FOREWORD

Upon the Twentieth Anniversary of the Hong Kong Handover:
An Update on State-Civil Societal Relations

1st July 2017 is the twentieth anniversary of the handover of Hong Kong by Great Britain to the People’s Republic of China, thus ending 156 years of British Crown rule (from 1841 to 1997, though from 1941 to 1945 it was actually under the Japanese occupation). Although the Hong Kong Island (香港島) was ceded from the Ch’ing Empire (大清帝國) to Great Britain in perpetuity after the First Opium War (1839-1842) and the colony expanded to the Kowloon Peninsula (九龍半島) in 1860, with 1997 approaching and the 99-year lease of the New Territories (新界, leased from 1898) ending the British did not find it feasible and viable to retain the rest of Hong Kong outside the leased territory. Hence the Handover was total. Then on 28th September 2014 a surprised sociopolitical event erupted that arguably marked a most important milestone in Hong Kong’s post-1997 development when pro-democracy protestors occupied the Admiralty (金鐘), Causeway Bay (銅鑼灣), Mong Kok (旺角)¹ and Tsim Sha Tsui (尖沙嘴) areas of Hong Kong. This momentous campaign was initially planned out earlier by the “Occupy Central with Love and Peace” (讓愛與和平佔領中環 / 和平佔中, OCLP) movement, but launched earlier than scheduled when

523
overtaken by the development of events, metamorphosised into unprecedented scale of demonstrations in multiple locations and was transformed into what was dubbed by the world media as the “Umbrella Movement” (雨傘運動) when umbrellas, which protestors were using to protect themselves when the police attacked them with tear gas and pepper spray, became a symbol of the occupation campaign. The scale of the protest movement, the zeal and passion of the participants and the personal sacrifices they were willing to make in pursuing the objective of the campaign and the bravery they showed in facing the formidable machinery of repression wielded by the State and at one stage an ominous prospect of Tiananmen redux – a repeat of the 1989 Beijing massacre, as well as the broad-based support from the wider Hong Kong society, reflected a culmination of almost two decades of grievances against the central government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC)\(^2\) whose one-party dictatorship not only continues to exhibit and strengthen its relentlessness in suppressing dissent in the vast Mainland but also shows an incremental, creeping infiltration of authoritarianism into the Hong Kong society.

There are three peculiar features that marked disturbingly the handover of Hong Kong to the PRC. First, the decolonisation process – the reversion negotiation – was conducted without the participation of the colonial subjects themselves, the Hong Kong people, but solely between the British and the PRC. Secondly, unlike the usual public mood that accompanied almost all decolonised territories’ return to the motherland which was marked invariably by joy and pride, the Hong Kong public and intellectuals’ feeling when the reversion was imminent and during the reversion had been one of unwillingness, sadness and trepidation. Thirdly, and probably most disturbingly, the Handover represents transferring the fate of a society that for 156 years had been enjoying the respect for human rights, freedom of thought and
expression and independent judiciary, as subjects first of a crown colony and later a dependent territory (from 1981) of a liberal democratic colonial master into the hands of regime, arguably a new colonial master, which is a self-justifying one-party dictatorship that has been maintaining and continues to maintain its grip on absolute power through enforcing public amnesia, brainwashing the young, and brutal treatment of dissidents. It has been particularly ironic that this is a territory that has provided a safe haven for refugees from the PRC after 1949, escaping the economic policy disaster and brutal political excesses of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)\textsuperscript{3}, who had by 1960 swelled the Hong Kong population to four times the population at the end of the World War II, where, as the Brookings Institution’s senior fellow Richard Bush, the co-director of the institution’s Center for East Asia Policy Studies (CEAP), wrote in his recent book:

\begin{quote}
... [the British colonial government] provided public health and education (free primary education became available for all by 1970). It moved refugees from unsafe and unhealthy shanty towns into basic, low-rent public housing [...] built transportation infrastructure, both to get workers to their jobs and the goods they produced onto the ships headed for global markets. The Hong Kong Police fostered a relatively safe social environment and the courts protected property rights. This social management was accomplished by a competent civil service through which talented Chinese officials rose to higher and higher positions of responsibility ...

\text靠着 Bush, 2016\textsuperscript{4}
\end{quote}

At last safely settled in this British colony, and gradually being able to both physically and psychologically distance themselves from the danger, hunger and persecution in the Mainland where they had risked their lives to escape from, and

\textit{CCPS Vol. 3 No. 2 (July/August 2017)}
… [w]ith the border with China closed, the colony’s Chinese population became far less transient than it had been before the war. Hong Kong became truly their home. The refugees and their children came to acquire a separate Hong Kong identity that complemented their sense of being Chinese […] As for the “New China” whose policies had driven them from their native places, Hong Kong’s refugee population was happy to have nothing to do with it.

(ibid.)

One can of course argue that the post-Mao China has changed so much, and that the economic success brought about by ditching Maoist central command economy for rugged capitalist market economy has legitimised the CCP’s continued monopoly of political power, but how would one explain the reaction of the Hong Kong people, especially the major part of the intelligentsia and the younger generation – that fear for and that distaste towards the CCP regime? How would one explain their reaction towards the death of persecuted dissidents, be they Li Wangyang (李旺陽), Cao Shunli (曹順利) or Liu Xiaobo (劉曉波), and towards Beijing’s creeping authoritarian intervention in Hong Kong’s governance, be it introduction of brainwashing school curriculum extolling the CCP, time-and-again interpretation of the Basic Law, or kidnapping of Hong Kong booksellers and publishers? How would one explain the eruption of 2014’s Occupy Campaign a.k.a. Umbrella Movement?

It is to answer such questions and to delve analytically into the complex State-civil societal relations twenty years after the Handover, background of determining factors, theoretical and ideological underpinnings, as well as possible future of the Hong Kong people’s valiant struggle for democracy against the backdrop of the formidable
odds as evidenced by the State’s handling of the Umbrella Movement and recent treatment of elected dissident legislators, that the present special focus issue of *Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal* has put together a collection of specially selected articles under the issue title *Hong Kong twenty years after the Handover: Quo vadis?* – with the query in the subtitle on the future path of Hong Kong reflecting the existential anxiety of the freedom-loving Hong Kong people now being forced to live under the ominous shadow of an entrenched regime that has no foreseeable intention of allowing for a transition from the present repressive one-party dictatorship to liberal democracy that would respect political freedom and civil liberties, or of relaxing its intolerance for dissent.

The obstacles are daunting for the cold reality that the “many freedoms and rule of law Hong Kong people enjoyed were less appealing to a regime that preferred a population obedient to its strictures and a legal system more pliable at the service of Communist Party power” (Dirlik, 2016: 667). Further confrontation between State and civil society will be inevitable, as Joseph Yu-shek Cheng foresees in his introduction to the present issue, “The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region: 1997-2017”, since Beijing apparently has no plan to grant Hong Kong genuine democracy. Pointing out the three variables that probably have the most important impact on Hong Kong’s political and social stability, viz. performance of Hong Kong’s economy, Beijing’s policy towards the Special Administrative Region and the development of the pro-democracy movement in the territory, Cheng’s prognosis in this introductory article is gloomy. Economy-wise, as people in Mainland China are expecting further improvements in living standards in the years ahead, as Cheng points out, most Hong Kongers believe that their living standards have deteriorated since 1997 while the
gap between the rich and poor further widens, and are pessimistic about their improvements in the foreseeable future. This happens as the heavy meddling by Beijing in Hong Kong’s governance and elections including through the United Front work in Hong Kong and other shadowy actions further weakened the legitimacy and effectiveness of the HKSAR government, while on the other hand, as Cheng highlights, widespread frustration among the pro-democracy groups is evident after the Occupy Campaign failed to achieve its aims and as Mainland China’s economy further strengthens the “lofty” ideals of freedom and human rights had become even less attractive to voters than before.

Ultimately, the basic argument between the genuine liberal democracy proponents and apologists for the Beijing central government who advocate CCP’s take on “human rights” and “democracy” with a Marxist-Leninist “democratic centralist” redefinition further layered with “market socialism with Chinese characteristics” is how one sees and interpret the Hong Kong’s situation of human rights and autonomy two decades after Handover. Chong Yiu Kwong in his article, “Human Rights Development in the First 20 Years of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region”, points out three main challenges facing the human rights development in the territory: that despite a high degree of autonomy promised under the Basic Law, the degree of Hong Kong’s autonomy has been steadily reduced since the Handover, and tightening of control by Beijing has resulted in more confrontation and less trust between the Hong Kong people and the central government; that the gap between the poor and the rich is getting wider and social mobility has declined thus leading to heightening social discontent, increasing socioeconomic and political exclusion and polarisation and escalating hostility, violence and hatred (witness the rather atypical violence of the “Fishball Revolution / 魚蛋革命” – the Mong Kok street disturbance in early February 2016); and finally, the weakened checks and balances in
the political system with more emphasis on executive-led governance. Such gloomy outlook notwithstanding, Chong retains a note of optimism that Hong Kong’s strong tradition and culture of the rule of law, her active civil society and vigorous media, her status as an international city with strong overseas connections and her people’s heightened rights awareness and political participation through several large, momentous movements in 1989, 2003 and 2014 would ultimately act as the cornerstone of human rights protection.

Nevertheless, it is within the overall depressing atmosphere of discontent, frustration and helplessness as pointed out by Chong that the rise of the more radical Hong Kong “localist” advocacy could be understood, where eventually a stage is reached when suddenly a big gap is opening up between what people want to achieve and what they actually get in life – an unhinged “want:get ratio” that leads to a “revolution of rising frustrations” (Lerner, 1958, 1964: vii) with expectations having outraced actual attainments – witness the failure of the Occupy Campaign in acquiring at least certain level of compromise solution from the central government in Beijing, and the HKSAR government at only Beijing’s bidding.

Yiu-chung Wong in his paper, “Localism in Hong Kong: Its Origins, Development and Prospect”, traces the root cause of such frustration to the shift of the CCP central regime from non-interventionism towards Hong Kong as promised in its “fifty years unchanged” pledge under “One Country, Two Systems” to today’s pervasive integration where the Basic Law is arbitrarily interpreted to suit political expediency in its “Leninist absorption of Hong Kong into Chinese authoritarianism” that has directly triggered the rise of “localism” in the younger generation. While seeing the localist-spurred “Hong Kong independence” as unrealistic and Sisyphean, Yiu-chung Wong nevertheless foresees that
Figure 1 Revolution of Rising Frustrations

![Graph showing the evolution of social injustice over time](image)

An intolerable gap between tolerance threshold of and actual social injustice

Actual social injustice

Tolerable gap between tolerance threshold of and actual social injustice

Tolerance threshold of social injustice

Fundamental change becomes inevitable at this time

Source: Based on Davies’s J-Curve Theory of Revolution. See Vander Zanden (1988: 584), Figure 21.2 (adapted from Davies, 1962: 6, Figure 1).

despite the CCP regime’s wish to reshape Hong Kong into a pliant economic city subservient to its political control, with liberal values already deeply embedded in the structure of the Hong Kong society, Hong Kong will always be “different from China’s other cities in terms of civic sense, openness of mindset, degrees of social and economic freedom, and vibrancy of the civil society”.

The rise of radical localism thus stems from the frustration felt by Hong Kong’s younger generation over the failure of the Umbrella
Movement, and as a strong reaction to Mainland China’s interference in Hong Kong affairs and the Hong Kong government’s compliance to such an interference, leading to further polarisation of the Hong Kong society and fractionalisation among the pro-democracy forces, exemplified for example by the rising radical localist perspective of denying Hong Kong people’s “Chinese” identity and of the overriding focus on distancing Hong Kong from China and escaping Beijing’s political control, which has led to even the questioning of the nature of Hong Kong’s annual commemoration of the 1989 Beijing massacre (Chan, 2016).

As Yiu-chung Wong comments in his article, amidst the struggles for the realization of genuine free and fair electoral democracy in Hong Kong, “the politics of democratization unavoidably become tainted with a touch of the politics of identities.” Whether it be the rise of radical localism vs the pan-Chinese approach of the “Tiananmen generation” of pro-democracy activists or the political orientation of Mainland Chinese immigrants vis-à-vis that of native Hong Kongers, the problem at hand ultimately boils down to the issue of identity. Immigrants from Mainland China post-Handover, for example, have been found to be by self-selection, “politically more conservative, more content with the status quo, and less supportive of progressive political change (i.e. fast democratization) than the native population in Hong Kong” – being reliable supporters of the pro-Beijing coalition in the elections in Hong Kong, thus representing a barrier to democratisation in Hong Kong (Wong, Ma and Lam, 2016)6. In this regard, Fu-Lai Tony Yu and Diana S. Kwan’s article in this issue, “Social Construction of National Reality: Chinese Consciousness versus Hong Kong Consciousness”, analyses the growing confrontation between traditional Chinese consciousness and emerging Hong Kong consciousness that is undermining the peaceful coexistence among Hong Kongers and Mainlanders, having in the late 2000s and early 2010s led to a surge in anti-Mainlander sentiment in

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6 CCPS Vol. 3 No. 2 (July/August 2017)
Hong Kong and a call for Hong Kong’s self-determination that have resulted in a series of political upheavals.

Probably most vividly putting such anti-PRC sentiment on public display was, as Yu and Kwan describe, the supporters of the Hong Kong soccer team jeering when the Chinese national anthem was playing in the matches between Hong Kong and Bhutan and between Hong Kong and the Maldives. In early October 2015 the Hong Kong Football Association (HKFA) was fined HK$40,000 (US$5,160) by the sport’s governing body, Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) because of Hong Kong fans’ booing the Chinese national anthem, March of the Volunteers (義勇軍進行曲), played at the beginning of a World Cup qualifying match with Qatar a month earlier, and fined again, this time for twice the amount, in early January 2016 because some football fans repeated the booing when the Chinese national anthem was played at the start of a crucial Hong Kong versus China World Cup qualifier in November 2015 while other fans turned their backs or held up hand-written notices with the word “boo” on them, with some fans chanting in English “We are Hong Kong” during the match (Bridges, 2016). While sport has long been a means by the State to promote nationalism and rally support for the ruling regime or for the government to advance its “patriotic” agenda, the booing at the matches has plainly put on display the distaste towards the Beijing overlord and rejection of PRC’s claimed sovereignty over Hong Kong, particularly in the aftermath of the Umbrella Movement of 2014 (ibid.).

To explain such sentiments, Yu and Kwan also interestingly point out that as the younger generation of Hong Kong built up their local consciousness from their everyday life experiences, they identified themselves as “we” (with a distinctly Hong Kong, non-Mainland, identity) and Mainland Chinese as “they”, strongly believing that mainlandization eroded the core values of Hong Kong, including
freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and the rule of law. As citizens of a truly international city, these “localists” have proudly embraced and shared common global values. As Yu and Kwan note, the civil movement of 2014 has brought forth a “new Lion Rock Spirit” (「新獅子山精神」) under whose banner the “localists” would continue to valiantly fight for democracy, liberty and human rights in Hong Kong against what they perceive as the creeping, encroaching authoritarianism of the CCP dictatorship of the PRC. Such phenomenon of the othering of the Mainland is observed not only in Hong Kong as well as Taiwan, as a comparison between the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong and the Sunflower Movement in Taiwan may show, in terms of national identity patterns and formation, but also how the rise of civic nationalism is furthering the nation-building project in these two polities which have led to increasingly widening identity gap between them and Mainland China (Kwan, 2016).

Within the Hong Kong society, such worsening State-societal relations is also calling for attention if one looks at the glaringly changing Catholic Church-State relations since the Handover, which is the focus of Beatrice K.F. Leung’s article, “Catholic Church-State Relations in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region: A Review of 20 Years”. Whereas during Hong Kong’s colonial era both the Catholic and Protestant churches had assisted the British to provide educational, medical and social services to the influx of Chinese refugees to Hong Kong after the Chinese Communists’ conquest of Mainland China and during its subsequent radical leftist policy disasters, and warm Church-State relations was maintained and reflected in the “contractor relationship” for long years with the Church providing educational, medical and social services according to the colonial government’s plan and policy apart from preventing the infiltration of Communism into Hong Kong from the 1970s until 1997, Leung
observes that the harmonious Church-State relations between the Catholic Church and Hong Kong government had turned to distrust, mutual distancing and even conflict since Hong Kong was returned to Chinese rule on 1st July 1997. Tracing the long history of ups and downs of the Hong Kong Catholics’ socio-political participation, Leung provides a critical analysis of the crucial factors of timing, changes in leadership, and political environment not only in Hong Kong but also in Beijing, as well as the Vatican, in influencing the evolving role of the Catholic Church in Hong Kong society and in particular in the Hong Kong people’s continued struggle for democracy, political freedom and civil liberties since the city’s reversion to the rule of the one-party dictatorship of the PRC.

If religion represents both “a cultural force and a badge of ethnic identity” (Curran, 1979: 148) – one of the different markers of ethnic distinction (often more loosely termed “ethnic markers”) of racial (phenotypical), linguistic and religious characteristics⁸, as one of the most important contributors to cultural distinctions, education can be seen as pseudoethnicity – “a subcase of the same processes that also produce ethnicity” (Collins 1975: 86), as Randall Collins remarked:

Schools everywhere are established originally to pass on a particular form of religion or elite class culture, and are expanded in the interests of political indoctrination or ethnic hegemony. In these situations, education is nothing more than ethnic or class culture, although it can be taught to those who are not born into it.

(Collins: 87)

That can explain the contents of the Moral and National Education (MNE, 德育及國民教育) school curriculum proposed by the Education Bureau of Hong Kong in early 2010s (changing from the existing moral and civic education (MCE, 德育及公民教育)) that

Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal 3(2) ♦ 2017
evoked huge protests from parents and activists in Hong Kong who accused it as being a shameless brainwashing curriculum, especially in its applauding the one-party rule of the CCP which the curriculum’s “China Model National Conditions Teaching Manual” (《中國模式國情專題教學手冊》) labels as an “advanced, selfless and united ruling group” (進步、無私與團結的執政集團)⁹. Moreover, as a later article here by Tim Nicholas Rühlig describes, citing Chan (2014), in order to enhance Hong Kong students’ patriotic feelings towards the PRC, the curriculum also prescribed them to show emotions and cry when the Five-star Red Flag (五星紅旗, national flag of the PRC) is raised and also to extol the Communist and nationalistic ideology. After all, the “society of Hong Kong was so politicized that education was also politicized as well”, as Steven Chung Fun Hung comments in his article, “Contextual Analysis of Hong Kong Education Policy in 20 Years: The Intention of Making Future Citizens in Political Conflicts”, with patriotism and nationalism rising to prominence in making political contents in schooling.

Admittedly, the fundamental goal of education in any society is “to socialize students in prevailing regime values and to prepare for the manpower needs of the economy”, but as Hung brings to our attention, Hong Kong’s transition of sovereignty has “created a series of symbolic acts which targeted the shift away from a focus on the depoliticized and decontextualized education.” Formal and informal education recently adopted by the HKSAR government apparently in the aftermath of the Umbrella Movement, Hung notes, basically aims to depoliticise students and instil in them the spirit of Chinese nationalism in order to minimize the youth’s potential challenge to its political legitimacy and to maintain its cultural hegemony. It is understandable that the present HKSAR government would find it imperative to do that, given the tremendous impact of the Umbrella Movement of 2014 has on the socio-political
development among Hong Kong people in the succeeding years, whether through prefigurative practices having set seeds of possibility for future political processes (a new way of “doing” politics), and the emergence of “occupation as prefiguration” as a political form in Hong Kong (Lin and Liu, 2016), or the emergence of online media as an important platform for political struggles in Hong Kong and citizen mobile phone camera-witness as a mode of civic camera-mediated mass self-testimony to brutality and as a medium to indict unjust events and engage others in the civic movement (Lo, 2016).

However, this has most notably led to the birth of a new social and political consciousness amongst Hong Kong students that carries a more distinctive anti-establishment profile in favour of more assertive means, exhibiting deep distrust of the HKSAR government and the Beijing Central government, as well as rising radical localism (Chan, 2016). To provide further understanding of this background of events in 2014, Tim Nicholas Rühlig in his article “Expressing my attitude and doing something impossible to make it happen ...’ – Listening to the Voices of Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement Protesters” brings us back to the streets of Hong Kong during those tumultuous months in the autumn of 2014 to listen to the voices of the protestors themselves “in all their diversity” in order to grasp his central argument that the Umbrella Movement’s call for democracy is actually part of a broader agenda for more self-determination, comprising besides democratisation also the “socio-economic, identity-political and institutional” dimensions.

Meanwhile, the failure of the Umbrella Movement to achieve its objective of securing the government’s acceptance of or compromise on its “genuine democracy” demands means that Beijing’s efforts in reshaping the territory into a politically pliant, subservient economic city will go on, and so will political indoctrination of the young through education as pseudoethnicity (Collins, 1975: 86). The first attempt at
MNE might have been thwarted, but with the failure of the Umbrella Movement and with the pro-democracy camp now in disarray, especially after six of its legislators were disqualified after Beijing’s latest interpretation of the Basic Law, CCP’s regime legitimation by way of indoctrination of Hong Kong’s younger generation is set to be further strengthened through extolling the superiority of the “China Model” upheld under the rule of the “advanced, selfless and united ruling group” in stark contrast to Western multi-party electoral democracy which the MNE manual describes as rife with inter-party rivalry that causes suffering to the people. The relentless promotion of such a superior “Chinese-style democracy” is what Benson Wai-Kwok Wong in his article, “Chinese-style Democracy as a Political Project for Meaning-Construction: Old Wine in a New Bottle?”, describes as a meaning-construction project surrounding themes of negative Western democracy versus positive Chinese-style democracy in terms of efficiency and economic performance, Western democracy as symbol of political failure involving street politics and social chaos, and perverting the language of Western democracy to construct Chinese-style democracy, such as “rule of law” and “human rights”. Employing discourse analysis, Benson Wong set out to “explore and interpret the premises, features and possible impacts brought by state apparatus in creating and producing knowledge for political purposes, including the foundation of legitimacy, the maintenance of hegemony, and normalization and internalization of false consciousness” through a process of “distorting, confusing and misleading the audience” in a project of meaning reconstruction.

Joseph Stalin once said, “The most important weapon in my arsenal is the dictionary. Let me choose the words … by which you think and I will tell you what and how to think.” As Raymond Sleeper pointed out in 1987 referring to the Soviet Union and the “nomenklatura conspiracy”, we can discern the same deception, which Benson Wong
directs our attention to, that is being employed today by the CCP regime to maximise the maintenance of the capture-bonding of its citizens, being a continuation of the use of Marxist-Leninist concepts developed in Soviet/Maoist times that represent subversions of well-accepted Western liberal democratic ideas, mainly through the use of double-meaning language that serves to justify CCP’s authoritarianism, e.g., admitting that human rights, freedom and democracy are universal values but giving them a different meaning in the “unique” Chinese context – in short, so-and-sos “with Chinese characteristics”, inevitably because of “different national contexts” (guoqing butong / 国情不同). Sleeper referred to then head of the US negotiating team in Geneva on nuclear weapons Ambassador Max Kampelman’s 4th January 1985 address to the Standing Committee on Law and National Security of the American Bar Association where he made a significant point on the USSR leaders’ facility in using language differently:

They have the ability to use language […] in a way which is designed to confuse people like ourselves and undermine our will. This they do professionally and effectively. They take a noble word like democracy and adopt it as their own – as you know, they frequently call their systems ‘people’s democracies.’ This is a total corruption of the term […] The Communists are able to use these differences [in meaning of words] to promote their own appeal, which […] is essentially a humanitarian appeal […] in their propaganda they identify themselves and ally themselves with efforts to achieve humanitarian goals such as ‘freedom’ or ‘justice.’

(Quoted in Sleeper, 1987: 203)

In other words, the “different use” of words Kampelman referred to is basically “an instrument of subversion, of disinformation – an instrument of deception” (ibid.). These concepts that are in fact
subversions of well-accepted Western liberal ideas born out of hundreds of years of the struggle of civil society against autocratic monarchy and over the Painean revolutions French and American, and based on fundamental ideas first developed during the Renaissance, used in Marxist totalitarian states or post-Marxist authoritarian states today as “active measures”, i.e. acts of “disinformation” and “deception” intentionally rooted in double-meaning language or “doublespeak”, is closely related to George Orwell’s concept of “doublethink” in his dystopian novel Nineteen eighty-four, one of the book’s twin central conceptual inventions (together with “Newspeak”). The use of such “different meaning” tactic has its roots at the time when Lenin was planning to overthrow the Tsarist government at the turn of last century, as Professor Raymond Sleeper plainly lays out:

When Lenin began to organize his revolutionary conspiracy, he found that the main ideas of communism were already or could be expressed in terms of Western ideas so cleverly that the average citizen of the West [as well as that of the Russian empire, later USSR] would not see the trick – the inherent deception of communist ideas. To the contrary, the average citizen understood genuine democracy and economic freedom to mean what they had always meant, the right to vote, the right to own property, the right to travel, the right to work where he pleased – in short, freedom.

(Sleeper, 1987: 191)

Maintaining its Marxist-Maoist tradition, today’s CCP is redefining concepts like democracy and human rights under the warped framework of “(market) socialism with Chinese characteristics”. In this process the Party is following this early Leninist subversion of Western liberal ideas in the wide use of double-meaning concepts – one meaning being the accepted Western liberal concept (the “universal values” to which
today’s CCP is paying lip service though under Document Number 9’s “7 speak-nots” (qi bujiang / 七不講) the term has in recent years been banned from the classrooms) and “the other meaning being the opposite or subverted meaning that was the true Marxist-Leninist meaning [which] also served the very useful purpose of not immediately alarming the established government, which Lenin had to deceive, confuse, and destroy in order to capture political power in Russia” (ibid.). No longer talking much about Communism, Marxism or even Maoism, the CCP regime of “People’s” Republic of China has remained the faithful follower of this power of double meaning – redefining such terms like “human rights”, “democracy” and “freedom” in its own way, and justifying such deception by referring to “China’s different context, different condition” (guoqing butong). After all, as Adolf Hitler once said, “The great masses of people … will more easily fall victims to a big lie than to a small one.”

As this special focus issue of CCPS begins, after this foreword and the introduction, with an article on human rights development in Hong Kong since the Handover from a legal professional dealing with human rights cases, it would be appropriate to have here another article on human rights in Hong Kong from the legal perspective – Matthew Chuen Ngai Tang’s “Enforcing the Right to Family Life in Hong Kong Courts: The Case of Dependant Policy” – before we move on to two thinkpieces that will bring this issue to a close. Tang’s paper thus completes this collection of articles that comprehensively explore and analyse in depth a whole range of critical issues facing Hong Kong – from human rights to ethno-national identity, from Church-State relations to education policy, and from socio-political evolvement in the civil society to State’s political project for meaning-construction.

Finally, this special focus issue closes with two thinkpieces – an extended review article by Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh on Richard C. Bush’s

Before ending this foreword, we would like to thank all the contributing authors of the articles in this issue and the anonymous reviewers of these articles for their invaluable efforts in making the publication of this July/August 2017 *CCPS* focus issue of *Hong Kong twenty years after the Handover: Quo vadis?* possible. We are deeply grateful to Joseph Yu-shek Cheng and Brian Bridges for their great support in the organizing of this volume; without their help the publication of this worthy issue on the twentieth anniversary of the Hong Kong Handover would not have been possible. We are also grateful to our proof-readers, Mr Goh Chun Wei ( 吳俊偉 ), Miss Janice Quan Nian En ( 官念恩 ) and Miss Amy Kwan Dict Weng ( 官狄雯 ) at University of Malaya, for their crucial assistance in checking the final galley proofs and CRCs, and to Miss Wu Chien-yi ( 吳千宜 ) for the journal’s website construction and maintenance. The responsibility for any errors and inadequacies that remain is of course fully mine.

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*CCPS Vol. 3 No. 2 (July/August 2017)*
Notes

1. The transliteration being from the older names 望角，芒角。
2. People’s Republic of China (中華人民共和國) consists of 31 provincial-level administrative units including sheng (省, i.e. provinces of Anhui /安徽, Fujian /福建, Gansu /甘肃, Guangdong /广东, Guizhou /贵州, Hainan /海南, Hebei /河北, Heilongjiang /黑龙江, Henan /河南, Hubei /湖北, Hunan /湖南, Jiangsu /江苏, Jiangxi /江西, Jilin /吉林, Liaoning /遼寧, Qinghai /青海, Shaanxi /陕西, Shandong /山东, Shanxi /山西, Sichuan /四川, Yunnan /云南 and Zhejiang /浙江), zizhiqu (自治區, i.e. “autonomous regions” – each a first-level administrative subdivision having its own local government, and a minority entity that has a higher population of a particular minority ethnic group – of Guangxi /广西 of the Zhuang /壯 /僮 people, Nei Monggol/Inner Mongolia /內蒙古 of the Mongols, Ningxia /寧夏 of the Hui /回 Muslims, Xizang/Tibet /西藏 of the Tibetans and Xinjiang /新疆 of the Uyghurs) and zhixiashi (直辖市, i.e. municipalities directly ruled by the central government – Beijing /北京, Chongqing /重庆, Shanghai /上海 and Tianjin /天津). After their respective Handover in 1997 and 1999 (or huigui /回歸 from the perspective of the PRC, i.e. “return” [to the motherland]), the British colony of Hong Kong and the Portuguese colony of Macau officially became the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (香港特別行政區) and Macao Special Administrative Region (Região Administrativa Especial de Macau /澳門特別行政區) of the People’s Republic of China respectively in 1997 and 1999. The now vibrantly free and democratic island state of Taiwan – officially still “Province of Taiwan, Republic of China” (中華民國臺灣省) – remains a sovereign country of her own, since the conclusion in 1949 of the Chinese Civil War, outside the control of Mainland China’s ruthlessly authoritarian Chinese Communist Party regime.
3. Or officially the “Communist Party of China” (CPC, 中國共產黨).

Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal 3(2) ♦ 2017

5. Chapter 1: “The Hong Kong hybrid” – § Becoming Hong Kong.

6. Wong, Ma and Lam’s empirical study was based on findings from the Asian Barometer survey data.

7. See, e.g., Orochi Ben Lam (Lam Siu Pan / 林兆彬) (2014). 雨傘運動下的「新獅子山精神」[the “new Lion Rock Spirit” under the Umbrella Movement]. *Hong Kong In-media* (香港獨立媒體), 23 October 2014 <http://www.inmediahk.net/node/1027668>. (Lam Siu Pan was the former vice-secretary general of the Hong Kong Federation of Students / 香港專上學生聯會.)

8. The emphasis on language and religion in empirical research of ethnic studies is due mainly to the fact that they are the relatively less vague factors in the fourfold categorization of ascriptive loyalty (Hoetink, 1975: 23-4) – ascriptive criteria of territoriality (ancestral homeland), notions of common descent (“race”), language and religion, the presence of only one of the four is necessary to create an “ethnic group” (*ibid.*: 24).

9. In contrast to democracy in the United States that the manual describes as a fierce inter-party rivalry that causes suffering to the people (政黨惡鬥，人民當災).


    “「宣誓態度不莊重」 香港立法會 4 議員遭撤銷資格” (by 林思怡), 上報 (*UP Media*) (Taiwan), 15th July 2017 <http://www.upmedia.ng/new s_info.php?SerialNo=20880>.


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CCPS Vol. 3 No. 2 (July/August 2017)


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