air defense identification zone.

Further, from the radio identification scheme requested by the PRC Defense Ministry announcement, the term is never mentioned in the text of the “Law of the People’s Republic of China on National Defense”. The term of radio has been noted in total for eight times in the texts of Article 10, Article 88 and Article 90 of the “Law of the People’s Republic of China on Civil Aviation”.\textsuperscript{21} Nonetheless, they are all irrelevant to the request of radio identification noted by the Defense Ministry announcement, either. Yet, in the texts of Article 48, 57, 60, 87, 95, 101 and 105 of the “General Flight Rules of the People’s Republic of China”, the term of radio are in total noted for 13 times but none of them is specifically addressed on the usage for identification. Only the partial content of Article 48, \textit{The crew members shall, from engine start before takeoff to engine shutdown after landing, keep radio communication contact with the air traffic controller or flight commander and strictly observe the communication discipline . . .}, is barely similar to the contents of radio identification requirement addressed by the announcement, \textit{Aircraft flying in the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone must maintain the two-way radio communications, and respond in a timely and accurate manner to the identification inquiries from the administrative organ of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone or the unit authorized by the organ.}

However, the party assigned for communication noted by the “General Flight Rules of the People’s Republic of China” is “air traffic controller
or flight commander”, which is obviously different from the “administrative organ of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone or the unit authorized by the organ”.

In addition, as reviewing the text of announcement regarding the paragraph of transponder identification, Aircraft flying in the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone, if equipped with the secondary radar transponder, should keep the transponder working throughout the entire course, and comparing all the articles of the “Law of the People’s Republic of China on National Defense”, we may notice that the terms of secondary radar and transponder have never been mentioned, not even the term of radar. As for the content of the “Law of the People’s Republic of China on Civil Aviation”, the term of radar has never been noted, either. On the other hand, the term of radar is noted by Article 12, 40, 96, 104, 107 and 108 of the “General Flight Rules of the People’s Republic of China” for 15 times, but the terms of secondary radar and transponder have never been mentioned. Moreover, the substantial contents of these articles aforesaid are entirely irrelevant to the identification function.

Finally, we may examine the request for logo identification. As comparing the original text noted by the PRC Defense Ministry announcement, Aircraft flying in the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone must clearly mark their nationalities and the logo of their registration identification in accordance with related international treaties, with the texts of the “Law of the People’s Republic of China on National Defense”, no term regarding logo has ever been noted in the text of the law. As for the “Law of the People’s Republic of China on Civil Aviation”, terms with the significance regarding either logo or sign are noted in Article 8, 58, 61 and 85 in total for five times. Nonetheless, only the content of Article 8, Having obtained the PRC nationality according to law, the civil aircraft should be marked with the nationality
and registration signs, may somehow be relevant to the announcement. Yet, it is in essence very different from the instruction of logo identification as requested by the East China Sea ADIZ announcement. Similar terms are noted in Article 24, 41 and 47 of the “General Flight Rules of the People’s Republic of China” for six times. However, contents in Article 24 and 47 are entirely irrelevant to any sign of aircraft. As for the text of Article 41, Aircraft operating within the territory of the People’s Republic of China shall bear distinct identification marks. Aircraft without identification marks are forbidden such flight. Aircraft without identification marks shall, when in need of such flight due to special circumstances, be subject to approval by the Air Force of the People’s Liberation Army. The identification marks of aircraft shall be subject to approval in accordance with the relevant provisions of the State, it is seemingly close to the announcement. Nevertheless, it is necessary to notice that the airspace governing by the article is nothing else but the territorial airspace of the People’s Republic of China. We therefore may understand, according to the coverage of the geographical jurisdiction, that it is fundamentally unrelated to any request of the ADIZ announcement.

After having summarized all the legal factors discussed in this section, we may conclude that it is indeed hard to construct the judiciary causation relationship between terms noted by these three legal decrees and the action of defining such an air defense identification zone as addressed by the government statement for the People’s Republic of China establishing the East China Sea ADIZ. Further, as for the identification measures demanded by the PRC Defense Ministry, after comparing the regulations noted in the articles of these three legal decrees, many inconsistencies are also exposed. It is hard for us to identify any legal causation relevance that may mutually exist as adopting these three PRC internal legal decrees to be the legal basis for
establishing the East China Sea ADIZ and requesting that all the aircrafts entering this airspace should apply for the identification measures.

3. Discussing Each Defined Aviation Airspace

Although the previous analysis has already obviously proved that there is no term of the air defense identification zone which had ever been specifically defined by the three decrees adopted by the People’s Republic of China as the legal basis for defining the East China Sea ADIZ, all the aviation airspaces ever listed by these three legal decrees will still be elaborated in this section in order to let the readers understand that these decrees are entirely irrelevant to any air defense identification zone. First, as for the “Law of the People’s Republic of China on National Defense”, it has mentioned the term of territorial airspace twice in its Article 26. Apart from this, no other airspace has been mentioned in the whole text. Apparently, the territorial airspace is very different from the air defense identification zone. For the “Law of the People’s Republic of China on Civil Aviation”, in Article 78, Civil aircraft should not fly into the restricted airspace except with special permission by State regulations, or fly into the controlled airspace except in observation of the restrictive conditions specified in regulations. The above mentioned restricted and controlled airspaces are to be specified according to State regulations, the terms of “restricted airspace” and “controlled airspace” are noted but with no specific definition of these terms. The term of “the search and rescue zone” is of course noted in its Article 182. Nonetheless, it is not purely an airspace. This law also has a specific chapter titled as “Airspace Control”; again, several principles are listed in this chapter but no definition of any airspace has ever been explicitly noted. Likewise, in the specific chapter for “Flight Control”, a term called “controlled
airspace zone” has been noted, but still no specific definition has ever existed. In summary, all the previously noted airspaces can be understandably clarified to be different from the air defense identification zone.

As for the “General Flight Rules of the People’s Republic of China”, in Article 12 of Chapter 2 “Airspace Management”, it is noted that the airspace is usually divided into aerodrome flight airspace, airways, air routes, prohibited areas, restricted areas and danger areas. It is also addressed that air corridors, fuel dumping areas and temporary flight airspace may be established when necessary for the need of airspace management and flight missions. It is further defined by Article 14 that: Normally aerodrome flight airspace includes such flight airspace as flying techniques (aerobatic, formation, instrument) flight airspace, scientific research test flight airspace, firing flight airspace, low-level flight airspace, super-low-level flight airspace, aeromarine flight airspace, nighttime flight airspace and holding airspace. Moreover, airspace and level such as holding airspace and lowest holding level are also defined by the same article. Subsequently, definitions of airway and air route are separately defined by Article 15 and Article 16 accordingly. Definitions of prohibited areas, temporary prohibited areas, restricted areas and temporary restricted areas are specified by Article 17 and Article 18. Danger areas and temporary danger areas are defined by Article 19. Air corridors and fuel dumping areas are regulated by Article 21 and Article 22. Finally, the code for establishing any temporary flight airspace is noted in Article 23.

In addition to those aforesaid airspaces, Article 30 of Chapter 3 “Flight Control” in this regulation, Within the territory of the People’s Republic of China, flight control areas, flight control sub-areas and aerodrome flight control areas shall be established according to their respective responsibilities of flight control. High altitude control areas,

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medium and low altitude control areas, terminal (approach) control areas and/or aerodrome tower control areas shall be established in areas of airways and air routes and/or in civil aerodrome areas. Flight information areas shall be established over the territory of the People’s Republic of China, its contiguous zones, its exclusive economic zones and the high seas adjacent to it, is noted with various control areas and the flight information area, which is the airspace most highly possible to be confused with the air defense identification zone. Nonetheless, based on the definitions and descriptions of the flight information area noted in Article 85 to 88 of Paragraph 1 “Flight Information Area” in Chapter 4 “Airspace” of the “Administrative Rules on Air Traffic of China’s Civil Aviation” established by the Civil Aviation Administration of China, it is clearly indicated that such flight information areas should be identical to those airspaces defined by the International Civil Aviation Organization and known by the other side of the Taiwan Strait as the Flight Information Region and other Chinese translated terms. We therefore can naturally confirm that it is completely different from the air defense identification zone. Last but not least, two special aviation zones known as transition level and terminal control are particularly defined by Article 123 of this regulation; nevertheless, they are totally irrelevant to the air defense identification zone.

As previously addressed, after reviewing three legal decrees adopted by the People’s Republic of China in its government statement for establishing the East China Sea ADIZ, many aviation airspaces are noted within their texts, most of them being specifically defined. Even for those which are never defined, whilst they are adopted, we may still clearly identify their significance being fundamentally unrelated to air defense identification zone. As for those airspaces that are overlapped with the air defense identification zone, they would have totally different significances. From such an inspection process, the value for the PRC
government statement to adopt these three legal decrees is essentially further undermined.

4. Air Defense Identification Zone and Sovereignty

Ever since the People’s Republic of China established the East China Sea ADIZ, there are various speculations about the functions that can be achieved by this air defense identification zone. It includes treating establishing ADIZ as an act of claiming sovereignty, expanding sovereignty or sphere of influence, enlarging air defense zone, increasing coverage of air military activities, presenting national strength and testing other states for building prestige, or even probing disputed territories. Whether these speculations can be sensible or only be plausible, it is indeed controversial. Based on the speculations on PRC’s strategic intentions from the international community ever since the establishment of the East China Sea ADIZ till now, we may conclude with the following several findings.

First, arguing that establishing ADIZ is associated with claiming sovereignty is in essence lack of linkage relationship. Taking a survey on states all over the world that had ever established ADIZs, it can be seen that no nation ever adopted any of the established ADIZs as the basis for claiming sovereignty of a disputed territory. This may well justify that such a speculation is indeed an overstatement. Second, considering that defining ADIZ may expand sovereignty or sphere of influence is likewise overstated. Establishing ADIZs does not exclude any other states from using these airspaces. The requests for identification are basically following the rules and norms generally practiced by the international civil aviation activities. They are essentially appropriate. Taking proper measures on those who do not follow the requests for identification and report procedures are the standard operating
procedures for every country to conduct its air defense operations. All these speculations are obviously reflecting double standard on this matter.

Further, viewing the East China Sea ADIZ that covers the waters around the Diaoyutai Islands (釣魚臺群島) as an action of probing disputed territories was a statement initially delivered by the United States State Department, right after the establishment of the East China Sea ADIZ, which criticized Mainland China for putting the Diaoyutai Islands into the coverage of its East China Sea ADIZ. Yet, surveying the North American ADIZ, it can be seen that the ADIZ along the Atlantic coast also covers the French territory of St. Pierre Miquelon. It is obviously a treatment of double standard since the United States also included this territory into its own ADIZ. Meanwhile, Beijing totally ignored this accusation with no follow-on associated statement on this matter. It is therefore again an apparent untrue proclamation.

Besides, judging the PRC adopting the East China Sea ADIZ and requesting other states to report flight plans with no reason as intention to enlarge air defense zone and increase coverage of air military activities may essentially be difficult to be justified. It firstly needs to be reminded that after surveying the detailed regulations for demanding all aircrafts entering the ADIZ to inform the PRC authorities, we may understand that it is purely an emulation of the U.S. Code of Federation Regulation Title 14, Part 99, Section 11, which clearly noted with the text of: No person may operate an aircraft into, within, or from a departure point within an ADIZ, unless the person files, activates, and closes a flight plan with the appropriate aeronautical facility, or is otherwise authorized by air traffic control. Hence, the argument of reporting the flight plan for enlarging air defense zone does have its prior example. It is by no means a request with no ground. Hence, the comment is also overstated. In addition, given the fact that the PRC
military aircrafts maneuvering through the island chain is already an existing routine practice, accusing it as increasing coverage of air military activities would not be consistent with the realities.

Finally, regarding the accusation targeted at the PRC adopting this action for presenting national strength and testing other states for building prestige, or even probing disputed territories, such should not be Beijing’s original purpose. However, from the level of compliance to the requests shown by the aviation administration authorities in various nations and the international aviation service enterprises, establishing the ADIZ should be an achievement beyond the initial intention. Overall speaking, from the perspective of its original purpose for establishment, it should have already achieved its intended goal. And judging from the actual practices at the moment, this air defense identification is still operated in its initial proclaimed operational mode. Whether the strategic aim is achieved as expected or not, it is indeed a matter of judgment.

5. Conclusion

“An ADIZ has no basis in international law and is not overseen by any international organization.”31 There is therefore no standard of establishing an air defense identification zone at all in the international society. This paper is targeted at the three legal decrees adopted by Mainland China in its government statement for establishing the East China Sea ADIZ and the subsequent Defense Ministry announcement of aircraft identification rules. After inspecting the legal causation relationship between these legal codes and the established East China Sea ADIZ as well as conducting the process of text identification, context examination and subtext interpretation, we may conclude that the construction of such a legal causation relationship between codes and the established ADIZ has failed. Furthermore, judging from the editions
of these legal decrees and their jurisdictions, it is in essence full of errors to an unbelievable degree.

Facing such an embarrassing situation caused by the legal flaws, if Mainland China would like to sustain its operations of the East China Sea ADIZ, it should follow the U.S. legal practices to establish some specific legal chapter for the air defense identification zone. Otherwise, it is necessary to conduct a legislative engineering for amending the associated legal terms. Only by so doing, it may satisfy the requirements of rule of law generally exercised by the major powers in the international community. Last but not least, it is necessary to point out that the staff who were involved in drafting the government statement and the announcement of aircraft identification rules were fundamentally reckless. They were completely unthoughtful in adopting these legal decrees, thus creating such an excessive and ridiculous consequence.

Notes

法理基礎分析” was a conference paper presented at the annual conference hosted by the Association of ROC International Relations at the National Cheng Kung University (國立成功大學) in Tainan 台南, Taiwan, on October 24, 2015.

Dr Ching Chang 張競 is a researcher with long distinguished experiences in national security affairs. He served in the Republic of China Navy as a line officer for over a quarter of a century. Numerous lessons were acquired from various posts in his naval career. Particularly, a decade of sea duty service in which he has committed to different types of surface combatants allows him to grasp much valuable first-hand information and lessons that could never be gained from any academic arena. Further, as a graduate from the Republic of China Naval Academy (中華民國海軍軍官學校, Kaohsiung 高雄 City, Taiwan, ROC), Naval Staff College of the US Naval War College and Naval Command College of the US Naval War College, Dr Chang received orthodox professional military education which serves to support his advancement in research on national security. Dr Chang has a diversified academic background comprised of a Bachelor’s degree in navigation and maritime engineering granted by the Republic of China Naval Academy, a Master’s degree in electrical engineering gained from the University of Colorado at Boulder in the United States, and a Doctorate in politics and international studies conferred by the University of Hull in the United Kingdom. Apart from the posts in the naval fleet, Dr Chang also attained the position of staff officer at various levels in the defense hierarchy. With nobility granted by the defense authority of the Republic of China, Dr Chang has been selected as the teaching staff in the Chinese Naval Command and Staff College as well as the War College of the ROC National Defense University (國防大學, Taoyuan 桃園 City, Taiwan, ROC). Dr Chang also owns a honor to be the speech writer for the Defense Ministers of the Republic of China and in charge of the Office of Policy Coordination for the Defense Ministers for
two years. Dr Chang has concluded his military career with the rank of
navy captain several years ago, thus acquired a privilege called the
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Society for Strategic Studies (中華戰略學會, Taipei 台北, Taiwan, ROC) to be a research fellow. Further, Dr Chang is also an active
columnist and TV commentator on political issues. <Email: chingchang@hotmail.com>

1. Statement by the Government of the People’s Republic of China on
Establishing the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone,
china/2013-11/23/c_132911635.htm, data acquired time: 1200, July 12,
2015.

2. The English version of the announcement is not available officially from
the PRC Ministry of National Defense. The Chinese version of the
announcement is as follows: 中華人民共和國國防部，中華人民共和國
time: 1200, July 1, 2015.

3. Law of the People’s Republic of China on National Defence, official
englishnpc/Law/2007-12/11/content_1383547.htm, data acquired time:
1200, July 1, 2015.

4. “Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on
Amending Some Laws”, Database of the Peking University Center for
law, data acquired time: 0900, January 26, 2016.

5. Ibid., please see the initial section noted as “Order of the President of the
People's Republic of China (No.18)”.

6. Ibid., please see Article 2, Paragraph 2, Item 8 of the “Decision of the
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Amending
Some Laws”.
8. Ibid., please see the “Civil Aviation Law of the People’s Republic of China”, Database of the Peking University Center for Legal Information. It is specified that the PRC Civil Aviation Law was revised by the “Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Amending Some Laws” with the effective date on August 27, 2009.
9. Please see the initial section noted as “Order of the President of the People’s Republic of China (No. 18)” in the “Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Amending Some Laws”, Database of the Peking University Center for Legal Information, op. cit.
10. The translation of the content of the “Law of the People’s Republic of China on Civil Aviation” is adopted from a blog, not from the PRC official source. The translation of this legal decree is not available at the PRC National People’s Congress database. Please see Anhui Hefei Legal English Translation (安徽合肥法律英语翻译), “The Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Revision of Some Laws” (全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于修改部分法律的决定), Sina Blog, http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_636b31170100ig58.html, data acquired time: 1900, January 12, 2016. It is also necessary to remind the readers that variations of translation may frequently occur among various sources.
11. The revision history for the “General Flight Rules of the People’s Republic of China” in this paragraph is concluded from the following various

12. Please see the text of Article 124 of the “General Flight Rules of the People's Republic of China” noted by the aforementioned sources containing the following: The General Flight Rules of the People’s Republic of China promulgated on April 21, 1977 by the State Council and the Central Military Commission shall be repealed simultaneously. This may indicate the significant revision after a long period of time.


Information, *op. cit.*


16. The original text of Article 26 is: The territorial land, inland waters, territorial seas and territorial air space of the People's Republic of China are inviolable. The State reinforces the defence of the frontiers, seas and air space and adopts effective defence and control measures to defend the security of the territorial land, inland waters, territorial seas and territorial air space and safeguard the maritime rights and interests of the country. Please see “Law of the People’s Republic of China on National Defense”, official website of the PRC National People's Congress, *op. cit.*

17. For all the texts of the relevant articles noted by the “Civil Aviation Law of the People’s Republic of China”, please see “Civil Aviation Law of the People's Republic of China”, official website of the PRC National People’s Congress, *op. cit.*

18. The further examination tasks on the texts of these three legal decrees in this paragraph are based on the aforementioned sources as listed in the previous notes.

19. The relevant text in Article 167 of this law is: … (1) Demurrers to claims for injury or damage that occurs after the termination of the effective term of the insurance or guarantee. But if their term should end in the midst of a flight, it should continue to be effective until the next landing specified in the flight plan. But the extended period of the term should not exceed twenty-four hours …; and the relevant text in Article 178 is: Foreign civil aircraft should make their flights according to the fly schedule or plan
approved by CAA. For a change in the fly schedule or plan …

20. The relevant text in Article 39 of this regulation is: … Each aviation unit shall conduct the flight in accordance with the approved flight plan; and the relevant texts in Article 90 are: Flight commanders shall earnestly fulfil their duties and responsibilities, … (1) be familiar with flight missions, flight plans, technical proficiency and health conditions of crew members, aircraft performance and airborne equipment, and conditions of all other supporting services; …

21. The relevant text in Article 10 of this law is: … refer to rights over their airframes, engines, propellers, radio equipment and all other articles …; the relevant texts in Article 88 are: … exercise control over civil aviation radio stations and the frequencies … The radio stations and other instruments and installations … should not interfere with the normal use of the frequencies specially reserved for civil aviation radio communication … having caused interference in an adverse way with the use of civil aviation radio frequencies should immediately suppress the interference … the use of the interfering radio stations and other instruments and equipment should be suspended; and the relevant texts in Article 90 are: Civil aircraft on flight duty should carry the following documents: … (5) License of the radio equipment on the aircraft …

22. The relevant text in Article 24 of this regulation is: … flight obstacle lights and marks shall be installed … in line with the relevant provisions of the State on high buildings or facilities that will possibly affect flight safety; and the relevant text in Article 47 of this regulation is: … the horizontal visibility is less than 2 kilometers during daytime, all the obstruction lights of the aerodrome shall be switched on before any takeoff or landing of aircraft; …

23. The relevant text in Article 12 of this regulation is: … The airspace is usually divided into aerodrome flight airspace, airways, air routes, prohibited areas, restricted areas and danger areas. Air corridors, fuel
dumping areas and temporary flight airspace may be established when necessary for the need of airspace management and flight missions.

24. The relevant texts in Article 12 of this regulation are: … Normally aerodrome flight airspace includes such flight airspace as flying techniques (aerobatic, formation, instrument) flight airspace, scientific research test flight airspace, firing flight airspace, low-level flight airspace, super-low-level flight airspace, aero-marine flight airspace, nighttime flight airspace and holding airspace. Holding airspace … The vertical clearance from the lowest holding … the flight levels in the holding airspace shall be separated by 300 meters; …


26. Based on the aforementioned sources, the text of Article 87 of the “Administrative Rules on Air Traffic of China’s Civil Aviation”, For flight
information services facilitating the aircrafts flying within the territories in China and airspaces beyond the territorial airspace assigned by the International Civil Aviation Organization, there are in total ten flight information regions known as Shenyang 瀋陽, Beijing 北京, Shanghai 上海, Guangzhou 廣州, Kunming 昆明, Wuhan 武漢, Lanzhou 蘭州, Urumqi 烏魯木齊, Hong Kong 香港 and Taipei 臺北 in the whole nation (translated by author), it can be proven that the flight information region noted by Article 87 is exactly the flight information region assigned by the International Civil Aviation Organization. Please note that the Sanya 三亞 flight information region had not been assigned yet while this regulation was revised.


The Writing on the Wall: National and Global Implications of the Ruling Chinese Communist Party’s Domestic and Foreign Policies

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Abstract

The December 2015 crackdown on labour activists was the culmination of a year of the Chinese Communist Party regime’s war on China’s civil society kicked off with the arrests of the “Feminist Five” in March, followed by the infamous crackdown on civil rights lawyers that began on 5th July and lasted till August. At around the same time, from mid-October to end of December 2015, five owners and staff members of Hong Kong’s Mighty Current publishing company and Causeway Bay bookshop which respectively publishes and sells politically dissident books banned by China disappeared under mysterious circumstances (including one while vacationing in Pattaya, Thailand, and another while inspecting warehouse in Hong Kong) and reemerged in mainland China under the custody of the Chinese authorities. While these volatile incidents were unfolding domestically, the year also witnessed the continued rise of China’s economic might in the global system. With specific focus on the latest events unfolding from year 2015 to the
present, this paper attempts to interpret such developments especially in terms of government policies with respect to the State’s relations with the civil society since the leadership transition from Hu-Wen to Xi-Li administration, the implications of the global reach of China’s economic might and soft power in this regard, as well as the current nature of the governing regime of the Chinese Communist Party.

**Keywords**: China, Chinese Communist Party, State, civil society, dissent, dissidents, weiquan, rights-defence lawyers, labour activism, liberal democracy, totalitarianism, authoritarianism, Fascism

**JEL classification**: D73, D74, F52, H12

1. Introduction

Recent years have witnessed several momentous developments in the political economy of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) both on the domestic front and in her foreign relations. The miraculous economic performance of the country in the past over three decades has truly transfixed the world, and has resulted in the astonishing projection of her financial strength around the world through her foreign direct investments (FDIs) especially in Africa, her “soft power” offensive including through the establishment of the Confucius Institutes across the world, and her recently pushed initiative for the setting up of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) that started operation on 25th December 2015 with a capital of US$100 billion and the “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR, 一带一路) proposal that saw continued progress with the creation of the State-owned Silk Road Fund on 29th December 2014 for which the Chinese government has pledged US$40 billion. Concomitantly, China’s increasing military and foreign policy
assertiveness in the East and South China Seas has brought her into different degrees of conflict and confrontation with her perennial nemesis Japan and her smaller Southeast Asian neighbours and their powerful Western ally, the United States of America (US).

Deriving correct interpretation of such fast-paced developments and changes has preoccupied much of the circles of China-watchers these days, with political scientists, economists, sociologists and international relations experts focusing their respective attentions on either the domestic transformation occurring within the PRC or on her foreign relations. This paper attempts to interpret such developments especially in terms of government policies with respect to the State’s relations with the civil society since the leadership transition from Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao 胡錦濤 - 溫家寶 to Xi Jinping-Li Keqiang 習近平 - 李克強 administration, and in addition, the implications of the global reach of China’s economic might and soft power in this regard. While having specific focus on the latest events unfolding from year 2015 to the present, the paper also delves into the history of imperial China in deriving its interpretation of the current nature of the governing regime of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)\(^1\).

2. Return to the Iron Fist

In what looks like a retrogression from the trend that William Dobson observed in his book *The dictator’s learning curve: Inside the global battle for democracy* (2012), there is a general trend since 2014 “that authoritarian regimes were beginning to abandon the quasi-democratic camouflage that allowed them to survive and prosper in the post-Cold War world”\(^2\), according to Freedom House’s report *Freedom in the World 2015 – Discarding democracy: Return to the iron fist*. As discussed from Section 2 to Section 7 of this special issue’s introductory
article, “Political Governance and Strategic Relations: Domestic-Foreign Policy Nexus and China’s Rise in the Global System”, the CCP regime led by Xi Jinping, who has projected an image of himself as an admirer of Mao Zedong 毛澤東 despite what Mao did to his father Xi Zhongxun 習仲勳 during the Cultural Revolution, has resorted to campaigns against dissidents reminiscent of the Mao era, including televised confessions, as the latest ones by the abducted publishers and book distributors Gui Minhai 桂民海, Lui Por 呂波, Cheung Chi-ting 張志平 and Lam Wing-kei 林榮基 (owners and staff of Hong Kong 香港’s Mighty Current publishing company 巨流出版社) and Causeway Bay Books (銅鑼灣書店) owned by Mighty Current since 2014) somberly or tearfully admitting to smuggling illicit dissident books into China (and in the case of Gui Minhai also to a hit-and-run case a decade ago), and Swedish activist Peter Dahlin who was arrested in January 2016 for his activities in China with his human rights group, the Chinese Urgent Action Working Group (CUAWG), offering training and support to Chinese human rights lawyers who were trying to provide justice to the country’s disenfranchised and downtrodden. Peter Dahlin was paraded on China state television confessing that “I violated Chinese law through my activities here […] I have caused harm to the Chinese government. I have hurt the feelings of the Chinese people. I apologise sincerely for this and I am very sorry that this has happened.”3 Several other “suspects” have also been made to confess their crimes on television recently, including Beijing rights-defence lawyer Zhang Kai 張凱 who admitted on TV his crimes of “violating state law, disrupting social order, harming national security” (違反了國家法律, 擾亂了社會秩序, 危害了國家安全).4

Besides, the CCP regime is “also resorting to criminal and administrative detention to restrict activists instead of softer tactics like house arrest or informal interrogations”, and according to FIW 2015, has

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“made use of one of the Cold War’s most chilling instruments, the placement of dissidents in psychiatric hospitals”. This infamous and inhuman Soviet instrument of repression has also made a comeback in today’s Russia. The appearance of Gui Minhai, Peter Dahlin, Gao Yu 高瑜 and various others in the spate of televised self-incriminations since President Xi Jinping took power three years ago seems to represent an adaptation of the kind of forced public confessions by “enemies of the state” in the Mao era – especially during the tumultuous period of Cultural Revolution – to new technology that now makes it possible for everybody to see these on prime-time television, as New York University’s Professor Jerome Cohen, a foremost scholar on China's legal system, observes. Recalling that Xi Jinping’s father Xi Zhongxun, Mao’s close comrade during the Chinese Soviet period, Long March and the Civil War era, who was publicly abused and humiliated during the Cultural Revolution, in fact advocated in 1983 the enactment of a law that would guarantee everyone in China the right to express differing opinion, Professor Cohen told CNN, “I hope Xi follows his father’s advice rather than continuing along this path. But I don’t have my hopes too high.”

3. PRC the Racketeer State

Analysing historical European experience, the late Professor Charles Tilly in his 1985 paper “War making and state making as organized crime” postulates that “a portrait of war makers and state makers as coercive and self-seeking entrepreneurs bears a far greater resemblance to the facts than do its chief alternatives: the idea of a social contract, the idea of an open market in which operators of armies and states offer services to willing consumers, the idea of a society whose shared norms and expectations call forth a certain kind of government.” (p. 169) While
Tilly warns of the “faulty implicit comparisons between today’s Third World and yesterday’s Europe”, one can nevertheless argue that a Third World country like China which is not post-colonial has like the European countries her military development and apparatus for protection developed from within rather than inherited from any colonial masters.

According to Tilly, a “racketeer” government exists if we

[...] consider the definition of a racketeer as someone who creates a threat and then charges for its reduction. Governments’ provision of protection, by this standard, often qualifies as racketeering. To the extent that the threats against which a given government protects its citizens are imaginary or are consequences of its own activities, the government has organized a protection racket. Since governments themselves commonly simulate, stimulate, or even fabricate threats of external war and since the repressive and extractive activities of governments often constitute the largest current threats to the livelihoods of their own citizens, many governments operate in essentially the same ways as racketeers.

(Tilly, 1985: 171)

This is the governance model of a ruling political party whose paramount concern being its own perpetual unchallenged rule that is resorting to all means, both State-dictated legal measures (anti-subversion laws, sedition acts, internal security acts, social harmony laws, anti-terrorism laws, anti-secession laws etc. which are further twisted in practice to serve the purpose of muzzling free speech and harassing or jailing dissidents) and extrajudicial actions (using agents or unidentified thugs to harass, beat up and kidnap, or even attempt to murder, dissident writers, editors, publishers, book distributors,
journalists and civil rights lawyers) as well as a combination of both, to provide its criminal action with a legal topping, or in official parlance, to “preserve social harmony” of its “glorious era of peace and prosperity” (taiping shengshi 太平盛世) against the threat of “a small group of people” (yi xiaozui ren 一小蕪人) who are accused of being in complicity with foreign enemies to try to discredit the government and to disrupt social harmony or to split the nation.

3.1. A CCP-defined Social Contract

The CCP government-defined threats to the country and people, internal and external, are in fact well identified, whether they be non-governmental civil-societal groups like the New Citizens’ Movement (Zhongguo Xin Gongmin Yundong 中国新公民运动), or worker’s groups independent of the nationalised All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU, 中华全国总工会), or outspoken academics or activists engaged in ethnic minority rights advocacy, civil rights lawyers who take up cases which the government wish the society to ignore, or any individual writers, artists and grassroots activists who become too vocal in criticising CCP government’s policies, not to mention those more outright democracy activists who directly challenge CCP’s self-declared moral right to deny Chinese citizens free political choice through multi-party elections. Continuous crackdowns, like Mao’s campaign against the “five black types” (hei wu lei 黑五類, i.e. landlords, wealthy peasants, anti-revolutionaries, bad elements and rightists) during the Cultural Revolution, have to be conducted to protect the Chinese nation from such threats, and in this process, the Party asks for the unquestioning loyalty and support from the Chinese people – not as a choice, but as an obligation, a CCP-defined social contract.

Like the great emperors in China’s past, whether they be Ch’in Shih-Huangti 秦始皇帝 (Qin Shihuangdi, the “First Emperor of Ch’in”
whom Chairman Mao idolised, whose dynasty name “Ch’in” gave rise to “China”, the name by which the country has since been known to the West, and whose self-invented title huangti (”emperor”) would continue to be borne by Chinese rulers for the following two millennia), Han Wu-ti 漢武帝 (Han Wudi, whose dynasty name “Han 漢” became the major autoglossonym of China’s dominant ethnic group that constitutes 92 per cent of the country’s population today), T’ang T’ai-tsung 唐太宗 (Tang Taizong), Sung Tai-tsu 宋太祖 (Song Taizu) or Genghis Khan§ (Yüan Tai-tsu 元太祖, Yuan Taizu) whom Mao Zedong evoked in his celebrated poem Snow (沁園春·雪), or the Ch’ing 清 (Qing) Dynasty emperors K’ang-hsi 康熙 (Kangxi), Yung-cheng 雍正 (Yongzheng) and Ch’ien-lung 乾隆 (Qianlong) in famed writer Eryue He 二月河’s novel trilogy and the phenomenal television series adapted therefrom, or First Emperor of Ch’in again in celebrity director Zhang Yimou 張藝謀’s national-glory-through-unity-is-all-that-counts epic film Hero ( Yingxiong 英雄), today’s CCP demands to be considered a modern sage-king, a truly benevolent dictator who has brought renewed glory and prosperity, unity and stability to the long-suffering Chinese nation, and a harbinger of future hope of China, and it asks, as a moral right, that all dissenters and nonconformists, domestic and overseas, to be silenced and to let it do its good work.

3.2. State Racketeerism with Fascist Moral Rectitude

The CCP regime, in other words, embodies the late Professor Charles Tilly’s concept of a racketeer government, par excellence, yet with a professed pretension of moral rectitude absent in private racketeer syndicates. One could say that the term could be applied to any other authoritarian regimes – in Russia, in Thailand, in Zimbabwe, etc. – but these regimes lack, and are conscious of lacking, a moral legitimacy in maintaining and prolonging authoritarian rule. Hence these authoritarian
regimes have to manuoevre within a constitutionally promised multiparty liberal democratic system which exists at least in writing in a general format, as generally described in William Dobson’s *The dictator’s learning curve: Inside the global battle for democracy* (2012). While Dobson includes China too, the Leninist backbone of this “degenerative totalitarian” regime (see Hsu, 2003) run by arguably the most successful triad in Chinese history nevertheless provides it with a Fascist moral rectitude for its authoritarian rule and hence there needs not be a pretension of free political choice or a multiparty electoral system wherein to manuoevre. In this ultimate realm of State racketeerism, anyone who complains about the price of protection (denial of civil liberties and political freedom) has to be a “subversive” (bending on subverting State power) who are often accused of committing another crime (as in the high-profile case of Gao Yu) – leaking State secrets by connecting with foreign human rights organisations or journalists, much akin to the ultimate sacrilege of breaking the code of *omertà* in the world of the most well-known private protection racket, *La Cosa Nostra* – the Sicilian Mafia.

Such fear bordering on outright political and ideological xenophobia towards presumed “collusion with outside forces” which has become part of the common charges against journalists and academics whom the Party-State is coming after was even loudly expressed against the country’s highly respected and influential government think tank, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, in the early period of the Xi Jinping administration’s intense crackdown on liberal intellectuals and activists, and tightening of its grip on the media, amidst his high-profile sweeping anti-corruption and ideological campaigns targeting the civil service and state-owned enterprises, when a senior party discipline inspector accused CASS of being “infiltrated by foreign forces” and “conducting illegal collusion during [politically] sensitive times”.
During a session on Xi Jinping’s thoughts on party discipline at CASS in June 2014, Zhang Yingwei 張英偉 who headed a group sent to CASS by the Communist Party's Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) said the academy had “ideological problems” including “illegal collusion” between CASS experts and foreign interests at sensitive times, allowing undue foreign influence in sensitive issues, using the Internet to promote theories that played into the hands of foreign powers and using academic research as a guise for other purposes.\(^9\) This represented the same rationale behind the action taken against the supposedly politically harmless “Feminist Five”, the most sustained crackdown on the NGOs and civil rights lawyers witnessed in two decades and the arrest of Peter Dahlin, which notably set the stage for the Xi Jinping administration to pass a controversial new law with a key element to cut foreign funding to Chinese NGOs and possibly stricter governing of foreign NGOs in the country on grounds of national security.\(^10\)

To the extent that the threats – towards social harmony, towards national unity and towards PRC’s sovereignty claim over almost all of East and South China Seas – that the Party-State implicitly or explicitly evokes to justify its repressive actions to “protect” its citizens are fabricated, exaggerated or entirely the consequences of its own activities in the sense that the “threats” are challenges against Party-defined “democratisation with one-party leadership under socialism with Chinese characteristics” – supposedly a new path of democratisation that China has created and ushered in in its role as a new-model democratising country (Zhou, 2013: 113-114) – the Party-State, in Charles Tilly’s model, operates in essentially the same ways as a protection racket (Tilly, 1985: 171).
4. From “Degenerative Totalitarianism” to Fascist Nationalist Leninist State Corporatism

Representing an ideology, “Fascism” has always been a controversial term on whose exact nature historians, political scientists and scholars in other fields have long engaged in heated debate. George Orwell, in his *As I Please* column essay “What is Fascism?” for *Tribune* on March 24, 1944, a day when the Nazi’s SS were murdering 335 political prisoners in the Ardeatine Caves outside Rome, describes the word “Fascism” as “almost entirely meaningless”, and being used in conversation even more wildly than in print, for he had “heard it applied to farmers, shopkeepers, Social Credit, corporal punishment, fox-hunting, bull-fighting, the 1922 Committee, the 1941 Committee, Kipling, Gandhi, Chiang Kai-Shek, homosexuality, Priestley’s broadcasts, Youth Hostels, astrology, women, dogs and I do not know what else.”

Yet, he did admit that

 [...] underneath all this mess there does lie a kind of buried meaning. To begin with, it is clear that there are very great differences, some of them easy to point out and not easy to explain away, between the régimes called Fascist and those called democratic [...] even the people who recklessly fling the word ‘Fascist’ in every direction attach at any rate an emotional significance to it. By ‘Fascism’ they mean, roughly speaking, something cruel, unscrupulous, arrogant, obscurantist, anti-liberal and anti-working-class. Except for the relatively small number of Fascist sympathizers, almost any English person would accept ‘bully’ as a synonym for ‘Fascist’.

That said, Orwell did recognise Fascism as “also a political and economic system” while lamenting that:
Why, then, cannot we have a clear and generally accepted definition of it? Alas! we shall not get one – not yet, anyway. [...] All one can do for the moment is to use the word with a certain amount of circumspection and not, as is usually done, degrade it to the level of a swearword.¹²

The late Bertram Myron Gross, American social scientist and Professor of Political Science at Hunter College of the City University of New York, in his provocative book Friendly fascism: The new face of power in America (1980) gave a more specific description for “classic Fascism” (as in Benito Mussolini’s Italy and Adolf Hitler’s Germany) as depicted in Table 1.

Table 1 Characteristics of “Classic Fascism” (Gross, 1980)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics of “Classic Fascism”</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. A tight Government-Big Business oligarchy with charismatic dictator or figurehead, and expansionist, scapegoating, and nationalistic ideologies.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Liquidation or minimalization of multiparty conflict and open subversion, with little use of democratic machinery and human rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Negative sanctions through ruthless, widespread, and high-cost terror; direct action against selected scapegoats.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Ceaseless propaganda, backed up by spies and informers, to consolidate elite support and mobilize masses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Widespread benefits through more jobs, stabilized prices, domestic spoils, foreign booty, and upward mobility for the most faithful.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Anxiety relief through participatory spectacles, mass action, and genuine bloodletting.</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Internal viability based on sustained, frantic, and eventually self-destructive expansion.</td>
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Source: Gross (1980: 170).¹³
Nevertheless, the definitional conundrum remains. “For much of the U.S. left, fascism is little more than an epithet – simply another way to say ‘bad’ or ‘very bad’ applied loosely to quite different social movements as well as to various aspects and elements of capitalist reaction”, says Don Hamerquist in “Fascism & anti-fascism” (2002), “But for those with more of a ‘theoretical bent’ fascism in essence is, and always has been, a ‘gorilla’ form of capitalism. That is, fascism is a system of capitalist rule that would be more reactionary, more repressive, more imperialist, and more racist and genocidal than current ‘normality’ of ruling class policy.”14 In opposition to that position, Hamerquist is of the opinion that Fascism “is not a paper tiger or a symbolic target but a real and immediate danger” whose nature, though, is not self-evident and thus requires clear explanation and the rejection of some conventional wisdom. “Fascism is not a danger because it is ruling class policy or is about to be adopted as policy. Not even because it could have major influences on this policy”, says Hamerquist with regard to the danger of today’s (neo-)fascism for the left, “The real danger presented by the emerging fascist movements and organizations is that they might gain a mass following among potentially insurgent workers and declassed strata through an historic default of the left. This default is more than a possibility, it is a probability, and if it happens it will cause massive damage to the potential for a liberatory anti-capitalist insurgency.”15

Without seeing Fascism too specifically from the perspective of the left, a workable definition of Fascism today, instead of simply using it as a label for some movement or governing model one considers “bad” or “very bad”, comes from Mathews N. Lyons. Lyons, an independent scholar who studies reactionary and supremacist movements, describes Fascism’s approach to politics as “both populist – in that it seeks to activate ‘the people’ as a whole against perceived oppressors or enemies
— and elitist — in that it treats the people’s will as embodied in a select group, or often one supreme leader, from whom authority proceeds downward.”

Placed in the context of China’s ruling CCP, there is no lack of perceived enemies. There is always Japan, about whose war atrocities in World War II the CCP has never pulled back from reminding its compliant subjects (including the *fěngqíng* 憤青 — literally “angry youths” — who are never hesitant to take to the streets or resort to cyber bullying to defend national glory as far as their actions would not get them into trouble with their CCP overlords) while the CCP imposed a forced public amnesia over its own atrocities committed in its 1989 crackdown, and whose leaders’ expression of regret over war atrocities would never satisfy the demand for apologies the CCP has never forgotten to stoke up while the CCP itself has never apologised for all the atrocities it inflicted on China’s citizens during Mao’s years of horror and in the 1989 Beijing massacre and submitted them to the citizens’ judgment through the ballot box. There is America, who is meddlesome, imperialist, hegemonic and always bending on supporting the splittists working to break up the great Chinese nation. And there is any party who has the audacity to insist that Taiwan (ROC) is an independent, sovereign country, Chinese or non-Chinese, or to support the Tibetans’, Uyghurs’ or Hong Kong people’s struggle for freedom and autonomy, and thus “hurts the feelings of the Chinese people”. And among members of the ethnic minorities, anyone who expresses ingratitude towards the Han-dominated central State by demanding real autonomy, political and economic, beyond the ostensible representation of “chairmanship” of an ethnic “autonomous” region, and the exercise of the right of ethnic self-determination to resist internal colonialism and assimilation to the dominant Han 漢 Chinese culture and language, i.e. to resist to be just politically-correct “exotic” minorities.

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Lyons states further that Fascism “seeks to organise a cadre-led
mass movement in a drive to seize state power [...] to forcibly
subordinate all spheres of society to its ideological vision of organic
community, usually through a totalitarian state [and both] as a movement
and a regime [...] uses mass organizations as a system of integration and
control, and uses organised violence to suppress opposition, although the
scale of violence varies widely.”

Though seems to have undergone
tremendous transformation in image and essence since the Mao days, the
Leninist nature of CCP’s governing model can never be doubted or
ignored. As Lenin was sometimes said to have stood Marx on his head
(in an analogy to Marx’s claim that he had stood Hegel on his head),
Lenin’s main ideological contrast vis-à-vis Marx in the former’s support
of the idea of a dictatorship (in contrast to Marx’s view of the state as a
feature of class society to be used by a politically conscious working
class to bring about the transfer of power from the bourgeoisie and then
be abolished) has clearly remained the ideological mainstay from the
Maoist era to the present post-economic reform era of the CCP:

Now we are repeating what was approved by the Central EC two
years ago ... Namely, that the Soviet Socialist Democracy is in no
way inconsistent with the rule and dictatorship of one person; that the
will of a class is at best realised by a Dictator who sometimes will
accomplish more by himself and is frequently more needed.

(Lenin’s “On Economic Reconstruction” speech on
31st March 1920, in V.I. Lenin: Collected Works,
Vol. 17, p. 89. First Russian Edition)

Or dictatorship of a Party which would not in any way tolerate any
real or potential challenge to its monopoly of political power through
demand for multi-party competitive elections that it labels as a foreign
ploy to bring about a “colour revolution” or “peaceful evolution” to destabilise China, to “hurt the feelings of the Chinese people”.

While being hostile to Marxism, liberalism, and conservatism, yet borrowing concepts and practices from all three, Fascism, as Lyons points out further, “rejects the principles of class struggle and workers' internationalism as threats to national or racial unity [...] rejects the liberal doctrines of individual autonomy and rights, political pluralism, and representative government [and] often romanticises the past as inspiration for national rebirth.”20

5. Romanticising Dynastic Glory: Projecting Taiping Shengshi (Era of Peace and Prosperity) of a Continued CCP Future

On a recent evening at an arts center by the Thames, one young Chinese man stood up, glaring at the author [Ma Jian, the dissident novelist forced to leave China in 1987] on the podium. Eyes brimming with self-righteous earnestness, he said: “You can praise democracy as much as you like, but how can you ignore that China has lifted 300 million people out of poverty in the past 15 years? That is a major human-rights achievement. Russia and India have democracy, but look where they are;” he exclaimed, turning to the rest of the audience.

(Salil Tripathi, 2008b: 37)21

The “young Chinese man” referred to by London-based writer Salil Tripathi is today archetypical of a world-wide club of Sinophileiac cheerleaders – businesses, corporate leaders, diplomats, academics, overseas Chinese businessmen and community leaders. Just a proof of how money and/or nationalistic glory can buy loyalty, obedience, sycophancy, and indifference to or oblivion of the trampling on human rights, freedom and human dignity. As mentioned, a cultural element
cannot be ignored, neither can historical experience. To judge the average Chinese citizens’ and overseas Chinese community leaders’ attitude, outlook, worldview and behaviour from the point of view of the Western world with its deep-rooted Renaissance values and the French revolutionary ideals of liberté, égalité, fraternité is futile. The cultural gap between these and the millennia-long dogmatic imperial-sanctioned Confucian worldview is wide.

5.1. The “Peace of Suppression”: An Existential Choice?

Chinese writer Mo Yan 莫言 (meaning “don’t speak”, nom de plume of Guan Moye 管谟業), also vice-chairman of the Communist Party-backed, State-run Chinese Writers’ Association, who was awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature of 2012 was heavily criticised by many Chinese dissident writers and artists including, among others, Ma Jian 马建, Yu Jie 余杰, Ai Weiwei 艾未未, Wen Yunchao 温雲超, Mo Zhixu 莫之許 and Zhang Yihe 张诒和 for a complete lack of solidarity with and support for other Chinese writers and intellectuals who were punished or detained by the CCP regime for exercising their rights of free expression, and more specifically for being a member of a team of a hundred prominent writers in 2011 to hand-copy Mao Zedong’s influential “Yan’an Talks on Literature and Art” (毛泽东《在延安文艺座谈会上的讲话》) in commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the speech Mao delivered on 28th May 1942 that forced writers to put their talent in the service of the Chinese Communist Party. This is a speech wherein Mao described the writer’s responsibility to place politics before art, how art should serve Communism – a speech that began decades of government control over Chinese writers and artists, a speech that served as the intellectual hand shackles on Chinese writers and artists throughout the Mao era, then again being held up for adulation by the CCP regime after the 1989 Beijing massacre, a speech with which
Mo Yan not only publicly agreed but has gone further to justify as a historical necessity that played a positive role in its time. This is not a surprise in view of Mo Yan’s role as the vice-chairman of the CCP State-run Chinese Writers’ Association, an instrument of thought control over China’s writers, his defending State censorship on writings as something as necessary as airport security checks\textsuperscript{22}, and his walking out of a literary symposium at the Frankfurt Book Fair of October 2009 along with Chinese officials to protest the presence of two dissident writers, Dai Qing 戴晴 and Bei Ling 贝岭\textsuperscript{23}.

The dedicate position of the “State writer” Mo Yan has resulted in a series of embarrassing events three years earlier at the 2009 Frankfurt Book Fair, in addition to his infamous walkout, as The New York Times’s correspondent Didi Kirsten Tatlow who covered the event relates\textsuperscript{24}:

After his opening speech at Frankfurt, Mr. Mo seemed to disappear. My notes record: “Things went downhill from there. Mo skipped his first public reading, where he had been due to inaugurate a new stage. I arrived five minutes early to find long faces at the stand of Horlemann Verlag, German publisher of ‘Life and Death Are Wearing Me Out,’” Mr. Mo’s new book.

“Fifteen minutes ago, according to a tight-lipped man with a company name tag on his lapel, someone rang to cancel. He didn’t identify himself, but said he was with the Chinese delegation. No reason given. A slight? The man shrugged. His face said it all. Later, Mo would skip a major event at the Blue Sofa, hosted by German state television broadcaster ZDF,” my notes continue.

According to literary agents and publishers, Mr. Mo was irritated by the endless political questions and, along with many delegation members, deliberately avoided events. Mr. Don’t Speak became Mr. No Show.
Mo Yan’s acquiescence on CCP’s brutal suppression on dissent in fact led to a joke circulating after Mo Yan won the Nobel Prize in Literature in 2012: “China has three Nobel Prize winners. The first can’t get in [referring to dissident writer Gao Xingjian who took French citizenship, laureate of Nobel Prize in Literature, 2000], the second can’t get out [referring to still-jailed dissident writer and democracy activist Liu Xiaobo, laureate of Nobel Peace Prize, 2010], and the third is ‘Don’t Speak’”25

It is probably too easy for people not living under the boot of this ruthless authoritarian regime to heap harsh criticisms on those intellectuals who have chosen to censor themselves and work with their overlord, as Perry Link concludes his article “Does this writer deserve the Prize?” in The New York Review of Books (6th December 2012):

Chinese writers today, whether “inside the system” or not, all must choose how they will relate to their country’s authoritarian government. This inevitably involves calculations, trade-offs, and the playing of cards in various ways. Liu Xiaobo’s choices have been highly unusual. Mo Yan’s responses are more “normal,” closer to the center of a bell curve. It would be wrong for spectators like you and me, who enjoy the comfort of distance, to demand that Mo Yan risk all and be another Liu Xiaobo. But it would be even more wrong to mistake the clear difference between the two.

As Mo Yan himself put it bluntly, “A lot of people are now saying about me, ‘Mo Yan is a state writer.’ It’s true, insofar as like the authors Yu Hua [余华] and Su Tong [苏童], I get a salary from the Ministry of Culture, and get my social and health insurance from them too. That’s the reality in China. Overseas, people all have their own insurance, but without a position, I can’t afford to get sick in China.”26 As Salman Rushdie, the thirteenth on The Times’s 2008 list of the fifty greatest
British writers since 1945 and the literary world’s most well-known fugitive from dogmatic terror, said in an interview by writer Salil Tripathi (2008a)27, “Defending free speech in absolute terms may take us into a turbulent, hurtful arena. If we say nothing, we will have peace. But it is the peace of suppression, and that’s the choice we have to make.” It is also a choice of safety via ignorance and selective amnesia, as so many intellectuals in imperial China had long learned as a safe way to live and how the Sung dynasty poet Su Shih 蘇軾 (Su Shi, also Su Tung-p’o 蘇東坡, Su Dongpo) lamented in his poem On the birth of a son (洗兒):

人皆養子望聰明。我被聰明誤一生。惟願孩兒愚且魯，無災無難到公卿。

Translation28:

Families when a child is born
Hope it will turn out intelligent.
I, through intelligence
Having wrecked my whole life,
Only hope that the baby will prove
Ignorant and stupid.
Then he’ll be happy all his days
And grow into a cabinet minister.

Some, like Mo Yan and myriad others, have chosen the peace of suppression. But as Lao Tzu 老子 (c. 571-471 BC) said, “民不畏死，奈何以死懼之?” [The people do not fear at all to die; / What’s gained therefore by threat’ning them with death?] (Tao Te Ching 《道德經》, Chapter 74), some rare breed like Liu Xiaobo 劉曉波 or Ilham Tohti and other dissidents past and present have made an unusual choice and opted
for personal turbulence in defending their rights and dignity as writers, academics, citizens and those of their fellow citizens.

However, in hand-copying Mao’s “Yan’an Talks on Literature and Art”, Mo Yan was just a new scholar following the line of venerated Chinese scholars over the dynasties flashing their loyalty for the infallible Son of Heaven while lamenting the poor masses’ plight in the hands of the corrupt officials. Thus was drawn the line in the sand going beyond which to challenge the emperor’s divine right to rule, his mandate from heaven, would be to bring doom on oneself. It is easy to attribute the scholars’ “blind” loyalty towards the emperor to Confucian culture, but in practical terms, it all boils down to basic survival – a compromise in principle that they have to make while trying to work within the system to sort out problems and injustices faced by the masses. After all, what can a dead scholar or one who is rotting in jail do for the betterment of the world?

The CCP’s argument – one which the cheerleaders are rallying around – is simple: it is demanding the people to abide by a basic compromise – a governing principle some call “market-Leninism”, as described by Nicholas Kristoff and Sheryl WuDunn (1995), or capitalism with Chinese characteristics: what Bertolt Brecht described as “Erst kommt das fressen und dann die moral” [morality can only follow food] or Salil Tripathi summed up pithily, “rice bowl 1, free speech 0”.29

Culture-based arguments have their limitations, of course. While not denying the role that external factors (and American foreign policy post-World War II or during the Cold War) were playing in the democratisation of Taiwan, South Korea and Japan, the fact that these three East Asian countries are able to sustain their human rights- and free speech-respecting vibrant, stable liberal multi-party democratic systems ever since despite their similarly imperial absolutist Confucian past, seems to be flying in the face of such cultural determinism. On the other
hand, the fact that another Asian giant, India, a multi-party liberal democracy, has also been able to lift nearly 100 million people out of absolute poverty since the country’s own economic reforms began in 1991 – without having to curb civil liberties and political freedom or to suppress dissent – is also clearly flying in the face of the great Chinese compromise that CCP is trying to convince everyone as inevitable.\textsuperscript{30}

However, Mo Yan was not alone in this expression of sycophancy and servility at their best. With him hand-copying Mao’s “Yan’an Talks” were a hundred of China’s other prominent writers and artists, including well-known personalities like He Jingzhi 賀敬之, Wang Meng 王蒙, Eryue He and Jia Ping’ao 賈平凹.

5.2. Imperial Glory Redux: The Feel-Good Factor?

Eryue He (nom de plume of Ling Jiefang 凌解放) is best known for his biographical novels of three Ch’ing-Dynasty emperors – K’ang-hsi, Yung-cheng and Ch’ien-lung – which have all been adapted into award-winning television series in China. Both the books and the television series had turned into quite a phenomenon in China and Overseas Chinese communities outside China and made Eryue He some sort of a celebrity writer. Like celebrated director Zhang Yimou’s star-studded, national-unity-is-all-that-counts 2002 epic film Yingxiong (Hero), the success of Eryue He’s “three emperors” series of books (1988-1996) and television series (1997-2002) adapted from them significantly reflects today’s newly revived pride coming with rising economic and military strength which the CCP has effectively exploited to promote a new mix of patriotism-induced nationalism to mobilise loyal support for the Party-State.

The intelligentsia and masses have indeed responded well – witness the continuing great success of the sedulously crafted films and television series on China’s past great emperors that coated brutality and
despotism with beautiful set, scenery and choreography, intoxicating audience with the prime sense of national greatness by pushing the judgment of social justice and the masses’ freedom and dignity into negligible importance (Liu, 2009: 203-204), as a Sicilian proverb says, “Cu è surdu, orbu e taci, campa cent'anni 'mpaci” [he who is deaf, blind, and silent will live a hundred years in peace]. In this regard China’s prisoner of conscience and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo in Daguo chenlun 大國沉淪 [great nation drowning] (2009) sees the present wave of rising nationalistic daguo jueqi 大國崛起 (the rise of a great nation) sentiments that the CCP is riding on as not simply a result of CCP’s ideological indoctrination but rather rooted in the traditional Great Han-ism and the egocentrism of t’ien-hsia 天下 (“under the heaven”, tianxia) mentality (Liu, 2009: 201-202) which was related to the worldview of “普天之下，莫非王土，率土之濱，莫非王臣” (“all land under the heaven belongs to the Emperor and all people on the land extending to the coast are subjects of the Emperor”, from the classic Tso Chuan 左傳 (Zuo Zhuan) compiled c. 389 BC).

5.3. Political Culture in Transformation

One of the earliest definitions of political culture is: “the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values, which defines the situation in which political action takes place” – that given by Harvard professor Sidney Verba (1965: 513). It has been observed how Marxism was transformed when it came into contact with traditional Chinese political culture and turned into the dynastic, semi-Confucian political hybrid of Maoism and other brands in Confucian East Asia (e.g., Vietnam, but especially North Korea), or in the religious domain how Buddhism was transformed when it merged with traditional Taoist-Confucian tradition to give rise to Mahayana Buddhism in China or how it meshed with traditional Tibetan beliefs to give rise to Lamaism. Back
to political development, it has been observed how the transplanted liberal democracy brought in and imposed by the American victors on post-World War II Japan merged with the local Confucian-Shintoist tradition and worldview and the vestiges of the former feudal class system to give rise to the distinctive deferential political culture and reverence for authority which students of the East Asian developmental model note with theoretical enthusiasm in trying to explain the economic success of Japan and the four East Asian Tigers.

The CCP’s success today in not only keeping its citizens cowed but actually in convincing most of its economically contented, patriotically fulfilled deferential subjects of their fortune to finally have an enlightened ruler (mingjun 明君) cannot be fully grasped without looking back into the long dynastic imperial history of China that shaped the deep-rooted political culture of the country, as we have seen earlier in the paper. After all, as Martin Jacques stressed, China is not a nation-state, but more than that, a civilisational state.31

5.4. Imperial Heritage

It is not too far off if we say that the PRC embodies the real essence of the traditional Chinese civilisational state. PRC is the real inheritor of the Chinese political tradition maintained through the millennia, whether in terms of the CCP State’s interaction with its citizens, its dealings with the minority-inhabited frontier regions, or its foreign policy. The ROC on mainland is but an aberrational interlude whose original ideals had never been realised. China watchers in the West love to comment that despite admitting the horrors of the Cultural Revolution and the failure of Mao Zedong’s radical collectivist economic policy, today’s new leaders of the CCP would not discredit Mao because to do so would be shaking the foundation of the CCP’s legitimacy. The implication is: what Mao represents is in all practicality dead. In reality, is this really so?
There is one most celebrated poem of Mao Zedong, *Snow* (沁园春·雪)\(^{32}\), in which Mao compared himself to the founding emperors of Ch’in (Qin), Han, T’ang (Tang) and Sung (Song) dynasties and Genghis Khan, the founder of the ancient Mongol empire that included Yüan-dynasty China. The poem was most often seen as an expression of Mao’s self-aggrandisement:

北国风光，千里冰封，万里雪飘。望长城内外，惟余莽莽；大河上下，顿失滔滔。山舞银蛇，原驰蜡象，欲与天公试比高。须晴日，看红装素裹，分外妖娆。
江山如此多娇，引无数英雄竞折腰。惜秦皇汉武，略输文采；唐宗宋祖，稍逊风骚。一代天骄，成吉思汗，只识弯弓射大雕。俱往矣，数风流人物，还看今朝。

*Translation*\(^{33}\):

Look at the landscape of northern China:
The vast frozen land is covered with ice,
And the snow flits far-flung in the sky.
On both sides of the Great Wall,
The empty wilderness survives;
From upriver to downstream,
The roaring currents disappear.
The mountains dance like silver snakes,
The highlands slither like huge wax elephants,
As though they would like to compete with the heavenly God to see who is higher.
When one glances at it on a fine day,
The land turns into a fair lady, who’d make-up with rouge, and
garmented in white –
That is extremely elegant and charming.
The territory is so gorgeous, and enchantment
That had lured countless heroes to rush in, bend and bow.
What a pity, the First Emperor of Ch’in and Emperor Wu of Han
Were men lack of literary grace;
Emperor T’ai-tsung of T’ang and Emperor T’ai-tsu of Sung
Were short of spirit and strength.
That proud son of Heaven,
Genghis Khan,
Knew only how to stretch the bow to shoot huge eagles.
Alas, they are now gone as history:
The real great hero,
Is coming up now.

It is notable that all of these great emperors – First Emperor of the Ch’in Dynasty ( 秦始皇帝，ruling his unified China from 220 to 210 BC), Emperor Wu of the Han Dynasty ( 漢武帝，ruling China from 140 to 87 BC), Emperor T’ai-tsung of the T’ang Dynasty ( 唐太宗，ruling China from AD 626 to 649), Emperor T’ai-tsu of the Sung (Song) Dynasty ( 宋太祖，ruling China from AD 960 to 976) and Genghis Khan (founder of the Mongol Empire that included Yüan-dynasty (AD 1271–1368) China; posthumously declared the founder of the Yüan Dynasty as Emperor T’ai-tsu ( 元太祖 ) – whom Mao compared himself to and aspired to surpass in achievement were empire builders and/or dynasty founders who no doubt contributed to how China looks today. Nevertheless, one should not ignore the fact that each of them was also murderer of hundreds of thousands of innocent people through military campaigns and conquests which often bordered on the genocidal, and in the case of Genghis Khan, a genocidal maniac whose trail of murder through Asia to Europe took at least forty million lives – a feat surpassed in the league of murderous dictators only by Mao himself and the CCP he led through
the disastrous Great Leap Forward (dayuejin 大躍進), the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (wuchanjieji wenhua dageming 無產階級文化大革命) years of madness and various other murderous political campaigns for which the CCP till today has never apologised to the people or submitted to the judgement of the people through the ballot.

However, re-reading it from a broader perspective, this poem of Mao, definitely reflecting the outlook that CCP represents or rather what Mao would want it to represent, shows us a CCP that equates its era of governance to the greatest heights of the Chinese dynasties. After all, the era of a founding emperor (as referred mostly to in Mao’s poem Snow) was usually the strongest part of a dynasty – Ch’in Shih-huangti, Han Kao-tsu 漢高祖 (Han Gaozu), T’ang T’ai-tsung (second emperor of the T’ang Dynasty but also the co-founder of the dynasty), Sung T’ai-tsu, Kublai Khan34 (Yüan Shih-tsu 元世祖, Yuan Shizu), Ming T’ai-tsu 明太祖 (Ming Taizu) … but sometimes the second or third emperor’s reign too like those of Yung-cheng, K’ang-hsi and Ch’ien-lung of the Ch’ing Dynasty – before the dynasty began to go into decline (although in the case of Han Wu-ti, he was the seventh and longest-reigning emperor of the Han dynasty).

5.5. A Global “Chinoiserie” Revival

Such image of grandeur is selling well too beyond China’s borders further feeding the unending adulation of the universal Sinophiles, which Dirlik and Prazniak (2012) compare to the Western Chinoiserie during the 17th and 18th Centuries, and dampening any criticism of the CCP regime’s brutal repression of dissent at home:

[…] criticism of the PRC seems perfunctory when compared to threats of embargoes and wars against comparable dictatorial regimes. Power relations, economic interests, and a long standing culturalist
fascination with China combine to set China apart from other such regimes. Indeed, there has been an ongoing celebration of the PRC’s development under the leadership of the Communist Party that recalls memories of the Chinoiserie that took Europe by storm three centuries ago.

(Dirlik and Prazniak, 2012: 290)

Nevertheless, while these ages of national grandeur were eras when China reached its highest glory in the ancient world, they also represented ages of great political brutality as shown in the next two subsections below.

On the other hand, Mao had an anti-Confucian streak and he clearly preferred Legalism (fajia 法家) and this flavour is obvious in CCP’s policies till now (e.g. the sometimes brutal implementation of one-child policy). Mao revered the First Emperor of the Ch’in Dynasty who reportedly burned Confucian canons and buried Confucian scholars alive.35 This Maoist political-philosophical line has not changed in the CCP (e.g. Zhang Yimou’s epic movie Hero, set during the reign of Ch’in Shih-Huangti) although that does not hinder today’s CCP from exploiting Confucius’ name where it find it useful, e.g., the Confucius Institutes, to project itself as a true guardian of Chinese traditions.

5.6. Repression during the Shengshi (Era of Prosperity):
The Imperial Chinese Tradition of Literary Inquisition

The most important weapon in my arsenal is the dictionary. Let me choose the words … by which you think and I will tell you what and how to think.

K’ang-hsi’s, Yung-cheng’s and Ch’ien-lung’s reigns did bring about long-term peace, stability and prosperity after years of war and chaos, but they were also eras of ruthless suppression of dissent. K’ang-hsi is considered one of China’s greatest emperors who managed to bring all of Han China proper, Taiwan, the Manchuria region as well part of the Russian Far East also known as Outer Manchuria, both Inner and Outer Mongolia (today’s Republic of Mongolia), and Tibet proper under Ch’ing Empire’s control, and began the “Prosperous Era of K’ang-hsi and Ch’ien-lung” (康乾盛世) or “Prosperous Era of K’ang-hsi, Yung-cheng and Ch’ien-lung” (康雍乾盛世) or “High Ch’ing” (1683-1839), which outlived him. Yung-cheng’s reign (1722 till his death in 1735), while much shorter than that of his father (K’ang-hsi, 1661 till his death in 1722) and of his son (Ch’ien-lung, 1735-1796 but retained ultimate power as emperor emeritus until his death in 1799), represented the continuation of the era of peace and prosperity (taiping shengshi) initiated by his father, further establishing Ch’ing-Dynasty China as the most powerful empire in Asia and extending the Pax Sinica began under his father’s reign later known as the “Prosperous Era of K’ang-hsi, Yung-cheng and Ch’ien-lung”. Ch’ien-lung’s reign saw the continuation of the era before decline set in towards the end of his rule.

Nevertheless, largely ignored by the masses who are mesmerised by the image of national glory promoted in today’s commercialised popular culture is the ruthless and gruesome suppression of dissent during that era of Pax Sinica under the three Ch’ing emperors, not to mention the human miseries inflicted upon people in the frontier regions in Ch’ing China’s military campaigns to expand and maintain its empire. Among China’s dynastic rulers, the Ch’ing emperors are particularly notorious for their use of literary inquisitions (wenziyu 文字狱, or speech crime / yi yan ruzui 以言入罪 – referring to imperial Chinese courts’ official persecution of intellectuals for their writings).
Literary persecution has been recorded since the Ch’in Dynasty over two thousand years ago, and has been practiced by almost all successive dynasties ruling China. While there are records of literary persecutions during the Ming Dynasty which were most severe at the beginning when Chu Yuan-chang 朱元璋 (Zhu Yuanzhang), i.e. Hongwu Emperor (洪武帝), temple name “Ming T’ai-tsu”), first founded the dynasty, literary inquisition was most severe during the Ch’ing dynasty which began with isolated cases during the reigns of the founding emperor Shun-chih 顺治 (Shunzhi, actually the third emperor of the Ch’ing Dynasty but the first Ch’ing emperor to rule over China) and K’ang-hsi, and then evolved into a pattern, reaching its zenith during the reign of the last emperor (Ch’ien-lung) of the “Prosperous Era of K’ang-hsi, Yung-cheng and Ch’ien-lung”. An estimated 151,723 volumes of about 3,000 literary titles were destroyed by the inquisition during the Ch’ien-lung period, and censorship, deletion and modification were conducted upon many of those volumes that had been categorised into the Ssu-k’u Ch’üan-shu 四庫全書 (Siku Quanshu, the Complete Library in Four Branches of Literature officially commissioned by Ch’ien-lung Emperor). In these campaigns of literary inquisition, if the authority decided that any words or sentences were derogatory or cynical towards the ruling regime, a search for copies (sometimes thousands) of the offending work would be conducted to destroy them, and the author or artist could be executed by beheading or the even more gruesome ling-ch’ih 凌遲 (lingchi, or 殺千刀/千刀萬剝, the lingering death by slow slicing) – an extremely gruesome punishment of torture and execution practiced in imperial China from around AD900 until it was banned in 1905, in which the convict had portions of his/her body cut away piece by piece over an extended period of time as a process of execution. If the convict in a literary inquisition was already dead, his/her corpse would be dug out from the grave and mutilated as punishment.
The fate of these authors and their relatives who fell victim to literary inquisition “well illustrates the dangers of publishing in an empire where the ruler had almost unlimited power even over the world of knowledge, particularly when the ruler happened to be so insulated from the realities of life in his empire as Ch’ien-lung was”\textsuperscript{36}, as Professor R. Kent Guy comments in the section “The Growth of the Literary Inquisition (1776-1782)” in his 1987 work \textit{The emperor’s four treasuries: Scholars and the State in the late Qianlong period}. The gruesome imperial Chinese practice of execution of relatives (抄家滅族) often extended wide – from First Emperor of Ch’in’s execution of three clans (夷三族), the punishment turned more and more cruel through the dynasties – to the execution of five, seven, nine (誅九族, i.e., in addition to oneself, all family members and relatives including also children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren and great-great-grandchildren), and in the case of the Ming-Dynasty Confucian scholar Fang Hsiao-ju 方孝孺, ten clans (including also his students), with the execution of 873 in total, plus the exile to remote frontiers (fapei chongjun 發配充軍) of over a thousand more distant relatives.

\textbf{5.7. Era of Conquest and Genocide}

Besides ruthless and gruesome suppression of dissent, this “Prosperous Era of K’ang-hsi, Yung-cheng and Ch’ien-lung” was also a period of empire consolidation with military campaigns, like those of the earlier empire builders whom Mao Zedong compared himself to and aspired to surpass in his own coming imperial exploits, bordering on the genocidal.

For instance, to exert full and formal control over Ch’ing empire’s “new dominions”/\textit{Hsin-chiang} 新疆 (Xinjiang), it took Emperor Ch’ien-lung a brutal campaign of ethnic genocide to deliberately exterminate the Dzungars and it has been estimated that close to a million people, about
80 per cent of the Dzungar population, were slaughtered or died from diseases in that military campaign from the year 1755 to 1757, a gruesome episode historically known as the “Dzungar genocide” (准噶爾滅族).

5.8. Distrust of Intellectuals

Ruler’s distrust of intellectuals is hence deep-rooted in Chinese history, and it was in fact well justified. While uprisings do not occur by themselves from the masses at the bottom, they could occur if intellectuals (literati) set their minds and commit themselves to organising them – in the modern era whether they be law graduates Lenin and Fidel Castro and his guerrilla comrades, medical doctors Che Guevara and Sun Yat-sen 孫逸仙 (孫中山), or the philosophy professor Abimael Guzmán who led Peru’s Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path, Partido Comunista del Perú) guerillas until his capture in 1992 by the Peruvian government that sentenced him to life imprisonment. The brutality of Chairman Mao’s campaigns against intellectuals was often attributed to his cold reception by intellectuals frequenting the Peking University library while he was an assistant to the Peking University librarian Li Ta-chao 李大釗 (Li Dazhao, who co-founded the CCP with Ch’én Tu-hsiu 陳獨秀 (Chen Duxiu)) due to his rural Hunan origin, but the fact is that Mao was simply following what has traditionally been the practice by all great emperors of the Chinese dynasties in their literary inquisitions (yi yan ruzui, wenziyu) – the same fear and distrust of the intellectuals’ ability to foment and galvanise dissent right from the First Emperor of Ch’in Dynasty whom Mao revered most. This tradition has continued till today with the new leadership of the CCP.

Intellectuals may act to galvanise the masses who want change, define the goal clearly and provide necessary leadership for mobilisation and strategy (which according to the Albert Einstein Institution’s founder
Gene Sharp, professor emeritus of political science at the University of Massachusetts Dartmouth, multiple-time nominee for Nobel Peace Prize since 2009 and guru of non-violent action, consists of mainly four immediate tasks: strengthening determination, self-confidence, and resistance skills; strengthening the independent social groups and institutions; creating a powerful internal resistance force; developing a wise grand strategic plan and implementing it skillfully), but revolutionary movements are still movements of the masses whose initial “fire in the minds of men”, as James Hadley Billington, the Librarian of Congress Emeritus, once called, leads to the “revolutionary faith” of the intellectuals. This is the faith that Thomas Paine referred to in his 1776 call to revolution, Common sense: “We have it in our power to begin the world over again.” (Appendix to the Third Edition) Or more appropriately, as Samuel P. Huntington put it, the economically deprived masses (the poor peasants or the exploited workers) provide the “numbers”, the urban, educated intellectuals provide the “brains”, and the confluence of these two forces is that which makes revolutions. Joseph Stalin understood that best when he said, “Ideas are more powerful than guns. We would not let our enemies have guns, why should we let them have ideas?”

5.9. Today’s Racketeer State and Culture of Fear:
Making Relatives Pay

In September 2015, Burma arrested Bao Zhuoxuan 包卓軒, the son of human rights lawyer Wang Yu 王宇 and activist Bao Longjun 包龍軍 already being held incommunicado in China, and sent him back to China’s Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, where he is then placed under house arrest. As Bao Zhuoxuan’s case shows, turning the screws on dissidents by persecuting their family members has become common practice by the CCP. Though no doubt much less cruel than the
punishment or even execution of a persecuted subject's extended family and entire clan in imperial China (抄家滅族，株連九族 / 論九族), this strategy of persecuting dissidents’ families to exert pressure on the dissidents clearly marks CCP’s PRC as the true heir of the millennia-long Chinese culture of imperial despotism.

For Anastasia Lin 林耶凡, a vocal supporter of China’s human rights, the first sign of trouble came shortly after she won the Miss Canada crown in May 2015, when security agents began visiting her father, who still lives in China, and pressuring him to put pressure on his daughter, who has made clear she would use her crown to continue promoting her Chinese human rights advocacy, to be silent.41

Since the release of Uyghur rights advocate and democracy leader Rebiya Kadeer, who was arrested in 1999 and jailed since 2000, from a Chinese prison in March 2005 on medical grounds into the United States’ custody in advance of a visit by the then US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to the region, her continued Uyghur rights advocacy has been met with an intense campaign on the part of the Chinese authorities to persecute her family members in China’s Xinjiang Uyghur “Autonomous” Region. While Rebiya Kadeer’s family has already been targeted by the Chinese government since she was detained in 1999, the harassment of her family members intensified after she was released on medical parole in March 2005 and left China for the United States, and a year later, her son, Ablikim Abdirixiem, was detained in June. On 27th November 2006, the day after Rebiya Kadeer was elected president of the World Uyghur Congress (WUC), a court sentenced another two of her sons in China, Alim Abdiriyim and Kahar Abdiriyim, to fines amounting to millions of US dollars, and Alim Abdiriyim also to seven years’ imprisonment on charges of tax evasion.42 In April 2007 Ablikim Abdiriyim was sentenced to nine years in prison for “instigating and engaging in secessionist activities”, amidst his family’s claim that he
was not given the right to legal representation of his choice and his “confession” was likely to have been made under torture. When his relatives visited him in prison on 13th December, he told them that he had been tortured and also had been held in solitary confinement since 3rd November after witnessing an incident on which the prison authorities wanted to keep quiet and after he refused to sign a document denying that he had witnessed the controversial incident in the prison.43

Gao Yu, the well-known journalist accused of leaking state secrets, according to her lawyer Mo Shaoping 莫少平 who also represents Liu Xia 劉霞, initially maintained her innocence and only confessed on camera after officials threatened the safety of her son.44

After Liu Xiaobo was sentenced to 11 years’ imprisonment on the charge of subversion for his role in co-authoring and distributing the 2008’s call for democratic freedoms in China, Charter 08, and was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2010, his wife Liu Xia has since been kept under house arrest although she has not been charged with any crime. This lawless confinement appears to be taking a toll as Liu Xia was admitted in 2014 to a Beijing hospital, apparently suffering from a heart ailment and depression.45 As though putting pressure on Liu Xiaobo through persecuting his wife was not enough, the CCP regime also brought fraud charges against Liu Xia’s brother, Liu Hui 劉暉, who also was given an 11-year prison sentence.

Since 9th September 2010 after having served his jail term of four years and three months – ostensibly for the destruction of public property and traffic disruption, after his revelation of the brutal implementation of population control policy by the government of the prefecture-level city of Linyi 臨沂 in Shandong Province, involving women’s forced abortion and sterilisation – blind civil rights lawyer Chen Guangcheng 陳光誠 together with his family had been placed under tight round-the-clock house arrest and complete seclusion during
which *weiquan* 維權 (rights-defending) activists who were coming to visit him to render help were repeatedly beaten up by local thugs who were guarding his house. At least a hundred local thugs were paid to enforce a watertight round-the-clock surveillance of his residence – a structure that Chen himself in dry humour referred to as the “Chen Guangcheng Economic Zone”, though probably some local villagers were under duress and threat to themselves and their families to be paid to guard Chen. After publicizing an image recording he secretly made of his house arrest ordeal, Chen and his wife Yuan Weijing 袁偉靜 were cruelly beaten up by a mob who broke into their house on 18th February 2011, according to a letter sent out by Yuan. The terrorising and intimidation continued, she said, with their windows being sealed up with iron sheets on 3rd March, television antenna broken on 7th, and the intrusion of a large crowd of thugs who took away their computer and certain handwritten materials. According to another *weiquan* activist Liu Shasha 劉沙沙, Cheng Guangcheng’s 6-year-old daughter Chen Kesi 陳克斯 was denied her right to schooling because of her parents’ house arrest although she had reached the school age.46

After Chen’s incredible escape from his Shandong confinement into the American embassy in Beijing with the help of Her Peirong 何培蓉 (‘PearlHer’/Zhenzhu 珍珠), Guo Yushan 郭玉閃 and other *weiquan* activists and some of Chen’s fellow villagers and even allegedly some conscience-stricken guards enforcing his house arrest, in late April 2012, to get Chen to leave the American embassy, his wife was reportedly tied on a chair for two days and threatened to be beaten to death. Activists and friends who were trying to visit Chen at the Beijing hospital where Chen was after he left the American embassy were beaten up too. Well-known *weiquan* lawyer Jiang Tianyong 江天勇 was brutally beaten to deaf in his left ear by the *guobao* 國保 (national security officers). Others who came to the hospital to support Chen, such as artist Liu Yi 劉
and weiquan activist Wang Lihong 王荔蕻, were also beaten up or detained. Back in Shandong Province, police beat up Chen’s eldest brother Chen Guangfu 陈光福, reportedly chained his feet, slapped him, and struck him with a belt.⁴⁷ Police also beat Chen Guangfu’s wife and also his son, Chen Kegui 陈克貴, who in self-defence caused minor injuries to the police officers. After Chen, his wife and two children were allowed to leave for the US on 19th May 2012 on “studies” ground, Chen Guangfu fled his family's captors in the tiny Dongshigu 東師古 village in Shandong and arrived in Beijing to seek help for his son. In November 2012, Chen Kegui was sentenced to over three years in prison.

Making relatives pay with the implicit threat of the worse has always been an effective tactic for the CCP regime to silence dissidents in exile as in the case of Chen Guangcheng, demoralise them and discourage other, potential, dissidents from following in their footsteps.⁴⁸

6. Mesmerised by the Dragon: The Chinese Road to Fascism

Money does buy loyalty and acquiescence. With a full treasury to dispense benefits and good feelings, the modern CCP State is adept in playing the role of a benevolent dictator. Helped by the proliferation of movies and TV series on imperial glory that mesmerise a contented people, the CCP State is resurrecting a proud image of a taiping shengshi (era of peace and prosperity) – a replication of the eras of T’ang T’ai- tsong, K’ang-hsi and Ch’ien-lung when China was a sort of international superpower too. But as we have seen, a hidden subtext is: these were also eras of brutal despotism. Prosperity and national glory under a brutal dictatorship: here lies the Faustian bargain. Economic success and increased military might overshadowing its Asian neighbours, especially its destined nemesis, Japan, in what can be called this century’s turning
of the tables, have fed rising nationalism with a heavy dose of vainglory in the PRC. This explains why the present authoritarian capitalist model of Chinese development smells Fascist.

There is indeed a great similarity between the present CCP corporatist elite’s political method and those used by the European Fascists over eighty years ago:

Imagine Italy 50 years after the fascist revolution. Mussolini would be dead and buried, the corporatist state would be largely intact, the party would be firmly in control, and Italy would be governed by professional politicians, part of a corrupt elite, rather than the true believers who had marched on Rome. It would no longer be a system based on charisma, but would instead rest almost entirely on political repression, the leaders would be businesslike and cynical, not idealistic, and they would constantly invoke formulaic appeals to the grandeur of the “great Italian people,” “endlessly summoned to emulate the greatness of the ancestors.”

Substitute in the “great Chinese people” and it all sounds familiar.

(Ledeen, 2008: 8)

Michael Ledeen of the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, who gave the above analogy, provides further evidence – the PRC’s enthusiasm today for, even compulsive embrace of, the glories of China’s long history and passionate reassertion of the greatness of past dynasties (State-promoted and popularly received books like Er Yue He’s dynastic novels, Zhang Yimou’s grandeur epic movies, and other similar movies and TV series) as compared to similar invocation by Mussolini and Hitler of architecture and history to resurrect the feeling of ancient Roman glory and the Third Reich’s supposedly mythical past (Ledeen, 2008: 9).
6.1. **Nationalism the Quintessential and Ultimate Ideology**

The power of nationalism today in the PRC is unmistakable as a political tool – the ultimate ideology after the demise of Marxist-Leninist-Stalinism and Maoism. Or rather after moving away from Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist-Maoism proper, nationalism – formerly a hidden underlying component – came out in full view in the open and became the major driving force in the ruling Party’s quest for political survival.

Indeed, according to Dirlik and Prazniak (2012), the real nature of the Chinese Communist Party-State and with it the so-called “China Model” of development can only be understood in terms of the central role played by nationalism right from the early revolutionary days:

The legacies of the revolution and Bolshevik structure of the Communist Party are no doubt important elements in structuring Chinese politics […] Criticism that focuses on the legacies of revolution and socialism are misleading most egregiously in ignoring that it is nationalism, not socialism, that accounts for the behaviour of the regime. After all, the Chinese Revolution was a national revolution for autonomous development against “semi-colonialism”, with socialism as its vehicle. The vehicle gave the nationalism its particular flavour, but with the retreat from any operative vision of socialism, the latter seems more than ever merely a front for the national pursuit of wealth and power – under the leadership of the Communist Party.

(Dirlik and Prazniak, 2012: 291-293)

6.2. **From Nationalism to Fascism, from Legalism to Fake Confucian Revival**

And let us not forget, in the first half of the last century in Italy and Germany, it was fervent nationalism that eventually grew into Fascism.
Like Mussolini’s transformation from a socialist firebrand into a fervent nationalist, the CCP State has also removed itself from its former socialist ideological base into embracing hard-core nationalism in rallying support for its monopoly of political power. We see the demand for undivided loyalty to the perpetually ruling CCP – an “advanced, selfless and united ruling group” (进步、無私與團結的執政集團), according to the teaching material “China Model National Conditions Teaching Manual” of the Moral and National Education (MNE, 德育及國民教育) school curriculum proposal which the Hong Kong Professional Teachers’ Union has accused as being a brain-washing political action – which is presiding over, as noted earlier, a new “era of peace and prosperity” reminiscent of the great T’ang T’ai-tsung era or that of K’ang-hsi and Ch’ien-lung (K’ang-Ch’ien shengshi 康乾盛世), and for the observance of CCP-instituted ideological uniformity and discipline.

Presuming that Mussolini had really made Italian trains run on time, moving far from the old days of austere Maoist autarchy to today’s embracing in full fervour rugged capitalist efficiency, we see high-speed trains are running faster and faster too in today’s PRC. There are a lot more similarities – talk of sacrifices for the Great Fatherland, and blind belief in legal coercion for social engineering reflecting the anti-Confucian Legalist (fajia) heritage of Mao who was himself a great admirer of the First Emperor of Ch’in who governed with Legalism and suppressed Confucianism along with all other non-Legalist philosophies in his time. In fact, new research and the latest experimentation with dan-du er tai 單獨二胎 which then led to the new two-child policy have shown how the unnecessarily coercive one-child policy has done more to wreck the Chinese society and cause untold miseries, while there has been no evidence of the so-dreaded population explosion in other countries like India which has allowed the fertility trend to take its
natural cause while interacting with modernisation and urbanisation. “As a symbol of the coercive state – an authoritarian government dictating the most intimate decisions a person can make – not much could surpass the People’s Republic of China’s one-child policy”, as a recent Newsweek report describes, “But for all the ostensible success of the policy – some demographers claim China’s population growth would have flattened out even without it – the draconian rule left emotional, social and economic scars the country and its citizens will be dealing with for years. Its consequences are felt throughout China, particularly in poorer rural areas, where its enforcement was often particularly brutal.”

While ditching the Maoist central-command economy and austere socialistic-communistic practices, the continuing ruling CCP with its leaders now in CEO-style suits and ties is still intrinsically a Maoist party which inherited the Maoist reverence for the Legalist tradition. Though against Mao’s anti-Confucian injunctions, the Party now goes with a fake revival of Confucianism which Yu Ying-shih 余英時, Emeritus Professor of East Asian Studies and History at Princeton University and the third recipient (2006) of the John W. Kluge Prize for lifetime achievement in the study of humanity, referring to the Confucius Institutes, calls an exploitation for commercial and political convenience in which what the CCP has been selectively promoting is the era-specific imperial dynasty-serving decadent feudalistic component of Confucianism that constituted the “Confucian shop” (Kongjiadian 孔家店) that the May Fourth Movement (1919) had aimed to destroy, while the Confucian insistence on the critique of political power and the contingent nature of political mandate, as well as the emphasis on the voice of the people in governance and the importance of public discourse and individual responsibility for social action have to be conveniently ignored or given a warped reinterpretation. In fact, the
Party-State centre has made two most important basic policy parameters for local authorities concerning the management of Confucian revival, as a research found, namely, “replacing Confucianism by an ambiguous notion of ‘traditional Chinese culture’” and “co-opting preferred Confucian fragments into the official ideology”, and “does not approve inheriting Confucianism without deleting elements that are incompatible with its rule” (Pang, 2014: 636-637).


Voltaire once said: “The Holy Roman Empire was neither Holy nor Roman, nor an Empire.”51 By the same token, the “People’s Republic of China” has always been a travesty of language. Whatever the original idealism underlying the fight for the “people’s” brighter future that spurred the young Chinese Bolsheviks to launch a peasant revolution against the established order, or establishing order, in the early 1900s has already been corrupted by gaining absolute political power in 1949, by the brutal political campaigns through to the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution to preserve the absolute dominance of a small elite led by Chairman Mao, and by the sheer single-minded determination of the new brutally dissent-intolerant political elite of the “reformed” authoritarian capitalist mercantilist CCP in the new governance mode of a “degenerative totalitarianism” (Hsu, 2003)52 bending on perpetuating the absolute one-party dominance of its political-industrial-business complex. In this process, Sun Yat-sen’s original liberal democratic republican ideal of separation of five powers has long been betrayed. The only thing that remains is probably “China”. If we could see the present CCP’s brutal authoritarian capitalist regime as the real modern manifestation of historian Karl Wittfogel’s “oriental despotism”53,
despite all its modern trappings, the contemporary CCP’s bureaucratic-
mercantilist totalitarian regime is merely the latest imperial dynasty to
rule China with the same brutal technique as practiced by the former
emperors through the Middle Kingdom’s millennia of despotic rule.

The new twist is that today, through PRC’s economic success, brutal
suppression of dissent, and enforced amnesia upon its people, supported
by the mesmerising eulogies of its cheerleaders across the globe and its
“soft power” backed by huge lucrative market and financial strength, has
presented the Asian giant as an irresistible model to the developing
world. The writing is on the wall, and there seems little the beleaguered
advocates of civil liberties, political freedom and social justice around
the world could do about it except to rue so: A spectre is haunting the
masses of the developing world. The spectre of the China model.

7.1. Cross-Border “Soft-Power” Silencing of Dissidents

On 26th November 2015, Anastasia Lin, the vocal supporter of China’s
human rights and the winner of the Miss Canada beauty contest we
referred to earlier, was barred from boarding her flight from Hong Kong
to China’s island province of Hainan, the host of 2015’s Miss World
contest. Due to her human rights advocacy related to China, she being
declared a “persona non grata” by the Chinese government can be
expected, but it is the particular circumstance in this case which is
intriguing. Miss Canada was barred from attending the Miss World
contest in China because of her human rights advocacy and no protest
was raised from the pageant organisers. “Miss World didn’t even try to
contact me,” as Lin told the global digital business news publication
Quartz, “These international organisers just give in to whatever China
wants to do, so China continues to do it.”54 Any sane person would think
that the Miss World pageant would have the self-respect to insist that
China as the host nation admits every legitimate contestant, otherwise
the contest would naturally have to move to another venue. But we no longer live in a sane world where common logic still prevails. “We do not have any control over who is issued a visa. Although regrettable the event would still continue under these circumstances.” A pageant official in London reportedly so answered The Washington Post’s query, said the paper in an editorial on 7th November titled “Miss Kowtow 2015”.55 Just another example of the kind of pathetic, pusillanimous response that has become increasingly common as China’s “soft power”, backed by lucrative market and investment opportunities it can provide in a world of economic despair, increases in leaps and bounds.

The CCP regime’s ability to stifle debate abroad is today as successful (including in the cash-trapped overseas academia where Confucius Institutes and joint programmes in China can come as much needed rescue) as its increasingly aggressive campaigns in locking up domestic dissidents and silencing critics at home. A blatant example of such extraterritorial attack on dissent is reflected in the exiled blind Chinese civil rights activist Chen Guangcheng’s accusation that he was being forced to leave New York University for “as early as last August and September, the Chinese Communists had already begun to apply great, unrelenting pressure on New York University, so much so that after we [i.e. Chen and his wife and son] had been in the United States just three to four months, NYU was already starting to discuss our departure with us.”56 Despite N.Y.U.’s denial of the allegation and its law school’s claim that the fellowship as that given to Chen was always to be for one year, it is probably difficult not to link that turn of events to the then newly opened New York University Shanghai (NYU Shanghai), the first university jointly operated by China and the U.S., and part of a major initiative the NYU law school calls its Global Network University.57
7.2. Exporting Repression of Dissent

Such cross-border “soft-power” silencing of dissidents backed by PRC’s present ability to offer lucrative opportunities through market, trade and investment (see Figure 4 and Figure 5 in this special issue’s introductory article “Political Governance and Strategic Relations:: Domestic-Foreign Policy Nexus and China’s Rise in the Global System”) has reached worrying proportions. The exiled dissident Chinese cartoonist, Jiang Yefei 姜野飛, who fled to Thailand in 2008 after being imprisoned and tortured by the Chinese authorities for criticising their handling of the deadly 2008 earthquake in Sichuan, was arrested by police in Thailand for illegal immigration on 28th October 2015 and put on a plane chartered by the Chinese government back to China on 13th November, despite the fact that the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) had recognised his refugee status and Canada had offered to take both him and his family in. Besides Jiang Yefei, deported by the Thai government back to China together with him on the plane on 13th November were Dong Guangping 董广平, a dissident and human rights activist who had refugee status, and Gui Minhai, the previously mentioned publisher of books critical of the Chinese government who was born in China but had acquired Swedish nationality and worked at a publishing house in Hong Kong.

The Thai government’s policy choice to please the Chinese government by helping the latter to export its domestic repression across its borders has been long recognised. In July 2015, Thailand deported nearly 100 members of Muslim Uyghur illegal migrants who were wanted by China back to the PRC, drawing condemnation from the United States and human rights groups and sparking protests in Turkey, home to a large Uyghur diaspora. The New York-based Human Rights Watch said the Uyghurs faced “grim” maltreatment back in China, and Sophie Richardson, China director for HRW stated that “Thailand should
make it clear it won’t further violate international law by immediately announcing a moratorium on additional deportations of Turkic people to China.”

Thailand is not the only member of ASEAN to do so, though, nor she is the first. In 2011, Malaysia detained 16 Uyghur illegal immigrants and deported 11 back to China, while the other five managed to register with the UN refugee agency UNHCR and were released into its custody. HRW said a Uyghur forcibly returned to China by Malaysia in 2011 was sentenced to six years in prison on charges of separatism, the same charge invoked to sentence the economist and ethnic Uyghur rights advocate Professor Ilham Tohti to life imprisonment in 2014. Then on 31st December 2012 Malaysia deported six more Uyghurs back to China. HRW said the men registered with UNHCR in Kuala Lumpur while in detention and were to have their claims reviewed when they were deported, and the UNHCR said in a statement that it had sought the men's release into its custody while their claims were being assessed and regretted that they were deported despite its intervention. HRW said the forced return of these Uyghurs to the PRC was a grave violation of international laws and Muslim minority Uyghurs repatriated to China from elsewhere in the past have expressed fear of torture, long jail terms or the death penalty. Cambodia, another ASEAN member country, also forcibly deported back to China 20 Uyghur asylum-seekers, nineteen of whom had fled to Cambodia from Xinjiang in the wake of the July 2009 riots in the city of Urumqi, fearing persecution by the Chinese authorities. UNHCR was in the process of reviewing their applications for refugee status when Cambodia succumbed to pressure from the Chinese government to deport the 20 individuals, including two children. The Cambodian government’s action to deport them back to China attracted international condemnation as fears mount that these individuals would suffer severe human rights violations upon their
For a further elaboration of such phenomenon of China’s domestic repression going global, see the earlier discussion in Section 6 of this special issue’s introductory article, “Political Governance and Strategic Relations:: Domestic-Foreign Policy Nexus and China’s Rise in the Global System”. On the claim of China’s rising soft power projection abroad, see Section 7 of the introductory article, and the diagrammatic depiction of her global economic might in that article’s Figure 4 and Figure 5.

8. Conclusion

From the first night of the Chinese New Year celebration on 8th February 2016 to the early morning of the 9th, Hong Kong’s famed busy residential and commercial district of Mong Kok (旺角, the transliteration being from the older names 望角, 芒角) descended into chaos when city authorities’ efforts to clamp down on street food vendors ended up with unprecedentedly violent clashes between the people and police in riot gear culminating in warning shots being fired by officers. The clashes, being dubbed the “Fishball Revolution” in an allusion to the “Umbrella Revolution” of 2014, resulted in 44 police injuries and 24 arrests.61

While even Hong Kong residents were shocked by the violent and bloodied nature of the street battle in a city where people pride themselves on a long history of peaceful protest including pro-democracy demonstrations like 2014’s Occupy Central campaign a.k.a. Umbrella Movement where the only defense against police tear gas and pepper spray was umbrellas, the unprecedented ferocity of the clashes can be portentous. As the global digital business news publication Quartz comments on the night of the clashes, “the scale and the ferociousness of the fighting […] point to motivations that go far beyond
the plight of a few hawkers. Instead, the violence appears to be borne out of a deep-seated mistrust about the direction Hong Kong is headed, under the leadership of a government that too often looks like it listens to Beijing more than its own people.”

The last observation above is reflected in a researcher’s take, in ruminating on whether Hong Kong’s chief executive should “be a political leader, in its full sense, or just an administrator”, regarding Donald Tsang Yam-kuen 曾蔭權, Hong Kong’s second chief executive (2005-2012):

That Tsang saw his appointment as a job he would strive to get it done is widely seen as indicative of the mind-set of civil servants [...] His “boss-servant” mind-set has been manifested in his body language when he met with mainland Chinese officials and leaders in Beijing. Television news footage of him listening attentively and taking down notes carefully on what state leaders such as President Hu Jintao had to say has reinforced the public perception of him being a loyal servant. It is also open secret that he had addressed to the former Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office Director Liao Hui as “laoban”, or boss, when they met although they enjoyed a similar rank in the Chinese hierarchy.

(Yeung, 2013: 163-164)

The sad implication of this situation is that, sighs the observer,

The excessive show of humbleness of Tsang when dealing with Beijing officials has weakened his role and position as a champion of the interest of Hong Kong people when it comes to issues such as democratic development where the city and the central government do not see eye to eye.

(ibid.: 164)
Thus, behind the violent events in Mong Kok are desperation, frustration, disappointment and fear for a grim future, especially after the violent crackdown on Occupy Central movement of 2014, subsequent persecutions, increasing pressure on the media and latest outrageous episode of the disappeared Causeway Bay Five, for this once vibrant, free-wheeling city transferred since 1997 to be under the boot of a ruthless totalitarian regime which is at the moment showing no short-term prospect of giving way to a liberal democratic governance model.

8.1. Après Nous, le Déluge …

And this is not just about Hong Kong. Like the title of the Quartz report, “Hong Kong’s ‘fishball revolution’ is about a lot more than just street food”, the violent and bloodied event in the first night of 2016’s Chinese New Year on the western part of Kowloon 九龍 Peninsula, like the increasingly volatile situation in Xinjiang and Tibet, reflects the inevitable responses of the people to the repressive policies of the increasingly Fascist racketeer central State in Beijing.

It would be unrealistic to think that none in the present CCP ruling echelon can foresee the dire consequences for future generations that would result from the continuation of the blatantly anachronistic Communist Party repression including that upon China’s vast restive frontier regions despite temporarily prolonging the CCP’s political power monopoly while bypassing all opportunities of liberalisation and democratisation, and national reconciliation related to the frontier ethnic regions, brought about by the never-came-before Zeitgeist of the e-generation. Après nous, le déluge … nonetheless, seems to be the prevailing modus operandi of a too-deeply-entrenched ruling party at this moment.
8.2. Political Reform: Lack of Urgency?

Some “nothing more to lose” uprisings are not guaranteed to happen even in times of general abject poverty, so one could surmise that they are even more remote in today’s PRC of modest prosperity. However, the trigger of revolution is not poverty per se, as the authority on political conflict and instability Professor Ted Robert Gurr in his 1970 book *Why men rebel* emphasises, but *relative* deprivation. Perception of unfairness and inequality in the distribution of resources, opportunities and benefits and a non-level playing ground is what really spurs the economic left-behinds, the dispossessed in the marketplace, those bypassed by economic growth to anger, bitterness and rebellious action. But these are, as the American historian of France and ideas Professor Clarence Crane Brinton notes in his 1938 work *The anatomy of revolution*, “not unprosperous people who feel restraint, cramp, [and] annoyance” at the existing governing regime and its cronies of patronage through government-business collusion (referred to as *guan-shang goujie* 官商勾結 in China) that are seen to be trampling on their right for a fair share of resources, opportunities and benefits from economic progress and wealth-generation. Revolutions “are born of hope” rather than misery, according to Brinton. As also observed by French political thinker and historian Alexis de Tocqueville in *L’Ancien Régime et la Révolution* (1856), while Louis XVI’s reign was the most prosperous period of the monarchy, it was this very prosperity that served to hasten the outbreak of the 1789 Revolution. That explains why the March-June 1989 student-led demonstrations on Tiananmen Square (天安門廣場) in Beijing, which gradually drew in participation of Chinese citizens from all walks of life and turned an initially small-scale anti-graft protest into a gargantuan movement for political freedom and civil liberties for which the Beijing residents were eventually willing to sacrifice their lives, had occurred at a time when economic life and even political

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atmosphere in China were liberalising and improving under Deng Xiaoping 鄧小平 and Zhao Ziyang 趙紫陽’s reform programmes, not when things were getting worse.

With expectations rising faster than actual improvement in life as economic growth takes hold, a previously mainly rural, pre-industrial or pre-reform moribund economy (traditional society beyond the far left side of the graph in Figure 1) going through reform, industrialisation and urbanisation (modernisation began, in the form of central-command to free-market economy, in the middle of graph) may eventually reach a stage when a variety of forces internal and external produce an economic downturn resulting suddenly in a big gap opening up between what people want to achieve and what they actually get in life – an unhinged “want: get ratio” that leads to a “revolution of rising frustrations” (Lerner, 1958, 1964: vii) as expectations outtrace actual attainments like what happened in the Beijing of 1989 (see Figure 1). The sometimes seemingly baffling expression of insecurity on the part of the CCP in its oppressive actions in this era of relative prosperity is actually well justified.

Nevertheless, Harvard sociologist Theda Skocpol argues in her book States and social revolutions (1979) that revolutions can only occur beginning from the top with “state crisis” when governments are caught in situations they can no longer deal with; revolutions, in other words, do not just bubble up from the masses below. Lenin’s success in taking over Russia was due to the virtual collapse of the Romanov dynasty after its defeat in the hand of the Germans in the First World War; Mao’s success in taking over China was mainly attributed to the invading Japanese army wrecking Kuomintang 國民黨’s ability to rule. Today’s ruling CCP does not face such crisis at the moment.
Figure 1 China: Expanding Demand for Political Institutional Change, 1978-1989

By 1989 greatly expanded popular demand for a more liberal and just society had diverged so much from existing situation of accentuated corruption and social injustice as by-products of market-oriented economic reform unaccompanied by liberal democratic political reform and result of Deng Xiaoping’s intolerance for “bourgeois liberalization” – an intolerable gap has developed between what people wanted and what they got

![Diagram showing satisfaction over time with expected and actual need satisfaction curves and a note on people taking to the streets at a certain time.]

Source: Based on Davies’s J-Curve Theory of Revolution; see Vander Zanden (1988: 584), Figure 21.2 (adapted from Davies, 1962: 6, Figure 1).

8.3. A Taste of Old Wine in a New Bottle

The late Jeane J. Kirkpatrick in her Commentary magazine essay “Dictatorships and double standards” (November 1979) argues that authoritarian regimes are different from totalitarian regimes in that the former (e.g. formerly junta-ruled Argentina, Chile and Brazil) can
reform their politico-economic systems but the latter (the Communist-Party-ruled Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist/Maoist countries) cannot, and indeed later development had borne witness to her prediction:

[...] the history of this century provides no grounds for expecting that radical totalitarian regimes will transform themselves. At the moment there is a far greater likelihood of progressive liberalization and democratization in the governments of Brazil, Argentina, and Chile than in the government of Cuba; in Taiwan than in the People’s Republic of China; in South Korea than in North Korea; in Zaire than in Angola; and so forth.⁶³

Admittedly, many might find distasteful this “Kirkpatrick Doctrine”, which advocated US support of anti-Communist governments including authoritarian dictatorships around the world during the Cold War based on Jeane J. Kirkpatrick’s conviction that democracy could be restored easier to authoritarian states which were more amenable to gradual reform in a democratic direction than to totalitarian states. Nevertheless, her argument does seem to have been borne out by later events in the Soviet bloc with political system collapse in the Soviet Union, followed by disintegration, as the end result of Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika and glasnost, and the rest of Eastern Europe plus the USSR’s Asian satellite state of Mongolia, now without USSR’s military-security power of terror to back up their ruling Communist Party regimes and defunct central-command economies, which simply bolted from the old system formerly imposed on them by the Soviet Red Army.

However, events did not transpire that way in the case of the PRC. In China, the Party-regime succeeded in reforming itself, remaining entrenched in political control as a modernised totalitarian State, and as we have seen earlier, transitioning into a new form of Fascist corporatist
system. If we look at David Easton’s application of the systems theory (see Section 2 and Figure 1 in this special issue’s introductory article, “Political Governance and Strategic Relations:: Domestic-Foreign Policy Nexus and China’s Rise in the Global System”), different organs of the biopolitical system would seem to have metabolically undergone renewal while the top-level ruling class has been preserved (Easton, 1965). This is like the capitalist states reforming themselves into welfare states, introducing measures to protect workers’ rights and the poor in the early part of the 20th century and thus preempting the Marxist prediction of a proletarian revolution. Different from the Eastern European case is also the local-born nature of the Chinese Communist movement – though representing in a way a strange hybrid ideologically foreign-inspired in its Marxist form, like the earlier Taiping Rebellion by the Christian millenarian movement of Hung Hsiu-ch’üan 洪秀全’s T’ai-p’ing T’ien-kuo /Heavenly Kingdom of Peace ( 太平天國, Taiping Tianguo), described as a “strange upheaval” in Jonathan Spence’s 1996 book God’s Chinese son: The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom of Hong Xiuquan (see page xxiv of his “Foreword”), which itself was a modern manifestation of the oft-occurring peasant uprisings throughout China’s long dynastic history.

On the other hand, the reason that the Party-State may no longer opt to rule by just brute force like old-style dictators but choose to use more subtle forms of coercion beneath a coat of democratic trappings, including grassroots elections, modern free market, politically censored but otherwise free access to the Internet and other social media and “evolving” rule of law, is simply that it has grown smarter with experience to realise that the old-style autocratic “thuggish repression” no longer works in this globalised Internet age, as William J. Dobson analyses in his book The dictator’s learning curve: Inside the global battle for democracy (2012).
Having evolved with the times into a much more public relations-savvy technocratic clique, operating by consensus at high levels while enhancing economic efficiency at the lower tiers of government, the modern Party-State thus presents a uniform face of a government that delivers to the citizens and the world to dissuade attempts to challenge or destabilise its political monopoly which is today, of course, no longer purely a matter of politics and governance, as the Party-State has grown into a complex nexus of politico-pecuniary interests, a gargantuan structure of interfeeding power, favour and lucre with simply too much to lose. In other words, the once ideal-driven Chinese Communist Party is today

[…] no longer just a political but also an economic class which has a direct interest in the accumulation of capital. It has so far been more successful than its predecessors in the twentieth century in convincing the population that its interests are also the national interest, but how long it can do so is anybody’s case. One of the particularities of the PRC is that the organizational apparatus that has enabled its development is equally efficient as an instrument of repression so long as it retains its coherence, which it has done successfully so far through the distribution of economic rewards and privileges throughout the organization. We should remember that the Communist Party and its auxiliary organizations make up around 20 per cent of the population.

(Dirlik and Prazniak, 2012: 297-298)

While kidnapping publishers and sellers of tabloid-style sensationalistic political books from Hong Kong to Mainland for interrogation seems remarkably civilised in comparison with the Islamic State’s 7th January 2015 massacre of Charlie Hebdo’s editorial team for
publishing sacrilegious cartoons, the racketeer-State action of the CCP regime has so far seemed to be far more successful than ISIL/Daesh’s terrorist tactics in instilling a sense of White Terror in the targeted society. Outside Hong Kong’s dissident community, there has not been a society-wide broad-based response equivalent to the post-massacre “Je suis Charlie” campaign – it looks as if for most Hong Kong people, out of fear, indifference, resignation, or among supporters of Beijing, exultation, and overseas Chinese communities too, the feeling is “Je ne suis pas Causeway Bay” or “Je ne suis pas Mighty Current”.

8.4. “Cheerleader Syndrome” and “Mirror-image” Self-deceit

Looking at the responses of international cheerleaders and China’s younger generation, the tactic – backed by strong economic performance, improved living standards and mesmerising investment opportunities – has seemed to be very successful both domestically and beyond the country’s borders.

No nation in history has ever done so much so fast. If the [...] leaders tell us that the control of information was necessary to get this job done, we can afford to take their word for it for the time being. We who know the power of free speech, and the necessity for it, may assume that if those leaders are sincere in their work of emancipating the [...] people they will swing around toward free speech – and we hope so soon.64

One can be forgiven today for thinking that the two ellipses in the passage above both stand in place of the word “Chinese”. But no, the passage above is from a 1943 Life editorial about the Soviet Union under Stalin – the two ellipses there stand for “Soviet” and “Russian” respectively in the original passage. Life’s optimistic opinion about the
Stalinist totalitarianism in 1943 unfortunately can today describe well the general view of CCP’s worldwide cheerleaders about the PRC, who never hesitate to act as devoted, ardent apologists for PRC’s human rights excesses, attempting to convince the world that anyhow the CCP leaders are gradually embracing the more “mature” concepts of the West (which admittedly the CCP leaders sometimes do pay lip service to as “universal values”) and as this genuine invention by the CCP of a free-market “socialism with Chinese characteristics” gradually “matures”, they will think more and more like the liberal democratic West – now a popularly accepted outlook Professor Raymond Sleeper called “the mirror-image syndrome” (Sleeper, 1987: 193). The end result of this adaptation process will not be a direct copy of the Western liberal model, but a Chinese improvement. For instance, Professor Xu Xianming 徐顯明, president of the China University of Political Science and Law (中國政法大學), posited in 2005 the hexiequan 和諧權 (i.e. “harmony rights”, apparently in line with the official “construction of a harmonious society” policy of the CCP) which according to him is to “supersede the earlier three generations of human rights (i.e. rights of freedom, rights of survival and rights of development)”.65

On China’s “democratic model”, here goes a standard apologist’s statement: “China’s practice and theory have shown that ‘democracy with one-party leadership under socialism with Chinese characteristics’ has been explored and practiced for over 90 years since the founding of the Chinese Communist Party. The institution of the National People’s Congress (人民代表大會制), the system of multi-party cooperation and political negotiation under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, ‘democratic centralism’ (minzhu jizhong zhi 民主集中制) and the Communist Party’s work style of criticism and self-criticism together represent the role model of democracy under one-party leadership, which has transcended the scope of what liberal democracy could
explain [...] Liberal democracy is not universal; it is merely a special manifestation of Western civilization.” (Zhou, 2013: 113; my translation) By this reasoning, such “democratisation under one-party leadership” (ibid.: 138) should be the future system of democracy for the world to replace the Western liberal democracy which has proven not to be universally suitable and to have failed in the developing countries, and have even been questioned in the Western countries themselves, according to the apologist. After all, one can argue that if Marx could legitimately stand Hegel’s idealist dialectically dynamic model of nature and of history on its head and Lenin could do the same to orthodox Marxism with his more absolutist, doctrinaire perspective, his elevation of the role of violence as a revolutionary instrument and his belief in the absolute necessity of a dictatorship of the proletariat, why can’t today’s “new CCP” do the same to these weary Western notions with its genuine invention of a perfect system of market-socialism and people-first (Hu Jintao’s “yi min wei ben 以民為本”) democracy with Chinese characteristics?

Such a “perfect” system, much superior to Western liberal democracy and which by Zhou’s criteria represents an unprecedented contribution to human civilization and a model of mankind’s political future, was succinctly and confidently described by Chen Xiqing 陳喜慶, deputy head of the United Front Work Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (中共中央統戰部), at a press conference in which he unreservedly declared that China’s “multi-party” system was already perfect, hence there was no need to establish new political parties. The CCP, according to Chen, has been absorbing the workers, peasants, soldiers as well as members of the intelligentsia as party members, while the eight existing “democratic parties” (minzhu dangpai 民主黨派) are focusing mainly on recruiting people from the middle and upper social strata, including those in the fields of

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technology, culture and sports, as their party members. In China’s so-called “multi-party cooperation” (duodang hezuo 多黨合作) system, these “democratic parties” are neither “non-ruling parties” (zaiyedang 在野黨) nor “opposition parties” (fanduidang 反對黨), but “participating parties” (canzhengdang 參政黨). Besides that, according to Chen, there are also “party-less” (wu dangpai 無黨派) people in the system, comprising those who are not members of the nine political parties.

8.4. The Road to Fascism Classic

Actually regardless of one’s take on the apologist’s statement, one has to admit that the road of democratisation may not be smooth for this Asian giant which had not seen a functioning liberal democratic era in her two thousand years of imperial and republican history (and in this context, today’s best-case liberal democratic island state of Taiwan (ROC) is not a typical representation of China’s destiny, but rather a unique aberration67). Curiously date-exact, following Professor Zhou Tianyong from the Central Party School, China’s authoritarian one-party political system will and should remain unchanged until at least 2037 (Zhou, Wang and Wang (eds), 2007: 2, 6, 45-46)68. This is in line with what Deng Xiaoping stated in 1987, that direct general elections could only be held after half a century had passed in the 2000s, and at the moment the country had to make do with indirect elections above the county level and direct elections only at county and below county level, given the colossal population and inadequate level of cultural quality of the people (Hu, Hu, He and Guo, 2009: 19-20)69. Even if the all-powerful authoritarian regime of China is willing to embark on a certain extent of democratisation at its own pace in a best-case scenario for the democracy advocates, as Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter (1986) opine, while a transition from authoritarian rule could probably produce a democracy, it could also terminate with a liberalised
authoritarian regime (*dictablanda*) or a restrictive, illiberal democracy (*democradura*) (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986: 9). While shadows of the remnants of her ghostly past still linger to haunt the one-party State, there are already telling signs that the continuing transformation from a *dictadura* (dictatorship) into a *dictablanda* (and for the cautious optimist, possibly leading further to a highly restrictive *democradura* in the near future) is the most possible direction the CCP regime is heading to and indeed planning to head to, given the fact that the Western, “bourgeois liberal” multi-party competitive electoral democracy (*democracia*), together with its notion of separation of powers, has already been ruled out of the cards, or at least not until mid-2000s according to Deng Xiaoping.

Nevertheless, as this paper has argued, given the political realities that constitute the essence of today’s CCP-ruled China, one can be forgiven for being overcome by some sentiment of angst and pessimism. Being obsessed with maintaining stability in order to perpetuate its grip on power, the CCP regime is today committing every conceivable violation of human rights – brutal suppression of free speech and political dissent with the harassment, physical abuse and torture, legal and extralegal detention, and tight surveillance and house arrest of civil rights campaigners, democracy activists, civil rights lawyers, civil society association leaders, and ethnic minority activists like Ilham Tohti who are simply voicing aspirations for regional autonomy and protection of ethnic rights. The case of Ilham Tohti’s life sentence is a good example of how the CCP regime is justifying harsh prison sentences even against nonviolent Uyghur rights activists and related Internet users by invoking today’s global War on Terrorism.

As this paper and the earlier introductory article of this special issue have shown, if the intensification of repression in the past year in both the domestic and global contexts could be a sign of what is to come for
China under the continued uncompromising political monopoly of the increasingly authoritarian post-reform-era CCP, even a further liberalised authoritarian regime (*dictablanda*) or a restrictive, illiberal democracy (*democradura*) seems to be precipitately fading from the horizon, but that may no longer be the heart of the matter, for heading out there into the uncharted waters, standing out ominously against the fading light of a liberal democratic future for China is the dark silhouette of a towering CCP navigating the country along a Chinese route to Fascism – not today’s varieties of neo-fascism in Europe and America, but full corporatist, classic Fascism of Benito Mussolini, *il Duce del Fascismo e Fondatore dell’Impero / della Repubblica Sociale Italiana*, of Adolf Hitler, *der Führer und Reichskanzler des deutschen Volkes*, and (though inconclusively among scholars of Fascism)\(^{72}\) of Francisco Franco, *el Caudillo de la Última Cruzada y de la Hispanidad* – and worse, pulling the rest of the developing world, mesmerised by the “China model”, along a repressive, authoritarian capitalist path.

**Notes**

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1. Or officially the “Communist Party of China” (CPC, 中國共產黨).
4. ODN, 3rd March 2016. (東方日報/Oriental Daily News/ODN is a Malaysian daily in Chinese, with China news sources mainly from the Hong Kong and Taiwan media.)
6. “Trial by media? Confessions go prime time in China” (by Steven Jiang),

7. People in southern China, especially among the speakers of either Cantonese/Yue 粵 or Hokkien/Fujianese/Min 闽 regionalects (whose combined population is larger than the number of speakers of either Polish or Ukrainian, the two East European/Slavonic languages with most numerous speakers except Russian, or the speakers of Dutch, Danish, Norwegian and Swedish combined) actually refer to themselves as T’ang-jen 唐人 (Tangren, in their respective varied local pronunciations) instead of Han-jen 漢人 (Hanren), as noted here by George Moseley (1966):

The contradistinction between Han Chinese and national minorities repeatedly made [...] suggests that the Han Chinese constitute a homogeneous, discreet community from whom the national minorities are readily distinguishable. In fact, however, the cultural gap between “Han Chinese” and “minority” is often no greater than that between Han Chinese of different regions. There is an almost continuous ethnocultural spectrum extending from the northern, wheat-eating, Mandarin-speaking Chinese at one end to, at the other, the dark-skinned K’awa in the south who are primitive food-gatherers and speakers of a language of the Mon-Khmer family. In between are the more than 100 million “Han” Chinese of south-coastal China who speak dialects other than Mandarin and who, in fact, sometimes refer to themselves as T’ang-jen (men of T’ang, after the T’ang dynasty, seventh to tenth centuries) rather than as Han-jen (after the Han dynasty, third century B.C. to third century A.D.) and the more than ten million persons of the “national minorities” in south China who have been to varying extents acculturated to Chinese ways – to the point, in some cases, that they had no awareness of being different, of being a “minority,” until they were informed of the fact by workers from the Chinese Academy of Sciences who came to their areas after 1949.

(Moseley, 1966: 8-9)
8. In Mongol “Chinggis Khagan” or “Chinggis Khaan” (Чингис хаан).
9. “Chinese Academy of Social Sciences is ‘infiltrated by foreign forces’: anti-graft official” (by Adrian Wan), South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), 15th June 2014 <http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1533020/chinese-academy-social-sciences-infiltrated-foreign-forces-anti-graft>. These warnings to CASS were posted in an article on the website of a research institute for modern Chinese history which Zhang Yingwei visited on 10th June 2014. The article was removed a few days later on 14th June after the news began circulating online.

17. In the context of the political economy of ethnic relations, it should be noted that the dominant group may perceive a subordinate group as “exotic” rather than “real” (Hoetink, 1973: 177-91). An example of such an “exotic” minority in Malaysia, besides the Orang Asli (i.e. “aborigines”), is the small Gente Kristang community (autoglossonym, from Portuguese “Gente Cristã”) in the state of Melaka, descended from the 16th-Century Portuguese settlers and occupiers. Defined as “deviating in somatic and/or cultural respects, without being conceived subjectively as a menace to the existing social order” (Hoetink, 1967), “exotic” groups (or Cox (1948)’s socioracial “strangers”) are not perceived as “real”, because they are not subjectively comprised within the “societal image” of the dominant. Thus they do not attract the latter’s hostility, as do “real” subordinate groups viewed as a menace. The case of the Ainu (アイヌ) and the “burakumin” (部落民) in Japan and that of the Amerindian natives and Afro-Americans in the United States today are good examples of these two polar subordinate situations – the Ainu and Amerindians being in some way viewed as “exotic” vis-à-vis the other two “real” minorities; instead of bitterness and hostility, they are met with “a mild benevolence, a condescending philanthropy” on the part of the dominant society (Hoetink, 1973: 179). Such distinction between the two types of subordinate groups was vividly described by DeVos in his study of the “burakumin”: “The basic attitudes held [by the dominant Japanese society] toward the Ainu are not as pejorative as towards the outcasts [i.e. the “burakumin”] [...] the Ainu have been treated ambivalently very much as the American Indians have been, in contrast to the caste distinctions which underlie the treatment of American blacks.” (DeVos, 1972: 326) Paradoxically, China’s largest minority, the Zhuang (僮) in Guangxi Province, could actually be more
“exotic” than “real”. Being the most assimilated of minorities, the Zhuang’s ethnic consciousness was virtually created by the Han-dominated central Communist Party-State in the early 1950s (see, for instance, Kaup, 2000). Similarly for many small ethnic minorities in adjacent Guizhou and Yunnan. The same cannot be said for the “real” ethnic minorities of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang and Tibetans in Tibet and Qinghai, many of whom are strongly resisting Han dominance, assimilation and internal colonialism.


32. Mao first composed the poem in 1936 but only published it when he went to Chungking 重慶 (Chongqing) in 1945 to hold peace talks with Chiang Kai-shek 蔣介石. The poem became quite an instant sensation among Chinese intellectuals at that time.


34. In Mongol “Khubilai Khagan” or “Khubilai Khaan” (Xūbīlài háán).

35. The first Emperor of Ch’in (Qin) reportedly buried 500 to 1100 Confucian scholars alive, though scholars including Michel Nylan and Martin Kern doubted the fact or the extent and pointed to possible biased Han-dynasty scholars’ exaggeration or fabrication.

36. R. Kent Guy (1987). The emperor’s four treasuries: Scholars and the State in the late Qianlong period. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, page 176 under the section “The growth of the Literary Inquisition (1776-1782)”. <https://books.google.com.my/books?id=bFA6a60_5LgC&pg=PA78&dq=The+Emperor’s+27s+Four+Treasuries:+Scholars+and+the+State+in+the+Late+Ch%27ien-lung+Era.&hl=en#v=onepage&q=The%20Emperor%27s%20Four%20Treasuries%3A%20Scholars%20and%20the%20State%20in%20the%20Late%20Ch%27ien-lung%20Era.&f=false>


40. Ibid.


43. Ibid.


50. 「孔子學院及其影響 —— 專訪余英時」 [Confucius Institutes: a special interview of Yu Ying-shih],《縱覽中國》[China overview], 8th April 2012.


52. Despite the smokescreen of rhetoric, basically what we are witnessing in the PRC is the resiliency of what Hsu Szu-chien 徐斯儉 called “degenerative totalitarian polity” (*t’ui-hua chi-ch’üan cheng-t’i* 迴化極權政體) since mid-1990s which while having lost the original totalitarian regime’s ideology, power of political mobilisation and monopoly over the economy, still not only continues with but tenaciously maintains the absolute monopoly of the “Party” over political power and State machinery and control over media of propaganda and social organisations (Hsu, 2003: 168). The major characteristic of such a degenerative totalitarian regime is, according to Hsu, just like many authoritarian and post-totalitarian regimes, by sourcing its legitimacy from economic development, and with the unchallengeable national power inherited from its totalitarian past, its now playing the role of a developmental State to drive economic development, while at the same time continuing to prohibit political pluralism, freedom of political association and the existence of independent mass media. Moreover, a degenerative totalitarian regime does not need to worry about justification for long-term survival that used
to plague authoritarian regimes from the perspective of the ultimate value legitimacy, for not only that the degenerative totalitarian regime has inherited totalitarianism’s self-justification of political monopoly, it is also carrying forward and strengthening the reign of terror and State machinery of repression that it inherited from its totalitarian past (ibid.: 168-169). Such an ingenious combination of the capability for national development and that for repression has served to continue a mode of governance which is justifying repression (in the name of weiwen 维稳, i.e. “maintaining stability”) with economic development, observes Hsu, as long as the benefits of development surpass the costs of repression, as development (which has replaced ideology and social reconstruction in its totalitarian past) is now the main aim of this degenerative totalitarian regime as the key to the paramount raison d’être of maintaining the status quo of monopolistic political governance. Unlike under an authoritarian government, even limited pluralism and self-organisation of societal interests to any meaningful extent are absolutely prohibited lest they jeopardise this degenerative totalitarian regime’s absolute monopoly of all political power (ibid.: 169).


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57. Ibid.
61. “‘Fishball revolution’: Hong Kong comes to terms with brutal New Year street battle” (by Finbarr Bermingham), The Week (UK), 11th February 2016 <http://www.theweek.co.uk/69474/fishball-revolution-hong-kong-comes-to-terms-with-brutal-new-year-street-battle>; “Bristling under Beijing: Hong Kong’s ‘fishball revolution’ is about a lot more than just street food” (by Richard Macauley and Heather Timmons), Quartz, 8th February 2016 <http://qz.com/612813/hong-kongs-fishball-revolution-is-about-a-lot-more-than-just-street-food/>.
62. “Bristling under Beijing: Hong Kong’s ‘fishball revolution’ is about a lot more than just street food” (by Richard Macauley and Heather Timmons), Quartz, 8th February 2016 <http://qz.com/612813/hong-kongs-fishball-revolution-is-about-a-lot-more-than-just-street-food/>.

65. “以和諧精神超越傳統三代人權的對抗精神，將化育出新一代人權——和諧權。和諧權將成為和諧世界建設的基石和要素。” [Let the hexie spirit transcend the confrontational spirit of the three generations of conventional human rights, to cultivate and produce a new generation of human rights – the hexie rights (rights of harmony). Hexie rights will become the foundation stone and key element of the building of the hexie shijie (harmonious world). ] (See “法學專家徐顯明提出第四代人權‘ 和諧權 ’”, 中國新聞網 / 騰訊網, 22nd November 2006 <http://news.qq.com/a/20061122/002038.htm>.)


67. “The island of Taiwan only achieved a peaceful transition from martial law and dictatorship to democracy roughly two decades ago, with 1990 student protests known as the Wild Lily movement [that] took place just one year after the Tiananmen Square pro-democracy demonstrations were violently crushed in China”, as *The Washington Post*’s China bureau chief Simon Denyer reminisced in a reportage on the recent Taiwanese general elections, “Twenty-five years later, as China moves in a more repressive direction, harassing and arresting not only dissidents, lawyers and journalists but also feminists and LGBT-rights activists, the island at its side is moving ever more confidently on the opposite path.” (“‘Progressive, tolerant and diverse’: How Taiwan is moving ever farther from China” (by Simon Denyer), *The Washington Post*, 19th January 2016 <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/01/19/progressive-tolerant-and-diverse-how-taiwan-is-moving-ever-farther-from-
Indeed, through one-person-one-vote free and fair popular elections on 16th January 2016 Taiwan elected its first female president Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文, an LSE PhD, who is part-aboriginal, “the first woman to run an Asian country who is not the child of a political dynasty”). The fact that female candidates won 43 out of 113 seats in Taiwan’s parliament, and legislators from Taiwan’s Austronesian aboriginal inhabitants who make up just 1.5 per cent of the population took up 7 per cent of seats in the parliament (ibid.), further consolidated Taiwan’s unique position not only as the only vibrant, fiercely democratic, proudly progressive, tolerant and diverse Chinese-speaking polity, but also in sharp contrast to the increasingly autocratic and ruthless CCP autocracy in Mainland China (cf. Taiwan’s being progressive, tolerant and diverse, besides her vibrant liberal democracy, especially in view of the new president having publicly supported LGBT rights and endorsed same-sex marriage, a position she publicly expressed when the biggest gay pride parade in Asia was held in Taipei on 31st October 2015. (“As Taiwan celebrates gay pride, presidential hopeful Tsai Ing-wen comes out for marriage equality” (by Kenneth Tan), Shanghaiist Daily, 1st November 2015 <http://shanghaiist.com/2015/11/01/tsai-ing-wen-gay-taiwan.php>; “Taiwan crowds march in Asia’s biggest gay pride parade” (by Agence France-Presse), Mail Online (Daily Mail, UK), 31st October 2015 <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-3298008/Taiwan-crowds-march-Asias-biggest-gay-pride-parade.html>)

68. See Bo (2009: 10-11).

69. Cited from 鄧小平文選 第 3 卷 [selected works of Deng Xiaoping, volume 3], Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe 人民出版社, 1993 年版, 第 220～221 頁。


72. Filipe Ribeiro de Meneses (2001) argues that Francisco Paulino Hermenegildo Teóadoxu Franco Bahamonde “was not a fascist. There is an element of revolutionary politics in fascism, of wanting to provoke a dramatic change in society. That was not Franco’s intention: on the contrary, he wanted to preserve Spain from change … the debate as to whether Franco was a fascist is in many ways irrelevant, since the denial of Franco’s fascism has often been an essential part of attempts to legitimise his actions. The fact remains that his brutality matched or even exceeded that of Mussolini.” (p. 87) Similarly Raymond Carr (1980) states that: “In spite of the Fascist trimmings of the early years – the goose-step and the Fascist salute – Francoism was not a totalitarian regime. It was a conservative, Catholic, authoritarian system, its original corporatist features modified over time. It came to have none of the characteristics of a totalitarian state: no single party parallel to the state administration; after the early years, no successful attempt at mass mobilization.” (p. 165) However, Paul Preston (1995) disagrees strongly with such an approach, saying that “in the last twenty years [since the 1970s], scholars have dwelt on the fact that Francoism was not Hitlerism … resulting in an increasingly widespread consensus that Francoism was never really fascism … Such an approach is understandable and unfortunate … An eagerness to exonerate the Franco regime from the taint of fascism can go with a readiness to forget that, after coming to power through a civil war which claimed hundreds of thousands of lives and forced hundreds of thousands more into exile, the dictatorship executed at least quarter of a million people, maintained concentration camps and labour battalions, and sent troops to fight for Hitler on the Russian front … the confident exclusion … of the Franco regime from a discussion of fascism cold only be justified if fascism is taken to be synonymous with Nazism at its most extreme, complete with racialistic bestiality. Such a view, since it leads logically to the suggestion that Mussolini’s Italy was not really fascist, is so rigid as to
be useless.” (pp. 10-11) Going into details on characteristics of the Caudillo’s regime, Andrew Forrest (2000) similarly finds Francoism fascist: “The teoria de caudillaje was a defining contour of the Franco regime, and with it came a flourishing personality cult … this bureaucratic state learned much from the economic policy of Fascist Italy. These lessons also included autarky, the Labour Charter establishing rights and duties of workers (1938), the ‘Battle for Wheat’ and the INI, a source of state investment for industry (1941). The Falangist Seccion Femenina … ‘re-educated’ women in their traditional roles, analagous to the Nazi Kinder, Kirche, Kuche … Franco regime banned not only divorce but, along with all Catholic countries, contraception. As in Mussolini’s Italy and the Third Reich, awards were given as incentive to produce large families … Through the voluntary Youth Front founded in 1940 (Pelayos aged 7-10, Flechas 11-14, Cadetes 15-18) Falangists instilled political doctrine … [and] occupied top positions in the Franco propaganda machine, press, radio, film, theatre, and … orchestrated parades and rallies affirming mass support for the Caudillo with their fascist salute and conspicuous blue shirts.” (p. 116, p. 118) Some observers, though, have opted for a mid-way approach, calling the Franquist regime “semifascist”: “Falangists never played a major role in the new state. Most of the key leaders of the Falange did not survive the Civil War, and Franco moved quickly to subordinate the fascist party, merging it as well as more conservative and traditional political forces into the broader and vaguer National Movement under his direct control … Thus, while there was a definite fascist element during the first decade of Franco’s rule, most analysts have concluded that early Francoism can more accurately be described as semifascist.” (Solsten and Meditz (eds), 1988) (The quoted passages in this note came from the compilation in “Was Franco a fascist?”, International School History <http://internationalschoolhistory.net/western_europe/spain/1945-53_was_franco_a_fascist.htm>.)
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Book Review
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The first to weaken was the Polish United Workers’ Party. The next to fold was the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party.

As the late 1980s slipped into the early 1990s, communist parties around the world began to fall, one by one. From Africa to Asia, Eastern Europe to Latin America, communism was quietly abandoned or violently rejected by the masses, until only a smattering of holdouts were left. Of these, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was the most prominent, and all eyes turned to them in anticipation of their demise. Huge changes in China seemed imminent, even inevitable.

But that was not to be. Today, nearly a century from its birth, the Chinese Communist Party still reigns over one of the biggest, most populous and economically powerful countries in the world. Though it has evolved greatly in response to the challenges it faces, the CCP has, on the whole, exhibited a remarkable durability in the face of international disapprobation and territorial challenges, internal scandals and ideological differences.

How did this happen? What has enabled the CCP to survive and furthermore, thrive? These are important questions that must be answered if one is to understand China as it is and China as it will be.
These are the questions which are tackled in *The Party: The Secret World of China’s Communist Rulers* (revised edition, 2013; original edition published in 2010).

*The Party* is the magnum opus of Richard McGregor, a political correspondent with nearly two decades worth of experience in reporting from North Asia. Drawing upon a range of historical anecdotes, current events, insightful interviews and personal observations, McGregor seeks to demystify the inner workings of China’s secretive party leaders, and in doing so provides a valuable contribution to the field of Chinese politics.

*The Party* is organized thematically, with each chapter focusing on a different societal institution or worrisome social issue. It starts with a description of the CCP, follows through with an exposition of the booming Chinese economy, the secretive party personnel department, the leashed military, the powerful but limited anti-corruption commission, the disconnected local government, before wrapping up with an exploration of Chinese communist history and censorship. The relationships between these social institutions and issues are investigated, with close attention being paid to the pervasive influence of the economy and corruption upon all levels of modern Chinese society.

Delicate power dynamics are a running theme in *The Party*. The CCP derives strength from a strong economy and a strong military, but cannot tolerate them being stronger than the hand which holds their reins. The CCP gives the anti-graft commission great powers to root out and heavily prosecute individual corruption, but not enough power to actually change the easily-gameable system. The CCP will allow and even respond to public critique and dissatisfaction, but only so long as that does not facilitate collective action that might result in another Tiananmen-esque crisis. The CCP thus vacillates between tightening and loosening its political grip upon Chinese society, and the resulting
ambiguity and inconsistencies both strengthens and endangers the CCP.

The scope of The Party is well-defined in accordance to its thesis and main objectives. McGregor focuses strictly upon Chinese domestic politics; international relations issues such as the global financial crisis and hostilities with Taiwan are mentioned only in passing. This is because McGregor’s argument is that the CCP’s biggest challenges come from within rather than without. China is a dangerous country to cross, as its global economic influence, intimidating military potential and status as a rising superpower mean that other countries, even those with superpower status, would risk losing more than they would gain in a hostile relationship with China. Thus, it stands to reason that the biggest threat to China is China itself – that its huge population and corruption-threatened institutions may be a ticking time bomb for the CCP.

The Party’s stated objectives are to explain how the CCP has survived and prospered until today, and to place the CCP “back at the heart of the modern Chinese society”. This it successfully does by providing a detailed exploration of the CCP’s adaptability and pragmatism. It clearly explains the factors – fear of collective action, determination to stay in power – which influence how the CCP operates. However, readers are left to ruminate upon why these factors are so important. What makes the individuals leading the CCP so desperate for power? Is it a matter of greed, of ideology, of inertia? These are admittedly difficult questions to answer, but the ensuing result is that the secret world of the Chinese Communist Party still remains, for the most part, disappointingly secret.

It is always interesting to observe how authors’ professional background guides the tone and arguments formed in their work. The first key point of note is that McGregor is writing The Party from a journalistic, rather than academic perspective. Thus, the target audience of The Party is the general public rather than the academia, and The
Party does not directly acknowledge or reference alternative works or academic theories about Chinese politics. The second key point to keep in consideration is McGregor’s previous service as the China bureau chief for the Financial Times, a paper with a focus on business, financial and economic news. Consequently, it stands to reason that he has a particular interest in the role and impact of the Chinese economy.

These two points bring both advantages and drawbacks to the table. As The Party is aimed at the edification of the wider populace, McGregor uses a lively, engaging writing style which renders the complex subject of Chinese politics easily understandable to the average layman. As a journalist, his investigative style, resources and informant network may be markedly different from those of academics, and so the anecdotes and observations he recounts are a unique, compelling source of primary data. His in-depth explanations of the role and impact of the Chinese economy – not just in relation to CCP leadership decisions, but also in relation to corruption, personnel selection and the military – add value to mainstream beliefs that say economy is a key factor in influencing Chinese politics.

On the other hand, The Party lacks academic objectivity. An academic work of quality would have gathered both supporting and opposing literature on the subject and presented it alongside its own argument. This would have allowed readers to place the book in the wider context of China studies. As it is, readers for which The Party is their introduction to understanding China would be hard pressed to evaluate its argument, question its assumptions and notice its limitations.

On the whole, however, The Party provides a convincing, consistent and coherent argument that still appears to be relevant through the half decade past its first publication. A 2013 Harvard study on Chinese censorship, for example, supports McGregor’s observations that Chinese censorship is fueled more by fear of collective action than worry about
governmental criticism. The emphasis upon individual prosecution rather than systemic changes in the recent scandal about improperly stored vaccines parallels The Party’s recounting of the Sanlu 三鹿 milk scandal.

Thus, on the surface, very little seems to have changed; the CCP appear as powerful and durable under Xi Jinping’s leadership as it did under Hu Jintao’s. One contemporary feature which might prove a game-changer, though, is the Chinese economic slowdown. As fresh data show a marked deceleration in China’s current economic growth, we are left to speculate on how this might intertwine with its demographical, environmental and energy problems to impact Chinese society, the CCP and the world at large.

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Notes


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