INTRODUCTION

Political Governance and Strategic Relations: Domestic-Foreign Policy Nexus and China’s Rise in the Global System

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Abstract

Recent years have witnessed several momentous developments in the political economy of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) both on the domestic front and in her foreign relations. Deriving correct interpretation of such fast-paced developments and changes has preoccupied much of the circles of China-watchers these days, with political scientists, economists, sociologists and international relations experts focusing their respective attentions on either the domestic transformation occurring within the PRC or on her foreign relations. While the volatile series of incidents involving a year of crackdowns on domestic civil societal movements, civil rights lawyers, labour activists and Hong Kong’s book publishers and distributors were unfolding dramatically, the year also witnessed the continued rise of China’s economic might culminating in the realisation of her initiative for the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) that started operation on
25th December 2015 and the continued progress of her “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) proposal after the creation of the State-owned Silk Road Fund on 29th December 2014. Such developments on China’s domestic and global fronts have to be properly placed in the overall context of China’s domestic-foreign policy nexus that has uniquely evolved during her recent decades of continuous, astounding economic tour de force amidst the stagnation of the modernisation and democratisation of her political structure and sociopolitical power configuration, and the rise of her influence in the global system.

**Keywords:** China, Chinese Communist Party, State, civil society, dissent, dissidents, weiquan, rights-defence lawyers, labour activism, liberal democracy, totalitarianism, authoritarianism, “One Belt, One Road”, “Maritime Silk Road”, “soft power”

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1. Political Governance and Strategic Relations: China in the Asia-Pacific

The present volume, *China amidst Competing Dynamics in the Asia-Pacific: National Identity, Economic Integration and Political Governance*, represents a special issue of *Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal* (CCPS) that focuses on the interconnecting issues related to the competing ideational forces of regional integration and distinctive nationalism within the context of the political and socioeconomic development of mainland China specifically, as well as in comparison with Taiwan. As Professor Samuel C.Y. Ku, director of the Institute of China and Asia-Pacific Studies (ICAPS) at Taiwan’s National Sun Yat-
sen University (NSYSU) and convener of the 2015 Sizihwan International Conference on Asia-Pacific Studies, “Identity and Integration: Competing Dynamics in Asia-Pacific”

, remarks in the convening preamble to the conference, the competition between these two ideational forces “has manifested in the region’s political evolution, economic development, and strategic configuration” which on the one hand call for closer inter-state policy coordination and institutional cooperation, while on the other hand have the region witnessing “the popularization of countervailing demands for demarcation and distinction based upon national, racial, ethnic, and class identities”. The twelve articles featured in this special issue of CCPS, with the exception of the two Special Features and two Policy Comments, represent new versions of selected papers among the many that were originally presented at the said conference, duly revised by incorporating critical peer feedback received at the conference and from other reviewers. This special issue begins with a Prologue by Lowell Dittmer, “China, Southeast Asia, and the United States”, which is based on Professor Dittmer’s keynote address to the conference. In this prologue Dittmer traces Southeast Asia’s historical role as a meeting point between East and South Asia, the beginning of modernization since Western colonialism, Japanese occupation during the Second World War, and the post-WWII dominance of the United States of America in the region and rising influence of the People’s Republic of China which has experienced increasing strategic complications with the enhancing projection of the “ASEAN Way” leading to a “ménage à trios” configuration of the strategic triangle between the US, China and ASEAN.
1.1. China, Asia-Pacific Regional Economic Integration and Cross-Strait Relations

After Professor Dittmer’s prologue, this issue’s first section China, Asia-Pacific Regional Economic Integration and Cross-Strait Relations begins with YuJane Chen’s article, “Asia-Pacific Regional Economic Integration: Coopetition vs. Conflict”, that brings to the fore the struggle between securing economic sovereignty and national economic development, given the differential national economic interests and the needs of protecting domestic industries, in regional trade agreements as a key strategy to attract foreign direct investment and enhance national competitiveness in the global economy with special reference to the context of the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) vs. China-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiations. Her use of the portmanteau “coopetition” (or “coopertition”, a neologism whose origin can be traced back to the second decade of 1900s), in contrast to outright conflict, points to the plausible solution in the form of “cooperative competition” within the framework of regional economic integration, a positive form of competition over benefits produced by cooperation while economic sovereignty is being preserved.

While Chen’s paper looks at the practicalities surrounding especially issues concerning claimed threat to sovereign integrity or national security from regional economic integration arrangements related to TPP and RCEP, the other two articles in this section examine the controversies around the issue of regional economic integration from the perspectives of what can be said to be the most successful of such experiences of integration, the European Union, and the European theories on this issue, with another paper looking at the effect of the Crimean crisis on military balance across the Taiwan Strait.
Wolfgang Pape in his paper, “Economic Integration and National Identity in Northeast Asia: A European Perspective”, delves into the seeming contradictions of the “Asian paradox” of the primarily market-driven and bottom-up regional economic integration (“the warm embraces that businesspeople enjoy”) vs. the almost stalemate among political leaders (projected for public consumption either through the press photo of Shinzō Abe meeting Xi Jinping showing both with grim faces looking astray or the open talk in Tokyo complaining about the “Icy Lady” of Seoul) from the perspective of the EU experience.

Similarly from a European perspective is István Csaba Moldicz’s article, “Integration and Disintegration: European Theories and Experiences in the Light of China-Taiwan Relations”, which analyses the connection between political and economic integration in the cross-strait relations. Taking a close look at the costs and benefits of a small economy and a small democracy and the saliency of security, in particular in the context of the determinants of the costs of the provision of public goods, Moldicz critically examines the recent Western theories of regional integration which show that economic integration does not benefit every partner equally, not only for the European experience, but which could also point to further diverging economic development paths for the two sides of the Taiwan Strait thus leading to weaker and weaker commitment to strengthen political cooperation across the Strait, although according to the neofunctionalist school economic integration would ultimately spill over into political integration. The analysis leads the author to conclude that economic globalisation does not lead Taiwan back to the One-China solution, and more provocatively, as diversity and competition have been the keys to European successes, “Taiwan’s independence would be beneficial for the Greater Chinese Area, not only for Taiwan, but even for China.” While tracing the emphasis on the saliency of security (the sequence of events starting from war making to
hold off competitors, through the acquisition of capital required to wage wars to providing protection) as provided by Charles Tilly in his 1985 thesis “War making and state making as organized crime”\(^2\) back to earlier approaches (e.g., Machiavelli, Bismarck) with “the fear of enemy” argument which inevitably carry era-specific limitations, Moldicz nevertheless affirms the logical validity of Tilly’s argument as protection is expanded beyond military security to other spheres (which Tilly himself referred to in his later work, *Coercion, capital, and European states, AD 990-1990\(^3\)*) that serves to legitimise state-making in today’s world. However, it would be difficult to ignore that the basis of the original argument – that fear is the most effective motive in the formation and unification of a nation – nevertheless stays salient in the context of the rise of Taiwanese nationalism in facing the overshadowing, overbearing and increasingly ominous behemoth across the Strait, and of the rise of Chinese nationalism on the Mainland (as analysed by Jungmin Seo in his paper in the next section of this special issue) in facing what is perceived to be a threatening containment tactic by the US with support from her European and East Asian allies of especially Japan and Taiwan. The interesting perspective provided by Charles Tilly’s thesis especially on the nature of a “racketeer State” will be revisited later in the *Policy Comments* in relation to the nature of the contemporary governance model of the Chinese Communist Party in the light of the tumultuous events that unfolded during the past one year from early 2015 to the first quarter of 2016 that characterised the latest phase of volatile State-civil societal relations in the People’s Republic of China (see also Section 2 to Section 7 of this introductory article).

Also focusing on cross-Strait relations is the last paper of this section, “Crimean Crisis and Military Balance in Asia” by Yongshu Li, which deals with a rarely noticed aspect of the Crimean Crisis – beyond the dynamics among the major players of the crisis, i.e. Ukraine, the EU,
the US and Russia – that the EU, Ukraine and Russia are also major players behind the rise of China in terms of the export of defense products and military hardware to China. Noting that Professor Lowell Dittmer’s classic analog of strategic triangles used for the Cold War context “when amity and enmity were relatively stable with the USSR-US confrontational structure” became less applicable in the post-Cold War, pre-Crimean Crisis era when “the relationship among the EU, China, Russia and Ukraine – or between most states – are dynamic and fluctuant”, Li argues that with China’s intervention in the Crimean Crisis as a pivot, the strategic triangles shift with the crisis which resulted in enmity between Ukraine and Russia, and between the EU and Russia, giving rise to China’s opportunity to act as a pivot in a “romantic triangle”, thus lead to military balancing between China and Japan in East Asia.

The four papers under the section China, Asia-Pacific Regional Economic Integration and Cross-Strait Relations thus bring to the fore the critical linkages between regional economic integration as a crucial component of a nation’s foreign policy agenda and a country’s concern for national security and sovereignty, a highly sensitive issue across the Taiwan Strait given the high level of distrust in cross-Strait relations between the governments of the two polities and the rising nationalisms among the people of the two states that continue to face each other down with a remarkable degree of distaste (e.g., as reflected in a United Daily News poll in September 2015 in which the Mainland Chinese government and people were rated as “bad” rather than “good” by approximately two-to-one margins of 58% to 28% and 51% to 28% respectively, as cited in Cal Clark and Alexander C. Tan’s paper in the next section) after such a long period of political separation from Japanese occupation of Taiwan through the Cold War era to the present.
1.2. Political Governance, Identity and Nationalism: China, Taiwan and the East Asian Experiences

Moving from the wider context of regional economic integration to focus specifically on the domestic sociopolitical environment are three articles under the special issue’s next section, Political Governance, Identity and Nationalism: China, Taiwan and the East Asian Experiences. The complexity of the subject matter involved here, as related particularly to cross-Strait relations, lies to a certain extent in the difference between a nation as a cultural and ethnic entity and a state as a political and geopolitical entity, a difference which can be further seen in terms of a community of people vis-à-vis territorial sovereignty, a biopolitical concept vis-à-vis a geopolitical institution. Among the various usages of the term “state” too - including a territorial concept linked to sovereignty (a body politic), one of the political units composing a federation under a sovereign government, and a supreme public power within a sovereign polity/political entity – a body politic could constitute a nation (a nation-state when nation and state coincide), but it could also be otherwise – the case of a truncated nation, leading to movements of revanchism (to regain lost territories) and irredentism (to acquire territory considered formerly part of the fatherland) as advocated by nationalist and pan-nationalist movements, involving identity politics, and cultural and political geography. While it is apparent that all the above-mentioned elements are pertinent in the relations between currently increasingly authoritarian one-party ruled mainland China and vibrantly democratic Taiwan, we can further question the essence of the nationalistic claims on both sides of the Strait by taking into consideration Benedict Anderson’s thesis of an “imagined community”. In his 1983/1991 thesis, Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism, Anderson defines a nation as a
community socially constructed and ultimately \textit{imagined} by the people who perceive themselves as part of that group and “regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible […] for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings” (Anderson, 1991: 6-7). The sovereignty of a nation-state is imagined, according to Anderson, because the concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm, giving rise to the national dreams of freedom whose gage and emblem were the sovereign state. Similarly, other historicist (in contrast to the primordialists) like Ernest Gellner (1983) and Eric Hobsbawm (1990) also posit that nations and nationalism are products of modernity and have been created as means to political and economic ends, and the nation, assuming the nineteenth-century conceptual entity of a nation-state, is the product of nationalism – but not vice versa – through the unification of various peoples into a common society or community.

Setting the context of this section is Jungmin Seo’s article “Nationalism, Nationalistic \textit{Demos} and Democracy: East Asian Experiences” in which, using the experiences of nationalistic fever in Japan in the 1930s and South Korea in the 1980s to reflect on contemporary Chinese neo-nationalism, starting from the sensational boom of “Say No” publications in the mid-1990s through the world attention-grabbing series of nationalistic \textit{demos}, i.e. demonstrations in support of nationalistic causes or in opposition to infringement on such claims, e.g. the massive street protests in 1999 and 2002 against the US, in 2005 against Japan, in 2008 against France and Carrefour from cyber-protest to product boycott, etc., he foresees that the surge of nationalistic sentiments from the bottom up in the Chinese society is set to pose a
threat to the domestic stability managed by the Chinese Communist Party which continues to monopolise political rule of China by brute force. Questioning the applicability of the Eurocentric perspectives of Benedict Anderson and Eric Hobsbawm which see the nationalist projects of nation-making invariably creating “a homogeneous – either real or fictive – population inspired by a strong sense of belonging to the national community” resulting in “the creation of national subjects who are willing to fight and die for the state that manipulates the symbolism of the nation”, Seo finds that while both the Japanese and Korean states just like their Western counterparts “were eager to produce a homogeneous and loyal population through massive state projects of nation-making”, his study of Japan of the 1930s and South Korea of the 1980s shows “a hidden face of nationalism – the more nationalized, the more rebellious – as the nationalized subjects claimed ownership of the state”. Believing that currently prevailing academic debates centred on the effectiveness of Chinese nationalism, including the expansion of patriotic education and popularisation of anti-Japanese war memories, deeply reflect Euro-centric experiences, in particular those of Nazism and Fascism, his study of the experiences of Japan and South Korea seems to suggest that the only outcome that can be predicted from the surge of nationalism as in today’s China “is the vitiated and weakened state capability to control the ideological realm of the society”. This interesting perspective on changing State capacity will be revisited later in the Policy Comments in a discussion on the “degenerative totalitarian” nature of the Chinese State and its connection with tendencies towards a mode of governance with strengthening features of Fascism (see also Section 2 to Section 7 of this introductory article).

Looking more closely at these issues of national identity and its connection with mode of political governance on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait respectively are the other two papers of this section, Cal
Clark and Alexander C. Tan’s “Identity and Integration as Conflicting Forces Stimulating the Sunflower Movement and the Kuomintang’s Loss in the 2014 Elections” and Alexey Alexandrovich Semenov’s “Development of Democratic Processes in the People’s Republic of China: Prospects of Transformation of the Political Regime”.

Clark and Tan find that while the clash between the need for economic integration with mainland China and a strengthening Taiwanese identity seems to have resulted in the preeminence of the later (even more evident now with the astounding DPP electoral landslide win in the 16th January 2016 elections when DPP’s Tsai Ing-wen was elected president), the mainland Chinese economy retains a major pull in Taiwan and hence the contradictory forces of integration and identity look set to continue to bedevil the island nation. After all, as István Csaba Moldicz highlighted earlier in his paper in the preceding section, the successful cooperation across the Taiwan Strait under the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) that has boosted trade and investment relations since 2011 between the two countries and relying on the rapid mainland Chinese economic growth have undeniably constituted one of the reasons why the island nation had been able to avoid falling into severe economic recession after the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-2009.

While Clark and Tan focus on the sociopolitical development on the Taiwan island, Alexey Alexandrovich Semenov looks at the difficult question concerning the political future of China and the possibility of its democratisation. Given that the Chinese leadership has proclaimed a war on “Western values”, in other words those features that characterise North Atlantic liberal democracies (including tolerance of dissent, a free press and the constitutional separation of powers), Semenov believes that the question of democratisation in China is fully in the hands of the ruling Communist Party. What is at stake, however, extends far beyond
China’s borders, in view of the high level of China’s involvement in the global processes and the East Asian giant’s enormous demographic potential.

Hence, the seven papers under the two sections above taken together provide a critical analysis of the consequential dynamics of the two competing strands of forces: the pushing force of regional integration, and the pulling force of national identity, which Professor Samuel Ku identified in the convening preamble to the 2015 Sizihwan International Conference on Asia-Pacific Studies, the competition between which has underlined the political evolution, economic development, and strategic configuration of the Asia-Pacific region, and more specifically as the focus of this special issue, mainland China and Taiwan.

In addition to the two sections above based on the 2015 Sizihwan International Conference on Asia-Pacific Studies, this special issue also contains two special featured research reports and two policy commentaries.

1.3. Special Featured Reports

The two special featured reports by Hara Fujio and Sun Jingxian take us back to that turbulent era of the early decades following the Communist Party’s conquest of mainland China, and an era during which Southeast Asia was embroiled in sociopolitical upheaval caused by the post-War decolonisation process and the rise of left-wing activism encouraged and supported by the socialist revolutionary movement in China’s civil war and later the newly established Communist Party ruling regime of mainland China under the fervent revolutionary leadership of Chairman Mao, and the Soviet government of Stalinist USSR.

Hara Fujio in his paper, “Literators of the Feng Xia”, studies the complex relationship between two factions of left-wing ethnic Chinese writers in Malaya (the China-oriented vs. the Malaya-oriented) during
the early post-War years. Hara’s research also provides valuable insights into how the rift between these two groups gradually widened and deepened, and how their activities were forced to come to an end through deportation by the colonial authorities – first the Malaya-oriented group regarded as a direct threat to the colonial authorities soon after the proclamation of Emergency in Malaya in 1948, and later the China-oriented faction too by 1950 after the eventual banning of the papers of the China Democratic League (CDL) among whose strong supporters was the well-known overseas Chinese leader and entrepreneur Tan Kah Kee.

In his research report “Population Change during China’s ‘Three Years of Hardship’ (1959-1961)”, Sun Jingxian takes a revisionist stance against the widely accepted view that around thirty million people died of starvation from 1959 to 1961 as a result of Mao Zedong’s disastrous “Great Leap Forward” industrialisation fiasco. Arguing that any research on the famine deaths should not and cannot be separated from the larger context and the discussion of anomalous population change both before and after the Great Leap Forward, Sun analyses the dramatic discrepancies in demographic statistics during those “Three Years of Hardship” and their causes based on the changing patterns of China’s household registration system to gain reliable knowledge of the country’s population changes during that period, and comes up with a revised famine death toll of about 3.66 million. Given the tragic significance of the “Great Leap Forward” in the contemporary history of the rule of the Chinese Communist Party, with the widely accepted death toll estimates ranging from 18 million to over 42 million (or a mid-estimate of around 30 million) which besides mainly deaths from starvation also include millions who were beaten or tortured to death and million others who committed suicide, Sun’s revisionist findings are sure to attract critiques and provoke debates. In the spirit of academic
objectivity, such critiques and debates would of course be warmly welcomed, for as the author emphasises in his paper: “Debating central and related issues would be an excellent way of promoting sound further research.”

1.4. Policy Commentaries

The collection of research articles in this special issue ends with two policy commentaries. Ching Chang in his commentary “The Legal Basis of the People’s Republic of China’s East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone” explores various key legal issues surrounding mainland China’s definition of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) the country proclaimed on 23rd November 2013. Scrutinising three legal decrees adopted by mainland China in the government statement for establishing the East China Sea ADIZ and the subsequent Defense Ministry announcement of aircraft identification rules, Chang finds a failure in the construction of a legal causation relationship between the related legal codes and the establishment of the ADIZ which has led to failure to satisfy the requirements of rule of law generally exercised by the major powers in the international community. While the first policy commentary by Ching Chang focuses on the very specific piece of policy item of the PRC’s proclamation of the East China Sea ADIZ in 2013, the second policy commentary by Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh, “The Writing on the Wall: National and Global Implications of the Ruling Chinese Communist Party’s Domestic and Foreign Policies”, picks up where the subsequent sections of this introductory article leave off and attempts to interpret the PRC’s government policy development with respect to the State’s relations with the civil society since the leadership transition from Hu-Wen to Xi-Li administration by scrutinising a year of unprecedented crackdowns on civil society by the Xi Jinping administration in 2015. To be read in
conjunction with the subsequent sections of this introductory article, Yeoh’s policy commentary, by focusing on the series of events unfolding through 2015 from the arrests of the “Feminist Five” in March, followed by the infamous crackdown on civil rights lawyers that began on 5th July and lasted till August, to the mysterious disappearance of the five owners and staff members of Hong Kong’s Mighty Current publishing company and Causeway Bay bookshop who were only to reemerge in mainland China under the custody of the Chinese authorities, to the unprecedented December crackdown on labour activists, explores the current nature of the governing regime of the Chinese Communist Party, the applicability of Charles Tilly’s concept of a “racketeer State” in this context, the domestic implications of the global reach of China’s economic might and soft power in this regard, and whether China is currently treading a solitary and dangerous path from a “degenerative totalitarian” mode of governance (Hsu, 2003) towards a uniquely repressive capitalist polity essentially Fascist in nature.


While providing a critical analysis of the consequential dynamics of the two competing forces of regional integration and national identity the competition between which has underlined the political evolution, economic development, and strategic configuration of, more specifically as the focus of this special issue, mainland China and Taiwan, as well as cross-Strait relations, it is undeniable that these issues very much depend on the political and socioeconomic development of the demographically, economically and militarily gigantic player, the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Sections 2 to 7 of this introductory article thus aim to
provide an analysis of the latest sociopolitical milieu of the PRC as a backdrop against which the events, issues and problems addressed by the articles in this special issue take place, in terms of both the country’s domestic State-societal relations, her global politico-economic power projection as well as how her international power tour de force is impacting upon her domestic political governance.

2. From Hu-Wen to Xi-Li Administration: Surprising Disillusionment or Teleological Inevitability?

In their cynical take of the teleological hopes invested in the presumed apparent continuous transition of the People’s Republic of China from authoritarianism to liberal democracy just like what went through with her East Asian neighbouring polities, especially South Korea and Taiwan, Dirlik and Prazniak (2012) ask three questions: “First is the relationship to the legacies of the revolution of the Party and the people at large, including many dissidents, which is hardly the one-dimensional relationship it is often assumed to be. Second is the relationship of questions of repression and dissent in the PRC to its structural context within global capitalism […] finally, is there a case to be made that the PRC is better off exploring socialist alternatives in economy, society and politics than emulating models whose future is very much in question, in which case critique should be directed at holding the Party to its promise of socialism rather than its failures to live up to the examples of those who themselves are in retreat from democracy?”

Dirlik and Prazniak’s first two questions can be viewed in an integrated context, for State governance and civil societal response in today’s China are intrinsically inseparable while opponents of the continuing political monopoly of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have increasingly based their challenge upon the mounting
socioeconomic injustice under CCP rule in the post-Mao Zedong 毛泽东 era, in facing the “increasing legitimacy” of the Party’s authoritarian grip following the last more than three decades’ miraculous economic success of the “China model”. This has resulted in a complex situation wherein while the PRC “presently suffers from severe economic and social inequality that may be sustained only by political repression”:

It is frequently overlooked, however, that economic and social inequality are products of the very development policies for which the PRC is widely admired. The ironic consequence is that criticism directed at the PRC for its democratic deficit is more than compensated for by pressures to keep up a pattern and pace of development that gives priority to its functioning within the global system over the economic and political welfare of the population. Indeed, the “China Model” has more than a few admirers who look to it with envy against the “inefficiencies” thrown up by popular pursuit of justice in democratic societies.

(Dirlik and Prazniak, 2012: 287)

Seen in this context, the teleological inevitability implicit in the democracy activists’ claim sounds equally hollow in view of the CCP’s continuing upholding of its now ragtag socialist flag in justifying its “moral obligation” to perpetuate its political monopoly, for as Dirlik and Prazniak argue:

Deepening inequality is a pervasive phenomenon of global neoliberalism, of which the PRC is an integral part. Around the globe the predicament of democracy has set off a dialectic of protest and repression that has further thrown its future into jeopardy in any but a formal sense. Within a global context in which democracy is at risk
and human rights in shambles, what does it mean for the PRC to be moving toward a more democratic regime?

(ibid.)

2.1. Perennial Hope for a Benevolent Autocrat

In an interview by Voice of America just prior to 2014’s June Fourth anniversary, veteran Tiananmen student leader Wang Dan 王丹, who holds both a Master’s degree in East Asian history (2001) and a Ph.D. (2008) from Harvard University, was asked the hypothetical question of what he would tell or wish to tell President Xi Jinping 習近平’s daughter Xi Mingze 習明澤 who was studying at Harvard if he happened to meet the latter. After expressing his lack of personal interest in Xi Mingze, Wang Dan said that, nevertheless, since her father was Xi Jinping, he would hope that she would talk properly to her father about the importance of democracy to the feeling of honour and pride of every Chinese. If Xi Jinping considered himself a Chinese, he should hope that China would be more democratic, and as the daughter of Xi Jinping and also feeling the honour of being a Chinese, added Wang Dan, Xi Mingze should persuade her father not to continue obstructing the tide of history. This would be the only way to enable every Chinese, including Xi Mingze herself, to have the true honour and pride of being a Chinese.5

Counting on a benevolent strongman (China’s millennia-long notion of a mingjun 明君, i.e. “enlightened ruler”) might sound ridiculous in other parts of this modern world, but ironically at least a Chinese Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev who is strong enough to push for real political reforms might just come in handy. Such hope for a closet Gorbachev who could be persuaded to eventually come out to do what is right when the time is ripe (or when the older and more conservative members of the politburo have retired) is real. Without economic crisis, without military defeat, any discretionary decision to move away from
the current one-party authoritarianism towards multi-party competitive liberal democracy could well be coming from a strongman’s personal political will. Nevertheless, contrary to all hopes and dreams of the democracy movement, such initiatives for political reforms, if not bottom-up, would also most likely not be top-down because the objective urgency for such changes simply does not exist at the moment in this rising superpower whose economic (and military) power advancement continues to be the object of both envy and apprehension of the world. In a country full of unprecedented hope of prosperity under a ruling Party that is ruthlessly protective of its absolute, unassailable political monopoly, yet execrately efficient and currently even showing good political will in bringing corruption down to a tolerable level, why should the people at large risk chaos and bloodshed in fighting for a liberal democratic dream that has been seen to turn sour in Russia, Thailand, the Philippines, the Arab world, and even India? Why would the masses still not be contented with this, as Aldous Huxley calls it in his 1946 foreword to *Brave new world* (1932), “welfare-tyranny of Utopia” – a totalitarianism “called into existence by the social chaos […] and developing, under the need for efficiency and stability”? “You pays your money and takes your choice”, shrugs Huxley, metaphorically.⁶

After all, there are “enormous pressures in all human societies to go along”, as the late Roger Joseph Ebert, American historian, journalist, screenwriter and author and the first film critic to win the Pulitzer Prize for Criticism, ruminates, “Many figures involved in the recent [late 2008] Wall Street meltdown have used the excuse, ‘I was only doing my job. I didn’t know what was going on.’ President Bush led us into war on mistaken premises, and now says he was betrayed by faulty intelligence. U.S. military personnel became torturers because they were ordered to. Detroit says it was only giving us the cars we wanted. The Soviet Union functioned for years because people went along. China still does […]
Most people, most of the time, all over the world, choose to go along. We vote with the tribe.”

2.2. “Withinputs” and External Efficacy

With intense repression beginning to target dissidents such as rights-defence lawyer Xu Zhiyong 許志永, founder of the Chinese New Citizens’ Movement (Zhongguo Xin Gongmin Yundong 中國新公民運動) and other human rights lawyers, even early in Xi Jinping’s presidency in 2013 (President Xi assumed office on 15th November 2012, taking over from Hu Jintao 胡錦濤) the liberals in the country have already expressed their disappointment with him and no longer expected that he was going to initiate significant political reforms, mainly due to the circumstances he waded into which his Maoist experience did not prepare him to deal with otherwise. With the intention “to exploit the combat of corruption and serious economic reforms to enhance the Party regime’s legitimacy and his own popularity, he needs to tackle the resistance of strong vested interests and therefore he has to strengthen his own personal control”, notes Professor Joseph Yu-shek Cheng 鄭宇碩 of the City University of Hong Kong (香港城市大學), making Xi want to follow the example of Vladimir Putin and not that of Mikhail Gorbachev, as his critics believe (Cheng, 2014: 339).

Neoinstitutionalist theorists proclaim that government institutions or structures tend to take on lives of their own and shape the behaviour and attitudes of the people within them, especially those who benefit from them. Whimsical optimists, who earlier bet on the long-awaited emergence of leaders free from traditional CCP totalitarian/authoritarian mindset or being closet democrats, now disillusioned with Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang 李克強, may take comfort in such neoinstitutionalist pessimism. This is not something that can be simplistically explained away by applying English historian and politician John Emerich Edward

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Dalberg-Acton (Lord Acton)’s dictum: “Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Great men are almost always bad men.” Modern governments work more like systems with a lot more occurring than simply the processing of outside demands – late Professor David Easton’s “withinputs” construct laying emphasis on pressures from various parts of government. This can be portrayed by shifting the box depicting the political system or conversion process of government decision-makers at the centre of Figure 1 to the left end as the direct recipient of inputs in the form of society’s demands and supports via the feedback loop. In this case, government decisions and actions generated from the box will lead to outputs and then through the conditioning of the social, economic and political environment produce results which give rise to inputs, now positioned at the right end of the diagram, in the form of society’s demands and supports (if we disregard the possible apathy), for the government decision-makers via the feedback loop.

However, while in the case of a one-party authoritarian state like PRC the “black box” of the government conversion process has to remain opaque or completely impenetrable, it does not mean that such government is only talking to itself and completely short-circuiting the feedback loop from the citizens as depicted in Easton’s theory. Economic success and expanding national wealth have enabled the authoritarian one-party State to be seen responsive to the citizens’ economic aspirations – in Easton’s terms, citizens’ demands, at least on the economic side, are recognised by the government decision-makers and processed, through the black box of conversion process into authoritative decisions and actions (“outputs”, in Easton’s terms). While civil societal groups’ assertion of pressures are frowned upon and met with stern government crackdowns, which are increasingly draconian under the Xi Jinping administration, be they upon non-governmental organisation (NGO) leaders, civil rights lawyers or labour activists,
the CCP State has at the same time been observed to be keen in responding to the society’s grievances, not least reflected in the Xi administration’s remarkably bold action against corruption, leading to the observation that this authoritarian State sometimes looks as if higher in external efficacy than that of some vibrant liberal democracies.

2.3. “Seven Dangerous Western Values”

An admirer of Mao, Xi Jinping has upped the ante on his credential as an exemplar leader of a totalitarian regime by shortly after taking over power having his government issuing directives dictating the “correct” pro-CCP ideology that has to be unquestioningly followed by party members, university lecturers, students, researchers and journalists, and
setting limits to discussions among university teachers and in the official media, thus turning “topics including universal values, freedom of the media, civil society, civil rights, independence of the judiciary, the Party’s historical mistakes and the power elite bourgeois class” into taboos, and severely attacking “historical nihilism” which refers to “the denials and criticisms of the Party’s established positions on various historical questions, especially the attacks on Mao and Mao Zedong Thought” (Cheng, 2014: 338). Referred to here are seven dangerous Western values warned of in a confidential internal document known as “Document No. 9” first published in July 2012: 1) constitutional democracy, 2) universal values of human rights, 3) civil society, 4) pro-market neo-liberalism, 5) media independence, 6) historical nihilism, i.e. criticisms of past errors, and 7) questioning the “Reform and Opening” policy, which represent the Xi administration’s tightening of thought control by including new topics that were previously not considered off-limits.

In this repressive atmosphere, civil rights activists and their family members were targeted “for harassment, arbitrary detention, legally baseless imprisonment, torture, and denial of access to adequate medical treatment”9 which, in a most well-known case, tragically led to the death in March 2014 of lawyer and grassroots human rights activist Cao Shunli 曹顺利 who while in detention was denied access to adequate health care even though she was seriously ill until it was too late when she was finally transferred from detention to a hospital.10 On the cyber front, influential weibo 微博 (China’s Internet weblog) bloggers were warned of writing about politics or making statements contradicting official narratives, or risked arrest or even imprisonment under a new law enacted in September 2013 against “defamatory” posts.
2.4. “New Five Black Types” and the Intensification of Repression

In an eye-catching article “Zhongguo zhenzheng de tiaozhan zai nali 中國真正的挑戰在哪裡” [Where lie China’s real challenges?] by Yuan Peng 袁鵬, director of the Institute of American Studies at the Academy of Contemporary International Relations (中國現代國際關係研究院美國所), published on 31st July 2012 in the overseas edition of the Renmin Ribao 人民日報 (People’s Daily), rights-defending lawyers (weiquan lüshi 維權律師), dissidents, recusant underground religious groups (supposed to refer mainly to the unregistered, illegal Catholic and Protestant churches outside the government-sanctioned official/“patriotic” churches), disadvantaged groups and leaders of the netizens are grouped as the five types of people acting as the channels through which the United States is infiltrating China’s grassroots to bring about change from bottom up.11

Besides the timing of the appearance of the article – just prior to CCP’s 18th National Congress – the accusative warning brought back memory of Mao’s “five black types” (hei wu lei 黑五類, i.e. landlords, wealthy peasants, anti-revolutionaries, bad elements and rightists) during the Cultural Revolution and hence the article’s five categories are referred to by some readers as the “new five black types”. The accusation is ominous, and placing civil rights lawyers at the top of the list could be a warning that State repression would be intensified upon those in the legal profession who dare to defend in court those dissidents that the State is going after or to take up civil rights cases against the routine State persecution in the name of weiwen 維穩 (maintaining stability) and hexie 和諧 (“harmony” – the Party-State’s euphemism for censorship and muzzling of dissent). On the other hand, grouping together the different strands of dissent as targets to suppress also reflects a certain degree of concern over the potential threat posed to the
one-party State by a better coalescence of these different strands of dissent to form a common front in the pursuit of some transplanted “velvet” or “jasmine” revolution.

2.5. The Bigger Picture

Indeed, miraculous economic performance and urban modernisation accompanied by uncontrolled widening socioeconomic inequalities and the lack of rule of law (and often “lawless” local governments especially in the cases of the suppression of local civil rights activists and demolition of residential houses to make way for lucrative property development) have characterised the past more than three decades of Chinese development during the market-reform era. The problem is often blamed on Deng Xiaoping’s “Let some people get rich first” directive and the rugged capitalist approach to economic reform. However, as argued by Dirlik and Prazniak (2012), the issue at hand is bigger than just the misconduct of the local cadres or the nature of the political system:

[…] the most widespread causes of discontent – forceful expropriation of agricultural land, widespread dislocation of the population, severe exploitation of labour, social and spatial inequalities, corruption from the top to the bottom of the political structure, urban and rural pollution – are all entangled in the development policies that the PRC has pursued since the 1980s in its quest of “wealth and power” within the context of a neo-liberal global capitalism […] The conversion of land into capital, the creation of a floating labour force available for this process, and the sale of cheap labour power to fuel an export-oriented economy are all aspects of capital accumulation within a globalized capitalist economy. If anything distinguishes the PRC, it is the presence of a sprawling organizational structure put in place by
the revolution that has guaranteed the efficient performance of these processes, with coercion whenever necessary.

(Dirlik and Prazniak, 2012: 295)

Besides, begging the question as to the glory of China’s success in the past decade is the apparent failure in establishing the rule of law under the Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao 胡锦涛 – 溫家寶 administration. The factors at work here could in fact be similar to the reasons why North Korea is so resistant to economic reform (Kim, 2012), for establishing a comprehensive framework of the rule of law could eventually harm the self-declared legitimacy of one-Party rule, jeopardise the wenwen efforts, and destabilise the sociopolitical status quo that the CCP State’s single-mindedness in pursuing greater economic prosperity, sometimes dubbed “GDPism”, has so far succeeded to maintain. An example, besides “evil laws” and hostile institutional arrangements, is “the naked violence of the State Security Division of the police, political police specialised in the suppression of political enemies of the Party[, who] are given extra-legal powers to keep their targets under round-the-clock surveillance, and even engage in kidnapping and physical assault on their targets, some of whom include rights defense lawyers” (Feng, Hawes and Gu, 2012: 331):

Many rights defence lawyers have become victims of these “evil laws” and hostile institutional arrangements. More often than not, the cases represented by rights defence lawyers are those sensitive cases avoided by ordinary lawyers and it is almost impossible for the rights defence lawyers and their clients to win the cases of this nature. Worse still, many defence lawyers representing those sensitive cases have been turned into defendants themselves by the state procurators on the charges [of] fabricating evidence, leaking state secrets or inciting
subversion of state power [...] And in the most recent government pre-emptive strike on Middle Eastern-style protests in connection with an online call to gather in public places – the so-called Jasmine Spring of 2011 – rights lawyers have again become major targets of intimidation and abuse.

(ibid.)

Zhang Wei 張煒, a senior research fellow at University of Nottingham’s China Policy Institute, in an interview by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) in 2012, rejected the popular claim that the Hu-Wen administration was responsible for the past decade of China’s unprecedented economic growth which he attributed instead to the economic reforms arduously engineered by earlier leaders in the 1980s and 1990s whose cumulative benefits were being reaped later by the Hu-Wen administration. On the contrary, the Hu-Wen administration were characterised in the past decade by its lack of any substantial reforms in economic or political institutions, as well as by the most draconian State control of society including the worst repression on civil rights activists and press freedom since the 1980s, which as Dirlik and Prazniak observe, combined to contribute to the complication of the overall problem of repression and dissent in the PRC:

Despite state pretensions to legality, the “crimes” for which intellectuals such as Ai Weiwei, Chen Guangcheng and Liu Xiaobo have been harassed, condemned, incarcerated and tortured (sometimes to death, as in the recent case of Li Wangyang) do not go beyond testing the limits of restrictive laws and even greater restrictiveness in their application. Restrictions on speech supposedly guaranteed by the PRC’s own constitution are routine practice. Unemployed peasant workers are employed by the authorities to provide round-the-clock
surveillance of victims whose only crime is to transgress against what the authorities deem the limits of speech or to pursue justice in the courts. The Party does not hesitate to resort to thuggery in order to enforce arbitrary restrictions. It is little wonder that the internal security budget of the PRC is larger than its defense budget.

(Dirlik and Prazniak, 2012: 288)

Far from being comparable with earlier leaders like Deng Xiaoping or even Jiang Zemin 江泽民 and Zhu Rongji 朱镕基 in terms of reform efforts, according to Zhang Wei, the Hu-Wen administration are directly responsible for the acute social contradictions resulted especially from spiraling income and wealth disparities. This would not come as a surprise, as Dirlik and Prazniak remind us “that most of the criticism[s] directed against the PRC for its ‘socialist’ failures overlooks the fundamental national interest that guides the Communist regime’s domestic and foreign policies, including the repressive exploitation of its own population in the name of development and security.” (ibid.: 293, italics added)

2.6. “Rule of Law” = “Rule of the Party”?  

It would not be from a balanced perspective if all these aberrations and inhuman consequences of GDPism are blamed on State-business collusion and corruption, and the local governments’ weiwén overdrive. After all, many cash-trapped and debt-ridden local governments might have no choice but to heavily rely on developmental projects for their revenues in this vast polity said to be the world’s most economically decentralised country where the centre expects relative self-sufficiency of the local economy whether at the provincial level or the county level and the local governments are expected to be fully responsible for the launching and coordination of local reforms, for local economic
development, and for legislation and law enforcement within their respective jurisdictions. Putting such context together with the country’s acute interlocal and interregional economic disparity, it will not be surprising to see inhuman forced demolitions becoming the rule of the day to make way for lucrative property development, or even manufacturing and mining ventures with little regard for human lives, labour rights and environmental consequences. Under such circumstances, these State actions of course unavoidably need to be coercive, leading to protests and resistance from the affected masses, which in turn lead to more repression in the name of weiwen including kidnappings, beatings, lock-ups and even murders, in the harsh environment of a legal system hostile and harmful not only to the rights defense movements but also the rights defense lawyers:

There are notorious “evil laws” against lawyers on the books, in particular against those perceived to be rights defence lawyers. In the Criminal Procedure Law, there are discriminatory provisions imposing onerous limitations on lawyers in meeting with their clients, accessing evidence, and investigating facts. The Criminal Law includes broad and vague provisions about “state secrets” that have been cited to prevent lawyers from investigating and obtaining a whole range of evidence. Most notorious is Article 306 of the Criminal Law with regards to “fabricating evidence”, which makes lawyers’ position disturbingly precarious and has been arbitrarily used to charge hundreds of lawyers in general and convict many high profile rights defence lawyers in particular.

(Feng, Hawes and Gu, 2012: 330)

While the Fourth Plenary Session of the 18th Party Congress held in October 2014 will probably go down in the history of the PRC as the
first time for a Party session to centre on strengthening the rule of law – according to the official Xinhua News Agency, “to speed up the construction of governance by law from the top level and by improving the system to promote social justice of the country”15, the Global Times ( 球時報, a daily Chinese tabloid under the auspices of the Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily)) reminded its readers “that the rule of law should only be advanced by the rule of the Party and there are CPC fundamentals that should not be overridden”16, or to put it more bluntly, that the Communist Party of China, like the Sons of Heaven in the Chinese imperial dynasties, is above the rule of law.

The labour activism blog Chuang 門, in its analysis of the 3rd December 2015 crackdown on worker’s groups17, somehow sees this development as still an encouraging sign:

[…] in the way the law is being used in this crackdown, we see an attempt to set a legal precedent for repression and enhance a certain rule of law, rather than an unlawful abuse of state power, such as the conventional beating or disappearing of activists without legal procedures […] We thus regard it as significant and necessary to explain why the state has now bothered to conduct extensive investigations into these activists in order to build legal cases against them. The reasons behind this may include the activists’ refusal to stop their workers-support activities after being beaten up, or the state’s desire to create a highly visible precedent, sending out a loud and clear message that certain forms of labor activism are illegal – or may run the risk of being treated as such. In any case, it is important to mark the difference between these legal charges and the mere hiring of thugs.
Panyu Dagongzu Service Center（番禺打工族服务部） staffer Zeng Feiyang 曾飛洋, a former corporate lawyer-turned grassroots labour organiser – who was among the seven workers-activists detained in the unprecedented December 2015 crackdown in Guangdong Province\(^{18}\) on some of China’s most effective independent labour organisations known as worker centres – has already earlier been, following his assistance in coordinating a major strike at a Guangdong shoe factory in late 2014, attacked by unidentified assailants in addition to his arrest and being threatened by police. Another activist among those arrested, Peng Jiayong 彭家勇 of the Panyu-based Laborer Mutual Aid Group（劳动者互助小组）, was earlier assaulted by eight unidentified men and severely injured in April 2014.\(^{19}\)

The Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions’ online petition, signed by numerous human-rights groups and European and Asian labour organisations, warns that while the Chinese government “purports to advance the ‘rule of law’ within its borders and promotes the idea of a civilised and peaceful rise internationally […]”, local governments abuse their power, using violence and arrests to repress and intimidate labour organisations, preventing Chinese workers from pursuing fundamental labour rights.”\(^{20}\) While such crackdowns and harassments can be blamed on the local government-business-underworld collusion, it is difficult to believe that these clampdowns are not having tacit endorsement or even planned from the higher level of government, which serves to expose the hypocrisy of CCP government’s “socialist rule of law with Chinese characteristics” pledge at the party’s 2014 annual plenum that ended on 23rd October, the CCP Central Committee promised to be implemented by 2020.
2.7. Assault on Independent Unionisation

With labour unrest in China’s industrialising south spreading like wildfire lately – the Hong Kong 香港-based watchdog group China Labour Bulletin (中國勞工通訊, founded in 1994 by labour activist and post-1989 Beijing massacre exile Han Dongfang 韓東方) reported labour protest incidents in Guangdong spiking from 23 in July to 56 in November 201521 – the independent labour activists’ attempt at independent unionisation of such “work centres” has become such a thorn in the CCP government’s side while the Party is struggling to maintain its tight Fascist Francoesque corporatist control22 over labour through the management-aligned official union system. The latter, in the form of the government-run union apparatus, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), typically serves to neutralise disputes on management’s behalf and in cases of worker uprising, such as the massive Yue Yuen 裕元 shoe factory strikes in 2014, acts to co-opt workers’ industrial action to help the authorities to quash the workers’ protests. As Hong Kong-based labour scholar Anita Chan succinctly put it, “the [official union] doesn’t do anything” to promote workers’ interests23, but that is exactly a major, indispensable part of the Fascist corporatist agenda.

It is in this environment that the “work centres” serve to actively help workers to bypass the official trade union entirely and organise strikes and protests themselves in pursuit of better pay and conditions and to get redress over unpaid wages, factory closures, mergers and relocations especially when the new phenomenon of “precarisation” besetting the working class spreads as the predicament of the “proletariat” now declines further into that of the “precariats” (Standing, 2011). In China these victims of “precarity” are particularly exemplified by the million of mingong 民工 (formerly known as nongmingong 農民
the rural-to-urban migrant labour who are increasingly habituated, as Guy Standing points out in his 2011 book, *The precariat: The new dangerous class*, to expecting and living as urban factory workers who were unstable and unregulated, at times being exploited by capital if they found employment, at times being excluded completely by capital if they did not. In other words, the “China Model” miracle of rapid development has been built upon what a critic called “low human rights advantage” and on exploitation of workers in the name of socialism:

Despite the ideological and organizational particularities of the PRC that are products of its revolutionary history, the accumulation of capital over the last three decades have been marked by class formations and relationships characteristic of the “primitive accumulation” of capital elsewhere. The distinction of the regime, derivative of its claims to socialism, is almost total control of resources, including labour, which under this “workers’ state” is not allowed to represent itself because it is already represented by the “socialist” regime.

(Dirlik and Prazniak, 2012: 296)

And this exploitation, like that described towards the end of George Orwell’s political satire *Animal farm* (1945), is conducted with the complicity of global capital:

Domestic accumulation has been achieved through the conversion of land into capital, in the process releasing huge amounts of cheap and controlled labour-power that then was put to use in the construction of cities, infrastructure projects, and industries. This labouring population also provided the workers and large numbers of women in export production financed by foreign and domestic capital that would
make China into the “factory of the world”, and a major depository of global capital.

(Dirlik and Prazniak, 2012: 296)

Hence, the present crackdown simply reveals the dilemma of CCP’s goal of holding on to its political monopoly by relying on an obedient workforce to support its over-riding priority of high growth and semblance of prosperity in order to continue sustaining its performance-based legitimacy. Crackdown on the “worker centres” thus becomes necessary.

2.8. From “Feminist Five” to “Guangdong Six”: A New Modus Operandi?

The December crackdown on labour activists was the culmination of a year of the CCP regime’s war on China’s civil society kicked off with the arrests of the “Feminist Five” (women’s rights activists Zheng Churan 鄭楚然, Wei Tingting 韋婷婷, Li Tingting 李婷婷, Wu Rongrong 武竣竣 and Wang Man 王曼) in March 2015 in Beijing 北京, Guangzhou 廣州, Hangzhou 杭州 and Yunnan 雲南. While the five were later released, a number of anti-discrimination organisations related to Yirenping 益仁平, the anti-discrimination organisation in which some of the Feminist Five had been involved, were investigated in May and June and some leaders were detained while Yirenping itself was declared illegal by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in April. Many other NGOs were also harassed and asked to cancel their registrations. Also in May and June cases of the dissidents Jia Lingmin 賈靈敏 and Tang Jingling 唐荆陵 consecutively went to trial and another dissident Wu Gan 吳淦 and some petitioners from Shandong were detained. These were followed by the infamous crackdown on civil rights lawyers that began on 5th July and lasted till
August. There was a hiatus from August to October 2015, the months that saw the 3rd September military parade in Beijing to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the end of the Pacific war (i.e. the Japanese invasion) and CCP leaders’ state visits to US and Europe. Then the relative calm was broken by the unprecedented crackdown on labour activists with the arrest of the “Guangdong Six”25 in December.

As a critic describes:

It is as if someone is cleaning out their house and takes a momentary break to visit some friends. He puts down whatever he is doing and closes the door (human rights lawyers were not allowed to leave the country during this time), and leaves the house. After fulfilling his social obligations, he returns home and with one hand, sets his automated machine to the “clean” function, and with the other hand, throws out the pre-packed garbage.26

And in what looks like a throwback to the times of the imperial dynasties:

The authorities treat the country simply as their home, diminishing any distinction between governance of a country, and ownership of a home […] Such a regime disposes of anything or anybody that displeases or contradicts it. The terrifying reality is that such a regime appears limitless, given that it gets rid of anything that threatens its stability and security.

Civil rights organizations, independent research institutes, anti-discrimination organizations, human rights lawyers and grassroots activists have been swept away. Now, it is time for the labor organizations to be attacked. Soon enough, the government will have its clean slate.27
Ever since the cases related to Hong Kong’s “Umbrella Movement” (the November 2014 trial of Xie Wenfei 謝文飛 and Wang Mo 王默, supporters of the Hong Kong “Umbrella Movement” who were arrested with several others on charges of “inciting subversion of state power”), it has been observed that the authorities seem to have changed their modus operandi from a “stabilisation” (維穩模式) strategy whereby the local authorities decided their own course of action, to one of “national security” (國安模式) whereby the central government began to centralise coordination of the whole country’s security measures.28

2.9. Leninist Fascist Corporatism

With the continuing economic downturn expectedly increasing the likelihood of worker struggles, workers’ self-organised collective bargaining outside the control of the CCP-sanctioned official union is obviously deemed dangerous to CCP’s well-planned Francoesque Fascist “vertical trade unionism”. The concept of “vertical trade union” was a creation of Francoism in 1940 inspired by the ideas of José Antonio Primo de Rivera according to whom class struggle would be ended by grouping together workers and company owners based on corporative principles, thus creating the sole legal trade union which was under government control, while other unions were forbidden and repressed along with political parties outside the ruling regime of the Fascist Franquist state. It is not difficult to discern a parallel in today’s Leninist Fascist corporatist politico-economic structure maintained by the post-Mao CCP regime in China under the euphemism “market socialism with Chinese characteristics”.

The Chinese working class movement blog Chuang in late December 2015 published an analysis of the 3rd December crackdown.29 Firstly, Chuang notes the unprecedented nature of the crackdown in the
number of workers’ organisations and individuals targeted at the same time – five worker-support organisations being raided on 3rd December 2015 and the following days, and at least 40 of their staff, affiliated workers and family members taken in for questioning – and in the severity of criminal charges brought against half a dozen of them who later remained in custody that “could result in lengthy prison sentences, setting a legal precedent for more intense repression in the future”. Chuang sees the arrests as the latest in a series of suppressions of workers’ groups and more broadly civil societal movement in general, exemplified by the crackdown on the New Citizens’ Movement, that has intensified since the 2012 CCP leadership transition, and this unprecedented repression on worker-support organisations represents “part of a dual strategy also attempting to integrate some of those oppositional forces, and to channel popular discontent into institutions it can control, such as the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) and affiliated ‘social work’ centers”.

2.10. Socioeconomic Determinants

Chuang highlights these worker-support organisations’ increasing focus on “political” issues – rather than targeting just individual private employers for wage demands, they are increasingly targeting also the State in struggles regarding social insurance and the outsourcing arrangements of local state services such as sanitation – that the government finds more threatening than merely economic matters as an explanation for the intensification of repression. However, Chuang further points out that the crucial determining factors were actually the slowing of economic growth in China (as well as globally) and industrial relocation away from the Pearl River Delta, a region that witnessed growing worker militancy with the number of recorded strikes doubling from over 1,000 in year 2014 to over 2,000 in year 2015, according to
the Hong Kong-based China Labour Bulletin, and those in Guangdong doubling just within five months between July and November of 2015 mainly “in the manufacturing sector with workers demanding payment of wages in arrears etc. after factory closures, mergers and relocations”. These occurred with the new economic realities that saw the country experiencing growth of merely 6.9 per cent for the full year of 2015, just below the government’s target of 7 per cent, which represented the weakest performance since 1990 when foreign investment shrivelled after the 1989 deadly crackdown in Beijing. The Chinese economy grew just at 6.8 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2015 – the lowest quarterly expansion since the global financial crisis in 2009.

Placed in a broader context, Chuang notes the similarities between this increasing repression in China and developments elsewhere recently:

More directly comparable to China’s crackdown on labor activists is the recent charging of South Korea’s union federation leader with “subversion.” This was in response to protests against state reforms of the labor law, and against the rewriting of history schoolbooks attempting to whitewash Korea’s history of state repression and popular resistance. Meanwhile, in response to the Euro-crisis and struggles in Greece, the EU has imposed a technocratic redefinition of “democracy” itself. And in the historical heartland of liberal democracy, the UK is preparing a new set of laws dismantling traditional rights of workers to strike and operate through unions. As in China, these governments’ responses have occurred in the context of tightening economic conditions, making it difficult for them to simply buy consent from the protesters.
Also, the problem is in fact more general than just an urban phenomenon. In terms of the participants’ profiles, while at the beginning the people involved in the “mass incidents” which are proliferating in an exploding proportion were mainly xiagang 下岗 workers\(^{32}\) and peasants (reflecting land loss and corruption issues) but later on the list of participants expanded to include, besides xiagang workers and peasants who lost their lands, also workers, urban residents, getihu 個體戶 (private individual enterprise owners), teachers, students and a small number of ex-servicemen and cadres, etc. (Hu, Hu, He and Guo, 2009: 143), thus reflecting expanding and deepening popular interest conflicts and contradictions.

The changing and expanding class structure is not only a society-wide phenomenon but also occurring within the particular social class itself, thus making the grievances of the class-within-class even more acute. Such is the inevitable consequence of a lopsided development which while having created an urban middle class evident of developmental success and managed successfully to feed the country’s huge population, with “the second largest economy in the world, the PRC nevertheless ranks among the world’s poorest countries in terms of per capita GDP” and has most of the wealth being “concentrated in the hands of the top 20 per cent of the population, but especially the top one per cent [while the] rural population which is still the majority languishes as agriculture is commercialised, with increasing participation from agribusiness” (Dirlik and Prazniak, 2012: 297). Regarding the last point, John Donaldson and Forrest Zhang give an incisive classification of China’s farmers today into five categories based on their role as direct producers and their class relations with the agribusinesses – “commercial farmers” who work independently on allocated family land; “contract farmers” who work on allocated family land to fulfill company contracts, whose harvests are sold to the
contracting companies, and while being dominated by the companies manage to retain some flexibility; “semi-proletarian farmers with Chinese characteristics”, mainly hired villagers who work on collective land rented to companies as company employees, whose harvests belong to the company, and while being dominated by the companies manage to enjoy a degree of entitlement; “semi-proletarian farm workers”, mainly hired migrant labourers who work on company land as company employees, whose harvests belong to the companies, and while being dominated by the companies do have family land at home as a fall-back option; and “proletarian farm workers”, mainly hired landless labourers who work on company land as company employees, whose harvests belong to the companies, and who, unlike the other four categories, suffer from complete domination by the companies (Donaldson and Zhang, 2015: 57, Table 1). On the other hand, on the urban front,

[...] the population is being crammed into “megacities” beset with problems of pollution, traffic, and the yet unpredictable toll on the population of life under such circumstances. The working population is still subject to abuse at the hands of domestic and foreign corporations. Workers fight back, needless to say, and the second generation of peasant-workers are less amenable to exploitation and prejudice than their parents. Much of the repressive apparatus of the state is directed to keeping under control, with violence if necessary, protests against inequality, exploitation, unjust plunder of public resources, rights to land in particular, and environmental pollution. State terrorism against these protests includes incarceration, torture and outright murder of their leaders, with similar treatment meted out to intellectuals and lawyers who throw in their lot with popular protests.

(Dirlik and Prazniak, 2012: 297)
With the ruling one-party state facing such mounting social challenges, to believe that extra-legal repression, which *Chuang* admits being such a common practice in China since time immemorial, will now be a matter of the past would be highly misguided probably for the simple reason that it provides such convenience for the ruling regime – witness the recent case of the disappearance of the Causeway Bay Five.

3. **“Causeway Bay Five”: The Curious Case of Disappearing Publishers and Book Distributors**

On 13th November 2015, Thailand’s military junta government put China’s exiled dissident cartoonist Jiang Yefei 姜野飛, dissident and human rights activist Dong Guangping 董廣平 and Gui Minhai 桂民海, a Hong Kong publisher of books critical of the Chinese government, on a plane chartered by the Chinese government and deported them to China. For the vast Hong Kong people who are seeing the daily erosion of civil liberties and political freedoms after the ”Handover” to the “motherland” in 1997, the Thai military junta government’s complicity with the Chinese authorities in kidnapping Gui Minhai to mainland China is particularly ominous. When Gui Minhai, the China-born Swedish national and co-owner of the Mighty Current publishing company (巨流出版社) and shareholder of the Causeway Bay Books (銅鑼灣書店, owned by Mighty Current since 2014), known for selling books critical of the Chinese government including those published by Mighty Current, failed to return from a holiday in Thailand’s beach resort town of Pattaya in October 2015, he was the fourth person linked to the company who had disappeared in that same month. The other three disappeared in southern China were Mighty Current’s general manager and shareholder Lui Por 呂波 (who logged in for the last time onto the Causeway Bay Books’ computer on 14th October before his disappearance – some sources later reported his being taken away in
Shenzhen 深圳 on 15th October), Mighty Current’s sales manager Cheung Chi-ping 张志平 (who went missing in Dongguan 東莞) and Causeway Bay Books’ manager Lam Wing-kei 林榮基 (founder of the bookstore in 1994 who sold the bookstore to Mighty Current in 2014, who was last seen in Hong Kong on 23rd October before his disappearance; his wife filed a missing persons report with the Hong Kong police on 5th November, but some sources later reported his arrest in Shenzhen on 24th October). Then on 1st January 2016, Choi Ka-ping 蔡嘉蘊 (who is one of the three shareholders of Mighty Current), the wife of the Causeway Bay Books’ major shareholder Paul Lee (or Lee Bo 李波), claimed that her husband had gone missing. Paul Lee, who holds British and Hong Kong dual nationality, was reported last seen in Hong Kong at 5 p.m. on 30th December 2015 at the bookstore’s warehouse which he is in charge of. Although Lee Bo is not the most important among the five from Mighty Current/Causeway Bay who mysteriously disappeared, his case has managed to turn the disappearances into a cause célèbre because he definitely did in fact go missing in Hong Kong (see Figure 2) which raised the dreaded spectre of the CCP regime having finally crossed the line drawn by the “one country, two systems” agreement and made cross-border arrests of Hong Kong-based dissidents.

3.1. State Gangsterism and White Terror

There has been a recent precedent, though. Another Hong Kong-based publisher, Sichuan-born Yiu Man-tin 姚文田, chief editor of Hong Kong’s Morning Bell Press (晨鐘出版社) that frequently publishes books banned by China, who was about to release a book about President Xi Jinping, was reportedly “lured” to Shenzhen in October 2013, detained and sentenced in May 2014 to 10 years’ imprisonment for smuggling by a Chinese court.
Figure 2 Mighty Current and Causeway Bay Disappearances

(1) 14th October 2015 – Mighty Current publishing company’s general manager Lui Por logged in for the last time onto the Causeway Bay Books’ computer before his disappearance (and some sources later reported him being arrested in Shenzhen, Guangdong Province, China, on 15th October).

(2) 15th or 22nd October 2015 – Mighty Current publishing company’s business manager Cheung Chi-ping went missing in Dongguan, Guangdong Province, China.

(3) 17th October 2015 – Gui Minhai, co-owner of the Mighty Current publishing company and shareholder of the Causeway Bay Books, went missing while vacationing in Pattaya, Thailand.

(4) 23rd October 2015 – Causeway Bay Books’ manager Lam Wing-kei was last seen in Hong Kong before his disappearance and his wife filed a missing persons report with the Hong Kong police on 5th November (but some sources later reported he being arrested in Shenzhen on 24th October).

(5) 30th December 2015 – Causeway Bay Books’ shareholder Paul Lee (Lee Bo) went missing in Hong Kong.
Facing expressions of concern from the United States and United Kingdom over the suspected Chinese kidnapping of the Hong Kong publishers and book distributors, Beijing remained intransigent, stating that “all Hong Kong affairs belong to China’s internal matters that not any foreign countries have a right to intervene” which in a way looks like admitting that the disappearance of the Hong Kong publishers and booksellers was the work of its agents, marking the regress of the regime from what some term “degenerative totalitarianism”36 to a form of quasi-Fascist racketeer governance37.

This was further confirmed by the Chinese government media *Global Times* which published an article by its commentator Shan Renping 翟仁平 in the early hours of 4th January 2016 accusing enemies of China of trying to exploit the issue to vilify China as violating the “one country, two systems” agreement. However, it is most important to note that the article calls for a reflection of what the Causeway Bay Books has been doing which consists of almost solely publishing and selling political books related to mainland China many of which being tabloid-style publications containing maliciously made-up contents amounting to severe defamation. The article continues its vitriolic attack by accusing the Causeway Bay Books (which has one third of the market share of such “banned books” in Hong Kong) of thriving on creating chaos in mainland Chinese society by supplying “banned books” to mainland China, taking advantage of the increasing number of mainland citizens entering Hong Kong after the 1997 “Handover” who have the opportunity to buy the “banned books” and bring them back to the mainland. By essentially intervening in mainland affairs, damaging the great interest of mainland China in maintaining stability and harmony, the article condemns, it seems like the Causeway Bay Books is deliberately creating a grey area between Hong Kong and mainland China to profit through confrontational politics.
3.2. The Making of White Terror

The mystery of the disappearing publishers and book distributors afflicting Mighty Current and Causeway Bay has started to have a chilling effect, in the form of “White Terror”, upon other booksellers in Hong Kong. Hong Kong’s Apple Daily (蘋果日報) reported that the PageOne bookstore (葉壹堂) at Hong Kong Airport had begun to stop selling books banned by the CCP regime, and in fact not only its airport outlet but all PageOne bookstores in Hong Kong had stop selling such books. In fact, with increasing pressure on every stage of production of these “banned books”, from author to publisher to distributor including increasing costs and rentals, maintaining their market has been facing a lot of difficulties especially since 2015, and the disappearance of the Causeway Bay owners and staff could just act as the last straw that broke the camel’s back. Admittedly, many of these “banned books”, including juicy political gossip books and exposés on Chinese leaders, are full of tabloid-style sensationalism with doubtful credibility, but there is an even larger proportion of books in bookshops like Causeway Bay which are serious political, historical and social studies on the PRC and these are also books banned by China. However, 2015, even other than the White Terror instilled by the five disappearances, has not been a kind year for distributors of such books. With China strengthening her custom checks on banned books, previously good sales of such books to information-hungry mainland tourists have dropped drastically as many such tourists no longer dare to buy those books and bring them back to the mainland. Greenfield Bookstore (田園書屋), the major distributor of such books, under rental pressure, was forced to shut down one of its two warehouses on the last day of 2015.

Following Lui Por’s “release on bail” and return to Hong Kong in the later part of March 201638, Paul Lee also returned to Hong Kong on 24th March. Interviewed by the Hong Kong media, Lee said that over
the three months when he was in China ("not being kidnapped", as he reiterated, "but back to the Mainland to assist investigation"), he was deeply impressed by the "great prosperity and strength of the Fatherland" and felt "proud to be a Zhongguoren 中國人 (i.e. a Chinese national)". He also promised that he would "no longer engage in the publication and distribution of rumour-mongering books" in the future and urged anyone who was still doing so to stop doing that.39

As Nicholas Bequelin, Amnesty International's East Asia regional director, put it, the once free-wheeling Hong Kong is today being gradually asphyxiated. According to the Reporters Sans Frontières’ latest World Press Freedom Index released in February 2016 (to be officially published on 20th April), Hong Kong’s press freedom has dropped by a drastic 52 places during the past 13 years, from number 18 in 2002 to today’s number 70 among 180 countries and regions.40

By 5th February 2016, with Beijing’s finally confirming three more of the disappeared Mighty Current/Causeway Bay’s owners and staff – Lui Por, Cheung Chi-ping and Lam Wing-kei – in addition to Gui Minhai were in fact in its custody41, this latest action by the CCP regime while rather unprecedented would represent a further political strangling after a series of replacement of newspaper editors and columnists and exerting of pressure on publishing houses after Beijing was angered by the Occupy Central campaign a.k.a. Umbrella Movement that broke out in September 2014. As six thousand people took to the streets of Hong Kong on 10th January 2015 demanding to know the whereabouts of the five missing people and over 500 publishers, writers, booksellers and members of the public signed an online petition pledging to “not fear the white terror and uphold the principle of publication freedom”, Bao Pu 鮑濮，who in 2009 published the posthumous secret memoirs of Zhao Ziyang 趙紫陽, told Reuters ominously, “Nobody is safe in Hong Kong now.”42 Neither are the dissidents safe outside Hong Kong as the
tentacles of the White Terror reach far and wide. In Thailand where Gui Minhaim was snatched, Chinese dissidents who were in exile told reporters in February that they were in fear of returning to where they were staying lest they should meet the same fate as that of at least four Chinese dissidents there who recently either disappeared (presumably snatched off the streets by Chinese agents) or were arrested “… only to resurface back in China in the custody of the government”.43 China has indeed been going global not only in her trade and investments but also in her pursuit of critics with the complicity of foreign governments tantalised by lucrative trade and investment relations with China.

Also as part of the ominous development of encroachment on freedom of expression and spreading of White Terror in Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Journalists Association claimed that reporters faced an “unprecedented” number of assaults during 2014’s pro-democracy rallies,44 an increasingly worrying pattern since the triad-style savage knife attack on Kevin Lau Chun-to 劉進圖, the replaced editor-in-chief of Ming Pao 明報, earlier in the year.

3.3. “The Confession of the Accused”

In a development chillingly reminiscent of the Moscow Trials of the Stalin era (the Zinoviev-Kamenev, Pyatakov-Radek and Bukharin-Rykov public show trials between 1936 and 1938), in mid-January 2016 Gui Minhai was paraded on China state television CCTV weeping and saying that he had returned to China to surrender to police 11 years after fleeing a fatal drink driving incident and urging Stockholm not to intervene, adding that: “Although I now hold the Swedish citizenship, deep down I still think of myself as a Chinese. My roots are in China.”45

In March 1938, in the trial of the 21 who were alleged to belong to the so-called "Bloc of Rightists and Trotskyites" led by Nikolai Bukharin (Никола́й Буха́рин), Bukharin in his last plea cryptically spoke of the
Hegelian “unhappy consciousness” and the threat of Fascism (ostensibly the degeneration into something akin to a kulak praetorian fascism, in Bukharin’s exact words), adding, as cryptically, that “the confession of accused is not essential. The confession of the accused is a medieval principle of jurisprudence.”\(^46\) In response to Gui Minhai’s paraded “confession”, Nicholas Bequelin, Amnesty International’s East Asia regional director, tweeted, “A very elaborate script, and a skillful mix of truths, half-truths and outright lies.”\(^47\) Get ready for more: there has even been an earlier report that the Hong Kong deputy to the National People’s Congress talked on 5th January 2016 of receiving information from a friend that the Causeway Bay five were in fact arrested while visiting prostitutes in the mainland\(^48\), while by mid-February Hong Kong media were reporting an exclusive coverage by BowenPress (博聞社) that according to latest sources in the PRC, Lee Bo could be jailed for up to 10 years over blackmailing charges\(^49\). If these rumours were true, later development shows that these tactics were probably dropped as the accusations were simply too unsubstantiated and unconvincing.

On 29th February, Lui Por, Cheung Chi-ping and Lam Wing-kei finally appeared in clips shown on Phoenix Satellite Television confessing their “role in assisting others committing crimes” of smuggling illicit books into China and expressing personal remorse.\(^50\) While Gui Minhai confessed that he had “explored ways to circumvent official inspections in China” in his television interview on 28th February, Cheung Chi-ping, Lui Por and Lam Wing-kee blamed their company’s illicit book trade on Gui in their television interviews.\(^51\) Lee Bo also appeared on Phoenix on the same day insisting that he had not been abducted by mainland authorities but instead had gone to the mainland of his own accord. “Many have sensationalised my British citizenship and have complicated the situation,” said Lee Bo, “so I have decided to give up my British citizenship.”\(^52\)
4. The Assault on Rights-defence (Weiquan) Lawyers

While the uncanny disappearance of dissident Hong Kong publishers and book distributors continued to attract the world’s attention at the beginning of the new year, January 2016 also saw further development in the regime’s unprecedented nationwide sweep of civil rights lawyers, during which hundreds of lawyers were detained, which began on 9th July 2015. Dozens of rights-defense lawyers and their associates later remained detained and some 38 lawyers and activists associated with the Beijing Fengrui law firm (北京锋锐律师事务所), which has been handling many weiquan (rights-defending) cases that the government deemed sensitive (including several high-profile clients, such as the ethnic Uyghur dissident scholar Ilham Tohti), have since remained under “residential surveillance”, many of them incommunicado and in unknown locations, according to the New York-based Human Rights Watch (HRW).

On 8th January 2016 two lawyers Zhou Shifeng 周世锋 and Wang Quanzhang 王全璋 and a legal assistant Li Shuyun 李胜勇 were formally arrested on the charge of state subversion or inciting state subversion.53 In China such formal arrest would usually lead to a trial and conviction by the country’s ruling Communist Party-controlled courts. On the same day, Beijing rights-defense lawyer Xie Yanyi 谢燕益, who was detained on 12th July 2015, was also formally arrested in Tianjin 天津, and another Fenrui law firm lawyer Xie Yang 谢阳 was arrested in Changsha 长沙, both also on the charge of “incitement to subvert state power” (颠覆国家政权罪) which could lead to imprisonment of 10 years or above or life imprisonment. Also on the same day, several other people from separate firms, including Zhao Wei 赵威, the 24-year-old female legal assistant to detained rights-defense lawyer Li Heping 李和平 at Globe-Law law firm (高文律师事务所) in
Beijing, were formally arrested for state subversion or inciting state subversion, while Fengrui rights-defense attorney Liu Xiaoyuan 劉曉原 said one of the firm’s lawyers, Huang Liqun 黃力群, its financial officer Wang Fang 王芳, and intern Xie Yuandong 謝遠東 had been released on “bail” although they have remained incommunicado, and he was presuming that any of the 38 lawyers and activists associated with the Beijing Fengrui law firm, many of whom were put under “residential surveillance” incommunicado and in unknown locations since the crackdown that began on 9th July 2015, who had not yet been released were being formally arrested. In the following week, another rights-defense lawyer of Fengrui law firm, Wang Yu 王宇 – who is China’s most prominent woman human rights lawyer who had defended online free speech advocate Wu Gan, prominent rights activist Li Tingting, and Cao Shunli, the activist who died in detention after being denied timely medical treatment – having been taken into custody in July 2015 and accused in the following month of inciting subversion and “causing a disturbance”, was formally arrested on the same charge of subverting the state.54

On 29th January 2016, in Guangdong Province rights-defence lawyer Tang Jingling, who had offered legal assistance to the family of Li Wangyang 李旺陽 55 who died in extremely suspicious circumstances in 2012, was sentenced to five years of imprisonment under the charge of “inciting subversion of state power” for initiating civil disobedience movement, and editing, printing and distributing foreign books of social activism and related flyers. His two other fellow weiquan activists, Yuan Xinting 袁新亭 and Wang Qingying 王清營, who were arrested with him in 2014, were sentenced to three and a half years and two and a half years respectively. Tang Jingling, who has been in the frontline of China’s weiquan and democracy movements, previously had his lawyer license revoked in 2005 for defending justice for villagers in Panyu,
Guangzhou, and was detained for half a year during the CCP’s “war on jasmine” in 2011\(^56\) (which pre-emptively detained many democracy advocates, bloggers and other “would-be troublemakers” including the prominent artist provocateur Ai Weiwei  艾未未)\(^57\) in response to the Internet call for a Chinese “Jasmine Revolution” following the Tunisian “Jasmine Revolution” of that year.

These sentences, like those handed out to prominent rights-defence lawyer Pu Zhiqiang 浦志強 on 22nd December 2015 (suspended 3-year jail for “inciting ethnic hatred” and “picking quarrels” in social media posts) and civil rights lawyer and activist Xu Zhiyong, one of the founders of the NGO Open Constitution Initiative (Gongmeng 公盟) which was shut down by the authorities in July 2009 and main founder and icon of the New Citizens’ Movement (four years in prison for “gathering crowds to disrupt public order”), are considerably lighter in comparison with the eleven-year sentence handed out to Liu Xiaobo 劉曉波\(^58\), human rights activist and main figure behind Charter 08 (Ling-ba Xianzhang 零八憲章)\(^59\), in December 2009 for “inciting subversion of state power” (his wife, Liu Xia 劉霞, a poet and photographer, was placed under house arrest since Liu Xiaobo was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in October 2010). They are also relatively light compared to the seven-year sentence handed out to prominent dissident journalist Gao Yu 高瑜 (who had been repeatedly jailed previously, sometimes as long) in April 2015 for leaking state secrets to a foreign news organisation (later in December 2015 reduced to five years and “released on medical parole” according to Chinese state media). They seem nothing in comparison with the life sentence handed out to Central Nationalities University economist Ilham Tohti, a well-known scholar on Uyghur-Han Chinese relations and vocal advocate for the implementation of regional autonomy laws in China, in September 2014 for “separatism”, and 19-years prison sentence given to rights activist
Zhang Haitao 张海涛 in January 2016 by Xinjiang’s Urumqi Intermediate Court for “inciting subversion of state power” (15 years, with evidence consisting of 69 posts made to WeChat, and 205 posts made to Twitter including posts he retweeted) and “probing and illegally supplying intelligence abroad”（为境外刺探、非法提供情报罪）(5 years) with accusations including publishing online articles attacking socialism, assisting the work of foreign media, and “rumormongering”, and 14-year prison sentence handed out to another Xinjiang-based activist Zhao Haitong 赵海通 a year earlier simply for attending rights-defending activities in Guangzhou 廣州 and Hefei 合肥 with other activists.60 This shows that the latest spate of imprisonments of civil rights activists and lawyers, as part of the intense legal campaign against civil rights organisations and independent (thus illegal) unions in the form of worker centres since Xi Jinping took over as China’s president, is at the moment meant more to send a warning to grassroots dissidents as well as the lawyers assisting dissidents, before their rights-defending activities (which are still conducted within the accepted CCP’s one-party rule framework – i.e. still in the form of “protesting to the government”, asking the CCP government to zuozhu 做主 (i.e. “do justice”) – and hence not yet directly challenging the political monopoly of the CCP) escalating into system-threatening proportions (in the form of “protesting against the government”, questioning the legitimacy of CCP’s one-party rule). The surprisingly harsh sentences for Zhang Haitao and Zhao Haitong have to do with the fact that they live in China’s restive region of Xinjiang where dissent, whether from Uyghurs or Han Chinese, often meets with particularly harsh retribution.
5. Repression via the Mob: Chou Tzu-yu Incident and “Authoritarian Patriotism”

Some cybercritics have called Gui Minhai’s TV “confession” a replica of the “Chou Tzu-yu video apology” two days earlier. The 16-year-old Chou Tzu-yu 周子瑜 (stage name “Tzuyu”), a Taiwanese member of the multi-national K-pop girl group Twice, was pulled off from her endorsement with Chinese smartphone vendor Huawei 華為, following the currently common nationalistic outburst of China’s netizens because of her introducing herself as a Taiwanese and waving the flag of the Republic of China (ROC) when she and her band mates appeared on a Korean variety show in November 2015 and subsequently accused, actually illogically, by the Taiwanese-born but China-based singer and self-declared anti-Taiwan independence warrior Huang An 黃安 of being a Taiwan independence supporter. Twice was cut off from Chinese television and JYP Entertainment, which formed Twice, was forced to suspend all of Chou Tzu-yu’s activities in China. With JYP facing huge pressure from the Chinese market boycott, it released a video on 15th January 2016 in which a pallid Tzu-yu, looking disoriented, scared and without makeup, took a deep bow and apologised and stressed that there was only one China and she was Zhongguoren (i.e. a Chinese national).

5.1. “Authoritarian Patriotism”

The two televised “confessions”/apologies are indeed somewhat dissimilar in nature, one being State-orchestrated, the other seemingly mass-jingoistic netizens-driven – though there is indeed a theory proposed in anti-CCP The Epoch Times (Dajiyuan 大紀元, linked to the persecuted physio-spiritual Falungong 法輪功 movement) that attributes the Chou Tzu-yu incident to Jiang Zemin-Xi Jinping factional struggle within the CCP based on the personalities and organisations involved
and the delicate timing of various stages of the incident that coincided with the Taiwanese general elections that ended with the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, 民主進步黨) for the first time ever winning control of both the presidency and the Legislative Yuan (Li-fa Yuán 立法院)\(^1\).

Nevertheless, the Orwellian ability of a quasi-Fascist racketeer State\(^2\) in degrading and destroying basic human dignity is plainly manifest in both cases, one directly through the coercive instrument of monopolised violence or threat of violence, the other through the masses – epitomised by the *fenqing* 憤青 (literally “angry youth”) – who, understanding that too much is at stake in challenging a ruthless but so-far “benevolent” dictator, find meaning in life by directing their “unhappy consciousness” (for which notably Hegel does suggest liberation via subservience\(^3\) outward via sporadic nationalistic outbursts (whether towards the traditional nemesis Japan, rival superpower America, or anybody who dares to articulate or insinuate the truth that Taiwan (ROC) is an independent, sovereign country not a part of the PRC). This is not too different from how so many Germans decades ago so heartily supported the Nazis and Third Reich of Adolf Hitler – a ruthless but “feel-good dictator” who, while being dangerous to challenge, did restore to them the feeling of self-importance and bring back not only lost glory and national pride but also long-awaited economic improvement and security\(^4\), and instill a higher feeling of external efficacy, like what Italians said about the effect of Benito Mussolini’s Fascist reign on improving Italian trains’ punctuality or what Mussolini did convince many of them about: “Mussolini may have done many brutal and tyrannical things; he may have destroyed human freedom in Italy; he may have murdered and tortured citizens whose only crime was to oppose Mussolini; but ‘one had to admit’ one thing about the Dictator: he ‘made the trains run on time.’”\(^5\)

\(^1\) Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh

\(^2\) Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal 2(1) ♦ 2016

\(^3\) Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal 2(1) ♦ 2016

\(^4\) Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal 2(1) ♦ 2016

\(^5\) Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal 2(1) ♦ 2016
This is what citizenship education scholar Professor Joel Westheimer refers to as the social psychology of authoritarian patriotism (as opposed to democratic patriotism) which depends on a deliberate and complicit populace full of fiercely nationalistic and jingoistic sentiments (Westheimer, 2006: 610).

That “dissent is patriotic” (see Table 1) as a principle of democratic patriotism in Westheimer’s formulation, as opposed to authoritarian patriotism’s demanding allegiance to the government’s cause and therefore opposing dissent, harkens back to the quotation “dissent is the highest form of patriotism”. This is often attributed to Thomas Jefferson, though no evidence has been found according to Anna Berkes in her Thomas Jefferson Encyclopedia entry of “Dissent is the highest form of patriotism (Quotation)” that found the earliest usage of the phrase, which was used repeatedly during the Vietnam-War era, in a 1961 publication, The use of force in international affairs: “If what your country is doing seems to you practically and morally wrong, is dissent the highest form of patriotism?”

5.2. Recurring Mass Paroxysms and Capture-Bonding: Existential Hobson’s Choice?

In the recurring nationalistic outbursts and mass paroxysms of rage of China’s netizens and people on the streets, whether against Japan (or Carrefour in 2008), or attacking Chinese actress Zhao Wei 趙薇 with human waste in 2001 following her photo shoot for a fashion magazine wearing a dress featuring the Japanese “rising sun” military flag, we witness the twisted psychology of a subservient populace making the existential Hobson’s choice of “resigning [their] will, right of choice, and need to understand to the authority” with “its emotional base [being] gratitude for having been liberated from the burden of democratic responsibility”. In the process of directing their suppressed
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<th>Authoritarian Patriotism</th>
<th>Democratic Patriotism</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Ideology</strong></td>
<td>Belief that one’s country is inherently superior to others.</td>
<td>Belief that a nation’s ideals are worthy of admiration and respect.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Primary allegiance to land, birthright, legal citizenship, and government’s cause.</td>
<td>Primary allegiance to set of principles that underlie democracy.</td>
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<td>Nonquestioning loyalty.</td>
<td>Questioning, critical, deliberative.</td>
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<td>Follow leaders reflexively, support them unconditionally.</td>
<td>Care for the people of society based on particular principles (e.g., liberty, justice).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Blind to shortcomings and social discord within nation.</td>
<td>Outspoken in condemnation of shortcomings, especially within nation.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Conformist; dissent seen as dangerous and destabilising.</td>
<td>Respectful, even encouraging, of dissent.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Slogans</strong></td>
<td>My country, right or wrong.</td>
<td>Dissent is patriotic.</td>
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<td>America: love it or leave it.</td>
<td>You have the right to NOT remain silent.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Historical Example</strong></td>
<td>McCarthy Era House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) proceedings, which reinforced the idea that dissenting views are anti-American and unpatriotic.</td>
<td>The fiercely patriotic testimony of Paul Robeson, Pete Seeger, and others before HUAC, admonishing the committee for straying from American principles of democracy and justice.</td>
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<td><strong>Contemporary Example</strong></td>
<td>Equating opposition to the war in Iraq with “hatred” of America or support for terrorism.</td>
<td>Reinforcing American principles of equality, justice, tolerance, and civil liberties, especially during national times of crisis.</td>
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helplessness-induced anger outward in public shows of patriotism, they openly or tacitly act to justify the authority of their authoritarian overlord, replacing, as political scientist Douglas Lummis argues, the love that brings a people together with the misguided love of institutions that dominate them in this manifestation of “authoritarian patriotism”.68

With the Xi Jinping administration unleashing its “extraordinary assault on basic human rights and their defenders with a ferocity unseen in recent years”69, such would be a safe and rational approach for the masses who want to avoid trouble and yet “feel great”. In this sense the social psychology of “authoritarian patriotism” is that of a people long held hostage by a ruthless racketeer government70 who end up, with no more rational option, expressing empathy and sympathy and developing in themselves positive feelings towards the Party that continues to hold them hostage, to the point of not only being apologists on behalf of but also vehemently defending and even identifying with their authoritarian ruler. In psychological terms this is called the Stockholm syndrome or capture-bonding in which by choosing the “safe” path and staying away from dissent the subservient populace is also mistaking any lack of abuse by the ruling Party for an act of kindness. As Adolf Hitler said, “The great masses of people … will more easily fall victims to a big lie than to a small one.”71

5.3. “Doublespeak” and the “Nomenklatura Conspiracy”

As Raymond Sleeper pointed out in 1987 referring to the Soviet Union and the “nomenklatura conspiracy”, we can discern the same deception being employed today by the CCP regime to maximise the maintenance of this capture-bonding, a continuation of the use of Marxist-Leninist concepts developed in Soviet/Maoist times that represent subversions of well-accepted Western liberal democratic ideas, mainly through the
use of double-meaning language that serves to justify CCP’s authoritarianism, e.g., admitting that human rights, freedom and democracy are universal values but giving them a different meaning in the “unique” Chinese context – in short, so-and-sos “with Chinese characteristics”, inevitably because of “different national contexts” (guoqing butong 國情不同). Sleeper referred to then head of the US negotiating team in Geneva on nuclear weapons Ambassador Max Kampelman’s 4th January 1985 address to the Standing Committee on Law and National Security of the American Bar Association where he made a significant point on the USSR leaders’ facility in using language differently:

They have the ability to use language […] in a way which is designed to confuse people like ourselves and undermine our will. This they do professionally and effectively. They take a noble word like democracy and adopt it as their own – as you know, they frequently call their systems ‘people’s democracies.’ This is a total corruption of the term […] The Communists are able to use these differences [in meaning of words] to promote their own appeal, which […] is essentially a humanitarian appeal […] in their propaganda they identify themselves and ally themselves with efforts to achieve humanitarian goals such as ‘freedom’ or ‘justice.’

(Quoted in Sleeper, 1987, p. 203)

In other words, the “different use” of words Kampelman referred to is basically “an instrument of subversion, of disinformation – an instrument of deception” (ibid.).

These concepts that are in fact subversions of well-accepted Western liberal ideas born out of hundreds of years of the struggle of civil society against autocratic monarchy and over the Painean
revolutions French and American, and based on fundamental ideas first
developed during the Renaissance, used in Marxist totalitarian states or
post-Marxist authoritarian states today as “active measures”, i.e. acts of
“disinformation” and “deception” intentionally rooted in double-
meaning language or “doublespeak”, is closely related to George
Orwell’s concept of “doublethink” in his dystopian novel Nineteen
eighty-four; one of the book’s twin central conceptual inventions (with
“Newspeak”). The use of such “different meaning” tactic has its roots at
the time when Lenin was planning to overthrow the Tsarist government
at the turn of last century, as Professor Raymond Sleeper plainly lay out:

When Lenin began to organize his revolutionary conspiracy, he found
that the main ideas of communism were already or could be expressed
in terms of Western ideas so cleverly that the average citizen of the
West [as well as that of the Russian empire, later USSR] would not
see the trick – the inherent deception of communist ideas. To the
contrary, the average citizen understood genuine democracy and
economic freedom to mean what they had always meant, the right to
vote, the right to own property, the right to travel, the right to work
where he pleased – in short, freedom.

(Sleeper, 1987: 191)

Maintaining its Marxist-Maoist tradition, today’s CCP is redefining
concepts like democracy and human rights under the warped framework
of “(market) socialism with Chinese characteristics”. In this process the
Party is following this early Leninist subversion of Western liberal ideas
in the wide use of double-meaning concepts – one meaning being the
accepted Western liberal concept (the “universal values” to which
today’s CCP is paying lip service) and “the other meaning being the
opposite or subverted meaning that was the true Marxist-Leninist

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meaning [which] also served the very useful purpose of not immediately alarming the established government, which Lenin had to deceive, confuse, and destroy in order to capture political power in Russia” (*ibid.*). No longer talking much about Communism, Marxism or even Maoism, the CCP regime of “People’s” Republic of China has remained the faithful follower of this power of double meaning – redefining such terms like “human rights”, “democracy” and “freedom” in its own way, and justifying such deception by referring to “China’s different context, different condition” (*guoqing butong*).

In this atmosphere criticisms against the Party or mode of government in this one-party state are considered subversive. The critic can be charged with “incitement to subvert state power” which can lead to more than 10 years’ jail or life imprisonment, as authoritarian patriotism asks for unquestioning loyalty and absolute allegiance to the government’s cause and therefore is intolerant towards dissent and any challenge against the Party’s monopoly over public discourse.72

6. Domestic Repression Goes Global: Racketeer State and Its Global Reach

Further to his postulation of a racketeer government (a concept that will be discussed in the special issue’s policy commentary article later, “The Writing on the Wall: National and Global Implications of the Ruling Chinese Communist Party’s Domestic and Foreign Policies” in the context of China’s authoritarian governing structure), Charles Tilly notes that “the relative balance among war making, protection, extraction, and state making significantly affected the organization of the states that emerged from the four activities.” (Tilly, 183-184) Tilly depicts the relationship diagrammatically as shown in Figure 3 here.
Figure 3 Relationship between War Making, Protection, Extraction and State Making (Tilly, 1985)


“To the extent that war making went on with relatively little extraction, protection, and state making [...] military forces ended up playing a larger and more autonomous part in national politics [e.g., Spain]”, says Tilly, “To the extent that protection [...] prevailed over war
making, extraction, and state making [e.g., Venice or Holland], oligarchies of the protected classes tended to dominate subsequent national politics.” (Tilly, 1985: 184) And the Papal States illustrate the other extreme when state making predominated relatively, giving rise to the disproportionate elaboration of policing and surveillance (ibid.) Moving from the Civil War period through Mao’s “perpetual revolution” years to today’s post-revolutionary, politically more stable yet no less repressive era, the CCP regime’s rule can be seen to have evolved from the first to the latter two forms of imbalances following Tilly’s explication of the development of racketeer governments.

On how racketeer governments acquire authority, Charles Tilly says, “Back to Machiavelli and Hobbes, nevertheless, political observers have recognized that, wherever else they do, governments organize and, wherever possible, monopolize violence [...] governments stand out from other organizations by their tendency to monopolize the concentrated means of violence.” (Tilly, 1985: 171) Mao Zedong understood this best when he said, “Every Communist must grasp the truth, ‘Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.’”73 This represents the true heritage from millennia of Chinese dynasties, and it was an aberration from this imperial tradition when Zhao Ziyang acted on his principle he reiterated in his secret memoir: “I told myself that no matter what, I refused to become the General Secretary who mobilized the military to crack down on students.”74 The twentieth-century history of the Communist conquest of China, from “Chinese Soviet” to the “People’s Republic” of China, would not have transpired as it did if not for the havoc the Japanese invasion wreaked upon the Republic of China under Chiang Kai-shek 蔣介石, and it would be futile to try to figure out whether the continued development of the Republic of China on the mainland would follow Tilly’s depiction of the European historical experience from the “state’s monopoly of large-scale violence [finally]
turning from theory to reality” by the later eighteenth century to “massive pacification and monopolization of the means of coercion” in the long run to “the coincidence of war making, state making, and capital accumulation” (Tilly, 1985: 174-175, 177), though Tilly did note the advantage in Chinese experience vis-à-vis the European: “Before quite recently, no European government approached the completeness of articulation from top to bottom achieved by imperial China. Even the Roman Empire did not come close.” (ibid.: 174)

What has become increasingly clear is that after the three-decade long Maoist idealistic ultra-autarchic socialist economic policies, the late-reform era PRC now looks like perching on the edge of resuming its missed process of contemporary imperialist state making (with possible limited war making) and capital accumulation as depicted by Tilly. Indeed, while the uncontrolled widening socioeconomic inequalities and the lack of rule of law (and often “lawless” local governments) accompanying the miraculous economic performance and urban modernisation that have characterised over three decades of Chinese development during the market-reform era are often blamed on Deng Xiaoping’s “Let some people get rich first” directive and the rugged capitalist approach to economic reform, the issue at hand is bigger than just the misconduct of the local cadres or the nature of the political system, as Dirlik and Prazniak argue, but the need now to fuel an export-oriented economy through various aspects of capital accumulation within a globalised capitalist economy:

[...] the most widespread causes of discontent – forceful expropriation of agricultural land, widespread dislocation of the population, severe exploitation of labour, social and spatial inequalities, corruption from the top to the bottom of the political structure, urban and rural pollution – are all entangled in the development policies that the PRC
has pursued since the 1980s in its quest of “wealth and power” within the context of a neo-liberal global capitalism […] The conversion of land into capital, the creation of a floating labour force available for this process, and the sale of cheap labour power to fuel an export-oriented economy are all aspects of capital accumulation within a globalized capitalist economy. If anything distinguishes the PRC, it is the presence of a sprawling organizational structure put in place by the revolution that has guaranteed the efficient performance of these processes, with coercion whenever necessary.

(Dirlik and Prazniak, 2012: 295)

Contrary to the “receptive to the governed” argument often referred to75, a governing regime’s legitimacy according to Arthur Stinchcombe depends rather little on abstract principle or assent of the governed for the “person over whom power is exercised is not usually as important as other power-holders” (Stinchcombe, 1968: 150, italics in the original)76 the probability of whose confirmation of the decisions of a given authority constitutes the latter’s legitimacy. These other authorities, says Tilly (1985), “are much more likely to confirm the decisions of a challenged authority that controls substantial force; not only fear of retaliation, but also desire to maintain a stable environment recommend that general rule [which] underscores the importance of the authority’s monopoly of force” (Tilly, 1985: 171-172). Lynn White in her four-country study77 of money-power nexus observes that: “By no means are state agents the only powerholders with whom business owners (as well as regional gangsters and mob-affiliated political canvassers) make liaisons. They also link up with each other. The coherent state, even if it behaves as a single actor, is just one of the interlocutors for other networks in either a fair or coercive ‘civil’ polity.” (White, 2009: 37) In a wider context, it is in this way that these “other powerholders”, be they
societal pressure groups, professionals, or academics and the intelligentsia, “have been co-opted into the decision-making process, rewarded with perks and privileges, and are no longer available as a source of inspiration [for the dissident activists …]”, having retreated “from ‘politically engaged and intellectually oppositional topics’ to inquiries reconcilable with the prevailing order and designed to legitimate the hegemonic order” (Benton, 2010: 321-322). Similar co-optation extends beyond China’s borders with the global reach of her “soft power” backed by her economic strength and market size, and the lucrative trade and investment opportunities she could offer the world – as discussed earlier in the preceding sections and will be picked up again in Section 7 of the policy commentary article later, “The Writing on the Wall: National and Global Implications of the Ruling Chinese Communist Party’s Domestic and Foreign Policies” – and there are

[…] even displays of willingness to complicity with the regime’s pursuit of global hegemony, most notoriously through the so-called Confucius Institutes. Not only governments and business but even educational institutions supposedly dedicated to critical inquiry are anxious to court a regime which is by common acknowledgment suspicious of free inquiry beyond its control. Rarely is this contradiction questioned. Business is less than eager to jeopardize its chances in the “China market” in the name of human or political rights. There are suggestions of envy in praises of a “China model” that has “successfully” combined neoliberal economic policies with authoritarian politics and social policy.

(Dirlik and Prazniak, 2012: 290)
7. National and Global: Nexus between Domestic Repression and International “Soft Power”

Today China’s global investment is truly impressive, as can be seen in the China Global Investment Tracker map in Figure 4, created by the American Enterprise Institute and The Heritage Foundation (“the only publicly available, comprehensive dataset of large Chinese investments and contracts worldwide (excluding bonds)”79).

**Figure 4** China’s Worldwide Investments and Contracts *(China Global Investment Tracker, created by the American Enterprise Institute and The Heritage Foundation)*

N.B.: Circle size represents total business.

The tracker map, as of April 2016, shows China’s worldwide contracted investment from 2005 to the first half of 2014 – “over 1250 attempted transactions – failed and successful – valued at more than $100 million in all industries, including energy, mining, real estate, and transportation.” As the Tracker reflects, “If there’s a Chinese business person in your neighborhood talking about buying a local company or plot of land, you’re not alone.”

Geographically, as shown in Figure 4 above and Figure 5 below, Latin America is among the furthest reaches of China’s global economic tentacles. Even here, one can sense the astounding rise of China. According to the Inter-American Dialogue’s latest report on Chinese finance to Latin America and the Caribbean in 2015:

- 2015 was the second highest year on record for Chinese state-to-state finance in Latin America, with loans to the region topping $29 billion. Much of this finance was announced during Premier Li Keqiang’s 2015 trip to Latin America.
- In 2015, Chinese finance to Latin America surpassed World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank lending to the region combined.
- China continues to be an important source of finance for those countries in LAC (e.g., Venezuela and Ecuador) with weaker access to global capital markets.
- Venezuela has received $65 billion since 2007, or approximately 52 percent of total Chinese policy bank finance in the region. Another 34 percent of Chinese finance to Latin America went to Argentina, Brazil, and Ecuador.
- Chinese banks continue to focus on LAC’s extractive and infrastructure sectors. From 2005 to the present, Chinese policy banks financed $40.3 billion in infrastructure projects (e.g., highway and
facility construction), as well as many energy projects with infrastructure components. Energy loans, including China’s oil-backed lending to Venezuela through the China-Venezuela Joint Fund, accounted for $70.2 billion of overall Chinese finance in LAC since 2005.

- In addition to China’s many bilateral loans to LAC, Beijing also recently established approximately $35 billion in region-wide funds for infrastructure and other projects. It is unclear whether these funds are a means for restructuring existing bilateral capital or an entirely new source of finance.

(“Chinese Finance to LAC in 2015” (summary), Myers, Gallagher and Yuan, 10th February 2016)\(^{81}\)

Indeed, a CCP reborn since Deng Xiaoping’s audacious reform initiative, transformed in nature into a curious chimeric hybrid some scholars refer to as CCCMMMP (Chinese Communist Confucian Marxist Maoist Mercantilist Party)\(^{82}\) or CCCMMMPP (Chinese Communist Confucian Marxist Maoist Mercantilist Plutocratic Party), in combination with the ambitious activities of Chinese companies, is remaking the country quickly into history’s most extensive global commercial-military empire\(^{83}\), according to Steve LeVine, adjunct professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University and the global digital business news publication Quartz’s Washington correspondent (see Figure 5 below).
Figure 5 The Dragon’s Global Reach

Key (For further details please refer to Note 84)

1. “Silk Road Economic Belt”: An overland network of roads, rail and energy pipelines that will begin in Xi’an 西安 in central China and extend as far as Belgium.

2. “Maritime Silk Road” initiative: A “21st-century Maritime Silk Road” will connect the South China Sea, and the Indian and South Pacific oceans. The “Maritime Silk Road” will enter Europe, and ships from China will also make port in Lisbon, Portugal, and Duisburg, Germany.

3. A high-speed rail network will start in Kunming 昆明, the capital of China’s Yunnan Province, and connect into Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia, Burma, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore.

4. A 3,300-mile high-speed railroad that will start in Acu, near Rio de Janeiro, cross the Amazon rainforest and the Andes Mountains, and terminate on the Peruvian coast. In addition, there was also an advanced proposal by a Chinese billionaire to build a 170-mile-long canal through Nicaragua.
(5) China has agreed with the African Union to help build railroads, roads, and airports that will link all 54 African countries, and has also envisioned modern ports in Dar es Salaam (Tanzanian capital), Maputo (Mozambican capital), Libreville (in Gabon), Tema (in Ghana) and Dakar (Senegalese capital).

(6) Besides the planned high-speed rail network into Malaysia and Singapore and through Laos, China is also planning a canal across Thailand’s Isthmus of Kra, a deep-water container port and industrial park in Malaysia’s Kuantan, an expansion of Maldives’ Male airport, as well multi-million-dollar projects in the Pacific island states.

(7) Multi-billion-dollar infrastructure projects in Pakistan, including the financing of a deep Arabian Sea port at Gwadar and a 1,125-mile-long super-highway, high-speed railway and oil-pipeline route back to Kashgar in China’s Xinjiang.

(8) A 4,000-km “Power of Siberia” gas pipeline and a 4,300-mile high-speed railway from Beijing to Moscow.

Source: Maps 1-9 in “Do as Rome does: China is building the most extensive global commercial-military empire in history” (by Steve LeVine), Quartz, 9th June 2015.

7.1. Soft Power Spurious and Nefarious

In the latest ranking (2015/2016) of countries by soft power according to the British magazine Monocle, it seems that China, ranked 21st, would still have some way to go to compete with the liberal democracies that are above her, including South Korea (see Table 2). According to this latest investigation by Monocle on soft power based on government standard, diplomatic facilities, cultural exports, educational capability, business environment, etc., topping the list in 2015/2016 is Germany, followed by the United States, United Kingdom, Japan, France, Australia, Sweden, Switzerland, Denmark and Canada among the top ten.85
### Table 2 Monocle Soft Power Survey 2015/2016

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<th>Ranking</th>
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<td>1</td>
<td>Germany</td>
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<td>United States of America</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Japan</td>
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<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
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<td>22</td>
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<td>Singapore</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
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That the recent claim of China’s increasing “soft power” is much overhyped was also reflected in, for instance, the comments of Professor Qiao Mu 喬木 of the Beijing Foreign Studies University (北京外國語大學) in 2013 on that year’s Country Ratings Poll of 25 countries and the European Union conducted by GlobeScan, an international polling firm, and the Programme on International Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland for the BBC’s World Service which shows global views of China’s influence having deteriorated sharply to reach their lowest level since the poll began in 2005, with positive views falling eight points to 42 per cent and negative views rising eight points to 39 per cent. Perceptions of China are seen plunging markedly not only within the EU, expectedly worst in Japan (with only 5 per cent holding positive views against 64 per cent holding negative views), but also in China’s regional neighbours which are not her traditional enemies, e.g., Australia (swinging around dramatically from the previous survey’s 61 per cent positive and 29 per cent negative to this latest survey’s 36 per cent positive and 55 per cent negative).86 Admitting that “the rating had put China in an ‘embarrassing’ position, compared to the nation’s rising economic power and the national image it sought to project”, sighed Professor Qiao Mu, “It seems China is getting rich fast but its influence ranking is dropping dramatically […] China is drawing more attention globally, for its increasing foreign aid and participation in international affairs, but now it turns out that the values and the political system China holds are not accepted by the world.”87

The reservations above notwithstanding, if we consider such impressive outreach of China’s economic power as depicted in Figure 4 and Figure 5 as the main driver of its “soft power”, it should still be noted not only that such influence makes the global economy a friendly place for Chinese commerce, but the much touted Chinese “soft power” derived therefrom has been put to excellent use to extract complicity
from foreign governments in assisting the PRC’s domestic oppression on political freedom and civil liberties to reach beyond the country’s borders. Despite the euphoric accolades enthusiastically heaped upon China’s supposedly rising “soft power”, the only clear nature revealed regarding this Chinese “soft power” so far has either been spurious or iniquitous. Spurious in giving the impression that traditional Chinese culture is supposed to spread across the globe by the strong China, not least through the so-called “Confucius Institutes” – a monstrosity of propagandic misnomer and misinformation; iniquitous, both in terms of extending domestic oppression on political freedom and civil liberties, muzzling of free speech and free media and trampling on human rights across her borders, and exporting her Fascist corporatist model to the despotic regimes and neo-authoritarian rulers of flawed democracies in the developing world which now find alliance or potential alliance with this biggest dictatorship on the planet a balancing safeguard against Western sanctions over their trampling on human rights and helping them keep their heads above water. On the other hand, extending domestic repression across China’s borders is an obvious and inevitable policy shift in line with, as mentioned earlier, the apparent change in modus operandi by the Xi Jinping administration from a “weiwen” (maintaining stability) strategy to one of “national security”, the latter also in taking advantage of the current global War on Terrorism.

With the national security law adopted on 1st July 2015, with its obligation to “defend the people’s fundamental interests”, today’s CCP regime, seemingly no longer contented with exporting its system of censorship and information control through the carrot and stick approach with foreign governments, corporations and academia which has proven to be surprisingly successful, has resorted to using “national security” as grounds for extending its repression beyond China’s borders with pursuit of dissidents who have gone into exile and by calling upon friendly
countries, especially China’s ASEAN neighbours, to repatriate those who fled the regime. Just a month prior to Jiang Yefei, Dong Guangping and Gui Minhai’s repatriation by the Thai government, as we have mentioned earlier, another ASEAN member country, Myanmar/Burma, arrested Bao Zhuoxuan 包卓軒, the son of human rights lawyer Wang Yu and activist Bao Longjun 包龍軍 who were already being held incommunicado in China, and sent him back to China’s Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, where he was then placed under house arrest.

7.2. A Disrupted and Stalled Democratic Transition

Admittedly for many developing countries a system of liberal democracy that is coming too soon, or worse, imposed upon them too soon can bring chaos. Amy Chua in World on fire (2003) points out how in cases like Rwanda and Burundi the “one person one vote” democracy by empowering abruptly the majority Hutus brought about genocide of the Tutsis. Also, abject poverty and lack of education opportunity for the majority of the masses always make democratic transition a failure. People in abjectly poor countries care more about food than pursuing democracy and civil liberties or political freedom. In 2004 the United Nations conducted a survey in Latin America about people’s preference for democracy; the majority of those surveyed said they preferred a dictator who put food on the table to democratically elected leaders who failed to do so. Liberal democracy in Europe took hundreds of years to develop and mature, through struggle between parliament and monarch and between the bourgeois merchant class and the hereditary aristocracy, through civil wars, moving stage by stage from the initial “whig democracy” to truly multiparty competition and universal suffrage that finally include (the newly emancipated and educated) women, ethnic minorities and lower social classes. As the late Jeane J. Kirkpatrick,

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American political scientist and President Ronald Reagan’s ambassador to the United Nations, emphasized in her most well-known article “Dictatorships and double standards” published in the monthly American magazine *Commentary* in November 1979, in “the relatively few places where they exist, democratic governments have come into being slowly, after extended prior experience with more limited forms of participation during which leaders have reluctantly grown accustomed to tolerating dissent and opposition, opponents have accepted the notion that they may defeat but not destroy incumbents, and people have become aware of government’s effects on their lives and of their own possible effects on government.” And such an arduous process takes a lot of time and calls for much patience:

Decades, if not centuries, are normally required for people to acquire the necessary disciplines and habits. In Britain, the road from the Magna Carta to the Act of Settlement, to the great Reform Bills of 1832, 1867, and 1885, took seven centuries to traverse. American history gives no better grounds for believing that democracy comes easily, quickly, or for the asking. A war of independence, an unsuccessful constitution, a civil war, a long process of gradual enfranchisement marked our progress toward constitutional democratic government. The French path was still more difficult. Terror, dictatorship, monarchy, instability, and incompetence followed on the revolution that was to usher in a millennium of brotherhood. Only in the 20th century did the democratic principle finally gain wide acceptance in France and not until after World War II were the principles of order and democracy, popular sovereignty and authority, finally reconciled in institutions strong enough to contain conflicting currents of public opinion.92
Today many nations in the developing world may have the
democratic structure, but may not have gone through a democratic
process that Europe has. But today’s world is also vastly different from
Europe one or two centuries ago. Modern communication, the Internet
and related electronic social media, air transport, and universal
compulsory education should serve to shorten the democratic process if
entrenched authoritarian regimes are not bending on blocking the
inevitable. In this great transition China is now playing an influential
negative role. Its rising power is acting to keep most of the despotic
regimes across the world afloat. There have been a hundred years of
democracy in the making since the Hsin-hai 辛亥 (Xinhai) republican
revolution (1911) – a hundred years are not a short time for democratic
process – and yet the process was first blocked by the Japanese invasion
and then by the Civil War and the totalitarian Chinese Communist Party
rule since 1949. This barrier to democratic transition is now projected
outward to the world by the sheer economic might of PRC after the
astonishing success of more than three decades of economic (solely
economic) reform – the soft power of glittering Chinese
authoritarianism. The success of such externally projected influence
feeds in a backward loop the Party’s control in the country through other
world powers’ cooperation or seeking cooperation in international affairs
and crisis management (Arthur Stinchcombe’s “other power-holders”
that legitimise the authoritarian regime), through the new “tributary
system” between the despotic and authoritarian regimes in the
developing world (another group of Stinchcombe’s “other power-
holders”) and this largest dictatorship on the planet which helps to keep
their heads above water, and through the mesmerising national glory to
impress its own hapless citizens.
7.3. Influencing Perceptions

PRC’s advance in influencing world and domestic perceptions of the CCP regime takes a complex mix of strategies. Renowned political scientist the late Sterling Professor emeritus of political science at Yale University Robert Alan Dahl used six main “influence terms” to explain the varieties of power: rational persuasion; manipulative persuasion; inducement; power; coercion; physical force (Dahl and Stinebrickner, 2002; Stinebrickner, 2015; Dahl, 1999). CCP’s foreign and domestic policies lay everything out as if all are done with nice rational persuasion, telling the truth and explaining why the world should support China’s peaceful rise which will always contribute to a win-win conclusion, and why her citizens should support the only party – an “advanced, selfless and united ruling group”93 – that has always been since 1949 and will always be in power.

In actuality, a tactic a notch lower, manipulative persuasion, is the tool the CCP regime employs to convince other world powers, the West, the world bodies, and the international financial, educational, and other institutions to forfeit their ethical, moral, and political principles, to turn a blind eye to her human-rights abuses, in order to reap the potential benefits promised in exchange for cooperation. For the developing world leaders who are struggling with poverty, political insecurity, and with their own political glass houses to guard, a still lower means, inducement, is that which is applied to secure their support and cooperation, via rewards in terms of aids and investments and trade, or punishments in the form of withdrawing or withholding these opportunities. For the overseas Chinese community leaders and business class, the same means of bribery or vote-buying is employed to secure their support, allegiance and loyalty.
7.4. “Fact-Value Fusion” in Social Contract

As common for authoritarian regimes, *inducement* is useful but not enough for domestic control in China. Diplomatic niceties are not required when dealing with her own citizens. The next three categories ordered by increasing brutality are applicable here: *power*, with threats of job dismissal (as experienced today by a great many disobedient academics at universities in mainland China, Hong Kong and Macau 澳門, as well as media editors and reporters) and imprisonment (as meted out to myriads of human rights, civil rights activists, labour unionists, civil rights lawyers, and civil societal group organisers), and *coercion*, denying the citizens all political choices other than supporting CCP’s rule, backed by *physical force* with threat of bodily harm – as experienced by victims of the 1989 Beijing massacre and today’s countless dissidents (including among others social activists and civil rights lawyers) harassed and beaten, put under round-the-clock surveillance or tortured in jail (detainees, including those incarcerated since 1989, often broken and driven to insanity by the long imprisonment, or ending up losing their lives like Li Wangyang and Cao Shunli). The fate of these persecuted or murdered dissidents serves to convince the wider citizenry that it is wise to stay away from un-CCP-sanctioned sociopolitical activities, support CCP’s version of history and social analysis and accept CCP-imposed public amnesia on 1989 and veil of ignorance over the present political oppression of those who dare to speak out. “Fear can keep a man out of danger, but courage only can support him in it”94, goes an old saw, and that the Chinese citizens today and foreigners who have a business stake or livelihood to maintain in China have chosen fear over courage testifies amply to the success of the CCP regime in enforcing their following its unique “social contract” for them: “… China is the one major country in the world for which
censorship is not merely or even principally, a matter of suppressing undesired messages”, and there are “no facts that exist independently of their significance in the social contract”, as a China-based foreign media entrepreneur ruminates. Instead, Beijing has created a “fact-value fusion”, he says, comparing this CCP-PRC Incorporated to the Western corporations that he is familiar with:

Thus, residence in China is not unlike working at a strongly cultured company, e.g., a Disney or Starbucks. Residents agree to support the “brand values” defined for China by the CCP. They are rewarded for doing so, penalized for abstaining from the general effort and punished severely for actively taking a contrary stance […] the mingling of positive official messages, suppression of alternative narratives and amplification of approved reactions make it almost impossible to understand what the average Chinese person might “really” think.

Fear can keep a man out of danger, as the epigram quoted earlier says, and those who dare to actively engage in dissenting activities would have only personal courage to accompany them as they languish in jail, or are harassed and beaten, or are put under round-the-clock surveillance and house arrest while the masses whose grievances they are fighting to redress stay clear and cower in fear, knowing “that local security and Party officials exercise broad latitude in enforcing the center’s line [and understanding] that pressures to maintain the correct line from the center [euphemistically, aligned with the “feelings of the people”] and specific interests of local officials [create] a broad zone of potential risk to steer clear of.”
7.5. Degenerative Maybe, Totalitarianism Lives

While the transition from Maoist terror (which claimed the largest number of victims, estimated up to 40 million, mostly by starvation, among 20th-century totalitarian regimes – compared to Hitler’s 11 million, and 6 to 9 million under Stalin) reflects moving away from absolute totalitarian practices to more subtle authoritarian exploits practiced in most pseudo-democracies from Russia to Singapore (for instance, replacing forced enthusiastic participation and mobilisation in support of the elite leadership with tolerated political passivity and obedience), interestingly in the unique case of China, the late Carl Joachim Friedrich and late Zbigniew Kazimierz Brzeziński’s all six features of totalitarian states (Friedrich and Brzeziński, 1956) seem still have not lost their applicability. The new “(market) socialism with Chinese characteristics” has replaced the old straitjacket Maoism as the all-encompassing ideology. There is still only a single party, the CCP, legally allowed, unchallenged, to rule the country though it is no longer led by one man with a cult of personality (like Mao, or the consecutive Kims in North Korea) but by collective leadership in the CCP central politburo. There is still a monopoly of communications by extreme censorship and with swift punishment of occasionally wayward editors and reporters, and monopoly of weapons ensuring swift State violence against any resistance threatening CCP’s rule including military action against ethnoregional insubordination towards Beijing’s internal colonisation. While the discredited central-command economic system has been thrown into the ash heap of history as in all other parts of the formerly Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist (Communist) world except North Korea and replaced with the free market, a CCP-tightly-controlled economy is still imperative as high economic growth has manifested itself to be the top priority in legitimising the Party’s continued monopoly of political power together with outward projection of
economic might taking precedence over local priorities (e.g., workers’ welfare, social equality) because of the rising nationalistic support for CCP that international clout can generate. Finally, organised terror remains an effective tool to subdue the country’s citizens, though as William Dobson notes in *The dictator’s learning curve* (2012), instead of mass killings and swift executions, the Party today prefers legal conviction and incarceration through the application of blanket laws like “subversion of State power” and “picking quarrels” (a nebulously defined “pocket crime” charge into which “anything can be stuffed”\(^9\)), house arrests, extralegal beatings and other forms of harassment or more subtle forms of control and intimidation like threats to family members, loss of jobs and internal exile to remote areas, which as a whole form what can be described as the government’s “holistic censorship regime”\(^9\).

The authorities’ legal tools are surveillance, arrest and imprisonment. But often the “legal” apparatus is deployed as a form of intimidation rather than law enforcement. This is because indiscretions against the ruling ideology are offenses against the CCP, not the civil authorities; civil law applies only imperfectly. So offenses against the “feelings of the Chinese people” are met with house arrest, incognito detention, assault by unidentified authorities and physical intimidation.\(^1\)

The “midnight knock on the door” during Soviet times that cowed the population throughout the Communist world, while still occurring occasionally like in the case of the disappearance of the Causeway Bay Five, in these days could usually come in broad daylight in the new PRC with official legal summons backed up by blanket public offense charges in the realms of “subversion of State power”, “sedition” or “disturbing social peace”, and a kangaroo court, just like in many other developing countries including members of China’s neighbour ASEAN.
8. Postscript

This April 2016 issue of *CCPS* is slightly longer than a usual issue for, as a special thematic issue, more leeway in terms of length has been given to the papers, in particular the *Special Features* and *Policy Comments*, as well as the introductory article, paying heed to Aldous Huxley’s concern that sometimes brevity might not do justice to all the facts of a complex situation.

Before ending this introduction, we would like to thank all the contributing authors of the articles in the various sections of this special issue and the anonymous reviewers of these articles for their invaluable efforts in making the publication of this 2016 *CCPS* special issue of *China amidst Competing Dynamics in the Asia-Pacific: National Identity, Economic Integration and Political Governance* possible. For the seven articles in the first two sections of this issue following the introduction and the prologue which represent new versions of the earlier papers presented at the 2015 Sizihwan International Conference on Asia-Pacific Studies, “Identity and Integration: Competing Dynamics in Asia-Pacific”, duly revised by incorporating critical peer feedback received at the conference and from other reviewers, we would also like to thank these conference presenters who have taken great effort to revise their papers for inclusion in this special issue, as well as the discussants, conference participants and other reviewers who have given invaluable assistance in providing critical comments on the earlier versions of these papers. We are also grateful to our proof-readers for their crucial assistance in checking the final galley proofs and CRCs, and to Miss Wu Chien-yi 吳千宜 for the journal’s website construction and maintenance. The responsibility for any errors and inadequacies that remain is of course fully mine.
Notes

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security (edited focus issue, *IJCS*, 2014, 195 pp. + x), *China: Developmental model, State-civil societal interplay and foreign relations* (edited monograph, 745 pp. + xxi, ICS, 2013). His latest research projects include the Malaysian Ministry of Higher Education/University of Malaya High-Impact Research (HIR) Grant project “The China Model: Implications of the contemporary rise of China” (2013-2016, principal investigator) at the Department of Administrative Studies and Politics, Faculty of Economics and Administration, University of Malaya, and Suntory Foundation/University of Tokyo international research grant project “Beyond ‘China threat theory’: Dialogue with China experts on the rise of China” (2014-2015, Malaysian component). <Website: http://emileyeo5.wix.com/emileyeo; email: yeohkk@um.edu.my, emileyeo@gmail.com>

1. The 2015 Sizihwan (西子灣) International Conference on Asia-Pacific Studies, “Identity and Integration: Competing Dynamics in Asia-Pacific”, held at the National Sun Yat-sen University in Taiwan (台灣國立中山大學), on 12-14 November 2015, jointly organized by the Institute of China and Asia-Pacific Studies of the National Sun Yat-sen University and the Department of Political Science of the University of the Philippines Diliman.


4. Or officially the “Communist Party of China” (CPC, 中國共產黨).

5. “其實說實話，我對她本人沒有什麼興趣。但是，因為她的父親是習近平，那我就希望她能好好地跟她父親談一下。中國好，中國壞，中國是否會民主，這涉及我們每一個中國人的光榮和驕傲。習近平假如


12. ODN, 31st August 2012. (東方日報 /Oriental Daily News/ODN is a Malaysian daily in Chinese, with China news sources mainly from the Hong Kong and Taiwan media.)

13. ODN, 12th October 2012.

14. Although the scope of China’s economic decentralisation goes far beyond decentralisation in public finance, but even measured solely by the latter, China has been said to be the world’s most economically decentralised country (Xu, 2008: 187-188) given that China’s local public spending has
since the mid- and late 1980s been steady at about 70 per cent of her total
national public spending, whereas in federal countries such as the US,
Germany and Russia, the proportions of local public spending in total
national public spending are only respectively 46 per cent, 40 per cent and
38 per cent. From the angle of central-local economic relations, China is
also one of the most, or to some, even the most economically decentralised
countries in the world, with most parts of resources controlled by the local
governments, including the allocation of land, energy and financial
resources (ibid.: 187). In fact, one of the characteristics of China’s
economic decentralisation is the relative self-sufficiency of the local
economy whether at the provincial level or the county level. The local
governments are fully responsible for the launching and coordination of
local reform, for local economic development, and for the legislation and
law enforcement within their respective jurisdictions. Such a characteristic
not only marks China’s economic institution apart from a central planning
economic system, but also makes her local governments more powerful in
competences than the local governments in most federal countries in the
world. (ibid.: 188)

15. “4th Plenum: Rule of Law with Chinese Characteristics” (by Zachary
/4th-plenum-rule-of-law-with-chinese-characteristics/>

16. “4th Plenum: Rule of Law with Chinese Characteristics” (by Zachary
/4th-plenum-rule-of-law-with-chinese-characteristics/>

17. “The Guangdong Six and the rule of law (of value): Preliminary theses on
chuangcn.org/2015/12/theses-on-dec-3/>

18. Provincial-level administrative units in the People’s Republic of China
refer to the country’s 31 sheng 省 (i.e. provinces of Anhui 安徽, Fujian 福
建, Gansu 甘 肅, Guangdong 廣東, Guizhou 贵 州, Hainan 海南, Hebei


22. The concept of “Fascism” will be discussed further later in this special issue’s policy commentary article “The Writing on the Wall: National and Global Implications of the Ruling Chinese Communist Party’s Domestic and Foreign Policies” in the context of China’s authoritarian governing structure.


25. According to Chuang, “Regarding the number of criminal detainees, Tang Huangxin appears to have avoided criminal charges by collaborating with the police, so he is no longer counted among the detained “labor heroes” (勞工俠) supported by mainland solidarity efforts – hence the change from ‘the Guangdong Seven’ to ‘the Guangdong Six’.” (“The Guangdong Six and the rule of law (of value): Preliminary theses on the December 3 crackdown”, Chuang, 28th December 2015. <http://chuangcn.org/2015/12/theses-on-dec-3/>)


32. The term “xiangang” refers to redundant workers mainly at State enterprises, without directly describing them as “unemployed”. Still officially attached to their work units or enterprises, the xiangang workers continue to receive basic minimum subsidies for their living and medical expenses, and are encouraged to change job, probably through State-run job and re-employment centres, or go into small businesses. In line with State enterprise reforms, the number of xiangang workers has been on the rise: 4 million in 1995, 8 million in 1996, 12 million in 1997, 16 million in 1998, 20 million in 1999, though dropping to 11 million in 2001. (Zhou, 2006: 289)


35. “4 Hong Kong book publishers critical of China’s Communist regime go missing” (by Jigmey Bhutia), International Business Times, 10th


36. While having lost the original totalitarian regime’s ideology, power of political mobilisation and monopoly over the economy, a “degenerative totalitarian polity” (t’ui-hua chi-ch’üan cheng-t’i 退化極權政體) still not only continues with but tenaciously maintains the absolute monopoly of the “Party” over political power and State machinery and control over media of propaganda and social organisations (Hsu, 2003: 168).

37. Charles Tilly’s concept of a “racketeer State” and the concept of “Fascism” will be discussed further later in this special issue’s policy commentary article “The Writing on the Wall: National and Global Implications of the Ruling Chinese Communist Party’s Domestic and Foreign Policies” in the context of China’s authoritarian governing structure.


42. “Thousands protest in HK over missing publishers; booksellers worried” (by Donny Kwok and Kalum Chen), Reuters, 10th January 2016. <http://
www.reuters.com/article/us-hongkong-publisher-bookshops-idUSKCN0UO02A20160110?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews>


45. “Missing Hong Kong bookseller paraded on China state television” (by Agence France-Presse), Mail Online (Daily Mail, UK), 17th January 2016. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-3403798/Missing-Hong-Kong-bookseller-paraded-China-state-television.html>


47. “Missing Hong Kong bookseller paraded on China state television” (by Agence France-Presse), Mail Online (Daily Mail, UK), 17th January 2016. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-3403798/Missing-Hong-Kong-bookseller-paraded-China-state-television.html>


49. “Blackmail charge for bookseller” (by Calum MacLeod), The Times (UK), 18th February 2016 <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/uk/article4693158.ece>; ODN, 17th February 2016.

51. “‘Missing’ Hong Kong bookseller Lee Bo says he will give up British citizenship” (by Agence France-Presse), *The Guardian* (UK), 29th February 2016. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/29/missing-british-bookseller-appears-on-television>

52. “‘Missing’ Hong Kong bookseller Lee Bo says he will give up British citizenship” (by Agence France-Presse), *The Guardian* (UK), 29th February 2016. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/29/missing-british-bookseller-appears-on-television>


55. A glass factory worker who was first arrested in 1983 for organizing the Mutual Aid Association of Shaoyang Workers (邵陽市工人互助會) under the influence of the Beijing Spring (Xidan 西單 Democracy Wall) and Poland’s Solidarność, and who during the tumultuous months of 1989 organized and chaired the independent workers’ union of Shaoyang city (邵陽市工自聯) and led workers’ demonstrations in support of the students’ protests in Beijing, Li Wangyang was arrested on 9th June 1989 immediately after the Beijing massacre and jailed for 13 years for “anti-revolutionary propaganda and instigation” and released on 8th June 2000 blind and deaf and in extremely poor health, after enduring long years of beating and torture in jail. He was soon jailed again in 2001 for 10 years for “subverting government institution” and under continued surveillance upon release in May 2011. “There’s no looking back even if they chop off my head,” said a blind and frail Li Wangyang, broken in body by 23 years
of life spent almost entirely in jail and under repeated beating and torture, in an impassioned, heart-rending video-recorded interview broadcast in Hong Kong on 2nd June 2012 (http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=IK47hlQtCQ0), before his highly suspicious “suicide” in a tightly guarded Beijing hospital ward on 6th June, two days after that year’s 23rd anniversary of the June Fourth massacre.


58. Leading intellectual dissident activist from the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations and hunger strikes to Charter 08 – for which he was sentenced to 11 years of imprisonment – Liu Xiaobo was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize on 8th October 2010 but was unable to receive it as he was serving his 11-year sentence. He received his Ph.D. from the Beijing Normal University in 1988 with his thesis “Shenmei yu ren de ziyou 审美学人的自由” [aesthetics and human freedom].

59. Charter 08 was published at the 60th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopting name and style from the anti-Soviet Charter 77 issued by dissidents in Czechoslovakia in 1977 which became an informal civic initiative in Communist Czechoslovakia till 1992, a few years after accomplishing its goal of overthrowing Communist Party dictatorship in the 1989 Velvet Revolution.

activist-zhang-haitao/.


62. Charles Tilly’s concept of a “racketeer State” and the concept of “Fascism” will be discussed further later in this special issue’s policy commentary article “The Writing on the Wall: National and Global Implications of the Ruling Chinese Communist Party’s Domestic and Foreign Policies” in the context of China’s authoritarian governing structure.


70. Charles Tilly’s concept of a “racketeer State” will be discussed further later in this special issue’s policy commentary article “The Writing on the Wall: National and Global Implications of the Ruling Chinese Communist Party’s Domestic and Foreign Policies” in the context of China’s authoritarian governing structure.


75. See Bo (2010: 117).


77. On China, Thailand, Taiwan and the Philippines.


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84. Explications quoted from Steve LeVine’s Quartz report, 9th June 2015:
(1) “Silk Road Economic Belt”: An overland network of roads, rail and energy pipelines will begin in Xi’an in central China and head west as far as Belgium. To take the network into the heart of Europe, Beijing has agreed to finance a 250-mile bullet train, costing up to US$3 billion, from Belgrade to Budapest. Separately, an 8,011-mile cargo railroad from the Chinese city of Yiwu to Madrid, which Beijing has already initiated, is taking away business from far more time-consuming truck shipping. Compared with 36 days of maritime transport (from Shanghai, Taipei, Hong Kong, Macau through the ports of Singapore and Colombo, onward via the Gulf of Aden and Cairo to Lisbon and Duisburg), goods transported by the envisioned Chongqing-Xinjiang-Europe International Railway
(through the Silk Road Economic Belt – a more direct route version from Chongqing and Xi’an through Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, Poland on to Duisburg) would take just 16 days.

(2) “Maritime Silk Road” initiative: At sea, a companion 21st-century Maritime Silk Road would connect the South China Sea, and the Indian and South Pacific oceans. China would begin to protect its own sea lanes as well. On 26th May 2015 it disclosed a strategy for expanding its navy into a fleet that not only hugs its own shores, but can wander the open ocean. The Maritime Silk Road will enter Europe through a US$260 million Chinese-funded upgrade of the Greek port of Piraeus. From there, rail service will continue into the Balkans. Ships from China will also make port in Lisbon, Portugal, and Duisburg, Germany.

(3) On land, Beijing also has in mind a high-speed rail network. It will start in Kunming, the capital of Yunnan province, and connect with Laos and on into Cambodia, Malaysia, Burma, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.

(4) In 2015 President Xi Jinping pledged US$250 billion in investment in South America over the next 10 years. The centerpiece is a US$10 billion, 3,300-mile, high-speed railroad that would start in Acu, near Rio de Janeiro, crossing the Amazon rainforest and the Andes Mountains, and terminate on the Peruvian coast. On top of that, there’s an advanced proposal by Chinese billionaire Wang Jing to build a 170-mile-long, US$50 billion canal through Nicaragua.

(5) In January 2015, China agreed with the African Union to help build railroads, roads, and airports to link all 54 African countries. These plans are already under way, including a US$13 billion, 875-mile-long coastal railroad in Nigeria; a US$3.8 billion, 500-mile-long railroad connecting the Kenyan cities of Nairobi and Mombasa; a US$4 billion, 460-mile railway linking the Ethiopian cities of Addis Ababa and Djibouti; and a US$5.6 billion, 850-mile network of rail lines in Chad. Then there are China’s maritime ambitions. These envision modern ports in the Tanzanian capital,
Dar es Salaam; the Mozambican capital, Maputo; Libreville, Gabon; the Ghanaian city of Tema; and the Senegalese capital, Dakar. All these land and marine projects align with existing Chinese natural-resource investments on the continent. For example, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) has large oil projects in Chad and Mozambique, and Chinese manufacturers are fast setting up Ethiopian factories that rely on cheap local labor.

(6) In addition to its planned high-speed rail network into Malaysia and Singapore, China’s reach into Southeast Asia also includes a planned high-speed railroad through Laos. In addition, China is planning a canal across the Isthmus of Kra in Thailand, a deep-water container port and industrial park in Kuantan, Malaysia, and a US$511-million expansion of Male airport in the Maldives. Further into the Pacific, Chinese projects include: a US$158 million hydroelectric plant and several sports complexes in Fiji, including the 4,000-seat Vodafone stadium in Suva; a US$100 million hospital in Apia, Samoa, a US$40 million terminal and upgraded runway at Faleolo Airport, and a US$140 million wharf at Vaiusu; a US$12 million government building in Tonga to be called St. George Palace, and two small Chinese turboprop aircraft for domestic routes aboard Real Tonga airlines; two turboprops for Air Vanuatu and US$60 million to build a Port Vila campus of the University of the South Pacific and a Parliament House for Vanuatu. The amounts of Chinese aid in the South Pacific are: US$52.16 million for Timor-Leste, US$440.30 million for Papua New Guinea, US$28.25 million for Federated States of Micronesia, US$225.57 million for Vanuatu, US$338.24 million for Fiji, US$158.50 million for Tonga, US$207.99 million for Samoa, US$0.70 million for Niue, and US$48.60 million for Cook Islands.

(7) In addition to the main route of the “Silk Road Economic Belt”, Beijing is lavishing US$42 billion in infrastructure projects on Pakistan, including the financing of a deep Arabian Sea port at Gwadar, and a 1,125-mile-long
super-highway, high-speed railway and oil-pipeline route to the Chinese
city of Kashgar. Sending goods through Pakistan will help China avoid the
Malacca Strait through which much of Beijing’s oil and other natural
resources passes and which US could theoretically blockade.
(8) The 4,000 km “Power of Siberia” gas pipeline, a US$400 billion
Gazprom-CNPC gas deal, will ship 38 billion cubic metres of Russian gas
to China a year for 30 years, starting from 2018. This is the larger one of
the two natural-gas pipelines, which form the centerpiece of Russia’s pivot
towards China announced in 2013, through which a fifth of China’s gas
imports would flow. In addition, China is to build a US$242 billion, 4,300-
mile high-speed railway from Beijing to Moscow, a two-day trip compared
with the current six-day Trans-Mongolian Express.
affairs/soft-power-survey-2015-16/> 86. “China’s image takes a battering as majority of nations brand it a ‘negative
influence’” (by Laura Zhou), South China Morning Post (Hong Kong),
chinatakesbatteringpollperceptions25nationsandeu>  GlobeScan’s 2014
Country Ratings Poll further confirmed this: “The UK is the country whose
perceived influence in the world has most improved from 2005 to the
present […] Conversely, China’s perceived influence has worsened the
most over the same decade”, though views of China “have stabilised in
2014 after the sudden deterioration that occurred in 2013.” (“BBC World
Service Poll” (2014 Country Rating Poll BBC GlobeScan), Embargo 23:01
ses/bbc2014_country_ratings/2014_country_rating_poll_bbc_globescan.p
df>)
87. “China’s image takes a battering as majority of nations brand it a ‘negative
influence’” (by Laura Zhou), South China Morning Post (Hong Kong),
chinatakesbatteringpollperceptions25nationsandeu>.

88. The concept of “Fascism” will be discussed further later in this special issue’s policy commentary article “The Writing on the Wall: National and Global Implications of the Ruling Chinese Communist Party’s Domestic and Foreign Policies” in the context of China’s authoritarian governing structure.

89. As Juan Pablo Cardenal and Heriberto Araújo summarise in the report of their field survey in over 25 countries across the globe on China’s expanding influence among the developing countries that for the overriding political and economic interest of the Party-State, whenever China sees an opportunity, she invariably “chooses to act as an accomplice in these excesses rather than acting as a guardian of the law”, and following from that, it is “not just the fact that China has become the great champion and favourite business partner of the world’s most repressive regimes (Burma, North Korea, Iran, Sudan, Cuba), or that its state-owned companies often enjoy carte blanche in their dealings as a result of the dizzying effect of the all-powerful Chinese state. What is just as important is the infiltration and acceptance of Chinese standards and values – which are highly ambiguous when it comes to good business practices or labour, social or environmental issues – throughout Beijing’s sphere of influence” (Cardenal and Araújo, 2011, tr. 2013, 2014: 262).


91. Ibid.

Education (MNE, 德育及國民教育) school curriculum proposal which the Hong Kong Professional Teachers’ Union has accused as being a brain-washing political action.


95. Mr X, whose identity was concealed by the *Far Eastern Economic Review* which published his article “China’s holistic censorship regime” in Vol. 171, No. 4, of the journal (May 2008, pp. 21-23) “because of the certainty that publishing this essay under his name would lead to the loss of his livelihood” (editorial footnote, p. 21).


99. “[...] in the more ambiguous spectrum that exists between democracy and authoritarianism. Most strive to win their people’s support by making them content, but failing that, they are happy to keep their critics off balance through fear and selective forms of intimidation.” (Dobson, 2012, ppb 2013: 6)


101. “The soul of wit may become the very body of untruth. However elegant and memorable, brevity can never, in the nature of things, do justice to all the facts of a complex situation. On such a theme one can be brief only by omission and simplification. Omission and simplification help us to understand – but help us, in many cases, to understand the wrong thing; for
our comprehension may be only of the abbreviator’s neatly formulated notions, not of the vast, ramifying reality from which these notions have been so arbitrarily abstracted.” (From: Aldous Huxley’s “Foreword” to his *Brave new world revisited*. Chatto & Windus Ltd, London, 1959, re-published by Grafton Books, London, 1983, p. 7.)

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